










The handle  http://hdl.handle.net/1887/38275  holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation 
 
Author: Vonno, Cynthia M.C. van 
Title: Achieving party unity : a sequential approach to why MPs act in concert 
Issue Date: 2016-03-02 
Achieving Party Unity
A Sequen al Approach to Why MPs Act in Concert
Cover
Paulien Varkevisser | Fotografie & vormgeving, Nijmwegen
www.paulienvarkevisser.com
The illustra on is inspired by the cover ofAmerican Legisla ve Behavior: A Reader (1968),
edited by Samuel C. Pa erson and published by D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Typese ng
Typeset using the LYX and LATEX Documenta on System.
Print
Wöhrmann Print Service
©2016CynthiaMaria Cornelia vanVonno. All rights reserved. No part of this publica on
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmi ed, in any for or by any
means, electronic, mechanic, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the the
prior permission in wri ng from the proprietor.
© 2016 Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno. Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze
uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautoma seerd gegevensbe-
stand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mech-
anisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen, of op enige andere manier, zonder voorafgaande
schri elijke toestemming van de rechthebbende.
Achieving Party Unity
A Sequen al Approach to Why MPs Act in Concert
Proefschri
ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnifucus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promo es
te verdedigen op woensdag 2 maart 2016
klokke 16:15 uur
door
Cynthia Maria Cornelia van Vonno




Prof.dr. I.C. van Biezen, Universiteit Leiden
Prof.dr. K. Deschouwer, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Prof.dr. R.Y. Hazan, The Hebrew School of Jerusalem
Prof.dr. J.J.M. van Holsteyn, Universiteit Leiden
Prof.dr. R.A. Koole, Universiteit Leiden
Prof.dr. J.J.A. Thomassen, Universiteit Twente
Contents
List of Figures v
List of Tables vii
1 Introduc on 1
1.1 Research ques on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Plan of the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Representa on in parliament by individual or by poli cal party: shi ing em-
phasis 9
2.1 Representa on in theory and in prac ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 The individual as main representa ve actor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Parliamentarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 The mandate-independence controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 The poli cal party takes over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Party democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 The responsible party model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 The return to the individual? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.1 Audience democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.2 Personaliza on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Unpacking the unitary actor 27
3.1 Party group unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.1 Conceptualiza on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1.2 Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Explaining party group unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.1 Ins tu ons and party group unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.2 Pathways to party group unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.3 Decision-making models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 The sequen al decision-making model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.1 MPs’ decision-making process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
i
Contents
3.3.2 The sequen al logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.3 Simplifica on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4 The influence of ins tu ons: MPs’ decision-making mechanisms in 15 na onal
parliaments 51
4.1 The influence of ins tu ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Expecta ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in 15 na onal parliaments 59
4.3.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.5 The sequen al decision-making process . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5 Different pathways for different levels: representa ves’ decision-makingmech-
anisms at the na onal and subna onal level 91
5.1 Different pathways for different levels of government . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Expecta ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.2.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in na onal and regional
parliaments in nine European democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3.5 The sequen al decision-making process . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4 Analysis of the decision-makingmechanisms in the Dutch Second Cham-
ber, provincial councils and municipal councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.4.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.4.5 The sequen al decision-making process . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
ii
Contents
6 Changes over me: party group unity and MPs’ decision-making mechanisms
in the Dutch na onal parliament over me 151
6.1 The one- or two-arena model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2 The Dutch case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.2.1 The electoral arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.2.2 The legisla ve arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.3 Party group unity over me . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.3.1 Party group defec on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.3.2 Party group vo ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.4 Expecta ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.4.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.4.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.5 Analysis of the decision-makingmechanisms in the Dutch Second Chamber185
6.5.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.5.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.5.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.5.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7 The sequen al approach evaluated 207
7.1 The decision-making mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7.1.1 Division of labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.1.2 Party agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
7.1.3 Party loyalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.1.4 Party discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
7.2 Sugges ons for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221








1.1 The study of party group unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 The style and focus of representa ves’ roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 The connec on between cons tuencies’ a tudes and a representa ve’s
roll call behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Representa onal role emphasis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 MPs’ sequen al decision-making process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on on a vote in parliament) and the absolute distance MPs’ perceive
between their own posi on and the posi on of their party on an 11-
point ideological Le -Right scale in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . 70
4.2 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and the importance
ascribed to promo ng the views and interests of the party in 15 na onal




4.1 Par Rep MP Survey response rates for 15 na onal parliaments . . . . . 61
4.2 Average party group unity in 15 na onal parliaments (Rice score) . . . . 62
4.3 Specialist or generalist in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s po-
si on on his topic’ in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.5 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on on a vote in parliament) in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . . . 68
4.6 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on on a vote in parliament) in 15 na onal parliaments: mul level bi-
nary logis cs regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.7 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in 15 na onal parlia-
ments (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.8 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in 15 na onal parlia-
ments: mul level binary logis cs regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.9 Sa sfac on with general parliamentary party discipline in 15 na onal
parliaments (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.10 Sa sfac onwith parliamentary party disciplinewhen it comes to s cking
to the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . 80
4.11 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking
poli cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on in
15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.12 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keep-
ing internal party discussions confiden al in 15 na onal parliaments (%) 82
4.13 ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in 15
na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.14 Sa sfac onwith parliamentary party disciplinewhen it comes to s cking
to the parliamentary party group line in votes in 15 na onal parliaments:
mul level binary logis cs regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.15 The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party dis-
cipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes
in 15 na onal parliaments (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
vii
List of Tables
5.1 2010 Par Rep MP survey response rates for na onal and regional par-
liaments in nine European democracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Specialist or generalist in na onal and regional parliaments in nine Eu-
ropean democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s po-
si on on his topic’ in na onal and regional parliaments in nine European
democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on on a vote in parliament) in na onal and regional parliaments in nine
European democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in na onal and re-
gional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.6 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and compe ng prin-
cipals (voters’ opinion versus party’s posi on) in na onal and regional
parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.7 Sa sfac on with general parliamentary party discipline in na onal and
regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . 111
5.8 Sa sfac onwith parliamentary party disciplinewhen it comes to s cking
to the parliamentary party line in votes in na onal and regional parlia-
ments in nine European democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.9 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking
poli cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on in
na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . 113
5.10 Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keep-
ing internal party discussions confiden al in na onal and regional par-
liaments in nine European democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.11 ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in
na onal and regional parliaments in nine European democracies (%) . . 115
5.12 The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party
discipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in
votes in parliament in na onal and regional parliaments in nine Euro-
pean democracies (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.13 Par RepMPSurvey response rates for theDutch SecondChamber, provin-
cial councils and municipal councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.14 Specialist or generalist in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils
and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.15 ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s po-
si on on his topic’ in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and
municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.16 Themain decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the
Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . 127
5.17 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on on a vote in parliament) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial
councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
viii
List of Tables
5.18 Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on on a vote in parliament) and ‘I feel involved in the decisionmaking in
the party group’ in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and
municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.19 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in the Dutch Second
Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . 132
5.20 Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and compe ng princi-
pals (voters’ opinion versus party’s posi on) in the Dutch Second Cham-
ber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.21 ‘There is a strong feeling of unity in the party group’ in the Dutch Second
Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . 136
5.22 ‘An individual representa ve’s freedom or party unity’ in the Dutch Sec-
ond Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . 136
5.23 Situa ons in which an MP who disagrees with the party’s posi on on a
vote in parliament s ll ought to vote according to the party’s posi on in
the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils
(% who answer affirma vely) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.24 Sa sfac on with general & specific aspects of parliamentary party dis-
cipline in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal
councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.25 ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to themedia’ in the
Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . 141
5.26 The likelihood of immediate nega ve sanc ons when a representa ve
repeatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Cham-
ber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.27 The likelihood of delayed nega ve sanc ons when a representa ve re-
peatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Chamber,
provincial councils and municipal councils (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.28 The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party dis-
cipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes
in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils andmunicipal councils
(%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.1 Average electoral vola lity and second order personal votes in the Sec-
ond Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.2 MPs who entered the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on the
basis of preference votes who otherwise would have not have done so
on the basis of their list posi on and the number of votes obtained by
their poli cal party 1946-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3 Parliamentary party groupdefec ons in the SecondChamber of theDutch
Parliament 1946-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.4 Percentage of votes in which party group unity was not complete in the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010 (%) . . . . . . . . 171
ix
List of Tables
6.5 Percentage of votes in which party group unity was not complete in the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and
VVD averages only (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.6 Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-
ment 1946-2010 (Rice score) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.7 Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-
ment 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (Rice score) . . . . . . . . . 175
6.8 Number of dissen ng MPs in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-
ment 1946-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.9 Use of parliamentary rights in the Second Chamber of theDutchNa onal
Parliament 1956-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.10 Dutch Parliamentary Studies and Par Rep MP Survey response rates for
the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.11 ‘As an MP you usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary
party spokesperson when it comes to bills that you did not deal with
yourself for the party group’ in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parlia-
ment 1972-2006 (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.12 Themain decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1979-2010 (%) . . . . . . . . 189
6.13 Party group ideological homogeneity on the Le -Right scale in the Sec-
ond Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD
only (coefficient of agreement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.14 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the SecondCham-
ber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.15 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the SecondCham-
ber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%) . 194
6.16 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the SecondCham-
ber of the Dutch Parliament: government-opposi on (%) . . . . . . . . 195
6.17 Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the SecondCham-
ber of the Dutch Parliament: party group size (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.18 Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%) . . . . . . . . 198
6.19 Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and
VVD only (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
6.20 Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the
SecondChamber of theDutch Parliament 1972-2010: government-opposi on
(%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
6.21 Sa sfac on with general party discipline in the Second Chamber of the
Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.22 Sa sfac on with specific aspects of party discipline in the Second Cham-
ber of the Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.1 Division of labor: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . . . . . . 211
x
List of Tables
7.2 Party agreement: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . . . . . . 213
7.3 Party loyalty: summary of expecta ons and findings . . . . . . . . . . . 217





1.1 Research ques on
Inmost (European) parliamentary democracies individualMembers of Parliament (MPs)1
are cons tu onally ordained as the main representa ve actors. Yet the poli cal par es
towhichMPs belong are also considered to be actors—in fact key actors—in these parlia-
ments. Both poli cal theory as well as empirical poli cal science have tended to resolve
this tension between the cons tu onal posi on of individual MPs and the role of polit-
ical par es to which MPs belong in favor of la er, thereby privileging the poli cal party
group as the main representa ve actor and object of scien fic inves ga on.
In norma ve poli cal theory themandate-independence controversy (Pitkin, 1967),
which revolves around the dyadic representa ve rela onship between an individual MP
and his cons tuents, was replaced by an almost complete adherence to the responsible
party model introduced by the American Poli cal Science Associa on (APSA) in 1950.
Whereas the former comes close to neglec ng poli cal par es, the la er considers po-
li cal par es to be the main representa ve actors. In fact, E.E. Scha schneider, the
chairman of the APSA Commi ee on Poli cal Par es, contended that “poli cal par es
created democracy and [...] modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the par-
es” (1942, XXVII). One of the requirements of the responsible party model is the pre-
condi on that MPs who belong to the same poli cal party ought to behave in concert
in order to enable the poli cal party to implement its policy program. In other words,
poli cal party groups ought to act as unitary actors (Thomassen, 1994, 252).
From amore ra onalist theore cal perspec ve, poli cal party organiza ons are held
to solve collec ve ac on problems, inherent to the poli cal process, in both the electoral
and legisla ve arena (Cox andMcCubbins, 1993). In the electoral arena, poli cal par es
present voters with a limited number of policy programs which they promise to enact,
1 For the sake of consistency and clarity, individualMembers of Parliament (MPs) are referred to usingmascu-
line pronouns, but readers should be aware that he/him/his/his/himself also refer to she/her/hers/herself.
This also holds for the more general terms ‘legislator’ and ‘representa ve’.
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and the party label therefore func ons as a valuable cue that allows voters to predict
what candidates running under the label will do once elected. In the legisla ve arena,
unified poli cal party groups mean that the par es in the execu ve can count on the
support of their parliamentary counterpart, which enables them to enact into laws the
policies they promised during the campaign. In other words, unified poli cal par es
enable the cons tu onal chain of delega on (Strøm et al., 2003), and without them the
accountability of the execu ve and legislature to voters “falls flat” (Bowler et al., 1999a,
3), or at least is arguably more difficult to realize.
In line with the so-called virtue of unified poli cal par es, there is a tendency to
point to the significance of MPs’ dissent. Indeed, the effect of MPs’ dissent may range
from the rela vely inconsequen al defeat of a government bill, to the destabiliza on
of the party (group) leadership, to the fall of the government (Kam, 2009, 7-11). The
desirability of unified poli cal par es, however, can also be ques oned. The increase
in electoral vola lity and decrease in poli cal party membership (Katz et al., 1992; Mair
and Van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012) found in many European democracies
since the 1970s, cast doubt upon the legi macy of poli cal par es as representa ves of
voters and party members, especially in terms of poli cal par es’ responsiveness and
accountability. If poli cal par es’ programs are not deemed representa ve transla ons
of the electorate’s and party members’ preferences, then the representa veness of po-
li cal par es, and the virtue of their unity, may also be disputed.
One could also take issue with unified poli cal party groups when it comes to the
legislature’s ability to hold the execu ve accountable. In the Netherlands, for example,
the 2003 rapport on the electoral system by minister De Graaf argued that highly disci-
plined, unified parliamentary party groups are problema c for the tradi on of the strong
separa on of powers between the execu ve and legisla ve branch of government. In
the United Kingdom, the 2000 Commi ee on Strengthening Parliament, chaired by Lord
Norton of Louth, also iden fied the development of strong par es as contribu ng to
the imbalance in the rela onship between parliament and government, in that unified
parliamentary party groups limit the ability of parliamentarians to hold government ac-
countable. Thus, one can debate whether unified poli cal par es enable the cons tu-
onal chain of delega on and accountability, or stand in its way.
That in prac ce parliamentary party group unity is the rule rather than the excep-
on in (European) parliamentary democracies, at least in terms of parliamentary vo ng
behavior, has led many scholars to treat party group unity as an assump on, or to take
it as a given, rather than a phenomenon in need of explana on (Bowler et al., 1999a;
Olson, 2003). Indeed, in numerous studies of representa on, parliamentary behavior,
and coali on forma on, the poli cal party group is considered the main unit of analysis
(Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a). Kam (2009, 2) refers to this view of the party group
as a unitary actor as the orthodox view—“MPs’ devia ons from the party line being so
infrequent and inconsequen al that they can safely be ignored”. This perspec ve is not
limited to poli cal scien sts, however. In his theore cal analysis of the causes of party
group unity in Germany, Patzelt (2003, 102) notes that “[b]y and large, legislators’ in-
dividual vo ng behavior seems to be an issue of no real interest in Germany. [...] final
unity of ac on is taken for granted to such a degree that neither the margin or actual
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composi on of a German cabinet’s majority on the floor is treated as a topic worthy of
documenta on or analysis”.
Although parliamentary party group vo ng unity may be quite common, ‘normal’
(Olson, 2003, 165) or even ‘natural’ (Patzelt, 2003, 102) in (European) parliamentary
democracies, this is not say that it is equally high in all party groups, or that party group
vo ng unity is just as common in legislatures and par es in other parts of the world.
There is nowa substan al body of compara ve empirical research that looks at how ins -
tu onal differences explain (cross-na onal) varia ons in party group vo ng unity (Carey,
2009; Depauw, 2003; Depauw and Mar n, 2009; Sieberer, 2006). These studies unde-
niably contribute to our knowledge of party group vo ng unity across systems and our
understanding of how vo ng unity may vary with andwithin ins tu onal configura ons.
Jensen (2000, 210) argues, however, that if one seeks an in-depth understanding of party
group unity and how it is brought about, merely looking at the outcome—parliamentary
vo ng—is not enough. Moreover, studying the direct rela onship between legisla ve,
electoral, and party ins tu ons and vo ng behavior does not allow one to dis nguish
between the different theore cally plausible ways in which party group vo ng unity is
brought about. Widely recognized, for example, is that party unity may result from par-
es, but more specifically party groups, consis ng of MPs who share the same policy
preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bowler et al., 1999a; Kam, 2001a, 2009;
Krehbiel, 1993, 2000). Ra onal-choice perspec ves emphasize that party group unity
may also be the consequence of party (group) leaders ‘whipping’ their MPs (Andeweg
and Thomassen, 2011a; Bowler et al., 1999a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009;
Krehbiel, 1993, 2000; Ozbudun, 1970). Sociological approaches, which emphasize the
internaliza on of norms and role concep ons, add that party group unity may also arise
from MPs’ shared sense of allegiance to the party (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a;
Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009). Finally, Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) as
well as Skjaeveland (2001) andWhitaker (2005), point out that cue-takingmay also serve
as a pathway to party group unity. This entails that MPs take their vo ng cues from their
party group specialist or spokesperson as a result of the division of labor within their
party group.
Compara ve scholars o en make assump ons and theore cal arguments about the
presence of these pathways to party group vo ng unity and how theymay be influenced
by ins tu ons. Ins tu ons are, for example, argued to influence the constella on of
MPs and their policy preferences in parliament, thereby affec ng the homogeneity of
preferences within party groups (Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003; Sieberer, 2006). Those
same ins tu ons are also, however, expected to ins ll in MPs par cular norms of loyalty
to poten ally mul ple actors with compe ng policy preferences (Kam, 2009), and pro-
vide MPs with incen ves to either cooperate or compete with their fellow party group
members (Carey, 2007; Depauw andMar n, 2009; Sieberer, 2006). At the same me, in-
s tu ons are held to equip these compe ng principals, including poli cal party (group)
leaders, with carrots and s cks to elicit coopera on from their MPs (Carey, 2007; De-
pauw, 2003; Sieberer, 2006). Whether these pathways are actually and equally affected
by ins tu onal se ngs has, however, rarely been put to the test, since most studies
that do deal with them consist of single-case studies that focus on one theore cal ap-
3
1.1. Research ques on
Figure 1.1: The study of party group unity
Ins tu ons → Party group unity
↓ ↑
→ Individual MPs’ decision-making mechanisms →
Cue-taking → Agreement → Loyalty → Obedience
proach that highlights one pathway.2 Scholars may thus claim that party groups that
vote in unity are ‘cohesive’, ‘homogeneous’, ‘disciplined’ or ‘loyal’ as a result of these
ins tu ons, but to be frank, we do not actually know which (combina ons of) pathways
are at work, because the rela ve contribu on of each of these pathways to party group
unity is impossible to determine on the basis of vo ng behavior alone, as is the effect of
ins tu ons on these pathways.
Moreover, studies that assume that parliamentary party groups are unified, as well
as those that look at the rela onship between ins tu ons and party group vo ng unity,
tend to pay insufficient a en on to the fact that these groups consist of individuals,
and that party group unity results the decisions made by individuals when cas ng their
votes (Becher and Sieberer, 2008). As pointed out by Laver (1999, 23-24) “[t]he danger
of the unitary actor assump on in this context is that it may encourage us to take a quite
unwarranted anthropomorphic view of how par es decide. [...] Yet a poli cal party
comprises a group of individuals, and each individual not only has his or her own u lity
func on but is clearly capable of autonomous ac on”.3 Studying only the outcome—
party group vo ng unity—, however, does not allow one to gauge howMPs come to vote
in concert;why individual MPs vote with the party group line. These research ques ons
form the star ng point for the studies included in this book.
The theore cal argument put forward in this book is that the different pathways to
party group unity men oned above can be viewed as affec ng MPs’ decision-making
process, and that this decision-making process is likely to consist of a chain of mul ple
steps that are ordered in a par cular sequence (see Figure 1.1). In deciding whether to
toe the party group line, an MP first asks himself whether he has an opinion on the vote
2 See Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) for an excep on of a single-case study, and Kam (2009) for an excep-
on of a compara ve analysis, that deal with more than one pathway.
3 Kiewiet andMcCubbins (1991, 26-27)make a similar argument, in that the unitary actor assump on ignores
the chain of delega on within poli cal par es themselves and the principal-agent rela onship poli cal par-
es engage in with their own MPs, as well as poten al agency related problems poli cal par es may en-
counter: “the very same problems of collec ve ac on that delega on is intended to overcome—prisoners’
dilemma, lack of coordina on, and social choice instability—can re-emerge to afflict either the collec ve
agent or collec ve principal”.
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at hand. Due to the substan al workload of parliament and resultant division of labor
applied within parliamentary party group, an MP may not have an opinion on all topics
that are put to a vote in parliament. If the MP does not have an opinion, he will follow
the vo ng cues given to him by his fellow party groupmember who is a specialist, or acts
as the parliamentary party spokesperson, on the topic. This first decision-making mech-
anism resembles the cue-taking pathway to party group unity forwarded by Andeweg
and Thomassen (2011a), Skjaeveland (2001) and Whitaker (2005).
If the MP does have an opinion on the vote at hand, he moves on to the second
decision-making stage. Now, he ascertains whether his own opinion on the vote is in
agreementwith his party group’s posi on. If so, hewill vote in accordancewith the party
group line out of simple agreement. This decision-making mechanism is based on the
preference homogeneity pathway, which holds that party group unity results from the
fact that an individual is likely to join the poli cal partywith the policy program thatmost
closely reflects his own poli cal preferences, and par es are likely to select candidates
for office whose policy preferences match those of the party (Andeweg and Thomassen,
2011a; Carey, 2007; Depauw, 2003; Krehbiel, 1993; Sieberer, 2006). AnMP’s opinion on
a specific vote can further be (in)formed through the process of delibera on within the
party group.
If the MP does not agree with his party group’s posi on, however, he moves on to
the third decision-making mechanism, party group loyalty. If an MP subscribes to the
norm of party group loyalty, he will disregard his own opinion and opt for the posi on
of his party group of his own accord. This decision-making mechanism reflects the path-
way to party group unity emphasized by sociological perspec ves. AnMP votes with the
party group out of a sense of duty, because he is aware of the expecta ons associated
with his role as a delegate of his poli cal party. He thus follows a ‘logic of appropriate-
ness’ (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Norton,
2003).
If the MP does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, or his conflict with
the party group’s posi on is so intense that his loyalty does not supersede his disagree-
ment, he could be moved to s ll vote with the party group in response to the an ci-
pa on, threat, promise or actual applica on of party discipline in the form of posi ve
and nega ve sanc ons, which is the fourth decision-making stage. This is the pathway to
party group unity specified by ra onal choice inspired approaches thatmaintain that po-
li cal behavior is determined by a ‘logic of consequen ality’ (Andeweg and Thomassen,
2011a; Hazan, 2003; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993; Norton, 2003). Finally, if
theMP has an opinion on the topic that is at odds with the posi on of his party group, he
does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, and is not amenable to posi ve
and nega ve sanc ons, the MP will dissent and vote against the party group line.
This sequen al decision-making model is admi edly not exhaus ve, as it focuses on
the rela onship between an MP and his party group, and thus pays less a en on to
other poten al actors that may (a empt to) influence an MP’s behavior. It does provide
a clear and structured model of MP decision making when it comes to vo ng with the
party group. The first aim of this study is to ascertain the rela ve role that each of these
decision-making stages plays in determining MPs’ vo ng behavior in parliament. The
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fact that themechanisms are placed in a certain order is important for our understanding
of how party group unity is brought about. If most MPs usually simply agree with the
party group’s posi on, for example, disciplinary measures by the poli cal party (group)
leadership are likely to be o ose, and describing party groups as ‘disciplined’ bodies
thus paints a false picture. If, alterna vely, party discipline turns out to be the most
important determinant of party group unity, referring to party groups as ‘homogeneous’
or ‘cohesive blocs’ would be inaccurate, as according to the sequen al decision-making
model, party discipline only becomes necessary when MPs do not agree with the party
group line and do not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty.
The second aim of this study is to test the assump ons and theore cal arguments
that scholars make concerning the influence of ins tu ons on the different decision-
making mechanisms. It may be, for example, that par es’ candidate selec on methods
have a strong impact on the number of MPs who usually agree with the party group
line in the first place, whereas electoral systems are rela vely more important in deter-
mining the number of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty. These
findings may be interes ng for policymakers and poli cal reformers who deem unified
party groups undesirable or argue that poli cal par es’ programs are not representa-
ve transla ons of the electorate’s preferences. Following the first example above, if
MPs’ agreement with the party group’s posi on is the most important determinant of
their vo ng behavior, and this agreement is found to be influenced mainly by par es’
candidate selec on methods and not by electoral ins tu ons, then reforming the elec-
toral system as suggested by the 2003 Dutch report by minister De Graaf would not
have the effect of making the parliamentary body as a whole more representa ve of the
electorates preferences, as party candidate selec on takes place before elec ons do. Al-
terna vely, if poli cal reformers would like to see MPs to be more responsive and loyal
to their voters, and MPs’ decision to vote with the party group out of loyalty is mainly
affected by the electoral system, then altering the electoral systemmay have that effect.
Individual MPs’ answers to ques ons included in various elite surveys are used to
gauge the presence and rela ve contribu on of each of these decision-making mecha-
nisms. The first two studies in this book both rely on the 2010 interna onal-compara ve
Par Rep MP Survey, which was held in 15 countries among members of 60 na onal and
subna onal parliaments. The compara ve character of the survey allows us to study
how the rela ve contribu ons of the different MP decision-making mechanisms differ
per parliament, and whether these differences may be explained by the different ins -
tu onal configura ons. The third study combines the Dutch responses from the 2010
Par Rep MP Survey with the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, which were held in 1972,
1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006. The Dutch case is a representa ve case in terms of the elec-
toral vola lity and decrease in partymembership found inmany European parliamentary
democracies, and these survey data allow us to study whether the use of the different
mechanisms has changed over me. These specific data sets are discussed more elab-
orately in the corresponding chapters. It should be noted, however, that as the three
studies in this book rely on different data sets that do not all include iden cal or equally
appropriate measure for each decision-making mechanism, it is not possible to include
the full sequence of decision-making mechanisms in all three studies and comparisons
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across the analyses should be done carefully.4
Logically, the ul mate dependent variable in a study of party group unity would be
MPs’ final behavioral outcome, usually opera onalized as legisla ve vo ng. When pos-
sible and if available, aggregate vo ng pa erns are presented in order to gauge and
discuss general trends and differences, although there are limita ons in terms of valid
comparability due to the wide varia on in vo ng prac ces across parliaments, and the
fact that the vo ng data may reflect different periods of me (and thus different MPs).
This, in combina on with the fact that the surveys are anonymized and we thus do not
know which response belongs to which MP, unfortunately makes it impossible to con-
nectMPs’ survey responses to their vo ng behavior in parliament.5 Even if it were possi-
ble to connect MPs’ survey responses to their vo ng behavior, the fact that party group
vo ng unity in European democracies is very high, in some parliaments almost perfect,
would make sta s cally tes ng the rela ve explanatory power of each of the mecha-
nisms difficult. Furthermore, even if there was enough variance in terms of MPs’ vot-
ing behavior in parliament at the aggregate level, and it were possible to connect MPs’
survey responses to their vo ng behavior, the ul mate test of the sequen ality of the
model would be to apply the model to MPs’ decisions regarding specific votes. These
data-related problems make the study of party unity in general, and the assessment of
the sequen al decision-making model specifically, more difficult, but nonetheless do
not make the study at hand less interes ng.
1.2 Plan of the book
First, chapter 2 reviews the history and study of representa on, in both norma ve and
empirical theory, paying special a en on to the representa onal role ascribed to re-
spec vely the individual MP and the poli cal party as a unitary actor. Chapter 3 then
moves on to review the theore cal and empirical literature on party group (vo ng) unity
and the pathways to party group unity, leading to the further development of the se-
quen al decision-making model introduced above. Next, the mechanisms in the se-
quen al decision-makingmodel are explored in three separate studies. As stated above,
individual MPs’ answers to ques ons included in various elite surveys are used to gauge
the presence and rela ve contribu on of each of these decision-making mechanisms.
Furthermore, in each chapter hypotheses are developed and then tested regarding the
effects of different se ngs on each of the stages of MPs’ decision making. Thus, the
decision-making mechanisms are the main dependent variables.
4 The Par Rep MP Survey was translated into 14 different languages by the respec ve members of the Par-
Rep project. We assume that that this was done with utmost precision and care, but we cannot rule out
that the transla on process, as well as cultural context, resulted in differences in meanings and interpreta-
ons of the survey ques ons and answering categories.
5 Apart from Kam (2009) and Willumsen and Öhberg (2012), most studies on party unity and its determi-
nants have not been able to connect candidates’ and/or MPs’ survey responses to actual legisla ve (vo ng)
behavior.
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The main aim of this book is to test and illustrate the poten al of the sequen al
decision-making model, not to offer a comprehensive explana on of party group unity
by including all poten al independent variables found in previous literature. The first
study is a synchronic cross-country analysis of MPs’ decision making in 15 na onal par-
liaments that focuses on the effects of electoral ins tu ons, poli cal par es’ candidate
selec on procedures and government par cipa on (see chapter 4). The second study
starts with a synchronic comparison of the rela ve importance of the decision-making
mechanisms among na onal and regional representa ves in nine mul -level countries
(see chapter 5). The analysis is then repeated at three different levels of Dutch govern-
ment (na onal, provincial and municipal), which allows us to keep country context and
formal ins tu ons (rela vely) constant. The third and final study is a diachronic analysis
of changes in behavioral party group unity (parliamentary vo ng and party defec ons)
as well as MPs’ decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch na onal Parliament between
1945 (1972 for the a tudinal data) and 2010 (see chapter 6). By focusing on one par-
liament through me, system, electoral, legisla ve and party ins tu ons are held (rel-
a vely) constant. The final chapter brings together the three studies; we summarize
our findings with regard to each of the decision-making mechanisms, and highligh ng a
number of implica ons and poten al avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Representa on in parliament by
individual or by poli cal party:
shi ing emphasis
2.1 Representa on in theory and in prac ce
The central norma ve problem of democracy is determining the proper rela onship
between ci zens’ preferences and the laws that govern them. Poli cal representa on
complicates this rela onship by introducing actors who mediate the preferences of cit-
izens and poli cal decision making (Rehfeld, 2009, 214). Although the two concepts
are o en thoughtlessly equated, democracy and representa on have a problema c re-
la onship (Pitkin, 2004). Etymologically the literal meaning of democracy—the peo-
ple (demos) rule (kratein)—denies any separa on between rulers and ruled. Whereas
representa on—to make present again of what is absent—specifies exactly such a sep-
ara on between the represented and representa ves (Ankersmit, 2002, 109; Fairlie,
1940a, 236; Pitkin, 1967, 8).
In its simplest form, the marriage of representa on and democracy is viewed as a
merely func onal second-best alterna ve to direct democracy which is considered an
imprac cable ideal given the popula on size of most countries today. Representa ve
democracy refers then to the means through which representa ves are chosen: the
selec on method (i.e. electoral system) of representa ve actors is publicly approved
which grants representa ves the legi macy to make poli cal decisions. Alterna vely,
representa ve democracy is postulated as superior to direct democracy; representa on
not only enables democracy, but unites “the democra c principles of rule by the peo-
ple with the Socra c and Platonic principle of the rule by the Wisest and Best” (Fairlie,
1940b, 459). At the core of most studies of representa ve democracy is the no on that
representa on entails a social rela onship between the representa ves and the repre-
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sented (Eulau et al., 1959, 743), and what makes representa on democra c is the link
between the wants, needs and demands of the public and the behavior of representa-
ve actors in making government policy (Lu beg, 1974, 3). Most of the literature on
poli cal representa on deals with how, in the case of norma ve theory, this link ought
to be shaped and how, in the case of empirical research, this link is shaped in prac ce.
Representa ve democracy “[...] features a chain of delega on from voters to those
who govern [...] mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the re-
serve direc on” (Strøm, 2000, 267). Representa ve democracy thus entails that poli cal
actors (agents) are delegated power to make, implement and enforce poli cal decisions
for ci zens (principals).1 It also requires representa ve actors to be responsive to the
preferences of the public and to be accountable to that public for their behavior. Strøm
(2000, 267) contends that what makes democra c regimes democra c is ci zens’ ability
to select and control their representa ves.
Poli cal ins tu ons provide a framework for this chain of delega on, as they not
only set the rules that organize how delega on takes place, but also provide actors with
tools that enable, but also limit, their own behavior as well as that of their agents in
the chain. Within representa ve democracy one can dis nguish between a parliamen-
tary system of government, which is characterized by “a single chain of command, in
which at each link a single principal delegates to one and only one agent (or several non-
compe ng ones), and where each agent is accountable to one and only one principal”
(Strøm, 2000, 269), and a presiden al system of government, which features agents
that have mul ple principals. In parliamentary systems of government, electoral sys-
tems provide a compe ve means through which ci zens elect who represents them in
the parliament. Legisla ve ins tu ons provide these representa ves with a number of
tools through which they can perform their tasks as agents of ci zens, such as the ability
to deliberate and vote on public policy. The legisla ve branch is also responsible for the
selec on of the execu ve branch of government. The execu ve branch, consis ng of the
Prime Minister and cabinet (junior) minsters, is charged with the execu on of the laws
made in parliament, for which the implementa on is delegated to different ministries’
civil servants. In presiden al systems of government, electoral systems typically enable
ci zens to select mul ple compe ng agents (the president, as well as the Upper and
Lower Chamber of the legisla ve branch), and the heads of the execu ve departments
and their civil servants report back these mul ple, poten ally compe ng principals.
In prac ce this chain of representa on is complicated by the fact that poli cal prin-
cipals and agents are usually not individual actors but collec ves with heterogeneous
preferences that can be difficult to iden fy (Strøm, 2000, 267-268). Voters, for example,
do not form a single homogeneous group in terms of iden es and preferences, and
the difficul es associated with the aggrega on of these iden es and preferences are
central in many studies of poli cal representa on. The deconstruc on of poli cal par-
1 There are a number of general arguments, not only applicable to the poli cal realm, regarding why dele-
ga on may occur. These are a general lack of capacity and competence (and transac ons costs associated
with their acquisi on) of actors to make mely, professional decisions, and the problems associated with
social choice (preference aggrega on problems), collec ve ac on and coordina on at the aggregate level
(Strøm, 2003, 56-58).
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es is arguably even more complicated, as they also consist of individuals with not only
poten ally different preferences, but also different roles, thus forming an arena in and
of themselves. They also perform amul tude of different func ons in both the electoral
arena and legisla ve arena. Finally, within the legisla ve arena one can dis nguish be-
tween individual MPs, poli cal party groups—which consist of collec ves of individual
MPs—, and the legislature as a whole, as poten al representa ve actors.
Manin (1997) describes three ideal-types of representa ve government: parliamen-
tarianism, party democracy and audience democracy. One could argue that each form
predominated poli cal representa on in western democracies during a par cular pe-
riod of modern history, although Manin (1997, 202) does explicate that the forms of
poli cal representa on can coexist and fuse at a given point in me in a given country.
The first two ideal-types, parliamentarianism and party democracy, can be connected to
norma ve debates as to how representa on ought to take form, and who should act as
main representa ve actor in parliament. These norma ve debates func on as the basis
for models of representa on used in the empirical analysis of poli cal representa on,
with empirical models o en lagging behind developments in poli cal reality (Thomas-
sen, 1994, 237, 240, 250). The third ideal-type, audience democracy, differs from the
first two in that its norma ve debate is s ll ongoing, and the empirical models are in
development. In the following sec ons, the three ideal-types of representa ve govern-
ment and their associated norma ve and empirical models are reviewed, with special
a en on paid to who is ascribed the role of main representa ve actor in parliament:
the individual MP or poli cal party.
2.2 The individual as main representa ve actor
2.2.1 Parliamentarianism
Representa on descends from a prac ce that that has li le to do with modern democ-
racy (Thomassen, 1994, 240). In fact, the monarchs in medieval Europe imposed it as
a duty. During the period of feudalism in Europe (500 – 1500) rights, powers, and priv-
ileges depended on property ownership, and landowners from different regions were
summoned as representa ves to parliament to commit their locality to measures that
themonarchs wished to impose. Thesemeasuresmostly involved taxa on, as the crown
sought addi onal revenues to fight wars in order to defend the na onal interests. Grad-
ually, parliament evolved into an arena in which representa ves defended local interests
in exchange for consent, which became condi onal. Representa on became a ma er
of right rather than a burden (Thomassen, 1994, 240; Pitkin, 2004, 337) although the
prac ce can hardly be described as democra c in the sense of the selec on of represen-
ta ves. MPs operated as individuals and were considered to be the delegates of their
communi es, mandated with the task of giving or withholding their consent provisional
upon redress of communal grievances.
Although most of the parliaments in Europe were dissolved during the period of ab-
solute monarchy (1500 – 1800), the Bri sh Parliament gradually developed into the cen-
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ter of power a er successfully placing the sovereignty of Parliament above that of the
king in the Glorious Revolu on (1688). Parliament became increasingly responsible for
na onal interests, and less an arena for the defense of local interests. Edmund Burke’s
(1774) speech to the electors of Bristol is renowned for reflec ng this change in poli cal
prac ce, and signifies a cri cal juncture in the development of modern poli cal thought.
Burke argued that given Parliament’s new role it should func on as a delibera ve arena
in which the general good ought to be the dominant focus of representa on:
“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hos le
interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate,
against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a delibera ve assem-
bly of one na on, with one interest, that of the whole—where not local pur-
poses, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resul ng
from the general reason of the whole” (Burke, 1887a, 96).
Following that parliament ought to act in the interest of the whole na on, Burke rea-
soned that this is incompa ble with the prac ce of MPs following the instruc ons from
their districts, and they should instead act according to their own judgment. So whereas
the tradi onal ‘mandate’ style of representa on holds that the represented should have
control over their own representa ves, either through recall right or binding instruc-
ons, Burke was a proponent of the ‘trustee’ style, whichmaintains that representa ves
are free to represent the interests of those they represent as they themselves see fit:
“Their [cons tuents]wishes ought to have greatweightwith him; their opin-
ion high respect; their business unremi ed a en on. It is his duty to sacri-
fice his repose, his pleasure, his sa sfac on, to theirs; and, above all, ever,
and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But, his unbiased opinion,
his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice
to you; to any man, or to any set of men living. […] You chose a member
indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a Member of Bristol, but
he is a Member of Parliament” (Burke, 1887a, 95).
Burke’s speechmarks a transi on in poli cal thought—from the domina on of mandate
representa on directed at local interests to independent parliamentarians focusing on
na onal interests—that is s ll reflected in cons tu ons that were wri en during the
democra c revolu ons of the first half of the nineteenth century. Manin (1997, 204)
refers to the Bri sh House of Commons in the period a er the Napoleonic wars (1803-
1815) as the “[...] archetype of parliamentarianism” in terms of individual representa-
ves’ autonomy, and Beer (1982) considers the period in the United Kingdom between
the First Reform Act (1832) and the Second Reform Act (1867) as “the golden age of the
private MP”. According to Manin (1997, 204) “[t]he poli cal independence of the indi-
vidual representa ve is due in part to his owing his seat to non-poli cal factors such as
his local standing”. Poli cal par es, moreover, hardly existed, and if there was any form
of poli cal organiza on outside of Parliament it was only for elec ons, and the individ-
ual MP was the uncontested leader in the electoral district. If MPs acted in concert with
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each other in parliament, this was on the basis of delibera on, similari es between the
regions they represented, or personal es (Depauw, 2002, 20).
2.2.2 The mandate-independence controversy
Over a century a er Burke’s speech to the electors of Bristol, the mandate - independ-
ence controversy (Pitkin, 1967)—whether individual representa ves should act as agents
who take instruc ons from their cons tuents or act according to their ownmature judg-
ment—was picked up by Eulau and his associates (1959; 1962) as the basis of themodel
to describe representa onal role orienta ons in their study of United States state legis-
lators. The authors dis nguish between the style (delegate or trustee) and focus (district
or na onal level) of representa on (see Figure 2.1). Accordingly, one can place repre-
senta ves who act according to the instruc ons from their local cons tuents in cell A,
and Burke’s preferred trustees who focus on the na onal interests in cell D.
Although the representa onal role orienta ons typology con nues to be widely ap-
plied, Thomassen (1994, 239-240) argues that the scien fic interest in the mandate-
independence controversy is inversely propor onal to its relevance in modern repre-
senta ve democracy. A first problem with the role typology is that it forces representa-
ves to choose between the delegate and trustee role, thereby trea ng representa onal
roles as a mutually exclusive dichotomy. But as highlighted by Pitkin (1967, 151), “in the
mandate-independence controversy both sides are probably right”:
“It is true that a man is not a representa ve—or at most is a representa ve
‘in name only’—if he habitually does the opposite of what his cons tuents
would do. But it is also true that the man is not a representa ve—or at
most a representa ve in name only—if he himself does nothing, if his con-
s tuents act directly” (Pitkin, 1967, 151).
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Figure 2.2: The connec on between cons tuencies’ a tudes and a representa ve’s roll
call behavior
Representa ve’s a tude
B
/ \
Cons tuency’s Representa ve’s roll call
a tude vo ng behavior
A \ / D
Representa ve’s percep on of
cons tuency’s a tude
C
Source: Miller and Stokes (1963)
This cri cism is actually aimed at the norma ve underpinnings of both the ‘trustee’ and
‘delegate’ model, which contradict the nature of representa on, defined as to make
present again of what is absent (Ankersmit, 2002, 109; Fairlie, 1940a, 236; Pitkin, 1967,
8). A representa ve taking on the trustee style of representa on cannot completely ig-
nore the opinions of those he is represen ng, as then that what is absent is not present.
But a representa ve cannot perfectly reproduce the opinions when taking on the role of
the instructed delegate, because then there is no representa on of what is absent for it
is already present. For this reason the original typology was postulated as a con nuum,
with the delegate and trustee as the two extremes. However, by including a third mid-
dle role, the poli co, for whom it depends on the circumstances whether he acts more
as a trustee or a delegate, Eulau and his associates (1959; 1962) treat it as a categorical
variable. Later applica ons of the representa onal role orienta on typology also failed
to acknowledge the con nuous nature of the typology, also trea ng it as a categorical
variable.
Another problem with the applica on of the representa onal role orienta on ty-
pology in later empirical analyses is the choice between the two foci of representa on:
the district or the na on. Again, these two foci can be traced back to Burke’s contrast of
parliament as a compe ve or delibera ve arena. The ques on is whether district inter-
ests are a per nent focus of representa on when most legislators today are concerned
with general policy making for which specific geographically defined local interest are
arguably less relevant. Connected to this is the another cri cism, which is most relevant
for the study at hand: the typology does not acknowledge the poli cal party as either
a poten al alterna ve focus of representa on from the perspec ve of the individual
representa ve, or representa ve actor in and of itself.
The Miller-Stokes model (1963, see Figure 2.2), introduced by the early Michigan
school, expands on the representa onal style of representa on (limi ng the focus of
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representa on to the district). The empirical validity of the model was tested by com-
paring the congruence between cons tuency and representa ves’ a tudes in differ-
ent policy domains to roll call vo ng behavior of representa ves. The lower path of
the model (ACD) describes the workings of the instructed delegate, which necessitates
that the representa ves perceive cons tuency a tudes correctly and that there is a
high correla on between cons tuency a tudes (A) and representa ves’ percep ons of
these a tudes (C). The upper path (ABD) presents the workings of the Burkean trustee,
whose own opinion is determinant for the representa ves’ behavior. It may s ll be the
case, however, that a representa ve expresses the will of the public in spite of himself,
i.e. there is a high correla on between his own opinion (B) and those of the ci zens
in his cons tuency (A). Miller and Stokes (1963, 56) conclude that the strength of the
different pathways of the model depends on the kind of issue area. In the case of so-
cial welfare, members of the US House of Representa ves generally followed the upper
path, taking on the role of the Burkean trustee, whereas when it came to civil rights,
representa ves were more likely to take on the role of instructed delegate (Miller and
Stokes hypothesize that this is out for fear of electoral consequences).
A empts weremade to apply theMiller-Stokesmodel in a number of different coun-
tries throughwhich it became clear that themodel was not fully transferable outside the
United States’ presiden al, single-member district systemwithweak poli cal par es. Al-
though the model does allow the tes ng of the modes of representa on under different
circumstances, therefore allowing these modes to vary, its focus is on the dyadic rela-
onship between cons tuencies and their representa ve (which was especially prob-
lema c in electoral systems with mul -member districts), and does not account for the
paramount importance of poli cal par es in mi ga ng the link between representa-
ves and the public in parliamentary systems. In presiden al systems the execu ve has
its own electoral mandate and is not dependent on a majority in legislature for its sur-
vival, whereas in parliamentary systems the execu ve does not have its own mandate
and is very much dependent on its majority in parliament for its survival, making party
group unity in parliament, at least among government par es, essen al. That the polit-
ical party is of overriding importance is especially apparent when it comes to Miller and
Stokes’ dependent variable: representa ves’ (roll call) vo ng behavior. Once poli cal
party (group) membership is taken into considera on the different pathways have very
li le substan ve effect in parliamentary systems.
This point is made clear by Converse and Pierce’s (1979; 1986) applica on of the
Miller-Stokesmodel in their studyof poli cal representa on in France, and Farah’s (1980)
study of West Germany. Both find limited feasibility of the model in the context of (hy-
brid) parliamentary systems and the influence of the poli cal party overriding. Converse
and Pierce therefore propose the introduc on of a third representa ve role, the party
delegate, a variety of the delegate with the party rather than the voters as the focus of
representa on (see Figure 2.3). Indeed, in their study of representa onal role empha-
sis the party delegate role was found to be most dominant—both in terms of individual
representa ves’ policy preferences and roll call vo ng behavior—the trustee role com-
ing in second and the voter delegate coming in a distant third. Although Andeweg and
Thomassen (2005, 508) ques on the relevance of this triangle in how it can aid in the
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Figure 2.3: Representa onal role emphasis
Party delegate
/ \
Trustee ― Voter delegate
Source: Converse and Pierce (1979)
understanding of poli cal representa on in terms of the rela onship between the vot-
ers and the actors who represent them, the party delegate role may help us understand
the rela onship between individual MPs and their poli cal party (group).
2.3 The poli cal party takes over
2.3.1 Party democracy
The second ideal-type of representa ve government iden fied by Manin (1997) is party
democracy. The change of parliament from an arena for local interest ar cula on to
na onal policy forma on not only increased the power of parliament, but also the com-
plexity of parliamentary work. The focus on na onal policy made it more efficient to or-
ganize along ideological lines than geographical ones, which led to coopera on among
individual MPs from different regions. According to Patzelt (1999, 23), some observers
go so far as to claim that that “[…] it is denounced as historical fic on [...] there has
never been a ‘normal’ parliamentarism with individual members (instead of parliamen-
tary groups) playing a significant role” in describing how common these forms of co-
opera on were. Again, it is Edmund Burke who is o en cited for iden fying the func-
on of the poli cal party in this respect, defining a poli cal party as “a body of men
united, for promo ng by their joint endeavors the na onal interest, upon some par cu-
lar principle in which they are all agreed” (Burke, 1887b, 530). He thus seemed to recog-
nize ideology as the basis of a parliamentary party group. Duverger (1954) categorizes
these parliamentary groups as ‘internally created’ elite (or cadre) par es, func oning
as a means to align the interests of individual MPs and make parliamentary work more
efficient, thereby stabilizing parliamentary poli cs. Examples include the forerunners of
today’s Bri sh Conserva ve and Liberal par es, the Democra c and Republican Party in
the United States, and the Liberal par es in Germany, Italy and other parts of con nental
Europe (Lapalombara and Anderson, 1992, 396).
Thus far, individual MPs were considered the core representa ve actor in both polit-
ical prac ce and poli cal thought. A tudes towards poli cal par es (or fac ons) were
generally hos le, especially among norma ve theorists who inspired the dra ers of the
cons tu ons (Scha schneider, 1942, 3-6). From a republican perspec ve, poli cs is
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the search for the common good for the en re public, brought about through delib-
era on and consensus, not through compe on that results in winners and losers. De
Tocqueville (1835), for example, considered poli cal par es, represen ng specific inter-
ests, to be inherently oppressive and to embody the danger of a tyrannical majority de-
priving minori es of fair representa on. Those responsible for the cons tu ons during
the democra c revolu ons were so hos le towards poli cal par es that they explicitly
a empted to make government by par es impossible, or at least imprac cable. That in-
dividual MPs are formally not supposed to take instruc ons from anyone, for example,
makes the involvement of poli cal par es in the act of representa on in a strict sense
uncons tu onal.
Theprac ce of coordina on in parliamentwas also extended into the electoral arena,
as parliamentary minori es a empted to boost their posi on in parliament by increas-
ing their share of votes in the electorate (Aldrich, 1995). With the extension of universal
suffrage at the turn of the nineteenth century ‘externally created’ mass par es that de-
veloped in society also entered the struggle for representa on in parliament. These
poli cal par es were based on mass membership and represented those interests that
were not yet present in the poli cal system (Duverger, 1954). Vo ng was an expression
of iden ty in terms of class and religion represented by par es, rather than the expres-
sion of a personal bond between voters and individual MPs in parliament. Examples of
‘externally created’ mass par es include the European socialist, communist, and Chris-
an democra c par es (Lapalombara and Anderson, 1992, 396).
Early twen eth century poli cal thinkers who acknowledged poli cal par es were
not pleased with their development. Both Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1915) saw
par es as oligarchic organiza ons dominated by leaders and subordina ng individu-
als, inhibi ng the realiza on of democracy as the search for the common good. The
economist and poli cal realist Schumpeter (1942), however, endorsed the development
of poli cal par es. Schumpeter disputed the idea that democracy was a process of iden-
fying the common good and he also had li le faith in the public’s ability to form opin-
ions and make ra onal poli cal decisions. He considered the ideal democracy postu-
lated by liberal thinkers as impossible and undesirable, and instead offered a minimal,
procedural defini on of democracy as an ins tu onal arrangement with a central role
for poli cal par es:
“The democra cmethod is that ins tu onal arrangement for arriving at po-
li cal decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means
of a compe ve struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, 269).
“A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the com-
pe ve struggle for power […] Party and machine poli cs are simply the re-
sponse to the fact that the electoral mass is incapable of ac on other than
in a stampede, and they cons tute an a empt to regulate poli cal compe-
on exactly similar to the corresponding prac ce of a trade associa on”
(Schumpeter, 1942, 283).
Schumpeter clearly held an eli st vision of democracy. Like Burke, he advocated a trustee
model of poli cal representa on in the rela onship between the representa ves and
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the represented, following Weber (1919) in s pula ng that poli cians should be of a
high quality—suited, trained and qualified to act as representa ves—and that ci zens
should respect the division of labor between poli cians and voters. He considered rep-
resenta on to be a top-down rela onship (Esaiasson and Holmberg, 1996), in which
poli cal par es put their views to the ci zens, and ci zens’ preferences are endoge-
nous to their interac on with poli cal par es (Schumpeter, 1942, 263). In terms of the
rela onship between poli cal par es and their MPs, Schumpeter (1942, 294) seemed
to hold Converse and Pierce’s (1979; 1986) party delegate model of representa on, as
he maintains that individual MPs ought to exercise democra c self-control and resist
the tempta on to upset or embarrass the government.2 Duverger (1966, 7-8) also rec-
ognized this party delegate rela onship between poli cal par es and their MPs in the
prac ce of representa on, classifying poli cal par es that had such a rela onship with
their MPs as ‘rigid’. Again, it seems to be the Parliament in the United Kingdom that took
the lead. Members of the House of Commons were organized in a very strict manner,
discipline was imposed upon them in vo ng on all important issues, and the authority
of the party group leader was not ques oned (Duverger, 1966).
Many posi vist theorists followed Schumpeter in their high regard for poli cal par-
es as representa ve actors in parliament. Stokes (1999, 244) suggests that this may
be because their norma ve world is ordered not around no ons of the public good but
around effec ve representa on, for which poli cal par es as an organizing principal are
considered vital.3 In 1950 the American Poli cal Science Associa on became the pri-
mary advocate for the norma ve responsible party model. The 1950 report by the APSA
Commi ee on Poli cal Par es, chaired by E.E. Scha scheider, urged reforms to make
the two poli cal par es in the United States more “democra c, responsible, and effec-
ve” (1950, 17). The responsible party model departs from Schumpeter’s compe ve
model of democracy in that it holds that the popular will can and must be reflected in
government policy, whereas Schumpeter had li le faith in the popular will (Thomassen,
1994, 251). As is the case in Schumpeter’s compe ve model, the responsible party
model holds that poli cal par es enable democracy through compe on in the elec-
toral arena.
There are three requirements: 1) poli cal par es should present voters with suffi-
ciently different policy program alterna ves. These party programs should be the result
of democra c decision making within the poli cal par es and supported by a large pro-
por on of the par es’ members. 2) Voters should be aware of the differences between
par es, and are assumed to then cast their vote for the poli cal party whose program
comes closest to their own policy preferences. 3) In turn, because voters base their
choice on the party’s program, party representa ves in office are expected to follow the
2 More specifically, Schumpeter (1942, 294) argues that “supporters of the government must accept its lead
and allow it to frame and act upon a program and that the opposi on should accept the lead of the ‘shadow
government’ at its head and allow it to keep poli cal warfare within certain rules”.
3 Mainwaring and Scully (1995), for example, argue that highly ins tu onalized party systems are necessary
for high democra c performance, in order to offer ci zens clear coherent choices (Carey, 2003, 193). Bowler
et al. (1999a, 3) consider the existence of cohesive legisla ve vo ng blocs, realized through poli cal par es,
a prerequisite for effec ve accountability.
18
2.3. The poli cal party takes over
party program in making government policy. Indeed, the APSA report (1950, 17-18) pre-
scribed that “[a]n effec ve party system requires, first, that the par es are able to bring
forth programs to which they commit themselves and second, that the par es possess
sufficient internal cohesion to carry out the program”. If representa ves do not follow
their party’s program the report suggests possible sanc ons the poli cal party (group)
could apply. Party unity in both the electoral and parliamentary arena is thus not only
considered the condi on for success (APSA, 1950, 20-23), but party disunity is also held
to impair democra c representa on. The responsible party model holds that the polit-
ical party ought to be the main actor in the representa onal rela onship, “[i]ndividual
poli cians play a second fiddle, at most” (Thomassen, 1994, 251).
2.3.2 The responsible party model
As argued by Thomassen (1994, 248), models that priori ze the poli cal party have
more a priori validity in the context of (European) parliamentary systems of government
than models that highlight the rela onship between individual MPs and their voters (or
districts). Although originally postulated as a norma ve model, the responsible party
model has been used as an empirical tool as well.
In poli cal party models of representa on, the poli cal party is treated as a collec-
ve, unitary actor and its parliamentary counterpart is considered the main representa-
ve actor in the legislature. Thus, in terms of the three requirements of the responsible
party model, it is the third—that par es must be sufficiently unified to enable them to
implement their policy program—that has become a central assump on in the empirical
analysis of various aspects of poli cal representa on. Indeed, if one considers the vot-
ing behavior of party group members in European parliaments, this assump on is the
least problema c of the three (Thomassen, 1994, 252). Consequently, scholars use party
manifestos and party strategies in the elec ons and coali on-forma ons, and aggregate
speech and policy congruence on the basis of party group membership in parliament, in
order to study the representa onal links between voters and their representa ve actors.
How poli cal par es, and more specifically their parliamentary groups, come to act as
unitary actors, however, was for a long me taken for granted in representa on studies.
The United States is generally categorized as a weak party system. Even in this weak
party system, however, Cox and McCubbins (1993) recognize poli cal par es as one of
the organizing principles in legislature. However, the authors do not make the same
assump ons about poli cal par es as the literature on representa on in Europe tends
to do. Indeed, in defining poli cal par es Cox and McCubbins (1993, 100) reject both
structural and purposive perspec ves. Whereas the structural approach, which defines
par es according to observable features of their organiza on, is generally aimed at the
extra-parliamentary rather than the intra-parliamentary organiza on, the purposive ap-
proach, defining par es by their goals, is cri cized for assuming too much about the
internal unity of par es. As highlighted by Cox and McCubbins (1993):
“[t]he unitary actor assump on has proven valuable for many purposes –
spa al models of elec ons and models of coali on forma on come readily
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to mind – but it is not a useful star ng point from which to build a theory
of the internal organiza on of par es. Such a theory must begin with indi-
vidual poli cians and their typically diverse preferences, explaining why it
is in each one’s interest to support a par cular pa ern of organiza on and
ac vity for the party. Accordingly, we begin not with par es and postulate
collec ve goals but rather with legislators and postulate individual goals”
(Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 100).
In line with the United States tradi on, Cox andMcCubbins con nue to give precedence
to the individual representa ve in legislature. They take on a ra onal-choice perspec-
ve of individual representa ves who seek reelec on. There are a number of factors
that improve the probability of reelec on, of which the authors consider reputa on to
be most important. A representa ve’s legisla ve ac vity affects his individual reputa-
on (a private good), his poli cal party’s collec ve reputa on (a public good), or both.
Cox andMcCubbins (1993, 113) argue that the realiza on of the la er poses a collec ve
ac on problem that, le unchecked, will lead to legisla ve inefficiencies. Poli cal party
legisla ve group organiza ons are the key to solving this collec ve ac on problem. By
crea ng legisla ve (leadership) posi ons that are both a rac ve and elec ve—entailing
that there is intra-party compe on for these posi ons and incumbents can be held ac-
countable if they fail to act in the collec ve interest—and organiza onal structures, rep-
resenta ves will 1) internalize the collec ve interest of the party and 2) monitor their
fellow par sans. This especially holds for the party group leadership posi ons which
are given control over selec ve incen ves, either in the form of posi ve rewards for
those who cooperate, and nega ve sanc ons to discipline party group members who
defect from the party group line (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 121-122). Poli cal party
groups therefore act as ‘legisla ve cartels’ that—especially when in the majority—are
able to seize power to make rules that govern the structure and process of legisla on.
Par es are floor-vo ng and procedural (having commi ee appointments and agenda-
se ng power) coali ons. In building a theory of the internal organiza on of par es, Cox
and McCubbins heed to Panebianco’s (1988, xi) complaint that “…something has been
lost: namely the awareness that whatever else par es are and to whatever other solic-
ita ons they respond, they are above all organiza ons and that organiza onal analysis
must therefore come before any other perspec ve”.
Cox and McCubbins’ study of the rela onship between individual members of Con-
gress and their poli cal par es in the United States highlights the prac cal tension be-
tween individual representa ves and their poli cal par es in terms of ra onalist eco-
nomic theory. Whereas individual representa ves possess an inherent tendency to value
their own reputa on above that of the party, poli cal par es as organiza ons value their
collec ve reputa on. This parallels the tensions between individual and collec ve rep-
resenta on found in norma ve theory. In the empirical study of representa on and
legisla ve behavior in the context of European parliaments, this tension has been re-
solved in favor of the party as a unitary actor, implicitly favoring models of collec ve
representa on by poli cal par es.
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2.4 The return to the individual?
2.4.1 Audience democracy
Since the 1970s, elec on results in western democracies vary significantly from one
elec on to the next, even though the socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds of in-
dividual voters have remained rela vely stable (Manin, 1997, 218). Dalton and Wa en-
berg (2000) a ribute the increased electoral vola lity and weakening of voters’ par san
es to the deseculariza on and moderniza on of society. These societal changes con-
tributed to “today’s alleged crisis in representa on” (Manin, 1997, 196-197), a change
from party democracy to audience democracy, the third ideal-type of representa ve
government. By audience democracy, Manin (1997, 223) means that “the electorate ap-
pears, above all, as an audience which responds to the terms that have been presented
on the poli cal stage”.
Manin (1997, 222-223) argues that because of deseculariza on and moderniza on
in a number ofWestern socie es, no socioeconomic and cultural cleavage is more poli -
cally important or more stable than others. On the one hand, this leaves poli cal par es
vulnerable in the electoral arena, as they cannot rely on a stable voter or membership
base. This has been the basis for the (mass) party in decline thesis (or rather ques on)
(Mair, 1994; Schmi and Holmberg, 1995). On the other hand, this also entails that vot-
ers themselves do not base their decision on their socioeconomic or cultural iden ty, but
on their percep on of what is at stake in a par cular elec on, which is decided on by
poli cians. This means that the ini a ve of electoral choice belongs to poli cians, and
the reac ve instead of expressive dimension of vo ng predominates. This is very much
in line with Schumpeter (1942, 263), who considered ci zens’ preferences endogenous
to their interac on with poli cal par es.
With the literature on poli cal par es (and not specifically their party group coun-
terparts in parliament), a number of authors connect these changes in the electorate to
the (poten ally resultant) changes in party structures (Depauw, 2002, 24-26). These are
modeled, among others, by the catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966), the electoral pro-
fessional party (Panebianco, 1988) and the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1994). These
empirical models differ from the (mass) party model and the APSA’s (1950) responsible
party model in that they do not assume that ci zens’ preferences are exogenous to their
interac onswith poli cal par es, and do not hold party’s policy pla orms as dis nct and
forming the basis for voters’ electoral choice. Moreover, par es’ policy programs are less
the result of intra-party democra c decision making and party member support.
Kirchheimer’s (1966) catch-all party is a vote-seeking machine that, having lost its
ideological voter and its membership base, tries to appeal to the increased number of
floa ng voters by providing the electorate with a wide array of policy posi ons instead
of one set ideological profile. Panebiano’s (1988) electoral professional party model is
a re-specifica on of the catch-all party, defined more precisely in organiza onal terms
(Wolinetz, 2002, 137) and emphasizes the professionaliza on of poli cs, entailing that
tradi onal party office holders are displaced by technical and poli cal specialists. As
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feared by both Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1915), the poli cal party leadership in-
creasingly draws power to itself. Because party leaders are less interested in servic-
ing their party members, vote-seeking is priori zed above party-building efforts. The
extra-parliamentary party organiza on is instrumentally aimed at winning elec ons for
its party leaders through professionaliza on and poli cal marke ng. Opinion polls and
marke ng strategies determine not only campaign strategies, but even the party’s po-
si on on issues (Depauw, 2002, 24-26). Katz and Mair’s (1994) final extension, the car-
tel model, characterizes poli cal par es as increasingly dependent on, and interwoven
with, state instead of societal resources and interests, to the point that poli cal par es
become agents of the state.
According to Mair (1994), poli cal par es scholars building forth on these models
have taken on two strategies. On the one hand, there is a focus on collec ng data on
poli cal par es: (changes in) membership numbers, financial resources and staff (and
where these originate and/or how these are allocated), organiza on, func ons of differ-
ent organs and the (power) rela onship between them, etc. (see for example the data
handbook on poli cal par es, Katz and Mair, 1992) in order to provide empirical data
on which to base the analysis of the party in light of the changes in the electorate. On
the other hand, there is also an explicit a empt to:
“... move away from the concep on of party as a unitary actor, and espe-
cially to move away from the almost exclusive concern with the rela onship
between par es and civil society, by disaggrega ng party organiza ons into
at least three different elements, or faces, each of which interacts with the
others [...] the party in public office, that is, the party organiza on in gov-
ernment and in parliament [...] the party on the ground [...] the party in
central office ...” (Mair, 1994, 4).
That combina on of these two avenues of research has led to an abundance of litera-
ture that deals with the ques on of party decline. Studies show that the so-called de-
cline of the poli cal party seems to be limited to the party on the ground; the party in
central office, and especially the party in public office, seem to unaffected, or accord-
ing to some have even gained in strength (as modeled by Katz and Mair’s (1994) cartel
model). The disaggrega on of the party organiza on in the poli cal par es literature
has allowed scholars to differen ate between the different ways that deseculariza on
and moderniza on in Western democracies has affected different parts of the poli cal
party organiza on. The ques on remains, however, how these changes have affected
the rela onship between the parliamentary party group and individual MPs as repre-
senta ves (Katz and Mair, 2009, 762), which requires disaggrega ng to the level of the
individual MP.4
Manin (1997, 227-228) expects that the ongoing change from party to audience
democracy will lead representa ve actors in parliament to have more freedom of ac-
on vis-a-vis voters once elected, as the electoral promises “take the form of rela vely
4 This is not to say that there are no studies within the poli cal par es literature on the parliamentary party
group as a ‘face’ of the party (see the different country case studies in Heidar and Koole (2000), for example).
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hazy images”. At the same me, he predicts that due to the societal changes and party
professionaliza on outlined above, voters will tend to increasingly vote for a person, or
the image of a person, rather than a party’s policy pla orm. Manin also specifies, how-
ever, that this personaliza on mainly holds for party leaders. Although poli cal par es’
parliamentary counterparts are increasingly considered part of the party leadership, and
less as agents of the party-as-a-whole, Manin (1997, 231-232) expects par es to remain
unified around their party leader in terms of parliamentary vo ng. But he also concedes
that the decrease in importance of the party programwill lead individual representa ves
to engage in a more direct personal rela onship with interest groups and ci zens asso-
cia ons. It is thus unclear what, according to Manin, the change from party democracy
to audience democracy means for rela onship between poli cal par es and their indi-
vidual representa ves (i.e., whether there could a be return to parliamentarianism in
terms of the individual MP as main actor in parliament, or a move in another direc on).
There are calls for formal ins tu onal changes from poli cal reformers, who pro-
pose modifica ons of electoral and intra-party selectoral ins tu ons in order to alter
the workings of poli cal par es, and create a more personal rela onship between the
voters and the individuals who represent them. These reforms target the workings of
poli cal par es in parliament in par cular. Poli cal reformers argue that giving the elec-
torate and party members a greater say in the selec on of representa ves will improve
the quality of representa on as it increases direct responsiveness and accountability of
individual MPs, implying that reformers deem that the individual—and not the poli cal
party—ought to be the main representa ve actor in parliament. Carey (2009, 8) notes
that the proposed reforms are especially aimed at increasing the accountability of party
(group) leaders, who are shielded from punishment by electoral systems (par cularly in
party-oriented electoral systems) that do not allow voters to discriminate among candi-
dates as long as candidate nomina on is centralized among party leaders. However, on
a more general note, the call for the personaliza on of electoral and selectoral ins tu-
ons is aimed at making all individual representa ves more responsive and accountable
to ci zens’ demands, favoring a dyadic rela onship between MPs and voters instead of
a collec ve rela onship through poli cal par es:
“Whereas advocates of collec ve, par san representa on are primarily con-
cerned with the ideological and policy content of party labels, the deci-
siveness of legislatures and the voters’ assessments of overall government
performance […], advocates of individual-level accountability aremore con-
cerned with maximizing virtues – deterring the betrayal of the demands of
par cular votes who picked an individual legislator as their representa ve”
(Carey, 2009, 8).
2.4.2 Personaliza on
In an a empt to create a uniform conceptual approach to personaliza on, Rahat and
Sheafer (2007) propose a typology of poli cal personaliza on, ofwhich two types are rel-
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evant at this point: ins tu onal and behavioral personaliza on.5 The above men oned
calls for changes to electoral and selectoral ins tu ons fall under ins tu onal person-
aliza on, as they propose “the adop on of rules, mechanisms, and ins tu ons that put
more emphasis on the individual poli cian and less on poli cal groups and par es” (Ra-
hat and Sheafer, 2007, 66). Behavioral personaliza on can refer to either the public or
poli cians. Public behavioral personaliza on entails that the voters’ increasingly place
emphasis on individual poli cians at the expense of the poli cal party, whereas poli -
cians’ personaliza on involves a decline in party ac vity in favor of individual poli cians’
behavior. Balmas et al. (2012) further specify this typology by differen a ng between
centralized personaliza on (some mes referred to as presiden aliza on), which entails
that poli cal power is increasingly placed in the hands of a few party leaders, and de-
centralized personaliza on, which means that poli cal power is diffused from the party
as a collec ve to those individual poli cians who do not belong to the party leadership.
In their survey of the literature on personaliza on, Balmas et al. (2012) conclude that
there is mixed evidence for the phenomenon of centralized ins tu onal personaliza on,
which would entail the ins tu onal empowerment of poli cal leaders, and party mem-
bers’ increased power when it comes to the selec on of their party leadership (Kenig,
2009; LeDuc, 2001; Scarrow, 2001). Although less research has been done on decen-
tralized ins tu onal personaliza on, those studies that have been conducted generally
point in the direc on of a strengthening of the ins tu onal posi on of individual poli -
cians: Bille (2001) and Scarrow et al. (2000) both iden fy a trend of democra za on of
par es’ candidate selec on methods in established democracies the between 1960 and
1990. When it comes to the electoral system, the weight of the personal vote has in-
creased in countries such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden (Karvonen,
2010). In the Netherlands, for example, the threshold for obtaining a seat in parliament
on the basis of personal votes was decreased from 50 percent to 25 percent of the elec-
toral quo ent (given that the candidate’s party is en tled to the seat) in 1998.
Whether these ins tu onal changes have led to more behavioral personaliza on by
the public and poli cians is unclear (Karvonen, 2007, 13). Some studies show that vot-
ers are increasingly more likely to base their vote on the iden ty of the party leader
instead of their evalua on of the party as a whole, whereas others find li le suppor ng
evidence for this (Balmas et al., 2012, 40). On the other hand, Van Holsteyn and An-
deweg (2010, 632-635) find that among the Dutch electorate the percentage of votes
cast for candidates other than the party leader increased from less than 5 percent in
the first post-war elec on to over 25 percent in 2002, poin ng towards an increase in
the public’s decentralized behavioral personaliza on. They conclude, however, that vot-
ers s ll consider the poli cal party to be more important than the individual candidate
5 Rahat and Sheafer (2007, 67) also include media personaliza on as a third type of personaliza on, which
entails that the media increase their focus on the individual poli cians at the expense of the poli cal party.
Balmas et al. (2012) specify that media personaliza on is centralized when journalists and poli cal cam-
paigns increasingly focus on a few poli cal leaders (presidents, primeministers, party leaders) instead of on
cabinets and poli cal par es as collec ves. Decentralized personaliza on means that the media increase
the a en on they pay to, and poli cal campaigns increasingly revolve around, individual poli cians who
are not party leaders or the heads of the execu ve.
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when cas ng their vote, but that within the poli cal party the choice for an individual
candidate clearly ma ers. In Belgium, where voters can choose between vo ng for a
party list as a whole or an individual on a party list, the share of voters who cast a pref-
erence vote also increased from around half in the 1980s to almost two-thirds at the
start of the 2000s (André et al., 2012, 7-8). In both cases, one could argue that the ins -
tu onal change led to an increase in voters’ personalized behavior, although the trend
in increased preference vo ng had already set in before the ins tu onal changes took
place. Contrarily, however, Karvonen (2011) finds no evidence of a systema c increase
in Finnish voters’ personalized vo ng behavior over me. The evidence for public be-
havioral personaliza on is thus mixed.
Unfortunately, very li le research has been done on whether these ins tu onal re-
forms have led to any behavioral personaliza on by poli cians (which might indicate an
increase in the responsiveness and accountability of individual poli cians), but the few
studies that have been done do seem to point in the direc on centralized behavioral
personaliza on (Balmas et al., 2012, 40). According to Balmas et al. (2012, 40), em-
pirical evidence of decentralized behavioral personaliza on in the parliamentary arena,
whether individual MPs engage in more individual—instead of party—oriented behav-
ior, is “... is hard to find. In fact, we have none, save for the case of Israel” (Balmas et al.,
2012, 40). Rahat and Sheafer (2007) find that ins tu onal personaliza on in Israel leads
to behavioral personaliza on by individual representa ves in both the electoral arena
(campaigning for personal votes) and the parliamentary arena (measured as an increase
in number of the submissions and adop ons of private member bills). The la er indi-
cator is also used by Balmas et al. (2012) in their own study of the Israeli Parliament.
Balmas et al. (2012, 43-46) add the increased use of roll call vo ng and the use of self-
references (the use of the first person singular, for example) in parliamentary speech as
possible indicators of personaliza on, both of which point in the direc on of an increase
in decentralized behavioral personaliza on.
2.5 Conclusion
Both parliamentarianism and party democracy have le their mark on poli cal repre-
senta on in modern day democracies. As a result of the period of parliamentarianism,
most (European) parliamentary democracies s ll ascribe a central role to the individual
MPs in their cons tu ons. The stranglehold of poli cal par es, remnants of the age of
party democracy, also remains, although the primacy of poli cal par es seems to be
declining, as evidenced by the increase in electoral vola lity and weakening of voters’
par san es. For some, the change towards what Manin (1997) terms audience democ-
racy cons tutes a crisis in representa on, as the ability of poli cal par es to meet stan-
dards of responsiveness and accountability is ques oned. Poli cal reformers’ calls for
ins tu onal personaliza on highlight the tension between individual representa on by
individual MPs and collec ve representa on by poli cal par es, and seem to favor (a
return to) the former.
The tension between individual MPs and their poli cal par es as representa ve ac-
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tors is, however, of all mes. Although Manin’s (1997) first ideal-type of representa ve
government, parliamentarianism, favored the individual MP as the main representa ve
actor, the change of parliament from an arena for local interest ar cula on to na onal
policy forma on already led to MPs’ coordina on and collec ve ac on within parlia-
ment. The extension of universal suffrage pped the balance towards the poli cal party
as the main representa ve actor, as this collec ve organiza on was extended into the
electoral arena. Although some consider the decline of poli cal par es a crisis in rep-
resenta on, one could also argue that the primacy of the poli cal party as the main
representa ve actor in western democracies has been a me-bound phenomenon; it is
not unequivocally desirable or virtuous in and of itself from a norma ve perspec ve. In
more prac cal terms, democra c representa on does not by defini on necessitate that
the balance between the individual MP and the poli cal party favor the la er.
Even though personaliza on may be on the rise, poli cal par es in most (European)
parliamentary democracies s ll behave as unitary actors, at least in terms of their leg-
isla ve vo ng behavior: “the usual, though not invariable, prac ce in the world’s parlia-
ments is that legislators vote together by party” (Olson, 2003, 165), and are by and large
treated as such by both academics and poli cal observers. That poli cal par es act as
unitary actors is certainly not automa c, however. How party group unity is established,
i.e., how the tension between individual MPs and their poli cal par es is resolved in fa-
vor of the la er, is a topic that has received only modest a en on. As highlighted by Ol-
son (2003, 165), and evidenced by the recent interest in poli cal personaliza on, “[w]e
pay a en on to ‘rebellion’ or ‘dissent’ as excep ons, while assuming unity is the more
usual behaviour and thus requires less detailed explana on [...] each body of research
examines departures from its respec ve ‘normal’”.
Whether the change towards audience democracy indeed marks a crisis in repre-
senta on is a norma ve ques on, as is whether unitary parliamentary par es are s ll,
or have ever been, necessary or desirable. Empirical research cannot provide the an-
swer. Empirical research can, however, provide an important basis for the norma ve
debate. How party group unity is established is a key ques on that remains understud-
ied. Do MPs vote with their party group voluntarily, or do they do so involuntarily in
response to (threatened) nega ve sanc ons or (promised) benefits by the party (group)
leadership? If MPs do vote with their party group voluntarily, is this because they sim-
ply agree with their party group’s posi on on the ma er, or because they have been
socialized to subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty and consider their party group
their main principal? Do MPs even have an opinion on ma ers that are put to a vote in
parliament, or do they rely on their party group specialist and/or spokesperson for their
vo ng cue? The rela ve role of these different mechanisms, or pathways to party unity,
and whether their contribu ons to party unity have changed through me, and whether
their use differs between ins tu onal se ngs, are important pieces of informa on if one
wants implement ins tu onal changes to increase responsiveness and accountability of
representa ve actors, and (re-)establish the representa onal link between voters and
individual MPs (or the primacy of the unified poli cal party).
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Chapter 3
Unpacking the unitary actor
3.1 Party group unity
Of the responsible party model’s three condi ons for effec ve representa on, it is the
third requirement, that poli cal par es ought to behave as unitary blocs, that is consid-
ered the least problema c in most parliamentary systems of government. And indeed,
when it comes to vo ng in parliament, MPs who belong to the same party group tend
to vote together. Scholars also o en take party group unity for granted, as evidenced by
the fact that many studies on poli cal representa on and behavior tend to assume that
poli cal par es can be treated as unitary actors, and refer to the party as the main rep-
resenta ve actor. As argued by Kam (2009, 21), however, “[u]nity is not preordained”.
Given the poten al diversity, and possibly conflic ng nature, ofMPs’ backgrounds, polit-
ical opinions, interests, ambi ons and role concep ons, one would actually expect party
group unity to be “problema c and condi onal rather than sta c and fixed” (Collie, 1984,
20). Moreover, the shi towards audience democracy and increase in personaliza on
forecasted by Manin (1997), has led some to predict that party group unity may be be-
coming more difficult to maintain, which leads to the further ques oning of scholars’
unitary actor assump on.
Within the study of legisla ve behavior, and that of legisla ve vo ng in par cular,
poli cal scien sts concentra ng on parliamentary systems of government have only paid
only scarce a en on to how party group unity is brought about. According to Collie
(1984, 5), this is because “it seemed reasonable to conclude that a single factor (i.e.,
party)was the primacy determinant” ofMPs’ behavior. What the variable ‘party’ actually
encompasses is, however, subject to disagreement. Moreover, many studies that do
seek to explain party group unity tend to focus on the level of the poli cal party group
or parliament as a whole, ignoring the fact that party group unity is the result of decision
making by individual MPs, who are constrained by their rela onship with their poli cal
party and influenced by their ins tu onal environment.
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3.1.1 Conceptualiza on
The literature on party unity is plagued with conceptual confusion (Andeweg and Tho-
massen, 2011a), as the terms party unity, party cohesion, party coherence, party ho-
mogeneity, party loyalty, and party discipline are o en used interchangeably. Early on
Özbudun (1970, 305) defined party cohesion as “an objec ve condi on of unity of ac on
among partymembers”, towhich Skjaeveland (2001) added that the unity of ac onmust
be ‘external’ to the parliamentary party group (i.e. public) to make the concept en rely
dis nct from any explanatory connota on. Nonetheless, the term party cohesion is s ll
o en used in reference to mechanisms that are hypothesized to cause unity of ac on
among MPs. In order to avoid this confusion, in this study the term party cohesion is
avoided altogether when referring to the final outcome—MPs’ concerted behavior. We
follow Hazan (2003, 3) in his defini on of party unity as “the observable degree to which
members of a group act in unison” (thus referring strictly to the behavioral outcome) and
reiterates the point made by Skjaeveland that the term ought to refer to behaviors ex-
ternal to what goes on within the parliamentary party group, which is in line with the
delinea on between the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ theaters of representa on suggested by Co-
pus (1997b).1 In addi on, this study focuses specifically on MPs, and thus party groups
in parliament.
Kam (2001a, 95) calls a en on to the fact that party cohesion (which in this study
is referred to as party group unity) is o en conceptualized as the inverse to dissent, but
that the two are measured at different levels of analysis. Whereas party group unity is
measured at the party group level, dissent is measured at the level of the individual MP.
The degree of party group unity, however, results directly from the collec ve behavior
of individual MPs; it is a func on of its aggrega on. MPs who assent to the party group
line contribute to the group’s unity, whereas MPs who dissent from the party group line
contribute to the breakdown of their poli cal party group’s unity. Party group unity,
therefore, is not only a collec ve phenomenon but also a con nuous variable, since po-
li cal party groups can be more or less unified, depending on the degree to which their
MPs act in concert (Olson, 2003, 165).
3.1.2 Measurement
Legisla ve vo ng is usually used as a measure of party group unity. From a theore cal
perspec ve the study of legisla ve vo ng behavior is linked to themost prominent ques-
ons in legisla ve studies, including the nature of representa on, the role and strength
of legisla ve party groups, and the durability of government (Collie, 1985, 471-472). In
1 In his study of the rela onship between local councilors and their party groups in the United Kingdom,
Copus (1997b) classifies council sessions, council commi ee and public mee ngs, as well as the local press
and electronic media, as ‘open’ theaters of representa on because they all take place in public and enable
high transparency of ac on. The party group and local party mee ngs, as well as private mee ngs between
councilors, take place within ‘closed’ theaters of representa on; councilors’ behavior in these se ngs is
much less transparent. Copus (1997b, 310) maintains that it is in the ‘closed’ theaters that councilors meet
privately to determine how they will act in the ‘open’ theaters, entailing that what goes on within the party
group (in part) determines how representa ves will act external to it.
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reference to the no ons of representa on and accountability, for example, Carey (2009,
4) argues that the act and result of vo ng on legisla on is the most transparent and
ul mately important behavior in the legisla ve process. Vo ng is an act of legisla ve
decisiveness, and therefore demonstrates representa ve actors’ (poli cal par es and
individual MPs) ability or failure to enact promised policy most clearly to their ul mate
principals (voters) who, depending on the vo ng procedure, incur rela vely low costs
in monitoring this behavior and holding their agents to account. Given the principal-
agent rela onship between the poli cal par es and their MPs, the vo ng stage is also
the most important from the poli cal party’s perspec ve. In fact, poli cal party (group)
leaders o en have an informa onal advantage over voters when it comes to monitoring
the behavior of their MPs at the vo ng stage.
The analysis of legisla ve vo ng behavior predates the 1950’s behavioral revolu on
and goes back to the classic studies on representa on in the United States by Lowell
(1902), Rice (1925) and Key (1949) (Collie, 1985, 471). The most commonly used mea-
sure of party vo ng unity is the Rice Index of Cohesion (Rice, 1925, 1928) which aggre-
gates individual representa ves’ votes and then calculates party group unity coefficients
on the basis of probability theory (the percentage of party representa veswho vote alike
on a given vote).2 Given the availability of roll call vo ng data in the United States, it is
no surprise that most legisla ve vo ng studies are about the United States Congress and
House of Representa ves, where party group unity is found to be rela vely low.3
Studies of legisla ve vo ng in Western European parliaments reveal party vo ng
unity to be generally much higher than in the United States. Many of these studies are
limited to a single country case.4 In one of the earliest compara ve analyzes to include
poli cal par es from both the United States and Europe, Olson (1980) includes 10 po-
li cal party groups from France, Britain, West Germany and the United States, and finds
that only the French Radical Party (Par Radical) scored as low as the two par es in
the United States when it comes to party group unity. Harmel and Janda (1982) extend
their analysis of legisla ve vo ng in the United States to include 67 (out of the total of
95) par es from 21 different countries, and find party group vo ng unity in all European
parliaments included in their analysis to be higher than in the United States. More re-
cently, Sieberer (2006) as well as Depauw andMar n (2009) reveal high Rice scores for a
2 One of the disadvantages of the Rice Index specifically, forwarded by Desposato (2005), is that it may lead to
a systema c overes ma on in small and rela vely divided party groups (Sieberer, 2006). Desposato (2005)
suggests adjus ng the Rice Index of Cohesion according to party group size.
3 Early analyses by Harmel and Janda (1982) show that party group vo ng unity averaged 64 percent for
Republicans and 69 percent for Democrats in the United States House of Representa ves between 1954
and 1978. Taking on a longer period of me, Brady et al. (1979) examines changes in party group vo ng
unity, revealing that average party Rice scores actually decreased slightly between 1886 and 1966 in the
House of Representa ves.
4 For France see Wilson and Wiste (1976) and Converse and Pierce (1979, 1986), for Finland see Pesonen
(1972), for Germany see Özbudun (1970) and Loewenberg (1967), for Italy see Di Palma (1977), for the
Netherlands see Tazelaar (1974); Visscher (1994); Wolters (1984), for Sweden see Clausen and Holmberg
(1977), for Switzerland see Her g (1978), and for the United Kingdom see Norton (1975, 1978, 1980) and
Crowe (1980). Mezey (1979) also conducted a number of single country studies.
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number of European parliaments. All in all, these results on vo ng behavior show that,
when it comes to vo ng, party group unity inWestern European parliaments is generally
very high.
As a measure of party group unity, legisla ve vo ng has a number of advantages as
well as disadvantages. First, vo ng takes place in almost legislatures and thus, at least
in theory, serves as a useful compara ve measure. Vo ng procedures can also differ
between legislatures and over me, however. In some legislatures all votes are auto-
ma cally recorded (in some cases electronically) and published on an individual basis,
whereas in others roll call votes are infrequent and atypical, and most votes are taken
by show of hands or are registered by poli cal party group (Owens, 2003, 15). This
has skewed the quan ta ve empirical analysis of vo ng behavior and party group unity
towards those legislatures that frequently make use of roll call vo ng procedures or reg-
ister all votes automa cally on an individual basis (Sieberer, 2006, 159).
Moreover, as pointed out by Carrubba et al. (2006) and Hug (2010), the reliance
on votes that are recorded and published on an individual basis (roll call votes) as a
measure of party group unity may lead to biased results for those legislatures in which
not all votes are taken by the same procedure, as these votes do not cons tute a random
sample. Some legislatures require roll calls on certain issues or classes of votes and
allow for other vo ng procedures on other issues or types of votes, thereby crea ng a
poten al selec on bias. There are only a limited number of studies that address this
poten al bias, but Hug’s (2010) study of the Swiss Parliament confirms that party group
unity (measured by the Rice Index of Cohesion) is higher for votes that are automa cally
recorded and published on an individual basis (which include, for example, final votes
and votes on urgent ma ers) than for votes taken through other procedures.
Another poten al bias associated with the use of roll call votes specifically in studies
of party group unity is the problemof endogeneity (Owens, 2003, 16-17). Thismay occur
in the study of legislatures where roll calls have to be explicitly requested by (a number
of) individual MPs or party groups, as roll call can be used as a disciplining tool and for
signaling to the public (Hug, 2010). On the one hand, the legisla ve party leadership
may request a roll call in order to monitor the behavior of its own MPs and force them
to close ranks, thus leading to higher levels of party group unity in comparison to other
vo ng procedures. On the other hand, however, roll may be called to draw a en on to
MPs’ dissent and disunity in other poli cal party groups, resul ng in lower levels of party
group unity than would be case if all votes were included in the analysis. As highlighted
by Depauw and Mar n (2009, 104), these two strategic func ons of the use of roll call
votes are expected to have opposite effects on party group unity scores, and therefore
may cancel each other out to a certain extent.
An advantage of using legisla ve vo ng behavior as a measure of party group unity
is that votes are a fairly simple measure, as vo ng almost always take on the form of a
binary choice: MPs vote for or against the proposal, with or against the othermembers of
the parliamentary party group, and thus either for or against their party group’s posi on
(Carey, 2009, 20). In most legislatures, however, nonvo ng is also possible. First, MPs
may be absent from the vo ng session for a variety of reasons, either professional (e.g.
prior engagements) or personal (e.g. illness, family circumstances). If vo ng by proxy is
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not possible, then this will result in nonvo ng. But absence can also be purposive, i.e. an
MP is physically able to a end, but chooses not to. Second, there are also legislatures
also allow their MPs to formally abstain from vo ng even if they are present for the
vote. Themo va on behind purposive absence and absten onmay be related to issues
of party group unity, because they can be used by MPs to explicitly show discontent
with the party group line, without going as far as to vote against the party group. Non-
vo ng can, however, s ll have an effect on the final outcome of the vote, depending on
the rules of the legislature, as some require a minimal number or percentage of MPs
to be present (or to partake in vo ng) in order for vo ng to commence or for the vote
to be considered valid. Party group size, and in the case of government par cipa on,
the margin of the government majority, may also influence the effect of nonvo ng on
the end result of the vote. Whereas some scholars ignore nonvo ng, other authors try
to disentangle nonvo ng according to its poten al causes (Ames, 2002; Haspel et al.,
1998), and s ll others treat nonvo ng according to its effect on the outcome of the vote
(Carey, 2007, 2009).
Nonvo ng le aside, as opposed to other legisla ve behaviors, the posi onMPs take
vis-a-vis their party group on a vote is considered rather easy to iden fy. Determining
whether MPs’ behavior is ‘in concert’ in the case of legisla ve debates and media ap-
pearances, for example, is more challenging. The focus on vo ng, however, leads to a
disregard of these other behaviors through which the degree of party group unity may
be revealed. This includes the submission, (co)signing and content of private member
bills, mo ons and amendments, the submission and content of (wri en and oral) par-
liamentary ques ons, the content of legisla ve debates and speeches, commi ee work,
and even public andmedia appearances. Each one of these situa ons also represents an
occasion when MPs may either toe the party group line or not (Kam, 2001a, 95; Owens,
2003, 16).
That the poli cal party (group) leadership is aware that party group unity is reflected
through these other behaviors, and thus also monitor the behavior of their MPs dur-
ing these other ac vi es, is illustrated by the par es in the Dutch Second Chamber
(Tweede Kamer), where a number of the parliamentary party groups require their mem-
bers to run their oral andwri en ques ons by the party group leadership orweekly party
group mee ng before formally introducing them to Parliament (Andeweg and Thomas-
sen, 2005). As such, poli cal party (group) leaders can try to control party group unity
and influence the behavior of their individualMPs through agenda control (Carey, 2007),
keeping certain issues off the legisla ve agenda if they consider these to be poli cally
risky, perhaps due to known or suspected intra-party group divisions (Owens, 2003, 16).
Poli cal party (group) leaders can monitor and a empt to control the behavior of their
MPs not only in the final vo ng stage, but also in the proceeding stages, as well as other
public behaviors in and outside of parliament.
Another behavioral outcomeexternal to the parliamentary party group that has been
connected to party group unity is party group defec on, an MP’s early departure from
his parliamentary party group (Owens, 2003). Heller andMershon (2008) andDesposato
(2006), for example, explicitly connect party group switching to party group unity. One
could argue that if an MP leaves his parliamentary group, either by switching to another
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party group (floor crossing) or by becoming an independent, this could be taken as an
indicator of party group disunity. Once the MP has le his parliamentary party group,
however, party group unity can be said to have been reestablished to a certain extent. It
is, however, more difficult to interpret party group defec on as a case of party disunity
when an MP not only defects from his party group, but actually leaves parliament alto-
gether, as this could be done for other reasons as well, of a personal or career-oriented
nature, for example.
3.2 Explaining party group unity
Within the body of literature that seeks to explain party group unity and individual MPs’
vo ng behavior, different lines of work can be iden fied. On the one hand, compara ve
studies generally focus on how government and electoral systems, party level ins tu-
ons and rules, and societal differences and changes, can explain cross-na onal varia-
on in party group vo ng unity. On the other hand, there are also a number of theoret-
ical and (small-n compara ve case) studies that deal with the party- and individual-level
mechanisms that lead MPs to vote with or against the party group line.
3.2.1 Ins tu ons and party group unity
Compara ve studies generally deal with the effects of different ins tu onal configura-
ons on party vo ng unity. Although numerous scholars alluded to the influences of
ins tu onal factors on party group unity, Ozbudun (1970) was among the first to the-
orize the connec on explicitly. Most authors agree that the structure of the rela on-
ship between the execu ve and legislature, whether presiden al or parliament, has a
profound effect on the level of party group unity. It is in par cular the (explicit or im-
plicit) confidence rule—the fact that the execu ve does not have its own mandate and
is dependent on the support of a majority of the legislature—found in parliamentary
systems, that leads to the expecta on that party vo ng unity is higher in parliamentary
systems than in presiden al systems, especially among governing par es (Carey, 2007,
2009; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Owens, 2003; Ozbudun, 1970). Indeed, past research
has found party vo ng unity to be much higher in parliamentary systems, as is the case
in European democracies, than in presiden al systems, as in the United States and La n
America. A second important ins tu onal factor is the degree of government decentral-
iza on: party groups in federal systems, where poli cal par es are required to organize
on a regional or state base, are expected to have lower levels of party vo ng unity than
party groups in unitary systems, which allow par es to organize at the na onal level
(Carey, 2007; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Key, 1949; Owens, 2003).
Harmel and Janda (1982) introduced electoral systems as a third important ins tu-
on affec ng party vo ng unity. Later, authors such as Carey and Shugart (1995) further
specified the electoral connec on, hypothesizing that electoral systems that create in-
cen ves for personal-vote seeking (candidate-oriented electoral systems) lead to lower
levels of party vo ng unity than electoral systems that do not create such incen ves
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(party-oriented electoral systems). Olson (1980) and more recently Rahat and Hazan
(2001), explicitly separated the candidate selec on process that takes place within par-
es from the effects of electoral ins tu ons, and argued that candidate selec on pro-
cedures that are exclusive and centralized are expected to lead to higher levels of party
vo ng unity than candidate selec on procedures that are inclusive and decentralized.
Indeed, much of what is ascribed to differences in the level of government decentral-
iza on and electoral systemmay actually be linked to the differences in poli cal par es’
candidate selec on procedures (Depauw and Mar n, 2009). Other ins tu onal and so-
cietal factors that are expected to lead to high levels of party group unity include system
stability (Owens, 2003) and electoral (de)alignment (Kam, 2009), the effec ve number of
par es (Turner and Schneier, 1970; Loewenberg and Pa erson, 1979; Harmel and Janda,
1982), party age, party (group) size, party ideology, ideological polariza on (Özbudun,
1970) and the shape of poli cal compe on (Owens, 2003), the effec veness (strength)
of legislature (Mezey, 1979), and commi ee strength.
Although many of these hypotheses are corroborated by different studies (the dif-
ference in party vo ng unity between parliamentary and presiden al systems, for exam-
ple), some of the results concerning these different theore cal expecta ons about the
effects of ins tu ons on party group unity are mixed. Regarding electoral ins tu ons,
for example, Carey (2007; 2009) finds that intra-party electoral compe on depresses
party group unity in La n American legislatures. In their study of the European Parlia-
ment (EP), Hix et al. (2005) also conclude that there is a rela onship between vo ng unity
within the EP party groups and the electoral system by which the members are elected.
Contrarily, Depauw and Mar n (2009) find that electoral rules only partly account for
party roll call vo ng unity in their 16 Europeanparliaments, and although Sieberer (2006)
concludes that party-oriented electoral systems indeed place rigid constraints on MPs
(i.e., high party group unity), his analysis also reveals that candidate-oriented electoral
systems are not a sufficient condi on for low party group unity. To a certain extent, the
different country cases included in each of the analyzes, the different opera onaliza-
ons of the ins tu onal variables, as well as the previously men oned disadvantages
of using (roll call) vo ng data as a measure of party group unity, may account for these
mixed results.
Carey’s (2007; 2009) Theory of Compe ng Principals provides an overall framework
through which to approach the effects of ins tu ons on legisla ve vo ng behavior, but
can also be used to illustrate another problem with the ins tu onal approach. Namely,
that the focus on the direct impact of ins tu ons on legisla ve vo ng behavior ignores
an important step in the process of party group unity forma on, specifically, individual
legislators’ decision-making mechanisms. Working from the perspec ve of Principal-
Agent Theory, Carey argues that ins tu ons determine the way in which valuable re-
sources are distributed among legislators’ principals, and thus influence the extent to
which legislators are dependent on—and thus accountable to—different principals. The
more legislators are dependent on their poli cal party, andmore specifically, on poli cal
party (group) leaders, the more likely it is that party vo ng unity will be high. Contrarily,
the less dependent legislators are on their poli cal party (group) leaders, and the more
ins tu ons make them dependent on alterna ve, o en compe ng principals within the
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poli cal system (such as voters, presidents, etc.) that “drive wedges into party groups”
(Carey, 2009, 162), the more likely it is that party vo ng unity will be low (Carey, 2009,
14-20).
Carey’s theory alludes to a number of different causal mechanisms that may be af-
fected by these ins tu onal configura ons. Ques ons arise as to what exactly these
ins tu ons do to foster a situa on in which party group unity is high. Does a lack of
compe ng principals enable party selectorates to select only those candidates whose
policy preferences are in line with their own? Does the fact that legislators owe their se-
lec on to their party leaders ins ll in thema sense of loyalty towards their party leaders?
Or does legislators’ sole dependence on the party give party (group) leaders more dis-
ciplinary leverage to (threaten to) coerce legislators to toe the party group line? Carey
men ons all of these possibili es, but generally remains at a theore cal level when it
comes to the workings of these mechanisms. Other authors also make assump ons
or theore cal arguments as to the effects of ins tu ons on MPs and their rela onship
with their poli cal party. Bowler (2000, 177), for example, argues that par es’ nomina-
on proceduresmay influence the homogeneity of parliamentary party groups. Sieberer
(2006, 154-155) makes a very similar argument when he hypothesizes that party lead-
ers’ control over candidate selec on allows them to determine the future composi on
of the parliamentary party group. Depauw and Mar n (2009, 117), however, contend
that centralized selec on methods appear to lead to higher levels of party group unity
because party leaders control MPs’ future careers, and legislators seem to be mo vated
by the desire to be promoted. And Rahat and Hazan (2001, 314, 317) argue that ex-
clusive selectorates allow par es to reassert both party discipline and cohesion. These
examples illustrate the two main problems with the ins tu onal approach. First, the
explana ons offered as to the workings of these causal mechanisms and the effects of
ins tu ons on these causal mechanisms differ per study and are o en limited to the-
ory and are thus not tested empirically. Second, focusing on legisla ve vo ng behavior
as the main dependent variable and indicator of party group unity, does not allow one
to dis nguish between the different causal mechanisms, or reasons why MPs behave in
accordance or in discord with the party group line. As recognized by Krehbiel:
“In cas ng apparently par san votes, do individual legislators vote with fel-
low party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in ques-
on, or do they votewith fellowmembers because of their agreement about
the policy in ques on?” (Krehbiel, 1993, 238)
3.2.2 Pathways to party group unity
In line with Krehbiel (1993), part of the theore cal literature on party group unity has
moved beyond the outcome of vo ng unity and focuses on the ‘pathways to party unity’
(Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a), the mechanisms that play a role in genera ng party
group unity. Returning to the conceptual confusion that was men oned at the start of
this chapter, most scholars acknowledge that party group unity can be achieved in (at
least) two ways: either by MPs voluntarily s cking to the party group line as a result of
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their ‘like-mindedness’, or alterna vely doing so involuntarily under the threat, an ci-
pa on or the actual use of posi ve and nega ve sanc ons by the parliamentary party
(group) leadership, or other individuals and/or organswithin the party that control these
resources. Many authors refer to the voluntary pathway as party cohesion, whereas the
involuntary pathway is typically referred to as party discipline. The former is associated
with a certain consensus in values and a tudes among MPs resul ng in their voluntary
conformance to the party group’s posi on, while the la er entails a form of compulsion
or the enforcement of obedience, usually applied by the poli cal party (group) leader-
ship (or whoever controls the resources that can be used as poten al carrots and s cks)
(Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bowler et al., 1999a; Hazan, 2003; Krehbiel, 1993;
Norpoth, 1976; Ozbudun, 1970).
The voluntary pathway, party cohesion, is also conceptualized in different ways by
different scholars. Whereas some emphasize the homogeneity of MPs’ policy prefer-
ences, others refer to cohesion as MPs’ shared subscrip on to norms of party group
solidarity. The former situa on, that of shared preferences, is o en associated with Kre-
hbiel’s (1993) preference-driven approach and is referred to in this study as party group
agreement. It holds that party group unity results from MPs vo ng together simply be-
cause of their agreement about the policy in ques on (Krehbiel, 1993, 238). Whereas
some assume that MPs’ policy preferences are formed exogenously to their work in par-
liament, others point out thatMPs’ opinionsmay also result from processes of argumen-
ta on and delibera on as a part of their parliamentary func on, through their contacts
with actors outside of parliament (such as voters and party members), within the par-
liamentary party group, and in parliament itself.
Party group agreement assumes, however, that MPs actually have an opinion on all
issues that are voted on. As pointed out by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 657) and
Whitaker (2005, 9-10) this need not be the case. Due to the workload of parliament
(distribu onal logic, Shepsle and Weingast, 1994) and technicality of certain issues (in-
forma onal logic, Krehbiel, 1991), many parliamentary party groups apply a division of
labor. The party group policy specialists and/or spokespersons are responsible for the
party group posi on (Patzelt, 2003, 106-107), as far as this posi on has not been s pu-
lated in the party program, electoral manifesto or, in the case of government par cipa-
on, the government (coali on) agreement. Thus, MPs may o en rely on the cues given
to them by their fellow party group members when it comes to issues outside their own
por olio. In the absence of MPs’ personal opinions (due to a lack of informa on or me
to invest gathering the informa on needed to form an opinion), party group unity can
also be brought about by MPs’ cue-taking. One could ques on whether cue-taking falls
under party cohesion, as in this situa on policy preferences are not shared, but absent
in the case of some MPs. On the other hand, cue-taking is of a voluntary nature, which
is in line with the general understanding of party cohesion in the literature.
The other facet of party cohesion, MPs’ subscrip on to norms of party group soli-
darity that results fromMPs’ internalized role percep on (Searing, 1991, 1994) acquired
through a process of internaliza on and socializa on in the parliamentary party group
as well as through MPs’ previous poli cal party experience (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 1983;
Kam, 2009; Rush and Giddings, 2011), is associated with the sociological approach and
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is referred to in this study as party group loyalty. As is the case in any group or or-
ganiza on, informal norms, defined as commonly held beliefs about what cons tutes
appropriate conduct, may guide the behavior of parliamentary party group members.
Although there is no precise threshold, it seems that a majority of group members must
hold the same belief about what cons tutes appropriate conduct for a norm to exist
(Crowe, 1983, 908). At the same me, however, one can argue that although norms are
probably created and reinforced by selec on and socializa on, the internaliza on and
judgment regarding the applicability of norms in par cular situa ons, is an individual
decision. If MPs subscribe to a par cular norm, and consider it relevant in a certain sit-
ua on, they will apply it whether their direct environment abides by the same norm or
not. Party group loyalty, as a mechanism leading to party group unity, entails that in the
case of disagreement with the party group’s posi on, MPs opt to s ll vote with the party
group because they subscribe to the norm of party group solidarity.
Party group loyalty is o en confusedwith party discipline, as both only need to come
into play when there is a conflict between MPs’ preferences and the party group’s po-
si on, i.e. MPs vote together in spite of their disagreement (Krehbiel, 1993, 238). But
whereas party group loyalty is brought about by MPs’ adherence to a ‘logic of appropri-
ateness’ and is of a voluntary nature, party discipline in the form of posi ve and nega ve
sanc ons brings about MPs’ decision making according to a ‘logic of consequen ality’,
and is of an involuntary nature. Party discipline is usually associated with a ra onal-
choice perspec ve on legisla ve behavior, highligh ng the interac on between MPs’
purposive goals (policy, office, and votes) and poli cal party (group) leaders’ hierarchi-
cal control over the distribu on of influence, office perks, and re-(s)elec on (Andeweg
and Thomassen, 2011a; Crowe, 1983; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009). Posi ve incen ves usu-
ally include the promised or actual advancement of MPs to higher posi ons in the party.
Nega ve sanc ons may range from threat or actual removal of MPs as parliamentary
party spokespersons or commi ee member for a certain period of me, to the demo-
on on, or exclusion from upcoming electoral party lists, or even to the expulsion from
the parliamentary party group.
Empirical studies that deal with these mechanisms mainly rely on a tudinal sur-
veys5 among MPs and/or candidates and are usually limited to a single mechanism or a
single case, although there are a few notable compara ve excep ons (including Jensen’s
(2000) comparison of the Nordic countries and Kam’s (2009) study of Westminster sys-
tems). Norpoth (1976), for example, uses the interviews held in 1958-1959 for the Rep-
resenta on Study conducted by Miller and Stokes, and compares the policy a tudes
indicated by Congressmen in the survey to roll call vo ng behavior in Congress (both ag-
5 There are also studies that rely on legisla ve (roll call) vo ng records to ascertain both MPs’ and party
groups’ policy posi ons. Themain problemwith this measure, however, is that using votes to explain vo ng
behavior may be tautological (Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Kam, 2001a; Vandoren, 1990). Another method
is the use of experts to judge the level of agreementwithin a poli cal party (group). Ray (1999), for example,
conducted an expert survey for all par es in the EUand EFTA concerning the degree of dissent over European
integra on between 1984 and 1996. However, the problem is that although the interviewees are experts,
they are s ll far removed fromMPs’ actual decision-making processes and may also not be able to dis l the
effects of agreement with the party group’s posi on from other determinants.
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gregated at the party group level). Norpoth (1976, 1171) concludes that shared policy
a tudes leave “a par san imprint on the ul mate vo ng decision of a congressman”.
Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) rely on the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, a series of
interviews heldwithmembers of the SecondChamber (which are also used in this study),
to gauge the different mechanisms. Agreement with the party group in the form of the
ideological homogeneity, was found to be high, but not perfect, among the par es in
the Dutch Parliament. Similarly, Willumsen and Öhberg (2012) connected Swedish MPs’
vo ng behavior to the distance MPs perceive between their own posi on and that of
their party on the ideological Le -Right scale (as first suggested by Kam, 2009), as indi-
cated by MPs themselves in the Swedish Members of Parliament Surveys. Their study
reveals that the smaller the distance MPs perceive, the more likely it is that MPs vote
with their poli cal party group in parliament. Bailer et al. (2011) take a different ap-
proach, by asking Swiss MPs what their individual preferences are on two specific votes
in parliament, and compare these preferences to how the individual MPs actually voted
during the final votes in parliament. They find that MPs’ self-indicated preferences lose
their explanatory power once the general Le -Right policy posi on ofMPs’ cons tuency
and poli cal party are taken into account.
As party group loyalty results from a process of socializa on, studies o en rely on
years of incumbency or tenure as a proxy. Time spent in parliament does not reveal
which normsMPs subscribe to or how intensely they do so, however. As is the case with
policy a tudes and party group agreement, party group loyalty has also beenmeasured
through the use of elite surveys. Relying on MPs’ responses to a survey held among
Bri sh Members of Parliament in 1971 and 1972, Crowe (1983, 1986) a empts to gauge
the rela ve strength of norms of party group loyalty in the Bri sh House of Commons,
and shows that both frontbenchers and backbenchers consider cross-vo ng to be the
most serious breach of party group unity.6 Crowe (1983) also finds that the importance
of a par cular norm is structured by the public visibility of the behavior with which the
norm is concerned and, in the case of government par cipa on, the risk that viola on
of the norm poses to the government. Basing his analysis on Australian (1993), Bri sh
(1992) and Canadian (1993) candidate surveys, Kam (2009, 197-201) constructs a three-
point loyalty scale, and connects these responses to MPs’ later vo ng behavior in par-
liament.7 He finds that in the United Kingdom, the more importance an MP a aches to
these facets of party loyalty, the less likely it is that the MP casts dissen ng votes. In
6 Bri sh MPs were asked to rank the following breaches of party discipline (in this study referred to as party
group unity, as most refer to behavioral outcomes that take place outside of the parliamentary party group)
according to the severity of the breach: privately expressing dissent to whips, making a cri cal speech in
Parliament, cross-vo ng, abstaining, signing a cri cal Early Day Mo on, wri ng cri cal le ers and ar cles
in the press, and making cri cal speeches outside the House Crowe (1983, 911).
7 Kam (2009, 197-201) constructs a three-point loyalty scale for the Bri sh and Canadian House of Commons
and the Australian House of Representa ves using the ques ons ‘In your view, how important are the fol-
lowing aspects of an MP’s job 1) suppor ng the party leadership, 2) vo ng with the party in Parliament,
and 3) defending party policy’. (Ques ons were included in the 1992 Bri sh Candidate Survey, the 1993
Canadian Candidate Survey, and 1993 and 1996 Australian Candidate Surveys respec vely.) For the Bri sh
case, Kam also interacts party loyalty with years in office and finds that there is evidence for the hypothesis
of decreasing party loyalty with parliamentary experience.
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Canada and Australia, however, there is no evidence that party loyalty has an impact on
MPs’ vo ng behavior. Rush and Giddings (2011) conclude that in the United Kingdom
MPs who consider the party their main focus of representa on and most important in-
fluence on their behavior are less likely to rebel in comparison to MPs who consider the
en re na on or their cons tuency their main focus or influence. And in the above men-
oned study by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a), party group loyalty, measured as an
MP’s response to the ques on as to how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagree-
ment with his party group, seems to play an increasingly important role in the Dutch
Parliament over me. The study by Andeweg and Thomassen therefore explicitly asso-
ciates party group loyalty with an MP’s internalized role concep on, specifically that of
the party delegate role iden fied by Converse and Pierce (1979, 1986) in their study of
representa onal roles in the European context (see chapter 2).
Norton’s (2003) study of the Bri sh House of Lords exemplifies a case of party group
unity brought about by party group loyalty, although he relies only on behavioral vot-
ing data. Norton points out that the members of the House of Lords lack the common
backgrounds (some do not even have a poli cal party background and many Lords are
recruited from different fields) that would result in high levels of prior policy agreement.
Furthermore, the House of Lords is in essence a discipline-free environment, as its mem-
bers are appointed for life and there is no evidence of nomina on being con ngent on
vo ng behavior commitments. Norton ascribes party vo ng unity (which is not com-
plete, but high), to tribal loyalty, which he defines as the emo onal or intellectual com-
mitment of an MP to ins nc vely vote with his party. Russell (2012) also deals with
party group loyalty in the House of Lords, but instead borrows concepts from social psy-
chology, thereby making a novel interdisciplinary contribu on. Early social psycholog-
ical studies confirm that individuals conform easily to group norms, without rewards
and punishment, and even without shared background or characteris cs. Using survey
ques ons, Russell taps into the House of Lord’s members’ ‘feelings of belongingness’ to
the party group and how these emo ons relate to MPs’ a tudes towards toeing the
party group line. She concludes that a sense of collec ve responsibility and sociability
are important factors in explaining MPs’ a tudes towards party vo ng.
Although there are many studies that claim to deal with party discipline, many of
these studies actually focus on the influence of ins tu ons, or consider any case of non-
preference related vo ng with the party group line to result from party discipline. As
highlighted above, party discipline can be difficult to dis nguish from party group loy-
alty, and it is probably even more difficult to observe. Nega ve sanc ons, for example,
can o en count on nega ve media a en on. Therefore, the assump on is that party
(group) leaders prefer to keep their applica on secret and behind the closed doors of
the parliamentary party group. Furthermore, using nega ve sanc ons can be costly, and
when used too o enmay also ini ate a counter-reac on, thereby leading to an increase
of dissent from the party group line rather than a decrease (Depauw, 2002), making it an
inefficient means of obtaining party group unity (Kam, 2009, 187-188). Norton (1978,
222-253), for example, argues that the overuse of nega ve sanc ons was the reason
behind the decrease in party vo ng unity in the Bri sh House of Commons during the
1970s, when the Conserva ve parliamentary party group was under the leadership of
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Edward Heath. From what is known about the applica on of nega ve sanc ons in Euro-
pean democracies, the overall conclusion is that their use of scarce. Depauw (2002, 125)
finds that in the Belgian ParliamentMPs deny the influence of sanc ons on their decision
to toe the party group line when vo ng. In the Netherlands, Andeweg and Thomassen
(2011a) argue that MPs’ sa sfac on with the current use of party discipline could mean
that party (group) leaders rely less on sanc ons than is o en assumed. Jensen (2000)
uses the same measure of party discipline as Andeweg and Thomassen in his study of
Nordic MPs, which also reveals that the vast majority of MPs are sa sfied with party dis-
cipline, especially when it comes to s cking to the party group line when vo ng. Kam
(2009), who as men oned before is one of the few who has connected a tudinal data
with actual vo ng data,8 argues that although policy preferences do have an impact on
vo ng behavior, party (group) leaders also take advantage of their control over MPs’
future parliamentary career to maintain party group unity.
Given that many of the empirical studies dealing with these pathways have been of
a case study nature, the effects of ins tu ons on these pathways and their associated
mechanisms have not been given their due a en on. As highlighted above through the
example of Carey’s (2007; 2009) Theory of Compe ng Principals, ins tu ons do not af-
fect party group unity directly, but instead affect the different mechanisms highlighted
above, poten ally in different ways. As is the case in the literature employing an in-
s tu onal approach to explaining party group unity, scholars o en make theore cal
arguments and assump ons concerning how these mechanisms are affected by ins tu-
ons. Electoral systems and candidate nomina on procedures, for example, are hypoth-
esized to influence the ideological composi on of parliamentary party groups (leading
to higher or lower levels of party agreement), but they are also supposed to ins ll in
MPs a stronger or weaker a sense of loyalty towards their party group (depending on
the number of compe ng principals) as well as to influence the ability of poli cal par-
es to elicit party group unity through party discipline, by providing the poli cal party
(group) leadership with various kinds of carrots and s cks. It is the aim of this study to
tease out the effects of ins tu ons on each of these mechanisms separately.
Moreover, most of the studies of party group unity in European Parliaments tend
to aggregate the mechanisms at the level of the party group, i.e., not only party group
unity, but also its determinants, party cohesion (agreement and loyalty) and party disci-
pline, are seen as a party level characteris c. One could argue, however, that the most
accurate level tomeasure theworkings of themechanisms is at the level of the individual
MP: party group unity “must be constructed oneMP at a me” (Kam, 2009, 16). A party
group that is cohesive in terms of shared ideological preferences, for example, results
from each individual MP’s agreement with his party group. The level of party cohesion
in the form of shared norms of party group solidarity is the aggregate product of each
individual MP’s subscrip on to those norms. And a disciplined poli cal party emerges
from individual MPs’ responsiveness to posi ve and nega ve sanc ons. As such, a party
group’s final level of unity consists of the adding up of all party group members’ individ-
ual behavior, and each MP’s behavior results from his own decision-making process.
8 But see Willumsen and Öhberg (2012) for a recent addi on.
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3.2.3 Decision-making models
In her review of legisla ve vo ng behavior literature Collie (1985) dis nguishes between
two schools of research: one that focuses on legisla ve vo ng at the level of the collec-
ve (i.e., the level of the poli cal party group or legislature as a whole), and the other
that looks at legisla ve vo ng at the level of the individual legislator. Collie concludes
that when it comes to the la er, there is a great imbalance between the American and
non-American se ng in terms of the number and the content of studies. Research dedi-
cated to the American context tends to focus on individual legislators as decisionmakers,
whereas outside the United States “it has been assumed that party predicts individual
decision making” (1985, 28, emphasis added), which she ascribes to the lack of variance
in legislators’ vo ng behavior. Collie also rightly points out that there is disagreement
about what ‘party’ actually is (i.e. there is no clear conceptualiza on). Indeed, different
authors tend to equate the party as an explanatory variable with the different path-
ways to party group unity discussed above. Most pointedly, however, is that it seems
unrealis c to assume that whereas legisla ve vo ng behavior by American legislators
results from individuals’ decision-making processes involving mul ple variables, MPs in
the non-American se ng would not engage in comparable processes.
The early studies of legisla ve vo ng in the United States were conducted within
the parameters of representa on studies (Collie, 1985, 494). Legislators are confronted
with numerous actors and influences, and the main ques on is in how far legislators
are responsive to each. From the start, the rela ve importance of party versus con-
s tuency was central to the debate. Some scholar concentrated solely on the influence
of cons tuency policy preferences, whereas others argued that legislators’ vo ng be-
havior was a func on of both cons tuency and the party preference (Collie, 1985, 492).
The relevance of legislators’ personal a tudes and percep ons, as well as legisla ve
norms and roles (Wahlke et al., 1962), were also incorporated, the la er gaining promi-
nence with the research and findings byMiller and Stokes (1963). Ques ons were raised
concerning the opera onaliza on and measurement of cons tuency, party and legisla-
tor preferences, and the cri que was that there was too much emphasis on correspon-
dence between preferences, and not enough focus on the actual influence. The results
of these different studies and approaches have been mixed, and as put by Collie (1985,
493): “[t]he fairest summary of their conclusions is that the impact of party and con-
s tuency varied between Democrats and Republicans and across issue areas, legisla-
tures, and me”.
Expanding the foci of representa on beyond the cons tuency and the party led to
the development of a number of legislator decision-making models. These include the
consensusmodel (Kingdon, 1973), which holds that a legislator first determines whether
the issue put to vote evokes controversy within the legisla ve arena. If not, he ‘votes
with the herd’. If there is controversy, the legislator ascertains whether there is any con-
sensus on the ma er among the different actors who may influence him, of which King-
don emphasizes six: the legislator’s cons tuency, his House colleges, the party leader-
ship, the execu ve administra on, the legislator’s own staff, and interest groups. Again,
if there is consensus on the ma er among these different groups of actors, he votes
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accordingly. If there is conflict, he votes with the majority of actors.
The cue-takingmodel, developedbyMa hews and S mson (1970), also dis nguishes
between mul ple actors who may influence legislators’ vo ng decisions, but contends
that legislators develop hierarchies of ‘cue-givers’. The authors also argue that cue-
taking is only relevant when the vote at hand concerns a topic outside of the legislators’
own area of specializa on or exper se, thereby acknowledging the problems of decision
overload and poor informa on. The policy-dimension model (Clausen, 1973) holds that
the nature of the policy that the vote falls under determineswhich of the different actors
the legislator will be influenced by most. Clausen finds, for example, that the influence
of the party is strongest when it comes to social welfare and government management,
and legislators are influenced most by the execu ve administra on when it comes to
issues of interna onal involvement, but only when the president in office belongs to the
same party. Asher and Weisberg (1978) vo ng-history model confirms that the actors
who influence legislators’ decisions differ per policy area, but the authors find that legis-
lators are muchmore likely to deviate from their previous posi ons within certain policy
areas when there is a change in the par san composi on of the House or the presidency
switches par san control.
In an a empt to integrate thesemodels, Kingdon (1977, 571) argues that “...the legis-
lator’s search for some sort of agreement among a set of possible influences on the vote
which predisposes him in a certain direc on, and some further decisional process in the
absence of that agreement—is a thread common to a number of the models of legisla-
ve vo ng”. Thus legislators start out searching for some form of consensus, first in the
legisla ve arena and second in their perceived field of influences. If no consensus can be
found legislators pick cues from par cular actors in light of various poten al goals (e.g.
cons tuency sa sfac on, influence in Washington, good policy, etc.). Kingdon (1977,
571) further highlights that a certain sequen ality of decision-making mechanisms and
rules are o en implicit included in manymodels of legisla ve vo ng in Congress (see for
example Clausen, 1973; Cherryholmes and Shapiro, 1969; Ma hews and S mson, 1970,
1975).
In the European literature, the argument that the pathways leading to party group
unity canbe viewedasworkingwithin a par cular order is also implicitly included. Bowler
et al. (1999a, 5), for example, argue that cohesion and discipline are related, in that high
levels of cohesion render discipline unnecessary, but at the same me discipline requires
a certain level of cohesion to be effec ve. On the one hand, if consensus in values and
a tudes among individual representa ves is high, there should be no need for disci-
plinary measures by party (group) leaders to obtain party group unity. On the other
hand, discipline is only effec ve when there is a minimum level of cohesion present
among members of the parliamentary party group, as the shared value that MPs place
on the party group determines their responsiveness to disciplinary measures. When
party group cohesion is low, MPs will not respond to (threats of) party discipline. As sug-
gested by Hazan (2003, 3), whose use of the term cohesion encompasses both shared
policy preferences and norms of party loyalty, “discipline starts where cohesion falters”,
indica ng a sequen al rela onship between the two mechanisms.
In their study of the pathways to party group unity in the Netherlands, Andeweg
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and Thomassen (2011a) suggest that the pathways are “different horses for different
courses”, and also hint at a possible sequen al rela onship between them. They argue
that depending on the nature of the issue, MPs will have an opinion on the topic at hand
or rely on the cues provided by the party group specialists and/or spokespersons. In the
case of rela vely uncontroversial and technical issues (and for which the party group’s
posi on is not specified in the party program and electoral manifesto), MPs will most
likely rely on the cues provided by their party group specialists and/or spokespersons.
In the case of poli cally controversial and non-technical issues, there is a high probabil-
ity that MPs will have an opinion, and that this opinion is in agreement with the party
group’s posi on. MPs also vote in line with the advice of the party group policy spe-
cialists and/or spokespersons in this situa on, but because they agree with them in the
first place, not because they defer to their opinion. The ac ve mechanism is thus MPs’
agreement with the party group’s posi on, and not cue-taking, because MPs do have
a personal opinion on the topic. Only if MPs disagree with the party group’s posi on
or the posi on advocated by the party group’s specialists and/or spokespersons, does
party group loyalty become relevant. And finally, if all other mechanisms fail, the party
(group) leadership may consider the use of sanc ons.
Finally, Kam’s (2009, 15) synthe c LEADS model (MPs Loyalty Elicited through Ad-
vancement, Discipline, and Socializa on) is also a sequen al model, but does not take
the perspec ve of decision making by individual MPs. Instead, Kam (2009, 15) argues
that party leaders’ dependence on different mechanisms is con ngent on the stage of
MPs’ careers. Ideological differences and electoral incen ves set the stage for dissent
to occur. Party leaders rely on posi ve sanc ons (promo on, for example) to prompt
MPs who are in the early stages of their career to vote with the party group line de-
spite their disagreement. Posi ve sanc ons work less well, however, for MPs who are
already highly ranked and cannot be promoted, or are in the final stages of their career.
Party leaders then prefer to rely on informal measures and norms of party group loyalty,
acquired through the process of socializa on. Finally, leaders may then resort to nega-
ve sanc ons, but need to do so strategically and focused, as they may carry substan al
costs.
What these models have in common is that voluntary party group agreement in the
form of the homogeneity of preferences is usually the first stage in determining party
group unity, with the excep on of Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a), who acknowledge
thatMPsmay not be able to form an opinion on all ma ers and thus implicitly place cue-
taking from the party group specialists and/or spokespersons at the start of the decision-
making sequence. Also, party discipline is usually posi oned as a last resort, at the final
stage, because of its involuntary nature and associated high costs, which make its fre-
quent use an inefficient pathway. Thus, in the case of disagreement, party group loyalty
comes into play before sanc ons.
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3.3 The sequen al decision-making model
3.3.1 MPs’ decision-making process
Themodel presented in Figure 3.1 forms the basis for the empirical analyses in this book.
It outlines an individual MP’s decision-making process in determining whether or not
to vote according to the party group line (i.e., contribute to party group unity).9 The
different decision-makingmechanisms, as well as the order in which they are placed, are
derived from themain pathways to party group unity found in the (theore cal) literature.
First, in determining whether to vote according to the party group line on a given
vote in parliament, an MP assesses whether he actually has an opinion on the ma er at
hand. If the MP lacks a personal opinion, he votes according to the party group line in
accordancewith the party group’s posi on as s pulated in the party programor electoral
manifesto, but also the vo ng cues provided by his fellow party group members. To a
certain degree, cue-taking ismade possible, but also necessary, by party groups’ solu on
for dealing with the workload of parliament. Applying a division of labor for which MPs
each specialize in, and/or act as parliamentary party spokespersons for, par cular policy
areas, allows party groups work more efficiently, but also entails that MPs will probably
not be able to develop a personal opinion about all ma ers that are put to vote.
Whether anMP has a personal opinion on a par cular vote is likely to also depend on
whether he has a background or some exper se in the topic area, whether the MP acts
as a parliamentary party spokesperson for a topic that is closely related to the issue at
hand, the level of technical and detailed knowledge required to form an opinion about
the vote, the amount of me and resources the MP would need to invest in developing
a personal opinion, and the importance the MP personally, and/or his party (group),
ascribe to the ma er at hand. If the MP needs to make quite an investment in terms of
me and resources to understand and then develop an opinion about a rather technical
issue, and/or the issue is not that important to him or his party (group),10 he may prefer
9 As men oned above, party group unity “must be constructed one MP at a me” (Kam, 2009, 16); for each
vote in parliament each MP must individually decide whether to vote according to the party group line or
not, and this decision-making process consists of a number of steps that are arranged in a par cular order.
The collec ve outcome, a party’s final degree of unity on a par cular vote, is therefore a func on of all
individual MPs’ sequen al decision-making processes.
10 MPs’ lack of an opinion may also result from the party group’s (informal) rules concerning the division of
labor itself. As men oned by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 657) the division of labor encourages MPs
not to interfere in each other’s policy areas. MPs therefore lack an personal opinion not (only) because they
do not have the me and/or resources to invest in forming their own opinion, but because they have agreed
not to interfere in other MPs’ issue areas. This agreement could a formal group rule, but it could also be
an informal rule, or tacit agreement, in which case it could be conceived as a party group norm, and thus is
closely related to our third decision-makingmechanism, party group loyalty. Alterna vely, anMP could also
not form an opinion on certain issues area not out of respect for the implicit norma ve agreement to not
interfere in each other’s policy areas, but because of the strategic agreementwith otherMPs to support each
other’s posi ons and ini a ves (logrolling). It could also be that MPs do not form an opinion on votes that
fall outside their own designated issue areas because they fear that if do, others may do the same to them
in the future (i.e., undermine an implicit t-for-tat strategic agreement (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a,

















































































































3.3. The sequen al decision-making model
(or need) to rely on the vo ng cues provided by his fellow party group members. The
MP has to trusts that the vo ng advice provided by his fellow party group members is in
line with the party program and electoral manifesto, and is representa ve of the opinion
the MP would have held had he developed his own.
If the MP does have an opinion on the ma er, or he considers the development of
his own opinion worth the investment of me and resources, he moves on to the sec-
ond decision-making stage, at which he gauges whether there is a conflict between his
own personal opinion and the posi on of his party group on the issue. The party group’s
posi on is to a large extent specified in the party program or electoral manifesto. Fur-
thermore, the party group’s posi on on a specific topic can be developed during the par-
liamentary term by the party group specialists and/or spokespersons, the parliamentary
party group leader(s), the parliamentary party group as a whole, or even the poli cal
party as a whole, depending on the division of labor and the hierarchy within a poli cal
party. Thus, there may be an array of sources that determine the party group’s posi on
on a given vote. The main ques on, however, is whether the MP agrees with his party
group’s policy posi on on a par cular vote in parliament. If there is no conflict, then
one can say that the MP’s contribu on to the unity of his party group is brought about
by policy agreement.
If there is a conflict between the MP’s preferences and his party group’s posi on,
theMPmoves on to the third decision-making stage, at which point he decides whether
or not his subscrip on to the norm of party group loyalty overrides his conflict with the
party group line. If the conflict with the posi on of the party group is rela vely minor,
and/or the normof party group loyalty is sufficiently internalized by theMP, it ought to be
enough to persuade the MP to voluntarily submit to the party group line. As highlighted
in our review of the pathways to party group unity literature above, MPs’ subscrip on
to the norm of party group loyalty is likely to result from a process of group socializa on
through previous party experience. However, whether or not the norm is considered
applicable in a par cular situa on is an individual MP’s decision.
If the MP does not subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, or the MP does sub-
scribe to the norm but his disagreementwith the party group’s posi on is so intense that
it supersedes his loyalty to the party group, the poli cal party (group) leadership enters
into the equa on at the final stage of decision making, making use of the available posi-
ve and nega ve sanc ons to force the MP to vote according to the party group line. If
(the threat of) sanc ons outweigh the MP’s resolve to follow his own opinion, his con-
tribu on to party group unity is brought about by the MP’s obedience. If the sanc ons
are not enough to elicit conformity to the party group line, the MP dissents.11 Nega ve
Although this does not immediately mean that an MP lacks an opinion as a result of the fear of (threat of)
nega ve sanc ons (i.e., party discipline, which is associated with the ra onal-choice approach to explaining
party group unity), it doesmean that the decision to develop an opinion is not only based onwhether anMP
has the me and/or resources to do so. In a sense, both norma ve considera ons and strategic calcula ons
can play a role in determining whether an MP will invest the me and resources needed in developing an
opinion in the first place.
11 Some legislatures and poli cal par es have designated votes about certain issues (e.g., the death penalty,
abor on, stem cell research, gay rights, marriage, etc.) ‘votes of conscience’ or ‘free votes’ (Cowley, 1998;
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sanc ons may s ll follow. Who exactly controls which poten al posi ve and nega ve
sanc ons may differ depending on formal and informal rules of the party organiza on.
Whereas in some par es the parliamentary party group (leadership) may actually con-
trol the applica on of certain sanc ons, in other par es the party group leadership itself
may only an advisory role in the applica on of these sanc ons; the sanc ons being con-
trolled by another organ of the poli cal party organiza on.
Themodel developed above disentangles the different decision-makingmechanisms
derived from the pathways to party group unity highlighted in the theore cal literature.
One of themost important novel es of themodel is the placement of thesemechanisms
in a par cular order, a sequence that generally matches the order usually suggested
in the exis ng theore cal literature men oned above, and is arguably logical from the
perspec ve of both the individual MP and the party. As is the case with most theore cal
models, however, our sequen al model of MP decision-making is also a simplifica on of
poli cal reality.
3.3.2 The sequen al logic
As stated above, the logic of the order of mechanisms in our decision-making model
can be explained from both the perspec ve of the individual MP and the poli cal party,
specifically the party group leadership, who is likely to be responsible for the parliamen-
tary party group’s behavioral unity.12 At the first stage of our decision-making model,
an MP who does not have a personal opinion contributes to the unity of his party group
by vo ng according to what is s pulated in the party program or electoral manifesto,
or following the cues provided to him by his fellow party group members. We assume
that during their poli cal career MPs self-select into poli cal par es whose policy posi-
ons they agree with the most, and thus that when an MP is unable to form a personal
opinion, he considers the posi on of his own party (group), or that which is advocated
by a fellow party member who is responsible for the party group’s posi on, his default
op on. Party group agreement is not relevant because without a personal opinion, an
MP cannot ascertain whether he agrees with the party group’s posi on on the vote. And
although he may also be toeing the party group line out of loyalty, this is not the deter-
minant decision-making mechanism that leads him to vote with the party group when
Mughan and Scully, 1997; Pa e and Fieldhouse, Edward Johnston, 1994). In similar vein, party groups
may also have formal and informal rules about under what circumstances dissent from the party group line
is permissible, and thus MPs can expect that devia ng from the party group line will not entail any short-
term or long-term nega ve repercussions for theMP. In general however, these situa ons are the excep on
rather than the rule. Our model s ll works, as an MP s ll has to decide whether he has an opinion on the
ma er, and he is s ll able to gauge whether his opinion is in line with the party group’s posi on. And even
though the vote has been declared free, hemay s ll consider it appropriate to toe the party group line out of
solidarity. If this is not the case, theMPmoves on to the fourth decision-makingmechanisms, at which point
je asks himself whether (poten al) posi ve and nega ve sanc ons outweigh his resolve to vote according
to his own opinion. As the party (group) leaders will likely not apply party discipline in this situa on, they
cannot outweigh theMP’s resolve to vote according to his own opinion. This means that theMPwill dissent
from the party group line, and that party vo ng unity will not be complete.
12 This again may differ depending on a poli cal party’s rules and organiza on.
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an MP lacks an opinion. The same holds for party discipline; while the MP without an
opinion may be responsive to (threats and promises of) party discipline, it is again not
likely to be the determinant mechanism of his decision to vote with the party group.
Both mechanisms are only determinant of behavior when an MP has an opinion and is
in disagreement with his party group’s posi on.
Party group leaders are likely to encourage cue-taking as a means of achieving party
group unity in parliament from an efficiency perspec ve. The division of labor not only
allows party groups to deal with the workload of parliament, but the resultant decision-
makingmechanism cue-takingmay ease andquicken party groupmee ng discussions on
the group’s posi on concerning the substan ve content of parliamentary votes. More-
over, if anMP does have an opinion, there is always a chance of theMP disagreeing with
the party group’s posi on, in which case the party group leadership is dependent on ei-
ther the MP’s subscrip on to the norm of party group loyalty (which the party group
leadership is ul mately unable to control), or the MP’s responsiveness to (the threat of
or promise of) sanc ons, which can be costly. Moreover, the threat, promise or appli-
ca on of discipline in response to an MP who simply lacks a personal opinion can be
considered quite premature, and may even have a nega ve effect on the party group
leadership’s authority.
Once anMPhas an opinion, cue-taking is not a relevant decision-makingmechanism,
and hemoves on to the second stage of the decision-makingmodel, atwhich point he as-
sesses whether his own opinion is in line with the party group’s posi on. If this is indeed
the case, his contribu on to party group unity is determined by his simple agreement.
Aswas the case as the earlier stage of cue-taking, theMPmay also subscribe to the norm
of party group loyalty, or may be responsive to sanc ons if they are applied, but these
pathways are redundant because he already agrees with the party group’s posi on, and
thus he will contribute to party group unity by simply following his own opinion. MPs
who vote with the party group line out of agreement are also likely to be preferred by
the party group leadership over those who do so out of loyalty or obedience. Although
an MP’s subscrip on to party group loyalty is likely to result from, and be reinforced by,
socializa on and selec on, and party group leaders can try to create an environment
that is conducive to adherence to the norm, the interna onaliza on, and actual appli-
ca on of the norm in a par cular situa on is an individual’s own decision. Relying on
an MP’s subscrip on to party group loyalty as a pathway to party group unity carries
certain risks as it makes behavioral party group unity dependent on the individual MP’s
decision as to whether is loyalty is strong enough to outweigh his resolve to vote accord-
ing to his own conflic ng opinion. When it comes to party discipline, threatening with
or actually applying sanc ons to elicit compliance from an MP who already agrees with
the party group line anyway is likely to be considered exorbitant, and thus counterpro-
duc ve. Moreover, (the threat or promise of) sanc ons are always costlier than simply
relying on an MP’s voluntary agreement.
If an MP disagrees with the party group line, he has to decide whether his subscrip-
on to the norm of party group loyalty outweighs the intensity of his conflict with the
party group’s posi on. If this is the case, discipline is unnecessary because the MP will
toe the party group line voluntarily. Although relying on an MPs’ subscrip on to the
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norm of party group loyalty is riskier for party group leaders than relying on the first two
decision-making mechanisms, party group leaders are likely to s ll preferred that MPs
vote with the party group of their own accord, as again, the unnecessary applica on of
discipline can be costly and undermine the party group leaderships’ authority. It is also
likely that an individual MP prefer vo ng with the party group despite his disagreement
of his own accord rather than being forced into obedience. Thus, in our model, (the
threat of) nega ve or (promise of) posi ve sanc ons are used as a last resort to get an
MP to vote with the party group line despite his disagreement.
As stated above, we do not argue that for a given vote there is always only one poten-
al decision-making mechanism present in the mind of MP. For example, anMPwithout
an opinion may also subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty, but he does not need
to weigh whether his subscrip on to the norm outweighs his resolve to follow his own
opinion, because he does not have a personal opinion to take into considera on. More-
over, an MP who lacks an opinion and does not subscribe to the norm of party group
loyalty is also likely to toe the party group line as a result of cue-taking. In both cases,
anMP has already decided to vote according to the party group line at the first decision-
making stage; he does not need to move on to the mechanisms that follow (unless he
decides that he wants to develop his own opinion, in which case the decision-making
process starts over once his opinion is formed, and cue-taking will not be the deter-
minant decision-making mechanism anymore). Agreement, loyalty and discipline thus
presume that an MP has an opinion. Loyalty and discipline are only relevant decision-
making mechanism when an MP disagrees with the party group’s posi on. Discipline is
only relevant when an MP disagrees with the party group line and will not vote with the
party group line voluntarily despite his disagreement.
3.3.3 Simplifica on
The sequen al decision-makingmodel in Figure 3.1 is, of course, a simplifica on of what
goes on in poli cal reality. For example, determining the posi on of the party group, as
well as the posi on of individual MPs, is likely to be an itera ve process that takes place
over weeks, months or even years, during which both the party group’s and MPs’ posi-
ons on the ma er may change (if MPs form an opinion at all). This process of posi on
forma on does not take place in isola on, and both the party group’s andMPs’ posi ons
may be influenced by actors both outside and inside the parliamentary party group. The
model does not aim to explain howMPs come to their opinions, or the substan ve con-
tent of their opinions, however, only how they come contribute to party group unity,
by deciding to vote with the party group or not. Thus, the model only comes into play
when anMP’s and the party group’s substan ve posi ons on a vote (or lack thereof) are
finalized. If something happens that leads to an MP (or the party group) to change his
(its) posi on on a par cular vote, the decision-making process is started over.
As opposed to the decision-making models found in the literature on the United
States in the 1970s’, which were developed in the context of representa on studies and
explicitly included the influence of different poten al foci of representa on (voters, in-
terest groups, the president, etc.) on the MP, the model developed above aims to ac-
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count for howMPs come to votewith their party group’s posi on or not; it therefore only
includes MPs’ decision-making process in rela on to the party group’s final posi on on
a specific vote. The model assumes, however, that if an MP’s personal opinion is indeed
influenced by other poten al foci of representa on, this occurs before the MP finalizes
his own posi on. Thus, the different foci of representa on may be the cause of the dis-
agreement between the party group’s posi on and the MP’s opinion, but according to
ourmodel, their influence is already encompassed in theMP’s own posi on on the vote.
The same assump on holds for decisions made in regard to the third decision-making
mechanism, loyalty. An MP’s loyalty to other principals may be the reason why the MP
has not sufficiently internalized the norm of party group loyalty, or account for why an
MP’s loyalty to his party group does not supersede his resolve to vote according to his
own opinion in the case of conflict with the party group’s posi on on a par cular vote.
In ourmodel, we acknowledge that fellow party groupmembers play the role of cue-
givers for an MP who lacks a personal opinion about a specific vote. However, if an MP
decides that he does want to invest me and resources in developing his own opinion,
these fellow party group members may serve as important sources of informa on in
their opinion forma on process. For an MP who does have an opinion, but one which is
in conflict with the party group’s posi on, fellow party group members may play a role
in trying to change the personal substan ve posi on of this MP through delibera on
and argumenta on. An MP may also try to convince his fellow party group members to
change their minds and/or the party group’s posi on. If the conflict between the MP’s
and the party group’s posi on remains, internal party group discussions may s ll take
place, but this me the aim is not to change the MP’s opinion, but to persuade the MP
that vo ng with the party group line despite disagreement would be most appropriate,
i.e., to convince the MP that as a party delegate, he ought to vote with the party group
line out of loyalty. Finally, although the control of posi ve and nega ve sanc ons is
likely to be located in the hands of different organs and individuals within the party or-
ganiza on (both inside and outside the party group), fellow party group members can
also apply pressure and warn an MP of the poten al nega ve consequences of dissent-
ing from the party group line, or remind him of the poten al rewards for toeing the
party group line despite his disagreement. Sanc ons can also take on the form of social
pressure and/or rewards, which can o en be quite subtle.
In other words, there is likely to be a constant process of delibera on and discussion
within the party group that may influence whether or not an MP has an opinion, the
substance of the opinion, and whether the MP considers his loyalty and/or the (threat-
ened or promised) sanc ons to outweigh his resolve to dissent from the party in the
case of disagreement. This process is not only limited to the parliamentary party group;
an MP may also enter into discussions with other members and/or parts of the party
organiza on.13 We argue, however, that as is the case with the influence of other po-
13 We are aware that it is unlikely that in prac ces the content and aim of these discussion and delibera ons
will take place in such a organized fashion. Indeed, arguments pertaining to the substan ve content of
posi ons, but also those that play on an MP’s party group loyalty and the consequences and benefits of an
MP’s decision, are likely to be used simultaneously and may even be muddled.
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ten al foci of representa on, that these discussions and delibera on may influence the
whether the MP has an opinion and the substance of his opinion, they do not affect the
ques ons that anMP asks himself in determining whether to vote according to the party
group line or not (see Figure 3.1). In other words, the fact that these discussions take
place does not mean that, when deciding whether to vote according to the party group
line or not, MPs do not apply the mechanisms outlined by the model.
3.4 Conclusion
The study of party group unity is confounded by terminological, conceptual and mea-
surement ambigui es. One of the most important novel es of this study is the disen-
tanglement of the different decision-making mechanisms derived from the pathways
to party group unity highlighted in the theore cal literature, and the placement of the
mechanisms that MPs apply in determining to vote with the party in a par cular order.
As with any model, it is a simplifica on of reality, and thus does not take all aspects of,
and possible influence on, MPs’ decision-making processes into account. The aim of our
studies is not a comprehensive explana on of MPs’ decision-making process including
all poten al independent variables, but to test the sequen al approach and illustrate is
poten al in three studies with a limited set of variables.
As previously men oned in the introductory chapter, the ul mate test of the model
would apply it to MPs’ decisions regarding specific votes. Unfortunately, we do not have
the data to do so. Our survey data do, however, allow us to place the mechanisms in the
sequence outlined above, and gauge the rela ve contribu on of each of the pathways
to party group unity, and see whether their contribu ons differ between parliaments
or change over me. Moreover, the data also allow us to test the assump ons and hy-
potheses about the influence of these ins tu ons on these different pathways. In the
following empirical chapters, we develop and test hypotheses concerning the effects of
ins tu ons on each of the mechanisms separately, and ascertain the rela ve contribu-
on of each themechanisms, and the extent towhich poli cal par es can count on these
pathways for the unity of their party in parliament.
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Chapter 4
The influence of ins tu ons: MPs’
decision-making mechanisms in
15 na onal parliaments
4.1 The influence of ins tu ons
As men oned in chapter 3, the impact of ins tu onal se ngs on party group (vo ng)
unity in parliament has been both theorized and studied empirically in the exis ng liter-
ature on representa on and legisla ve behavior (see for example Bowler et al., 1999b;
Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and Mar n, 2009; Morgenstern, 2004; Ozbudun, 1970; Sie-
berer, 2006). We argue, however, that these ins tu ons do not affect vo ng behav-
ior directly. Instead, we contend that these ins tu ons influence MPs’ decision-making
process in determining whether to cast their vote in parliament according to the party
group’s posi on, or to dissent from the party group line. Relying on the 2010 Par Rep
Survey in 15 na onal parliaments, the aim of this chapter is to ascertain what the rela-
ve contribu on of the different decision-making mechanisms is to party group unity,
whether this varies by country, and to what extent ins tu ons can account for these
differences.1
There are a number of different ins tu ons that are hypothesized to impact legisla-
ve party unity, but in this chapter we focus on three ins tu ons that are deemed most
relevant for party group unity in the exis ng literature. First, most compara ve studies
expect the condi ons under which MPs compete for (re-)elec on, to play an important
role in determining party group unity (Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and Mar n, 2009;
Mar n, 2011; Sieberer, 2006). Electoral laws that allow voters to cast a personal vote
and, in the case of list systems enable voters to upset the order in which candidates are
1 Parts of the analyses in this chapter are also included in Van Vonno et al. (2014).
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elected to parliament, are expected to lead to lower levels of party group unity in par-
liament. The ins tu onal characteris cs of these so-called candidate-oriented electoral
systems provide candidates with incen ves to cul vate a personal vote and to engage in
intra-party compe on with their fellow candidates, which is expected to increase in in-
tensity with district magnitude. Alterna vely, party-centered electoral systems, where
voters are unable to cast personal votes and cannot upset the order in which candidates
are elected to parliament, are hypothesized to be conducive the party group unity, as
candidates must rely on, and contribute to, the poli cal party label as a means of ap-
pealing to the electorate. In this case, intra-party compe on is argued to decrease as
district magnitude increases.
Although the electoral connec on is considered conven onal theore cal wisdom,
the empirical evidence for its influence on parliamentary party vo ng unity is mixed
(Mar n, 2014). In his analysis of party vo ng unity in 11Western parliamentary systems,
Sieberer (2006) follows Mitchell (2000) in his classifica on of electoral systems as party-
oriented, intermediate or candidate-oriented.2 Contrary to his expecta ons, Sieberer
(2006) finds that party vo ng unity is actually higher in candidate-centered electoral
systems than party-centered systems. Average party vo ng unity is highest in countries
classified in the intermediate category (although variance in average party group unity
is lowest in party-centered electoral systems), leading him to ques on the validity of the
argument that party vo ng unity is a func on of electoral rules and personal vote seek-
ing. Carey (2007), however, finds that the level of intra-party compe on in the electoral
arena explains varia ons in party vo ng unity in a range of different systems across the
globe,3 andHix’s (2004) study of vo ng behavior in the European Parliament reveals that
the electoral system by which Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected
in their home countries influence vo ng unity in European party groups.4 According to
Depauw and Mar n (2009), these mixed results are in part due to the different classi-
fica ons of electoral systems as candidate or party-centered electoral systems used in
the studies.
Depauw and Mar n (2009) further argue that varia ons in parliamentary party vot-
ing unity that are a ributed to electoral systems may actually stem from differences in
poli cal par es’ internal candidate selec on procedures, which take place before po-
li cal par es and their candidates enter the electoral arena. Rahat and Hazan (2001)
dis nguish between the dimensions of inclusiveness and (territorial) centraliza on in
the process of candidate selec on. The inclusiveness dimension refers to the number
of actors included in the selectorate, which may range from the en re popula on of
2 Mitchell (2000) classifies closed-list propor onal representa on (PR), addi onal member systems and for-
mally open but in prac ce rather closed list systems, as party-centered electoral systems. Single-member
simple plurality, alterna ve vote and double-ballot systems are classified as intermediate electoral sys-
tems. Genuinely open-list PR and systems in which voters have a single transferable vote (STV) fall under
candidate-centered.
3 Carey (2007) simply tests whether electoral systems allow for intra-party compe on or not.
4 Hix (2004) classifies closed-list and semi-open-list PR systems as party-centered electoral systems, and fully
open-list PR and STV systems as candidate-centered. He also includes district magnitude in his model as a
separate variable.
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the country (which is not common in European party systems), to all party members via
party primaries, to a special party agency, and finally to only a select group of poli cal
party leaders. The centraliza on dimension refers towhether selec on takes place at the
local, district, regional or na onal level. Candidate selec ons procedures that are exclu-
sive and centralized are hypothesized to lead to high levels of party group vo ng unity,
as they place the control over candidate selec on in the hands of a rela vely small and
homogeneous group, concentrated at the na onal level, that is able to (directly) moni-
tor the behavior of incumbent MPs. Contrarily, candidate selec on procedures that are
inclusive and decentralized are hypothesized to lead to lower levels of party vo ng unity
in parliament (Depauw and Mar n, 2009).
There are only a few empirical studies that actually include candidate selec on as a
possible determinant of party group vo ng unity.5 Sieberer (2006), who dichotomizes
candidate selec on procedures into those with high and low centralized control,6 finds
a posi ve rela onship between centralized control and party vo ng unity in his study
of 11 parliamentary democracies. Depauw and Mar n (2009) also test for a rela on-
ship between party vo ng unity and candidate selec on in their analysis of 16 European
democracies. Using Lundell’s (2004) five-point scale,7 which combines both the central-
iza on and inclusiveness dimensions of candidate selec on procedures developed by
Rahat andHazan (2001), DepauwandMar n (2009) find that party vo ngunity increases
as candidate selec on becomes more centralized and exclusive. Both Faas (2003)8 and
Hix (2004)9 find that MEPs are more likely to defect from their European party group
line when their poli cal party’s candidate selec on procedure is more centralized at the
na onal level in their home country. Finally, although Hazan and Rahat (2006) do not
look at party vo ng unity, they find that in the Israeli parliament the democra za on of
candidate selec on (which entails increasing candidate selec on inclusiveness) led to an
increase in the adop on of private member bills, which is argued to be an individualis c
form of parliamentary behavior and indica ve of the ‘personaliza on of poli cs’. Their
5 In his study of party vo ng unity in 19 countries, Carey (2007, 94) includes a hypothesis regarding the de-
gree of decentraliza on of government. Carey reasons that in unitary systems the strongest level of party
organiza on is the na onal level, whereas in federal systems the subna onal levels of party organiza on are
usually more powerful. As candidate selec on methods may differ between par es within the same coun-
try, looking directly at candidate selec on instead of the degree of government decentraliza on serves as
a more precise measure of power distribu on within poli cal par es.
6 Sieberer (2006) considers centralized control high when the party leadership can select candidate directly,
or proposals from the local or regional level have to be approved by the central party leadership; candidate
selec on centraliza on is low in all other circumstances.
7 The scale developed by Lundell (2004) starts with control over selec on located exclusively at the local level
(1) or district level (2), and ends with control over selec on located exclusively at the na onal level (5). In
between (3-4), selec on takes place at either the district, regional or na onal level, but other levels can
exercise influence over the selec on process by being able to propose candidates, actually add names to
the list, or veto candidates.
8 Faas (2003) uses three categories: candidate selec on by central leadership, by party congress and by re-
gional party organiza on.
9 Hix (2004) simply dichotomizes candidate selec on into centralized (na onal party execu ve or na onal
party congress) and decentralized (regional or local party caucus).
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analysis does not allow for cross-country comparison, but they do note that “Members
of the US Congress, which is known for its low levels of party cohesion, are selected
through highly inclusive primaries. In contrast, Bri sh, Irish, and Norwegian legislators
(as well as most other West European legislators), who are selected by more exclusive
selectorates, exhibit higher levels of cohesion.” (Hazan and Rahat, 2006, 381).
Finally, the defining aspect of parliamentary systems, the confidence conven on, is
expected to generate higher levels of party group unity in parliamentary systems than in
presiden al systems. In parliamentary systems, the execu ve is dependent on the con-
nued explicit or implicit confidence of a plurality in the legislature (Strøm, 2000, 365).
Although confidence votes are not regularly used, their possibility alone is expected to
lead to higher levels of party vo ng unity (Kam, 2009). Some authors even consider the
confidence conven on both a necessary and a sufficient condi on for high party group
unity (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998). Carey (2007, 94), on the other hand, argues that
since confidence provisions are not formally summoned onmost votes, their impactmay
be overstated. The confidence conven on is further argued to have a stronger impact on
anMPwhen his party is in government than when his party is in opposi on. For govern-
ment MPs, dissent acquires a second dimension: vo ng against the Prime Minister and
cabinet, which may bring down the government and, in some systems, may lead to early
parliamentary elec ons. According to Carey (2007) the confidence conven on cannot
account for why MPs in opposi on party groups vote in unity, however, as there are no
addi onal costs associated directly with being in opposi on and party vo ng disunity.
As stated above, our main argument is that these ins tu ons do not affect party
group unity directly, but instead affect the decision-making process MPs apply in de-
termining how to vote in parliament. This is already evidenced by the theore cal ar-
guments developed by scholars in their study of the rela onship between ins tu ons
and party vo ng unity, which o en highlight the impact of these ins tu ons on differ-
ent causal (i.e., MPs’ decision-making)mechanisms (see sec on 3.2 in chapter 3). Below
we outline how we expect each of these three ins tu ons to affect the decision-making
mechanisms employed byMPs. We then test our hypotheses in 15 na onal parliaments
on the basis of the 2010 Par Rep Survey.
4.2 Expecta ons
4.2.1 Division of labor
During the first stage of our sequen al decision-making process, individual MPs deter-
mine whether they actually have a personal stance on the vote at hand. It may be, how-
ever, that because of the considerably heavyworkload inmost na onal legislatures, MPs
do not have the me or resources to form their own personal opinion on all topics (An-
deweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Whitaker, 2005). In order to deal with this workload,
party groups apply a division of labor among their members (Andeweg and Thomassen,
2011a; Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Skjaeveland, 2001), As such, candi-
dates’ background and specializa on in par cular issue areas are likely to be important
54
4.2. Expecta ons
criteria during par es’ candidate recruitment and selec on process. Moreover, MPs’
specializa ons are likely to develop further during their me in parliament and their ex-
perience as spokespersons for their party groups in their legisla ve commi ees. This too
may result inMPs being less knowledgeable and up-to-date about topics outside of their
own field. If MPs lack a (strong) opinion on the topic that is put to a vote, they follow
the vo ng advice provided by their fellow party group members who are specialized in,
or act as a spokesperson for, the relevant issue area, and thus MPs contribute to party
group unity through cue-taking.
In this chapter, we present somedescrip ve sta s cs for our indicators of cue-taking,
but we do not formulate or test any hypotheses about cue-taking in the sequen al
decision-making model. First, the Par Rep survey ques ons do not allow us to measure
the role of cue-taking during MPs’ vo ng decision making itself (see subsec on 4.3.1).
Our first indicator enables us to gauge whether MPs are more likely to consider them-
selves generalists or specialists. We argue that if there are many specialists in parlia-
ment, this evidences that party groups are likely to apply a division of labor, and thus
that MPs will need to engage in cue-taking when vo ng on issues that fall outside their
own por olio. Our second indicator is a ques on that asks respondents whether they
consider it true or false that in the day-to-day prac ce of parliament, the party group
spokesperson determines the posi on of the party group on his topic. We argue that
if MPs answer that this is true, this also provides some evidence for the argument that
party groups apply a division of labor among theirMPs. Both ques ons, however, do not
refer specifically to the role of cue-takingwhen it comes toMPs’ decision-making process
preceding a vote in parliament, which makes it problema c to place this mechanism in
the sequen al decision-making model. Moreover, the ques on that we use to measure
the second decision-making stage, party group agreement, cannot dis nguish between
MPs who vote with the party group line because they personally agree with it, and MPs
who vote with the party group because they lack a personal opinion on the topic, but do
not disagree with the party group’s posi on (see discussion in subsec on 4.3.2 below),
which also makes the inclusion of cue-taking in the sequen al decision-making model
problema c.
Second, the ins tu ons thatwe focus on in this chapter are not likely to have a strong
impact on the division of labor parliamentary party groups apply and MPs’ tendency to
engage in cue-taking, especially when taking our indicators into considera on. Although
we argue above that specializa on is likely to be an important candidate selec on crite-
rion, there is no reason to suspect that the inclusiveness of the selectorate or the cen-
traliza on of the candidate selec on procedure will necessarily influence the number of
policy specialists and generalists, or that candidate selec on procedures will impact the
way in which parliamentary party groups organize their workload. Instead, the extent
to which party groups apply a division of labor and MPs are able to engage in cue-taking
is likely to be determined by ins tu ons and specific rules and procedures inside the
legisla ve arena, for which we lack the data on for the parliaments included in our anal-
ysis (but see chapter 6 for an analysis of changes in cue-taking over me in the Dutch




If MPs do have an opinion on a vote in parliament, they move on to the second decision-
making stage, at which they assess whether their opinion on the issue at hand corre-
sponds with the posi on of their party group. Party agreement is the most basic source
of MPs’ toeing the party line on their own accord (Krehbiel, 1993) and is held to mainly
result from a process of (self-)selec on. Individuals interested in a poli cal career are
likely to join the poli cal party with which they agree the most in terms of ideology and
general policy posi on (Rush and Giddings, 2011), and party selectorates recruit, se-
lect and promote candidates whose preferences are most in line with their own. Thus,
working under the assump on that selectorates choose candidates whose preferences
match their own, the further removed from the na onal level (i.e., the more decentral-
ized), and the larger the group involved in the candidate selec on process (i.e., themore
inclusive the selectorate), the wider the range of their preferences, and thus the more
likely it is that they will choose a heterogeneous group of candidates, which will lead
to lower levels of agreement in the parliamentary party group. If candidate selec on is
concentrated in the hands of the na onal party leaders, a rela vely small and probably
homogenous group, party agreement is likely to be higher, as party leaders are likely to
select candidates who agree with the party program and electoral manifesto as much as
possible. Our expecta on is therefore thatMPs in par es with exclusive and centralized
candidate selec on procedures are more likely to frequently agree with the party than
MPs in par es with inclusive and decentralized candidate selec on procedures (H1a).
When it comes to the influence of electoral ins tu ons, we argue that party group
agreement is likely to be higher in party-oriented electoral systems than in candidate-
oriented electoral systems. As stated above, it is in the interest of the party selectorate to
only grant access to the poli cal party label to those candidates who reflect the party se-
lectorate’s own policy posi ons. Moreover, in list systems specifically, party selectorates
are likely to place those candidates with whom they agree with the most at the top of
the candidacy list in order tomaximize these candidates’ chances of (re-)elec on. There-
fore, in party-centered electoral systems, where voters are unable to cast a personal vote
and/or there is li le intra-party compe on and few incen ves for personal vote seek-
ing, the party’s control over candidates extends into the electoral arena in terms of who
is eventually elected to parliament. In candidate-centered electoral systems, where vot-
ers are able to cast a personal vote, and/or intra-party compe on is strong and there
are more incen ves for candidates to engage in personal vote seeking, par es to some
extent lose their control over who is elected to parliament. Given that the policy pref-
erences of the electorate at large are likely to be more heterogeneous than those of
the party selectorate, party agreement in parliament is likely to suffer. Moreover, as a
personal vote seeking strategy, candidates may a empt to dis nguish themselves from
their fellow candidates with whom they compete. One strategy could be by adop ng,
or emphasizing, a policy posi on that differs from that of (the other candidates of) that
help by the poli cal party. Our hypothesis is that MPs in party-oriented electoral sys-




Finally, when it comes to the effects of government par cipa on in parliamentary
systems, one could argue that if anMP’s party par cipates in government, this increases
the likelihood that MPs will disagree with the party’s posi on. Domes c circumstances
and interna onal pressures may lead the government to take ad hoc or unpopular mea-
sures, which governing par es’ counterparts in parliament are expected to support, but
individual MPs may not agree with. In the case of coali on government, governing par-
es may have to support certain government ini a ves that are a part of the coali on
agreement, but that were not originally in their party’s own electoral manifesto or party
program, also increasing the likelihood of MPs’ disagreement with the party line in par-
liament. We expect thatMPs in governing par es are less likely to frequently agree with
the party on a vote in parliament than MPs in opposi on par es (H3a).
4.2.3 Party loyalty
If MPs do not agree with the party group line on a vote in parliament, they move on to
the next decision-making stage, at which they weigh whether their loyalty to the party
group overrides their disagreement with the group’s posi on. MPs who subscribe to the
norm of party group solidarity toe the party group line voluntarily despite their reserva-
ons because they acknowledge the importance of legisla ve party group unity for par-
liamentary government. Party group loyalty is theorized to be the result of processes of
socializa on and internaliza on. Norms of group loyalty are learned not only in parlia-
ment (Rush and Giddings, 2011), but also through prior party experience (Asher, 1973;
Crowe, 1983).
Similar to party group agreement, a candidate’s loyalty to his selectorate is likely to be
an important candidate selec on criterion. Thus, if candidate selec on is concentrated
in the hands of the na onal party leadership, MPs are more likely to subscribe to the
norm of party group loyalty, than if the selectorate is more inclusive and decentralized.
In the cases of the former, it is clear who an MP’s main principal is (the na onal party
leadership). The more inclusive and decentralized the selectorate, however, the more
compe ng principals there are within the poli cal party to whom an MP may owe his
allegiance, and thus the more likely that his loyalty to the party group leadership will be
diffused by his loyalty to other party members and branches of the party organiza on,
who may disagree with the posi on of the party group and expect the MP to vote in
line with their own, instead of the party group’s, posi on (Carey, 2009). Therefore, we
expect thatMPs in par es with exclusive and centralized candidate selec on procedures
aremore likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty thanMPs in par es with inclusive
and decentralized candidate selec on procedures (H1b).
The no on of compe ng principals is also important when it comes to the influence
of electoral ins tu ons on MPs’ decision to vote with the party group’s posi on despite
disagreement. In party-oriented electoral systems in which par es control ballot access,
voters are unable to cast a personal vote and/or there is li le intra-party compe on,
MPs owe their seat to the party and benefit from the collec ve party reputa on. The
party is therefore their main principal, and thus MPs are more likely to be loyal to the
party group in the case of disagreement. In candidate-oriented electoral systems, voters
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can cast a personal vote and/or there is more intra-party compe on, and thus there is
more incen ve to cul vate a personal reputa on that sets MPs apart from their other
party group members, and MPs are more likely to owe their seats to voters who elected
on them on basis of their personal policy stances. Voters are therefore more likely to act
as compe ng principals to the poli cal party, and thus loyalty to the party group may be
diffused to an MP’s own (poten al) voters. The hypothesis is thatMPs in party-oriented
electoral systems are more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than MPs in
candidate-oriented electoral systems (H2b).
Finally, the added responsibility of suppor ng government ini a ves, and the threat
of early elec ons if the government is brought down, may ins ll in government MPs a
stronger feeling of responsibility towards their poli cal party, andmake themmore likely
to support their party group voluntarily in the case of disagreement, than opposi on
MPs. We expect thatMPs in governing par es are more likely to subscribe to the norm
of party loyalty than MPs in opposi on par es (H3b).
4.2.4 Party discipline
WhenMPs disagree with the party group line, and do not subscribe to the norm of party
group loyalty or the conflict with the party group’s posi on is so intense that it outweighs
their loyalty to the party group, party (group) leaders may employ disciplinary measures
in an a empt to sway their vote. At the final decision-making stage, MPs must decide
whether (the promise of) posi ve incen ves or (the threat of) nega ve sanc ons out-
weigh their resolve to dissent from the party group line. As opposed to party group
agreement and party group loyalty, which results in MPs’ voluntarily contribu ng to
party group unity, party discipline is an involuntary pathway.
Control over candidate selec on is an important tool that can be used to discipline
MPs. When candidate selec on procedures are inclusive and decentralized, the na onal
party (group) leadership’s access to candidate selec on as a poten al and credible dis-
ciplining tool is limited. Contrarily, when the na onal party (group) leadership has ex-
tensive control over candidate selec on, this can be very powerful disciplining tool.10 In
terms of nega ve sanc ons, the party (group) leadership can (threaten to) not reselect
an MP who is considering dissen ng or has dissented from the party group line. In the
case of candidacy lists, the party (group) leadership can also decrease an MP’s chances
of re-elec on by placing him near the bo om of the electoral candidacy list. In terms
of posi ve sanc ons, the party (group) leadership can do the opposite and (promise to)
reselect an MP, or place him nearer to the top of the candidacy list. Therefore we ex-
pect that MPs in par es with exclusive and centralized candidate selec on procedures
aremore likely to be disciplined thanMPs in par es with inclusive and decentralized can-
didate selec on procedures (H1c).
10 Depending on the rules of the poli cal party, the parliamentary party group leadership may be involved
in candidate selec on, and thus have direct access to reselec on as a disciplining tool, or may play only an
advisory role, making its access indirect and the use of candidate reselec on as a disciplinary tool dependent
on others within the party organiza on.
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The same logic holds for electoral ins tu ons: in party-oriented electoral systems,
where poli cal par es control ballot access and voters are unable to cast a personal
vote, poli cal par es’ control over candidate selec on extends in to the electoral arena.
In the case of list systems, safe posi ons near the top of the list are very valuable to
candidates, as being placed high on the party electoral candidacy list greatly increases
their chances of (re-)elec on. In candidate-centered electoral systems, where voters
can cast a personal vote and/or influence the order in which candidates are elected to
parliament, the party’s (leaderships’) ability to use the electoral system as a credible
sanc oning tool is diminished. We expect that MPs in party-oriented electoral systems
are more likely to be disciplined than MPs in candidate-oriented electoral systems (H2c).
In Anglo-Saxon parliamentary systems such as in the United Kingdom, where gov-
ernment (junior) minister are also members of parliament, a governing poli cal party
technically has the power to demote a frontbencher who refuses to vote with the party’s
posi on, to the posi on of backbencher. However, in most countries a (junior) minister
cannot simultaneously hold a seat in parliament, and therefore being a governing party
does not give a party’s leadership access to other tools to discipline its MP than if the
party is in opposi on. A governing party could promise an MP a future posi on in gov-
ernment, but there is no guarantee that the party will remain in government a er the
next elec ons. Thus, in parliament, governing and opposi on party groups have access
to the same disciplining tools. Depending on the rules of parliament, party (group) lead-
ers can remove anMP from his legisla ve commi ees, or (temporarily) relieve an MP of
his spokesmanship for par cular topics. They can also expel anMP from the party group,
and in legislatures where MPs’ seats formally belong to the party, even evict him from
parliament en rely, thus ending his poli cal career. The added responsibility of govern-
ment and the threat of early elec ons if the government is brought down, however, may
make governing par es more willing than opposi on par es to (threaten to) use these
disciplinary measures when MPs threaten not to toe the party group line voluntarily.
Our final hypothesis is that MPs in governing par es are more likely to be disciplined
than MPs in opposi on par es (H3c).
4.3 Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in 15 na-
onal parliaments
This analysis relies on data collected in the context of the Par Rep project. One of the
components of the Par Rep project involves a cross-na onal survey carried out in 15
countries amongmembers of 65 na onal and sub-na onal legislatures. For the purpose
of this analysis only respondents from the 15 na onal parliaments are included (see
Table 4.1). Data collec on took place between the Spring of 2009 and 2012, and in the
ming of the data collec on electoral cycles were taken into account asmuch as possible
to minimize the impact of electoral campaigns and ensure that MPs had been in office
for sufficient me to have experience with the phenomena into which our ques ons
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inquired.11 Depending on country context and the accessibility ofMPs,MPswere invited
to par cipate either by filling in a web-based survey or print ques onnaire by hand, or
were interviewed via telephone or face-to-face.12
On average 20 percent of na onal MPs par cipated in the survey, but the response
rates vary quite a bit between countries (see Table 4.1). There are few studies of re-
sponse rates themselves in poli cal science, and in par cular when it comes to elite
surveys. It is therefore difficult to determine whether these response rates can be con-
sidered acceptable or are comparable to those achieved through other elite surveys.
One recent example of another elite survey is the 2009 Compara ve Candidate Survey,
which achieved a response rate of 22 percent. During their Inaugural Conference, the
members of the project had agreed that “a survey with a return rate below 20 percent of
the target popula on (universe or sample) is not acceptable” (2007). According to this
threshold, the overall response rate a ained by the Par Rep survey just makes the cut.
However, there are a number of individual countries for which response rates are below
20 percent: Italy (7 percent), France (9 percent), the United Kingdom (10 percent) and
Portugal (12 percent). And Ireland (20 percent) and Germany (22 percent) are only just
above the threshold.
The dataset’s representa veness of the popula on was tested by the project lead-
ers using the Duncan Index of Similarity, on the basis of which the authors conclude
that “the selec on closely resembles the popula on in most respects” (see Deschouwer
et al. 2014, 11). 49 percent of respondents are from governing par es, and 51 per-
cent are members of par es in opposi on, which in almost all countries is very similar
to the ra o in the popula on. The sample is also fairly representa ve of party group
membership, although there are a few excep ons (Deschouwer et al., 2014, 11).13 As
such, responses are weighted to correct for these poten al biases in response rates be-
tween party groups in legislatures. A second weight is applied to bring the number of
responses in the different countries in line with one another. S ll, country differences
in response rates should be kept in mind in interpre ng the analyses in this chapter.14
Finally, the eight independents (defined as MPs whose poli cal party only has one seat
in parliament) included in the data set are excluded from the analysis, as they have no
parliamentary party group to conform to.
As highlighted in subsec on 3.2.1 in chapter 3, there are a number of other variables,
including those at the poli cal party and individual level, that are also argued to affect
individual MP behavior and party group unity. Although the survey is deemed fairly
11 Only in the Netherlands, Norway and Spain did data collec on take place in themonths prior to the na onal
parliamentary elec ons.
12 The fact that different methods of data collec on were used may hve
13 In both France and Spain, the Socialist party is overrepresented, whereas the Conserva ve Party is slightly
underrepresented. In Italy the Par to Democra co is overrepresented, whereas Popola della Libertá is un-
derrepresented (Deschouwer et al., 2014, 11). In Poland, the large established par es are slightly under-
represented (André et al., 2012, 109).


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3. Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in 15 na onal parliaments
Table 4.2: Average party group unity in 15 na onal parliaments (Rice score)















United Kingdom 1992-1997 99.25
Total / average
Rice score sources: Source for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy and United Kingdom is
Depauw and Mar n (2009). The authors excluded both non-votes and absten ons. Source for Switzerland is
Lanfranchi and Lüthi (1999). The scores for the Netherlands were calculated by the author.
representa ve of the popula on of MPs in the 15 na onal parliaments included in the
study, and there are over 100 parliamentary party groups included in the survey, and
data weights have been used to try to correct for poten al biases, there are some party
groups, especially the smaller ones, that are underrepresented or not represented at all,
which may have made the inclusion of party (group) related factors problema c. Thus,
one of the main reasons why we have opted to limit the analysis to only three main
ins tu onal variables is data-driven.15
In eachof the sec ons below,wefirst present descrip ve sta s cs on the four decision-
making mechanisms. When possible we also validate our measures of the decision-
making mechanisms with other ques ons from the 2010 Par Rep Survey. Each discus-
sion of the descrip ve sta s cs of the individual mechanisms is followed by a mul vari-
ate analysis in which we test the hypotheses developed above (with the excep on of
15 Wedid check for correla ons between the ques ons used tomeasure the decision-makingmechanisms and
the poten ally relevant variables included in the Par Rep dataset. Almost all of the rela onships were not
sta s cally significant, and for some the relevance and suitability of the variables (i.e., ques on formula on
and/or answering categories formula ons and variable type) for our analysis can be ques oned.
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cue-taking for which we did not develop any hypotheses, see subsec on 4.2.1). Because
all our dependent variables are categorical, logis c regression is the best mul variate
method to use. In order to take the hierarchical nature of the data into account, we
use a mul level model, through which we control for the 15 parliaments and 94 poli cal
party groups that MPs are members of.
First, to test our hypotheses regarding government par cipa on in parliamentary
systems, we use a simple dummy variable that marks whether an MP’s party is in oppo-
si on (0) or in government (1). Regarding the opera onaliza on of candidate selec on,
MPs’ par es’ candidate selec on procedures are classified according to the two dimen-
sions of inclusiveness and centraliza on iden fied by Rahat and Hazan (2001) in the Par-
Rep dataset. These classifica ons are based on the expert judgments of the Par Rep
project researchers from the respec ve countries. Inclusiveness is measured using a
categorical indicator, the categories being that party selects its candidates via party pri-
maries, a party agency or the party leadership. Most of the respondents in the 2010
Par Rep survey are selected by a party agency (59 percent), one-third are selected by
party leaders, and about 10 percent are selected through party primaries. The Par Rep
experts also classified the decentraliza on of candidate selec on procedures as either
taking place at the local, district, regional or na onal level. We have opted to combine
these two dimensions into one dummy variable: candidate selec on is both exclusive
and centralized when it takes place at the na onal level by party leaders or a select party
agency (1), and candidate selec on is considered inclusive and decentralized when can-
didates are selected through party primaries at any level of the party organiza on, or by
party leaders or a party agency at one of the subna onal levels (0).16
Next, as explained above, the classifica on of the formal proper es of electoral sys-
tems as either candidate- or party-oriented is not consistent in the literature, which may
account for the mixed results regarding their effects on party vo ng unity. In line with
Carey (2007), we opt for the simplest measure, and that is to differen ate between sys-
tems in which voters can formally cast a preference vote for an individual candidate (0)
and systems in which voters cannot (1).17 We also check for the effect of district mag-
nitude (decimal logged), as one could argue that when voters can cast personal votes
the intensity of intra-party compe on, and thus the value of an individual reputa on,
increases with district magnitude, because the number of co-par san compe tors also
increases. When voters cannot cast a vote for an individual candidate, the value of the
poli cal party label instead increases with district magnitude (Carey and Shugart, 1995).
The frequency distribu ons of these variables for each of the 15 parliaments are pre-
sented in Table 4.1 .
Table 4.2 provides informa on on recent Rice scores for those parliaments for which
these are available, as an indica on of the levels of party group unity found in previous
research. Party vo ng unity is very high in almost all of our 15 parliaments, meaning that
16 Alterna ve classifica on of candidate selec on procedures based on the expert judgment of the Par Rep
project research team produced very similar results.
17 Alterna ve classifica on of the formal proper es of electoral systems based on the expert judgment of the
Par Rep project research team produced very similar results.
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by and large, MPs usually vote with the party group in parliament. With the excep on
of Switzerland, Rice scores are all above 95. As stated before, however, these scores
do not allow us to ascertain the rela ve contribu on of each of the decision-making
mechanisms (see sec on 3.2 in chapter 3). Ideally, our explanatory model of decision
making would be tested by asking MPs what mo vated their choice at each stage of
their decision-making process on individual legisla ve votes. However, the available
data precludes us from doing so, and we are also unable to connect MPs’ responses
to the Par Rep Survey ques ons to their past vo ng behavior. We can, however, get
a general idea of the rela ve importance that the decision-making mechanisms play in
determining party vo ng unity, and how these may vary between countries and with
different ins tu ons, based on our 2010 Par Rep Survey. Thus the results below reflect
general tendencies, but can be considered in light of these high levels of party vo ng
unity found in previous research.
4.3.1 Division of labor
During the first stage of the sequen al decision-making process, individual MPs deter-
mine whether they actually have an opinion on the vote at hand. We argue that as a
result of the heavy workload of parliament and the division of labor party groups apply
in order to deal with this workload, it is likely thatMPs do not have the me or resources
to form a personal opinion on all topics, and if they lack an opinion MPs vote according
to the vo ng advice provided by their fellow party group members.
We lack a direct measure of cue-taking that refers specifically to its role in MPs’ de-
cision making when it comes to vo ng in parliament, but we can ascertain the extent
to which MPs are likely to view themselves as generalists or specialists, our argument
being that specialists are more likely to lack an opinion on votes outside of their area
of exper se, and thus are more likely to rely on cue-taking. In the 2010 Par Rep Sur-
vey, MPs were asked whether they, in their role as a Member of Parliament, prefer to
speak on a wide range of issues from different policy areas, or instead specialize in one
or two policy areas. The aggregate percentage of MPs who indicate to keep up with a
wide range of issues (referred to as generalist), is prac cally the same as the percent-
age of MPs who indicate to specialize (referred to as specialist, see Table 4.3). In most
individual countries, however, the percentage of specialists is indeed higher than the
percentage of generalists; specialists are in the minority only in Norway (16 percent),
Ireland (29 percent), and the Netherlands (36 percent), followed to a lesser extent by
Austria (45 percent) and Italy (47 percent). With the excep on of Italy, the parliaments
where specialists are in the minority are also those with the fewest number of seats
(see Table 4.1), entailing that the average size of party groups is likely to be smaller as
well; this may explain why in these parliamentsMPs aremore likely consider themselves
generalists (for a further analysis of the rela onship between party group size and the
percentage of generalists versus specialists, see chapter 5).
We also inquired intoMPs’ percep on of the role of the parliamentary party spokes-
person in determining the posi on of the party on his topic. One could argue that where
there is a strong division of labor, parliamentary party spokespersons play an important
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Table 4.3: Specialist or generalist in 15 na onal parliaments (%)
Generalist Specialist Total Total (n)
Austria 55 45 100 48
Belgium 38 63 101 66
France 33 67 100 48
Germany 45 55 100 131
Hungary 42 58 100 99
Ireland 71 29 100 32
Israel 39 61 100 38
Italy 53 47 100 45
Netherlands 64 36 100 60
Norway 84 16 100 45
Poland 38 62 100 54
Portugal 36 64 100 76
Spain 37 63 100 103
Switzerland 50 50 100 48
United Kingdom 50 50 100 60
All 51 50 101 953
χ² (14) = 97.750, sig. = .000; φc = .324, sig. = .000
role in determining the posi on of the party, and MPs will also be more likely to rely on
the parliamentary party spokespersons’ vo ng advice when they do not have a personal
opinion on issues put to a vote in parliament. According to the figures in Table 4.4,18 61
percent of all MPs answer that it is (mostly) true that the parliamentary party spokes-
person determines the posi on of the party on his topics. In most individual countries,
the answering pa erns are very similar to those at the aggregate level. Countries where
the parliamentary party spokesperson seems to play an especially important role include
Austria (85 percent answer that the statement is (mostly) true), Spain (78 percent), Ire-
land (75 percent) and Poland (74 percent). The excep ons are Hungary, where only 36
percent of respondents answer that the statement that the parliamentary party spokes-
person determines (mostly) true (and almost half consider the statement is (mostly)
false), and Italy (34 percent answer that the statement (mostly) true). All in all, these
descrip ve sta s cs do seem to imply that cue-taking may be an important pathway to
party unity, although given the high levels of party vo ng unity found in previous studies,
it is certainly not the only one.
18 For presenta onpurposes the answering categories ‘mostly false’ and ‘false’ are collapsed into one category,
as are the answering categories ‘mostly true’ and ‘true’.
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Table 4.4: ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s posi on
on his topic’ in 15 na onal parliaments (%)
(Mostly) false Neither (Mostly) true Total Total (n)
Austria 10 5 85 100 47
Belgium 23 23 55 101 66
France 30 17 53 100 49
Germany 13 19 68 100 133
Hungary 48 16 36 100 98
Ireland 25 0 75 100 32
Israel 24 12 65 101 38
Italy 25 41 34 100 43
Netherlands 22 23 54 99 65
Norway 23 9 68 100 46
Poland 6 20 74 100 54
Portugal 31 9 59 99 75
Spain 11 11 78 100 102
Switzerland 25 13 63 101 49
United Kingdom 23 21 55 99 60
All 24 15 61 100 957
χ² (28) = 115.206, sig. = .000; φc = .248, sig. = .000
4.3.2 Party agreement
If MPs do have an opinion on a vote in parliament, they move on to the second decision-
making stage, at which they assess whether their opinion on the issue at hand corre-
sponds with the posi on of the party. If this is the case, they vote with the party line
voluntarily out of simple agreement. In the literature on party unity, ideological Le -
Right and policy scales found in elite surveys are o en used to gauge party agreement.
These scales can be used to calculate a party’s coefficient of agreement (Van der Eijk,
2001) or party homogeneity in terms of the difference between MPs’ own posi on and
the mean (or another central tendency, such as the median) posi on of all party group
members. Alterna vely, Kam (2001a, 103) measures the absolute distance between
MPs’ self-placement and the posi on at which they themselves place their party, as he
argues that MPs may have different interpreta ons of the scale. In this study, we use
MPs’ self-reported frequency of disagreement as a measure of party agreement.
In the Par Rep Survey, respondents were asked how o en, in the last year, they found
themselves in the posi on that their party had one posi on on a vote in parliament, and
they personally had a different opinion. This ques on goes further than the abstract ide-
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ological and policy scales used in previous studies: the ques on specifies two actors (the
individual MP and the party) and the event (a difference of opinion over an upcoming
vote), and provides quan fiable answering categories (the frequency of disagreement
over months and years). The ques on gives a sense of, on the whole, how o en MPs
disagree with their party on a vote in parliament. MPs’ answers to the ques on remain
es ma ons, however, although if MPs disagreed infrequently they ought to be able to
recall each unique vote for which this was the case, and it is safe to assume that dis-
agreement occurs quite frequently if MPs cannot recall the exact number of mes they
disagreed with their party. It could be argued, however, that since the ques on refers
specifically to vo ng that it may measure MPs’ behavior (and thus MPs’ contribu on to
party group unity, the final outcome of MPs’ decision-making sequence), instead of a -
tudinal party agreement. But the fact that the ques on is followed by a direct follow-up
ques on as to how anMP should vote in the case of disagreement with the party’s posi-
on (see subsec on 5.3.3), implies that MPs are likely to have interpreted the ques on
as inquiring into the frequency of disagreement before vo ng took place.
Another poten al problem of the ques on is the fact that it refers to the posi on of an
MP’s ‘party’, and not specifically his party group in parliament. Thus, respondents may
have interpreted ‘party’ as referring to the party group, but also to other parts andmem-
bers of the party organiza on. The ques on does, however, also refer specifically to a
conflict of posi ons on ‘a vote in parliament’, whichmakes it likely that respondents have
interpreted the ques on as referring to the party group in parliament, although we can-
not be sure. Onemore drawback of the ques on is that it does not allowus to dis nguish
between MPs who vote with the party because they agree with the party’s posi on, or
because they lack an opinion but do not do not disagree with the party’s posi on (i.e.,
they do not have an opinion on a par cular vote and rely on the vo ng advice provided
by their fellow party members). Thus, infrequent disagreement (or more precisely, lack
of disagreement) as a result of cue-taking cannot be ruled out by our measure.
Of all the MPs in our 15 na onal parliaments, 61 percent disagree infrequently with
their party (28 percent (almost) never disagree with the party’s posi on on a vote in
parliament and 33 percent indicate that disagreement occurs about once a year, see
Table 4.5)19, meaning that it is a quite important pathway to party vo ng unity. S ll,
19 Of course, what these percentages mean is rela ve to the (average) number and the rela ve frequency of
different types of votes (i.e. roll call or regular votes) held in each parliament per year, as well as the vo ng
procedures per parliament. These figures are unfortunately not available for all parliaments. Hix et al.’s
(2005) study of the dimensions of conflict in legislatures does offer an indica on of the number of roll call
votes for four of the parliaments included in our analysis. Hix et al. (2005) analyzed all roll call votes during
one term in either the late 1990s or early 2000s, or part of a term if the data from the full-term were not
available. They then excluded all lopsided votes (for which less than 10 percent ofMPswere on theminority
side) and all MPs who voted fewer than 25 mes. Looking at the four parliaments in our analysis that were
included in their study, we see that in Belgium there were 663 roll call votes during the 2003-2007 term,
in France there were 105 roll call votes in the 1997-2002 term, in Poland there were 1,050 roll call votes
during the 1997-1999 term, and in Israel there were 584 roll call votes in October and November 1999. In
the Netherlands there were 6,304 votes during the 2006-2010 term, of which only 48 were taken by roll
call. The ques on inquiring into the frequency of disagreement does not, however, specify on what type of
vote disagreement takes place.
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Table 4.5: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi on on
a vote in parliament) in 15 na onal parliaments (%)
Frequently disagree Infrequently disagree
Once a month Every three months Once a year (Almost) never Total Total (n)
Austria 0 21 58 21 100 46
Belgium 7 27 32 34 100 68
France 4 42 40 14 100 49
Germany 4 38 29 29 100 133
Hungary 19 31 31 20 101 99
Ireland 0 20 58 22 100 32
Israel 27 33 2 38 100 39
Italy 18 38 32 12 100 44
Netherlands 7 21 33 40 101 62
Norway 9 22 34 35 100 45
Poland 2 28 41 29 100 53
Portugal 15 35 25 25 100 76
Spain 5 16 27 51 99 103
Switzerland 13 25 50 13 101 48
United Kingdom 23 23 33 21 100 61
All 11 28 33 28 100 958
χ² (42) = 168.897, sig. = .000; φc = .425, sig. = .000 (four original answering categories)
χ² (14) = 65.801, sig. = .000; φc = .265, sig. = .000 (four answering categories collapsed into ‘frequently disagree’ and
‘infrequently disagree’)
39 percent indicate that disagreement with their party occurs frequently (28 percent
disagree with the party line about once every three months and 11 percent indicate to
disagree about once a month). These aggregate figures hide considerable differences
across parliaments, however. Party agreement is highest among MPs in Ireland (where
80 percent indicate to disagree about once a year or (almost) never), Austria (79 per-
cent), Spain (78 percent) and the Netherlands (72 percent), and only in Israel, Italy,
Portugal and Hungary does a (small) majority of MPs indicate to experience frequent
disagreement with the party on a vote in parliament.
In order to validate this indicator of party agreement, MPs’ responses to the fre-
quency of disagreement ques on are compared to the distance between where MPs
place themselves on the 11-point Le -Right ideological scale, and where they perceive
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their party to be (Kam, 2009).20,21 40 percent ofMPs perceive no distance between their
own posi on and their poli cal party’s posi on, another 40 percent perceive a 1-point
difference, and the remaining 20 percent place themselves at two or more points from
their party (not shown in Figure 4.1). We can therefore conclude that in general, the
par es are quite homogeneous in terms of their Le -Right ideology, at least according
to MPs’ own percep ons. Our expecta on is that the larger the absolute distance MPs
perceive between their own and the party’s posi on, the more frequently they disagree
with the party. For presenta on purposes, we combine all perceived distances of two or
more points into one category (see Figure 4.1). The answering categories used for the
ques on concerning the frequency of disagreement are also collapsed: ‘about once a
month’ and ‘about once every three months’ are combined into ‘frequently disagree’,
and the categories ‘about once a year’ and ‘(almost) never’ are collapsed into ‘infre-
quently disagree’.22
Among thoseMPswho perceive no ideological distance between themselves and the
party, 68 percent infrequently disagree with their party and 32 percent indicate to fre-
quently disagree. And among those MPs who perceive a 1-point difference, 61 percent
infrequently disagree and 39 percent frequently disagree. This linear trend con nues,
in that the larger the perceived ideological distance, the higher the percentage of MPs
who frequently disagree with their party over a vote in parliament. Indeed, a one-step
increase in the absolute perceived distance between an MP and the party’s posi on on
the 11-point Le -Right scale increases the odds of frequently disagreeing as opposed
to infrequently disagreeing with the poli cal party over a vote in parliament by a factor
of 1.359. All in all, MPs who, according to their own percep on, share the ideological
posi on of the poli cal party are more likely to usually agree with the party on a vote in
20 Valida on of party agreement with the ideological distance MPs perceive between their own and their
party’s posi on can be framed as both convergence and nomological valida on (Adcock, 2002). On the
one hand, ideological placement has been used as a proxy for the influence of policy preferences on par-
liamentary behavior in previous studies (convergence valida on). On the other hand, it can be argued that
ideological distance as a measure of policy differences can be seen as a cause or predictor of the frequency
of disagreement (nomological valida on).
21 The ques ons that askMPs to place themselves and the poli cal party on the Le -Right ideological scale are
located consecu vely in the Par Rep Survey, making it reasonable to assume that any distance indicated
by MPs is conscious and meaningful. However, that MPs are first asked to place themselves may act as an
anchor for where they subsequently place the poli cal party, making the la er con ngent on the former.
This may lead to an underes ma on of the distance MPs perceive between their own and the party’s po-
si on. As is the case with the ques on concerning the frequency of disagreement, MPs are asked to place
their ‘party’, and not specifically their party group, on the Le -Right scale. Thus means we cannot be sure
whether respondents kept in mind their party group, or another part of their party organiza on, or their
party members, when answering the ques on.
22 Although the measurement scale is meaningful (months and years), the intervals between the answering
categories differ. As the two middle answering categories (once every three months / once every year) are
the most popular, dichotomizing any way other than down the middle results in a skewed distribu on of
responses. Although there may be context-specific theore cal arguments in favor of dichotomizing differ-
ently in specific legislatures (e.g. in some parliaments votes take place much less frequently than in others,
and thus disagreement once a year may be considered quite frequent), it is best to dichotomize down the
middle for the en re data set to obtain the most equal variance between the two groups.
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Figure 4.1: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi on
on a vote in parliament) and the absolute distance MPs’ perceive between their own
posi on and the posi on of their party on an 11-point ideological Le -Right scale in 15
na onal parliaments (%)
parliament. This entails that our measure is likely to be a good measure of party agree-
ment.
Moving on to the effects of ins tu ons on MPs’ frequency of agreement, Table 4.6
presents the es mated binary logis c regression coefficients, robust standard errors, sig-
nificance levels and odds ra os for each of the variables hypothesized to influence party
agreement. The null model includes only the random effects (the effects of country and
poli cal party), models 1 through 3 test for individual ins tu ons, model 4 contains all
fixed and random effects, and model 5 reruns the full model but disregards the hierar-
chical nature of the data, and thus tests for fixed effects only.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3. Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in 15 na onal parliaments
on party agreement. First, candidate selec on exclusiveness and centraliza on have a
posi ve effect on party agreement, as expected (H1a). MPs who belong to par es in
which candidate selec on is concentrated in the hands of party leaders or party agency
at the na onal level are more likely to agree with their party, thanMPs who are selected
by subna onal party leaders or agencies, or party primaries at any level of the party
organiza on (model 1). When placed in the full hierarchical model, candidate selec on
is just shy of sta s cal significance (model 5).
On its own, voters’ inability to cast a vote for an individual candidate has a posi ve
(almost sta s cally significant) effect on party agreement (model 2): when preference
vo ng is not allowed, the odds of an MP frequently agreeing with his party increase
by a factor of 2, which is in line with our hypothesis (H2a). However, the interac on
between preference vo ng and district magnitude is in the opposite direc on fromwhat
was predicted. In other words, in systems that do not allow preference vo ng the odds
of an MP infrequently disagreeing with the party decrease as district magnitude (and
thus intra-party compe on) increases. The interac on effect between voters’ inability
to cast a personal vote and district magnitude remains sta s cally significant in the full
model as well (model 5).
Finally, as predicted (H3a), government par cipa on indeed has a nega ve effect on
party agreement (model 4); MPs in governing par es are less likely to frequently agree
with their party on a vote in parliament than MPs whose par es are in opposi on. The
difference between MPs in governing par es and those in opposi on is again just shy of
sta s cal significant a er the other variables are added (model 5).
It seems that poli cal par es in these parliamentary democracies can, to a large ex-
tent, rely on MPs’ agreement with the party line for party vo ng unity in parliament.
Moreover, with the excep on of the formal proper es of the electoral ins tu ons, all of
our ins tu onal variables have the predicted effects on party agreement. Nonetheless,
around 40 percent of MPs indicate to frequently disagree with their party which, given
the high levels of vo ng unity found in previous compara ve analyses, is more than one
would expect if party agreement were the sole determinants of MPs’ vo ng behavior.
Par es, it seems, must also rely on other mechanisms to achieve party unity.
4.3.3 Party loyalty
If MPs do not agree with the party line on a vote in parliament, theymove on to the next
decision-making stage, at which they weigh whether their loyalty to the party group
overrides their disagreement with the party group’s posi on. MPs who subscribe to the
norm of party group solidarity toe the party group line voluntarily despite their reserva-
ons because they acknowledge, and have internalized, the importance of party group
unity for parliamentary government.
As alreadymen oned (see subsec on 4.3.2), the ques on concerning the frequency
of disagreement was followed by a ques on asking respondents how they think an MP
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Table 4.7: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) in 15 na onal parliaments
(%)
Own opinion Party’s posi on Total Total (n)
Austria 53 47 100 44
Belgium 31 69 100 68
France 64 35 100 48
Germany 53 47 100 124
Hungary 38 63 101 95
Ireland 20 80 100 31
Israel 44 56 100 37
Italy 64 36 100 44
Netherlands 11 89 100 45
Norway 15 85 100 42
Poland 51 50 101 52
Portugal 45 55 100 75
Spain 17 83 100 101
Switzerland 88 13 101 48
United Kingdom 53 47 100 55
All 38 62 100 909
χ² (14) = 114.279, sig. = .000; φc = .359, sig. = .000
should vote in the case of conflict between anMP’s opinion and the party’s posi on.23, 24
Table 4.7 shows that 62 percent of MPs contend that when in disagreement with the
party’s posi on on a vote in parliament, anMP s ll ought to vote according to the party’s
23 As was the case with the ques on pertaining to the frequency of disagreement used as an indicator of party
agreement, the ques on refers to the respondent’s ‘party’, and not specifically the party group.
24 In past parliamentary surveys held in the Dutch Second Chamber, the ques on as to how an MP ought
to vote when his opinion conflicts with the posi on of the party included a middle answering category ‘it
depends’. This category was always the most popular among Dutch MPs. The omission of this category in
the 2010 Par Rep Survey was associated with almost 30 percent of Dutch respondents refusing to answer
the ques on, and a very high percentage of respondents selec ng the answering category ‘MP should vote
according to his party’s opinion’ (see Table 6.18 in chapter 6). In the other 14 na onal parliaments included
in the analysis in this chapter, however, the omission of this category seems to have had a smaller effect
on the response rate: 7 percent (67 respondents) of the total number of MPs’ responses to the ques on
are missing. In comparison: 2 percent (18 respondents) of MPs from these 15 na onal parliaments refused
to answer the ques on that preceded this ques on in the survey. Of the 65 MPs who did not fill in the
ques on pertaining to party loyalty, 18 percent (12 respondents) filled in the survey online, 42 percent (28
respondents) filled in a hard-copy version, and 40 percent (26 respondents) were interviewed face-to-face
(20 of these respondents were from the Netherlands). These percentages and number of respondents are
not weighted.
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posi on. Since the ques on pertains specifically to situa ons inwhichMPs disagreewith
the party line, this entails that the resultant behavior in these situa ons is not based
on party agreement, and thus serves as a good indicator of party loyalty. That over
60 percent of MPs answer to voluntarily submit to the party line despite disagreement
means that it is an important voluntary pathway to unity that par es can rely on. S ll,
38 percent answer that in the case of disagreement an MP ought to vote according to
his own opinion. Thus, if party loyalty were the sole determinant of party vo ng unity,
we would likely see more party disunity in these parliamentary systems than is now the
case. Subscrip on to the norm of party loyalty is par cularly high among MPs in the
Netherlands (89 percent), Norway (85 percent), Spain (83 percent) and Ireland (80 per-
cent). In Switzerland, however, only 13 percent answer that an MP should follow the
party line when in disagreement. Party loyalty also seems to be less prevalent in France,
Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria and Poland, where only a minority indicate
that in the case of disagreement an MP ought to opt for the party’s posi on.25
In order to validate this measure of party loyalty, MPs’ responses are compared to
the importance they ascribed to promo ng the views and interest of their party. Sup-
posedly, MPs who a ach great importance to promo ng the interests and views of the
party are also more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. Most MPs consider
represen ng the interests of the party rather important, withmore than 80 percent posi-
oning themselves on the right end of the scale (scoring 5 points or more on the 7-point
scale). Furthermore, there is a posi ve and almost linear rela onship between ascribing
importance to promo ng the views and interests of the party and thinking that an MP
ought to vote according to the party line in the case of disagreement. Of thoseMPs who
assign the greatest importance to promo ng the interests of the party (scoring a 7 on the
scale), 79 percent subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. At the other extreme, only 47
percent of MPs who ascribe no importance to promo ng the views and interests of their
party subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. A one-step increase on the scale 7-point
ordinal scale towards ascribing more importance to promo ng the views and interests
of the party increases the odds of vo ng with the party’s posi on as opposed to vo ng
to according to an MP’s own opinion by a factor of 1.369. All in all, MPs’ opinions about
how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement appears to be a good indicator of
party loyalty.
When it comes to the effects of ins tu ons, we hypothesized that candidate selec-
on procedures that are inclusive and decentralized diffuse loyalty to the party group
in parliament, as this creates a situa on of compe ng principals within the party (H2a).
Indeed, on its own, being selected by na onal party leaders or an agency, as opposed
to party leaders or an agency at the subna onal level or through primaries at any level,
increases the odds of subscribing to the norm of party loyalty by a factor of 1.484 (model
25 France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom also happen to be among the countries where the a ained
survey response rate was low. It could be that MPs who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty
were more likely to par cipate in the survey than MPs who do subscribe to the norm. Maybe the former
group saw the survey as a means of expressing their lack of loyalty. As far as we know, however, MPs in all
countries were approached to par cipate in a survey about representa on in general, and not specifically
their rela onship with their party (group).
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Figure 4.2: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and the importance as-
cribed to promo ng the views and interests of the party in 15 na onal parliaments (%)
1 in Table 4.8). However, once other variables are added to the model, the influence of
candidate selec on is not sta s cally significant.26
Concerning electoral ins tu ons, voters’ ability to cast a personal vote is also ex-
pected to lead candidates to engage in personal vote seeking, which may lead to a situ-
a on of compe ng principals once in parliament, and diffuse MPs’ loyalty to the party
(H2b). Whether personal vo ng is formally possible does not seem to have an effect on
26 Itmay also be that the ques onweuse tomeasure party loyalty is interpreted in differentways: the ques on
asks how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement between an MP’s own opinion and the posi on
of the party, but does not explicate ‘the posi on of the party’ as that of the party group in parliament. Thus,
respondents may have interpreted the posi on of the party to include that of their selectorate, or specific
groups within the poli cal party, as well. This lack of specifica on of what is meant by ‘the party’s posi on’
also holds for our measure of party agreement, however, on which our measure of candidate selec on did
have a sta s cally significant effect.
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party loyalty, however (model 2). And again, when district magnitude is taken into con-
sidera on the effect is sta s cally significant, but in the opposite direc on from what
was predicted, actually decreasing the odds of an MP voluntarily vo ng with the party
line when in disagreement.
One could ques onwhether the formal proper es of electoral ins tu ons accurately
captureMPs’ tendency to engage in (or the value they ascribe to) personal vote seeking,
or their response to the dilemma they face when confronted with compe ng principals.
In order to gauge the former, we have added a variable that includes MPs’ responses
to the ques on whether they would rather spend scarce me and resources running
a personal campaign (1) or party campaign (5), measured on a five-point ordinal scale
(model 4). Indeed, MPs who indicate to prefer to run a party campaign aremore likely to
vote according to the party line when in disagreement, whereas MPs who would rather
spend their me and resources on a personal campaign (thus engaging in personal vote
seeking) are less likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (the variable is almost
sta s cally significant on its own).
By using the choice between an MP’s own opinion and his party’s posi on as our
measure of party loyalty (and thus dependent variable) we implicitly assume that vot-
ers as a poten al focus of representa on are nested in representa ves’ personal prefer-
ences. To be er capture the influence of voters versus the party as compe ng principals
onMPs’ party loyalty, we use a ques on that asks respondents how anMP ought to vote
in the case of disagreement between the voters’ and the party’s posi on. According to
the theory of compe ng principals, an MP who chooses to vote according to his own
opinion in the case of disagreement with the party’s posi on does so because his own
opinion is based on, or at least informed by, voters’ preferences, and the MP wishes to
remain loyal to the voters.27 Model 5 shows that this is indeed the case, and that the
choice between voters’ and the party as compe ng principals has a very strong effect
on party loyalty: On its own, the odds of an MP subscribing to the norm of party loyalty
as opposed to not doing so are almost 8 mes higher for an MP who selects the party’s
posi on over voter’s opinions than for an MP who would opts for the voters’ opinion.
Model 6 includes only all of the formal ins tu onal variables, in which only district
magnitude and the interac on effect between voters’ inability to cast personal votes
and district magnitude remain sta s cally significant (but not in the predicted direc-
on). Adding our measures of MPs’ tendency to engage in personal vote seeking and
the influence of compe ng principals does not change the effect of these formal ins -
tu ons much (model 7). In the full model, our measure of personal vote seeking is no
longer sta s cally significant, but the effect of an MP’s choice between voters’ and the
party as compe ng principals s ll is. Finally, we also predicted that MPs from governing
par es would be more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than opposi on
27 Another op on is that an MP is not responsive to voters’ interests, but considers himself a ‘trustee’ in
terms of his style of representa on and thus truly follows his own opinion (Eulau et al., 1959; Wahlke et al.,
1962; Converse and Pierce, 1979, 1986). This situa on is actually be er captured by the ques on as to
whether he would prefer to spend his scarce me and resources running a personal or party campaign, as
one could argue that a trustee does not face a situa on of compe ng principals; only an MP who takes on
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MPs because of the added responsibility of maintaining their party in government (H2c).
On its own, government par cipa on does not have a sta s cally significant effect on
whether an MP will toe the party line voluntarily despite disagreement (model 3), but
the variable does increase in strength in the model containing both formal ins tu ons
as well as our measures of personal vote seeking and compe ng principals.
All in all, 60 percent of our MPs hold the opinion that an MP ought to vote according
to the party’s posi on in the case of conflict. It is noteworthy that the formal proper-
es of ins tu ons seem to have less effect on MPs’ tendency to subscribe to the norm
of party loyalty than they do on MPs’ frequency of disagreement. It may be that can-
didates’ loyalty is a less important candidate selec on criterion than candidates’ policy
preferences are (one could argue that due to the personal norma ve nature of themech-
anism, it is difficult for selectorates to gauge the extent to which candidates will be loyal
to them).28 It is somewhat surprising, however, that electoral ins tu ons seem to have
the opposite effect on party loyalty than what is argued in the literature concerning per-
sonal vote seeking and the no on of compe ng principals. Of our two individual level
a tudinal measures of these concepts, the one which poses voters’ and the party as
compe ng principals does prove to have predic ve power in the full model. 29
4.3.4 Party discipline
When MPs disagree with the party line, and do not vote with the party out of loyalty,
their party (group) leadersmay employ disciplinarymeasures in an a empt to sway their
votes. At the final stage of our sequen al decision-making model, MPs must decide
whether (the promise of) posi ve incen ves or (the threat of) nega ve sanc ons out-
weigh their resolve to dissent from the party line. As opposed to party agreement and
party loyalty, which results in MPs’ voluntary contribu on to party vo ng unity in par-
liament, party discipline is an involuntary pathway.
As men oned in subsec on 3.2.2 in chapter 3, the observa on and measurement
of party discipline is problema c. First, the threat, promise or expecta on of sanc ons
alone may be enough to elicit submission to the party line. Second, when discipline is
applied, this is usually done behind the closed doors of the parliamentary party group, as
public disciplining can lead tomedia a en on which is assumed to have nega ve effects
on the electoral prospects of the party as a whole. Finally, it is difficult to dis nguish be-
tween behavior resul ng from the use of sanc ons and other rela vely innocent factors
28 Ideally, we would also check whether an MP’s choice when force to choose between the parliamentary
party group’s posi on and his party’s selectorate’s opinion would prove a more accurate measure of the
situa on of compe ng principals within the poli cal party. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to do
so.
29 Although there is a sta s cally significant correla on between our measure the frequency of disagreement
and our measure of the voters’ versus the party as compe ng principals, we do not include these in the
mul level mul variate analysis of party agreement (see Table 4.6 ) for substan ve reasons. Party agree-
ment, we argue, is not influenced by the existence of poten ally compe ng principals, but by that when
making their vote choice, voters’ select the party or candidate whose policy stances are representa ve of
their own.
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Table 4.9: Sa sfac on with general parliamentary party discipline in 15 na onal parlia-
ments (%)
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Austria 41 59 0 100 50
Belgium 11 78 11 100 59
France 15 77 8 100 48
Germany 46 52 2 100 129
Hungary 26 65 9 100 97
Ireland 26 61 13 100 32
Israel 13 77 10 100 38
Italy 38 59 3 100 43
Netherlands 9 83 8 100 63
Norway 7 89 4 100 45
Poland 8 72 20 100 50
Portugal 5 73 22 100 71
Spain 6 73 21 100 92
Switzerland 29 71 0 100 44
United Kingdom 17 75 8 100 52
All 17 72 11 100 913
χ² (28) = 112.700, sig. = .000; φc = .251, sig. = .000
(e.g., not being placed on the electoral candidacy list for the upcoming elec ons may be
a nega ve sanc on applied by the party leadership, but it may also be the case that an
MP simply wants to re re from poli cs).
Unfortunately, the Par Rep Survey does not have any ques ons that askMPs directly
whether sanc ons are applied if an MP does not vote according to the party line, or
threatens to do so (but see subsec on 5.4.4 in chapter 5 for an analysis of the expected
likelihood of nega ve sanc ons among Dutch representa ves). We do, however, have
ques ons that inquire into MPs’ sa sfac on with general, as well as specific aspects of,
party discipline in their parliamentary party group. Respondents were asked whether
they thought that party discipline should be more strict than it is now, should remain
as it is, or should be less strict than it is now. In interpre ng the answering categories,
we assume that MPs who hold the opinion that party discipline ought to be more strict
are not likely to have been disciplined themselves, but feel that they personally, or their
party group as a whole, suffers from the recalcitrant behavior of fellow group members.
They thus value the collec ve benefits of presen ng a united front to the outside world
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Table 4.10: Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to s cking to
the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 na onal parliaments (%)
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Austria 10 85 5 100 48
Belgium 0 89 11 100 61
France 14 77 10 101 48
Germany 11 80 9 100 126
Hungary 15 72 12 99 97
Ireland 7 81 13 101 32
Israel 16 76 8 100 38
Italy 33 61 6 100 43
Netherlands 0 96 5 101 63
Norway 4 87 9 100 45
Poland 5 80 16 101 50
Portugal 7 71 23 101 72
Spain 9 79 12 100 92
Switzerland 13 75 13 101 45
United Kingdom 12 74 14 100 54
All 9 80 11 100 914
χ² (28) = 72.762, sig. = .000; φc = .201, sig. = .000
above an individual MP’s personal mandate and freedom.30 Those who answer that
party discipline should remain as it is probably perceive a good balance between the
two, or value one above the other, but are content with how they are maintained in the
parliamentary party group. And MPs who answer that party discipline ought to be less
strict are those who value an individual MP’s freedom and personal mandate above pre-
sen ng a united front, and are likely to have experience with party discipline being used
against them (or have operated under the threat of sanc ons). Admi edly, however,
30 This interpreta on is in line with the dis nc on between individual costs and collec ve benefits forwarded
by Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) in their analysis of the pathways to party group unity in the Dutch
Parliament. In the 1990 Dutch Parliamentary Study MPs were asked an open ques on about the advan-
tages and disadvantages of party discipline. Posi ve aspects included the collec ve benefits of presen ng
a unified front to the outside world and making clear where the poli cal party stood, whereas nega ve
aspects were placed primarily at the individual level (such as curtailing individual MPs’ freedom and s fling
crea vity). Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 661) interpret these results as “party discipline is considered
ra onal from a collec ve point of view, not from an individual point of view”. Jensen (2000, 224-226), who
uses the same ques on in his study of Nordic countries, comes to a similar conclusion, and dichotomizes
the variable by combining the answering categories party discipline ‘ought to remain as it is’ and ‘should be
more strict’.
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Table 4.11: Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to taking po-
li cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on in 15 na onal parlia-
ments (%)
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Austria 29 57 14 100 48
Belgium 8 79 13 100 61
France 8 83 10 101 48
Germany 11 80 9 100 127
Hungary 25 68 7 100 96
Ireland 3 71 26 100 32
Israel 12 79 9 100 38
Italy 12 79 9 100 43
Netherlands 6 88 7 101 63
Norway 12 80 8 100 46
Poland 15 64 21 100 50
Portugal 2 80 18 100 71
Spain 9 67 24 100 91
Switzerland 13 75 13 101 45
United Kingdom 11 78 11 100 52
All 11 76 13 100 911
χ² (28) = 73.232, sig. = .000; φc = .201, sig. = .000
the ques on does not allow us to gaugeMPs’ responsiveness to party discipline (i.e., we
do not know whether they are actually disciplined into toeing the party line, or choose
to stay true to their own opinion and dissent).31
Given thatmuchof the compara ve literature emphasizes party discipline as a promi-
nent pathway to party group unity, it is surprising that over 70 percent of MPs are sat-
31 Another poten al problem is that the party discipline ques ons in the surveys do not specify which defini-
on of party discipline MPs should keep in mind. As the term already brings about conceptual confusion
within legisla ve studies, this may also be the case in the minds of MPs. It is unclear whether respondents
make this samedis nc on in termof voluntary and involuntarymechanisms aswedo in our decision-making
model. However, in the study of party group unity in Finland by Jensen (2000, 221), MPs were asked to eval-
uate party cohesion and party discipline separately, with very different results: only 8 percent of Finnish
MPs preferred stronger discipline, while 48 percent preferred stronger party cohesion. Although this does
not help us verify howMPs interpret the concepts, it doesmake clear thatMPs do see a dis nc on between
the two. Moreover, the answering categories to the ques ons in the Par Rep Survey refer to ‘strictness’,
which holds connota ons with ‘authority’ and thus suggests discipline and sanc ons imposed by the po-
li cal party. It may be, however, that respondents have interpreted the ques on as mainly referring to
nega ve, as opposed to posi ve, sanc ons.
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Table 4.12: Sa sfac on with parliamentary party discipline when it comes to keeping
internal party discussions confiden al in 15 na onal parliaments (%)
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Austria 35 65 0 100 48
Belgium 60 41 0 101 61
France 60 39 2 101 48
Germany 80 20 0 100 128
Hungary 67 32 1 100 98
Ireland 60 38 2 100 32
Israel 28 68 4 100 38
Italy 41 59 0 100 43
Netherlands 22 78 0 100 63
Norway 22 73 5 100 45
Poland 59 38 3 100 49
Portugal 57 42 2 101 71
Spain 65 32 3 101 93
Switzerland 43 57 0 100 45
United Kingdom 46 54 0 100 54
All 48 50 2 100 916
χ² (28) = 135.487, sig. = .000; φc = .274, sig. = .000
isfiedwith general party discipline, answering that it should remain as it is (see Table 4.9).
Sa sfac onwith general party discipline is highest inNorway (89 percent) and theNether-
lands (83 percent). Moreover, the majority of MPs who are not sa sfied with general
party discipline would like to see it applied more strictly. This is especially the case in
Germany (46 percent), Austria (41 percent) and Italy (38). Only in Portugal, Spain and
Poland does a majority of unsa sfied MPs hold the opinion that general party discipline
ought to be less strict, which according to our interpreta on of the ques on, implies
that party discipline is probably used more o en in these parliaments.
Portugal and Poland are also the two countries with the highest percentage of MPs
(respec vely 23 and 16 percent) who think that party discipline should be less strict
when s cking to the party line when vo ng, the ques on that is most in line with our
measures of party agreement and party loyalty, which both also refer to parliamentary
vo ng. Overall, however, the figures in Table 4.10 reveal that the vast majority (80 per-
cent) of all MPs are sa sfied with party discipline when it comes to vo ng in parliament.
Sa sfac on with party vo ng discipline is highest in the Netherlands (96 percent), Bel-
gium (89 percent) and Norway (87 percent). In Italy, a rela vely high percentage of MPs
(33 percent) would like to see stricter party discipline when it comes to vo ng in parlia-
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Table 4.13: ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in 15
na onal parliaments (%)
(Mostly) false Neither (Mostly) true Total Total (n)
Austria 60 20 20 100 47
Belgium 51 10 39 100 68
France 10 27 64 101 49
Germany 21 6 72 99 133
Hungary 33 4 63 100 99
Ireland 37 5 58 100 32
Israel 17 3 80 101 39
Italy 14 26 60 100 44
Netherlands 74 13 12 99 65
Norway 61 19 19 99 45
Poland 21 16 64 101 53
Portugal 20 3 77 99 75
Spain 11 14 76 101 102
Switzerland 25 13 63 101 49
United Kingdom 30 15 56 101 58
All 34 12 54 100 958
χ² (28) = 241.124, sig. = .000; φc = .359, sig. = .000
ment.
Almost the same distribu on holds for MPs’ sa sfac on with party discipline when
it comes to seeking authoriza on from the party group when taking parliamentary ini-
a ves (over three-quarters of MPs are sa sfied), with this me Ireland (26 percent)
Portugal (18 percent), Poland (21 percent) and Spain (24 percent), as the countries with
the highest percentage of MPs who feel that party discipline should be relaxed (see
Table 4.11). Only in Austria (29 percent) and Hungary (25 percent) does a substan al
percentage of MPs feel that party discipline should be more strict when it comes to tak-
ing parliamentary ini a ves.
In light of these high levels of sa sfac on with party discipline, it is interes ng to
draw a en on to scholars’ tendency to emphasize party discipline as a pathway to party
vo ng unity. If party discipline were the main pathway to party group unity, we would
expect there to be more MPs who would like to see party discipline applied less strictly.
The high levels of sa sfac on, however, indicate that party discipline is likely to be ap-
plied much less o en than is assumed by the literature on party group unity; it is more
likely that party vo ng unity results from the other pathways, such as party group agree-
ment and party group loyalty, than from party discipline.
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There is one excep on to the pa ern of sa sfac on with party discipline. When it
comes to keeping internal party discussions confiden al only 50 percent of MPs are sat-
isfiedwith party discipline as it is, and among thosewho are dissa sfied almost all would
like stricter party discipline (see Table 4.13). GermanMPs aremost likely to want stricter
party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confiden al (80 per-
cent), followed by MPs in Hungary (67 percent) and Spain (65 percent). Sa sfac on is
highest in the Netherlands (78 percent) and Norway (73 percent). These rather high
levels of dissa sfac on highlights that party unity is a much broader requirement, en-
compassing not only the end vote, but the en re policy making process. Indeed, when
asked about the day-to-day prac ces in parliament, over half of all MPs answer that
it is (mostly) true that internal party discussions do find their way to the media (see
Table 4.13).32 Noteworthy is that these percentages are quite high in the parliaments
where there is also a high percentage of MPs who would like to party discipline ght-
ened on this aspect of party life as well.33 This provides some evidence that there are
apparently MPs who do breach the confiden ality of internal party discussions.
For our mul variate analysis of party loyalty, binary logis c regression was the ob-
vious choice because our dependent variable is dichotomous. For party agreement we
also used binary logis c regression because we dichotomized the four answering cat-
egories to the ques on concerning the frequency of disagreement between an MP’s
opinion and the party’s posi on into ‘frequently agree’ and ‘infrequently agree’ (see
subsec on 4.3.2). Our measures of party discipline, however, have three answering
categories. Considering the hypotheses developed above, what is of interest most is
the difference between MPs who hold the opinion that party discipline ought to be less
strict (implying that party discipline is indeed applied, or at least thatMPs work under its
threat) and those MPs who answer that party discipline can remain as it is or should be
stricter. We have opted to dichotomize the variable by combining the answering cate-
gories party discipline ‘should remain as it is’ and ‘should be more strict’, as is also done
by Jensen (2000) in his analysis of the Nordic countries. This way, binary logis c regres-
sion can be used to test the effects of ins tu ons on party discipline as well. Because
our measures of both party agreement and party loyalty refer specifically to vo ng, we
use the party discipline ques on that asks MPs about their sa sfac on with party disci-
pline when it comes to s cking to the party line when vo ng in parliament.34 Collapsing
two answering categories, in combina onwith the fact thatmost of our respondents an-
swer that party vo ng discipline should remain as it is, accounts for why the percentage
predicted correctly by the null model is almost 90 percent (see Table 4.14).
32 For presenta on purpose the extremes of answering categories of the ques on as to whether it is true or
false that confiden al party discussions usually find their way to themedia are combined: ‘mostly false’ and
‘false’ are collapsed into one category, as are ‘mostly true’ and ‘true’.
33 The bivariate rela onship between MPs’ responses to the ques ons as to whether confiden al party dis-
cussions usually find their way to the media and their opinion on party discipline when it comes to keeping
internal party discussions confiden al is sta s cally significant (χ² (8) = 91.930, sig. = .000; gamma = -.402,
sig. = .000).
34 The analysis was repeated using MPs’ sa sfac on with general party discipline as dependent variable; the
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None of the ins tu onal variables have the predicted effect onMPs’ sa sfac onwith
party disciplinewhen it comes to vo ng in parliament (see Table 4.14). We hypothesized
thatwhen candidate selec on is concentrated in the hands of party leaders and agencies
at the na onal level, this would provide the party leadership access to posi ve and neg-
a ve sanc ons through which it could discipline recalcitrant MPs, who we argue would
answer that party vo ng discipline ought to be less strict (H3a); this does not seem to
be the case (model 1). Extending the party selectorate’s power into the electoral arena
(H3b), made possible when voters cannot cast preference votes, does seem to have the
expected effect (model 2). And again, when combined with district magnitude, the rela-
onship is in the opposite direc on (but not sta s cally significant this me). And finally,
our hypothesis that in parliamentary systems government par es would bemore willing
to use discipline on their MPs because the stakes are higher than for opposi on par es
(H3c) can be rejected (model 4).
More so than was the case in our analysis of party loyalty, the effects of ins tu ons
decrease even more as we move further down the sequen al chain of decision-making
mechanisms to the final stage of party discipline. Following the sequen al nature of our
model, one could argue that it need not be the existence of ins tu onal tools that can
be used to discipline MPs that determines the actual use of discipline, but the need for
discipline as a result of MPs not toeing the party line on their own accord. Whereas
party agreement and party loyalty involve decisions made by individual MPs, the deci-
sion to (threaten to) apply discipline is in the hands of the party (group) leadership (an
MP’s response to the applica on of discipline is, however, an individual level decision).35
As such, we expected that MPs who frequently disagree with the party and/or do not
subscribe to the norm of party loyalty are more likely to be disciplined, and thus answer
that party discipline ought to be less strict. Indeed, both individual level characteris-
cs have a strong predic ve effect on MPs’ sa sfac on with party discipline. Frequently
disagreeing with the party increases the odds of answering that party vo ng discipline
ought to be less strict by a factor of 4.341 (model 4), and not vo ng according to the
party line voluntarily out of loyalty does so by a factor of 3.057 (model 5). Both variables
remain significant in the full hierarchical model (and removing them from the model
does not change the results with regard to the ins tu onal variables, model 6). In other
words, the existence of ins tu ons does not determine the applica on of discipline, but
MPs’ lack of voluntarily party agreement and party loyalty does. As suggested by Hazan
(2003, 3), whose use of the term cohesion encompasses both shared policy preferences
and norms of party loyalty, “discipline starts where cohesion falters”.
35 We did not test for the effect of MPs’ frequency of disagreement on party loyalty because, although party
loyalty follows party agreement in our decision-making model, the subscrip on to the norm of party loyalty
is independent of MPs’ party agreement, i.e., whether or not MPs frequently agree with their party does
not affect whether or not they subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, it only determines whether the second
decision-making mechanism comes into play at all.
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4.3.5 The sequen al decision-making process
Themain argument of this study is that in deciding how to vote in parliament, MPs apply
these decision-making mechanisms in a par cular order. An MP must first determine
whether he has an opinion on the ma er. If he does not, he looks to his fellow party
group members for vo ng advice, and the MP contributes to party group unity through
cue-taking. Agreement, loyalty and discipline are therefore not relevant. If an MP does
have an opinion on the vote, and this happens to be in line with the posi on of the
party group, the MP toes the party line voluntarily out of simple agreement. Again, the
mechanisms further down the decision-making sequence—loyalty and discipline—do
not play a role in his decision making. If an MP does have an opinion on the ma er,
and this is in conflict with the party group’s posi on, an MP could s ll vote according
to the party line voluntarily if he subscribes to the norm of party group loyalty, and his
subscrip on the norm outweighs the intensity of the conflict with the party’s posi on.
Only if an MP disagrees with the posi on of the party group and his subscrip on to
the norm of party group loyalty does not override his conflict, do party (group) leaders
need to elicit him to toe the party line through (the promise of) posi ve and (the threat
of) nega ve sanc ons. If, at this final stage of the decision-making sequence disciplinary
measures are not enough to elicit compliance, we expect that theMPwill vote according
to his own opinion and thus dissent from the party group line.
Asmen oned earlier, this explanatorymodel of individualMPdecisionmakingwould
ideally be tested by asking MPs about how they came to the decision to vote as they did
on individual parliamentary votes. We do not have the data to do so, however. But
we can get a general idea of the rela ve importance of the three last decision-making
mechanisms (party agreement, party loyalty and party discipline), at the aggregate level
in the 15 parliaments under study, and thus the extent to which par es can count on
these pathways to achieve party group unity. We exclude cue-taking from the sequence
because whereas the ques ons we use to measure party agreement, party loyalty and
party discipline all refer specifically to vo ng in parliament, the ques ons we use to
gauge cue-taking do not so do. Moreover, as men oned before, our indicator of party
agreement cannot dis nguish between MPs who vote with the party line out of agree-
ment, or because they do not disagree as a result of the lack of a personal opinion.
First, 61 percent of all MPs indicate to infrequently disagree with the party’s posi-
on, answering that they disagree with the party either ‘about once a year’ or ‘(almost)
never’ (see Table 4.15). This entails that, indeed, par es can count on party agreement
as an important pathway to party unity. Next, although above we found that 62 percent
of all MPs included in the survey subscribe to the norm of party loyalty (see Table 4.7),
answering that an MP ought to vote according to the party’s posi on in the case of dis-
agreement, from the perspec ve of poli cal par es, this pathway is most relevant for
those MPs who frequently disagree with the party. Indeed, 21 percent of all MPs fre-
quently disagree with the party line, but can s ll be counted on to vote with the party
voluntarily in the case of disagreement. In most countries, the percentage of MPs found
in this category is well above 20 percent (with Belgium taking the lead with 32 percent),
meaning that, although not as important as party agreement, the pathway s ll plays a
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Table 4.15: The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party disci-
pline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes in 15 na onal
parliaments (%)
Voluntary Involuntary
Agreement Loyalty Discipline Unaccounted Total Total (n)
Austria 79 11 5 5 100 42
Belgium 65 27 3 5 100 61
France 53 10 10 28 101 47
Germany 56 19 7 19 101 117
Hungary 51 27 6 16 100 93
Ireland 79 14 3 3 99 31
Israel 39 32 2 27 100 36
Italy 42 23 7 29 101 41
Netherlands 77 22 0 2 101 45
Norway 71 26 0 3 100 42
Poland 69 9 7 15 100 47
Portugal 51 28 15 7 101 71
Spain 74 21 3 3 101 91
Switzerland 57 0 14 29 100 44
United Kingdom 59 11 11 20 101 50
All 61 21 5 13 100 858
χ² (42) = 139.722, sig. = .000; φc = .234, sig. = .000
Note: These percentagesmay differ fromprevious tables in this chapter because they only include respondents
who answered all three ques ons. Unfortunately, the ques ons about party discipline were located near the
end of the survey.
prominent role. The excep on to this pa ern is, Switzerland, where party loyalty does
not seem to play a role for any of the MPs who frequently disagree, which is in line with
the earlier findings on party group unity in the Swiss na onal parliament.
Only 5 percent of MPs frequently disagree with the party, do not ascribe to the norm
of party loyalty, and answer that party vo ng discipline ought to be less strict (which
we argue to be indicate that MPs are disciplined, or at least operate under the threat
of sanc ons), meaning that of the three pathways included in our sequen al decision-
makingmodel, the contribu on of party discipline is the lowest. However, given the high
levels of party vo ng unity found in most of these parliaments, it is odd that 13 percent
of MPs remain unaccounted for. These MPs frequently disagree with the party, do not
vote with the party out of loyalty, and do not think that party discipline should be less
strict, instead answering that it should be even more strict, or remain as it is. It could be
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that some of these MPs rely mostly on cue-taking for their vo ng decisions, which we
are unable to include in the sequen al decision-making model due to the formula on of
the ques on. It may also be that our measurement of party discipline, which admi edly
requires quite a bit of interpreta on and does not actually inquire into the role of party
discipline inMPs’ decisionmaking, leads to an underes ma on of the role that sanc ons
play the decision-making process of MPs.
4.4 Conclusion
When it comes to the determinants of party group unity, par es can generally count on
MPs voluntarily toeing the party line, with party agreement playing the most important
role inMPs’ decisionmaking, followed by party loyalty in the case of disagreement. Party
discipline, although probably underes mated by our decision-making model, seems to
play a secondary role in determining whetherMPs conform to the party line or dissent in
most of our 15 parliaments. Although we are unable to place the division of labor path-
way and associated mechanism of cue-taking in our sequen al model, the fact that in
most countries the majority of MPs (completely) agree with the statement that the par-
liamentary party spokesperson determines the posi on of the party on his topic serves
as an indica on that par es do apply a division of labor, and that cue-taking is likely to
play an important role as well.
The influence of ins tu ons tends to decrease as we move through the sequen al
decision-making process. Whereas candidate selec on and government par cipa on
do have the predicted effects on party agreement, the effects of these ins tu ons are
much weaker when it comes to party loyalty. And although exclusive and centralized
candidate selec on procedures and voters’ inability to cast a personal vote, in theory,
provide poli cal party leaders with addi onal sanc oning tools that can be used to dis-
cipline their MPs, MPs’ sa sfac on with party discipline does not seem to be affected
by these ins tu ons either. Instead, and following the logic of our sequen al decision-
making model, MPs who frequently disagree with the party, or do not subscribe to the
norm of party loyalty in the case of disagreement, are more likely to prefer less strict
party discipline, which we hold to be indica ve of MPs’ past experience with sanc on-
ing by the party (group) leadership.
Concerning the effects of the formal proper es of electoral ins tu ons onMPs’ deci-
sion making mechanisms, the results are somewhat unexpected. In all our mul variate
analyses, voters’ inability to cast a personal vote has a posi ve, yet not a sta s cally
significant, effect on MPs’ decision-making mechanisms. Yet, in combina on with an
increase in district magnitude (which is theorized to increase the value of the poli cal
party’s reputa on in the electoral arena, Carey and Shugart, 1995), voters’ inability to
cast a personal vote does not result inMPs beingmore likely to frequently agreewith the
party, stay loyal to the party despite their disagreement, or answer that discipline ought
to be less strict. These rather unexpected findings may, in part, be accounted for by our
rather crudemeasure of the formal proper es of electoral systems and the classifica on
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of par cular countries.36 As men oned before, previous studies on the effects of elec-
toral se ngs on party vo ng unity have also yielded mixed results, and thus this study
forms no excep on. However, our alterna ve (individual level) a tudinal measure for
the dilemma of compe ng principals does have a sta s cally significant effect on party
loyalty. It may thus be that formal ins tu ons do not determine the extent to which
MPs are loyal to one principal or another, or that if electoral ins tu ons do provide the
means to discriminate between candidates, the electorate does not do so on the basis
of party loyalty. This may be because they find it of less importance than, for example,
party agreement, or because they are unable to accurately gauge candidates’ loyalty
due to the personal norma ve nature of the decision-making mechanism). As men-
oned before (see sec on 3.2 in chapter 3) party loyalty is theorized to result fromMPs’
socializa on through (previous) experience as representa ves of their poli cal party,
however, the internaliza on and actual applica on of norms is an individual’s decision;
if anMP subscribes to a certain norm, he will apply it whether his (electoral ins tu onal)
environment promotes it or not.
This also taps into the ‘one- or two-arena debate’, as postulated by Bowler (2000),
which focuses on whether party group unity in the legisla ve arena is actually affected
by, or insulated from, the ins tu ons and changes electoral arena. This debate is ad-
dressed further in chapter 6, where we tackle the ques on from an alterna ve perspec-
ve by focusing on changes in the rela ve contribu on of MPs’ decision-making mecha-
nisms over me in the Dutch na onal parliament. For now, we con nue our analysis of
the effects of ins tu onal se ngs on the decision-making mechanismsMPs apply in de-
termining whether to vote with the party group or dissent, by looking at the differences
between representa ves in legislatures at different levels of government.
36 As men oned in footnote 17, alterna ve classifica ons of electoral systems based on the expert judgment
of the Par Rep project research team yielded very similar results.
90
Chapter 5
Different pathways for different
levels: representa ves’
decision-making mechanisms at
the na onal and subna onal level
5.1 Different pathways for different levels of government
The previous chapter focused on the effects of a number of ins tu ons onMPs’ decision-
making mechanisms and the pathways to party group unity in 15 na onal parliaments.
In most democracies, representa on is not limited to the na onal level, however, and
poli cal par es are ac ve in the electoral and legisla ve arenas at the lower levels of
government too. As such, the norma ve and ra onalist arguments for party democ-
racy and its associated criterion of party unity (see chapter 3) are likely to hold at the
subna onal level as well. Indeed, although the number of studies on representa on at
the subna onal level is limited in comparison to those concerning the na onal level, ex-
is ng research points in the direc on that unified poli cal party groups are the rule in
representa ve assemblies in parliamentary democracies at the subna onal level as well.
However, we have reasons to expect that the way in which party groups achieve unity,
and thus the rela ve importance of representa ves’ decision-making mechanisms, is
different at the subna onal level than it is at the na onal level.1
1 Note that our aim is to compare representa ves’ decision-makingmechanisms and the way in which par es
achieve party group unity at the na onal and subna onal levels of government; we do not deal with the
interac on between representa ves and their par es at mul ple levels of government, which is also argued
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Surveying the literature, it seems safe to assume that in most (European) parlia-
mentary democracies, poli cs at the subna onal level is dominated by poli cal par-
es, as is the case at the na onal level. Leach and Copus (2004, 337), for example,
describe poli cal representa on at the municipal level in the United Kingdom as typical
of ‘partyocracy’. And in their compara ve analysis of the influence of poli cal par es
at the local level, Denters et al. (2013, 669) rate the local government system of the
Netherlands, along with that of Austria, Norway and Sweden, as ‘party democra c’ with
a strong emphasis on party discipline, party loyalty and the implementa on of the party
program. In passing, Deschouwer (2003, 218) men ons that in Belgium, party discipline
is high at both the federal and regional level, whereas in Switzerland party discipline is
actually stronger in the cantons than it is in the federal parliament. The fact the poli cal
party is taken to be the main representa ve actor in many studies on electoral (Jeffery
and Hough, 2001; Laffin et al., 2007; Scarrow, 1997), legisla ve (Allers et al., 2001; Jef-
fery, 1999) and government poli cs (Bäck, 2003b,a, 2008; Seitz, 2000) at the subna onal
level, also indicates that the poli cal party model stands at the basis of representa on
at the lower levels of government.
There are also a few studies that focus on the subna onal level that deal with party
(vo ng) unity specifically. Copus (1997a,b, 1999b), for example, finds that municipal
councilors in the United Kingdom struggle to combine the party group system, with its
emphasis on party unity through loyalty and discipline, with their scru ny role, but usu-
ally end up privileging the former over the la er. Copus bases his analyses on the 1986
Widdicombe commi ee of inquiry’s research team, which found that 92 percent of Con-
serva ve, and 99 percent of Labour councilors, indicate to usually or always vo ng to-
gether in themunicipal council (Copus, 1997a, 62-63).2 Patzelt (2003, 102) argues that in
Germany, the 16 state (Länder) legislatures do not bother to keep any systema c record
of individual members’ vo ng behavior (with the excep on of the infrequent occurrence
of roll call votes), because “... final unity of ac on is taken for granted to such a degree
that neither the margin nor the actual composi on of a German cabinet’s majority on
the floor is treated as a topic worthy of documenta on ...”. Stecker’s (2013) later analysis
of party unity on roll call vo ng in 16 German state parliaments between 1990 and 2011
is one of the most comprehensive analyses of party vo ng at the subna onal level. He
finds that in 77.5 percent of the 2402 analyzed votes perfect party unity is achieved, with
the average index of agreement reaching over 95, leading him to conclude that perfect
unity is the rule rather than the excep on at the German state level (2013, 6).
The subna onal level has also been used in a semi-experimental research design to
discriminate between the explanatory power of the sociological and ra onalist / ins tu-
onalist approaches with regard to party group (vo ng) unity. In her study on budget
vo ng in Berlin’s 23 city district councils in 1997, Davidson-Schmich (2001) finds that the
vast majority of the party groups in western Berlin city district councils voted in unison.
to be a lacuna in the study of representa on in general, and poli cal par es in par cular (Deschouwer, 2003;
Kjaer and Elklit, 2010).
2 The figures taken from the 1986 Widdicombe commi ee of inquiry’s research team are based on survey
responses, not actual vo ng behavior.
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Party groups were less unified in eastern Berlin, where in the majority of the city district
councils at least one party group experienced dissent when vo ng on the budget. In
an earlier study, Davidson-Schmich (2000) also personally observed assembly and com-
mi ee vo ng in seven western and six eastern Berlin city councils between 1997 and
1998, and found that whereas in western districts the established par es voted in per-
fect unity on almost all votes, their eastern counterparts were less likely to do so.3 The
author concludes thatmost eastern Berlin par es responded to the introduc on ofwest-
ern German poli cal ins tu ons with stronger party discipline, although lower levels of
ideological cohesion (which resulted from the fact that eastern poli cal par es did not
have enough me to develop clear stances on local issues), preexis ng norma ve oppo-
si on to party discipline, and smaller candidate pools (which make it difficult for party
(group) leaders to credibly (threaten to) sanc on party group members) explain why
party vo ng unity was below the levels found in western Berlin city councils.
Davidson-Schmich (2003) later extended her analysis of the German subna onal
level in her study of party vo ng unity in eastern German state legislatures during the
1990s, where party group unity on both roll call and regular votes on substan ve mat-
ters increased drama cally throughout the first decade a er Germany’s reunifica on.4
She also explicitly compares the vo ng behavior in these recently established eastern
German state legislatures to the vo ng behavior in the na onal Bundestag during its
first terms (1949-1953, 1953-1957 and 1957-1961), during which the development to-
wards increased party vo ng unity was clearly mirrored. With party groups obtaining
Rice scores very close to 1.0 by 2000, party vo ng unity in these eastern German state
legislatures was near complete and closely resembled vo ng unity in the western Ger-
man state legislatures. Finally, both Cowley (2001) and Dewan and Spirling (2011) ex-
plicitly compare party unity on roll call votes between the na onal Westminster parlia-
ment and the regional Sco sh Parliament. Cowley (2001), whose analysis only covers
the first year of the Sco sh parliament, concludes that there are no noteworthy differ-
ences in party vo ng unity between the na onal and subna onal parliament. Dewan
and Spirling’s (2011) analysis is more complete, as it deals with the two first terms of the
Sco sh parliament. During both terms the Rice scores a ained by the Sco sh party
groups was well above 95 (including free votes), which leads the authors to conclude
that party group unity is “as prevalent and robust in the Sco sh Parliament as in the
3 In the eastern districts, it was the Party of Democra c Socialism (Partei des Demokra schen Sozialis-
mus, PDS) that did not vote in unity in 52 percent of the 25 analyzed votes. The Social Democra c
Party (Sozialdemokra sche Partei, SPD) (92 percent), Chris an Democra c Union (Christlich Demokra s-
che Union, CDU) (80 percent) and Alliance ’90 / The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) (80 percent) in the
eastern districts were clearly more unified, albeit less than the SPD (100 percent), CDU (100 percent) and
Alliance ’90 / The Greens (97 percent) in the western councils (78 votes were analyzed in the western coun-
cils) (Davidson-Schmich, 2000, 17-18). Davidson-Schmich (2000, 15-16) excludes votes on which the en re
council voted unanimously, and counts absten ons as defec ons because abstaining representa ves usu-
ally publicly announced that they were abstaining because they disagreed with their party group’s posi on.
4 Davidson-Schmich (2003) bases her analysis on roll call votes and a sample of floor debates, vo ng decla-




House of Commons” (2011, 341).5
Although these studies show that party group (vo ng) unity seems to be as high at
the subna onal level as it is at the na onal level, this does not automa cally entail that
the way in which party group unity is brought about is the same at both levels of govern-
ment. Within one country, the electoral and legisla ve ins tu onal se ngs that are held
to affect the different pathways to party group unity may be different at the subna onal
levels than they are at the na onal level. However, one could also argue that there are
differences between the na onal and subna onal level that hold across countries. For
example, subna onal parliaments tend to be smaller than na onal parliaments in terms
of the number of legisla ve seats, which entails that party groups are generally smaller
as well. This is likely to affect the way in which party groups func on, and thus may also
affect the way in which representa ves come to their vo ng decisions. Moreover, the
smaller size of cons tuencies at the subna onal levelmay also affect representa ves’ de-
cision making, as they are likely to have a closer and more direct rela onship with their
voters. On the other hand, whereas the number of na onal parliaments in one country
is usually limited to one (unicameral) or two (bicameral), territorial decentraliza on en-
tails that at one subna onal level mul ple representa ve assemblies exist, whichmeans
that the total number of seats that poli cal par es need to fill is a lot higher at the sub-
na onal level than it is at the na onal level. Intra-party compe on is therefore likely
to be lower at the subna onal level, thus affec ng candidate (re-)selec on criteria, and
also party (group) leaders’ ability to employ candidate selec on as a disciplining tool.
All in all, our argument is that although representa ves at the na onal and subna-
onal level employ similar decision-makingmechanisms in determining whether to vote
with or dissent from the party group line, the rela ve importance of the mechanisms,
and therefore the contribu on of the pathways to party group unity, may differ at the
different levels of government. In the next sec on, we outline how we expect each of
the four mechanisms included in the decision-making model is affected by the general
differences between the na onal and subna onal level. We first test these hypotheses
on the na onal and regional legislatures in the nine mul level countries included in the
2010 Par Rep Survey. Subsequently, we test the same hypotheses on Dutch data that
allows us to add the local level to the na onal and regional levels.
5.2 Expecta ons
5.2.1 Division of labor
In most countries, the job of a na onal MP is a full- me occupa on with a considerably
heavyworkload. In order to deal with this workload, parliamentary party group are likely
to apply a division of labor (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle
5 Another example of a cross-level compara ve analysis is Di Virgilio and Pinto’s (2013) study of roll call vo ng
in the Italian na onal parliament and the regional councils of Emilia Romagna, La um and Lombardy. The




and Weingast, 1994; Skjaeveland, 2001), for which par es select candidates who are
specialized in a par cular policy area and who as MPs are likely to subsequently act as
the parliamentary party spokesperson for these topics in their legisla ve commi ees.
As a result of their workload and specializa on, it is likely that na onal MPs do not have
the me or exper se to form an opinion on all topics outside of their por olio, and thus
rely on their fellow party group members for vo ng advice.
At the subna onal level, the workload is (compara vely) lighter than at the na onal
level (depending on the degree of decentraliza on), and one could argue that subna-
onal representa ves are more likely to have the me to form their own opinion about
a wider range of topics. On the other hand, being a representa ve at the subna onal
level is usually not a full- me occupa on (this usually depend on the size of the district,
among other things), entailing that representa ves may hold another job as well, which
limits the me they can spend on their representa ve func on. But because subna-
onal legislatures and party groups are usually smaller than at the na onal level, party
groups have fewer members over which they can divide the workload, and party groups
are less able to apply a strict division of labor. Moreover, government jurisdic ons and
decision-making powers also tend to become more limited as we move down the lad-
der of government levels, which entails that poli cal party groups need fewer specialists
and policy experts in order to develop the party’s stance. Thus, we argue that during the
process of candidate recruitment and selec on, par es are less likely to select policy
specialists, and instead prefer to opt for candidates who are able to keep up with the
full range of issues that play a role at the subna onal level. These generalists are more
likely to have a personal opinion on a broad range of topics, and therefore less likely to
rely on their fellow party group members for vo ng instruc ons. We therefore expect
that subna onal representa ves are less likely to engage in cue-taking as a result of the
division of labor than na onal MPs (H1).
5.2.2 Party agreement
There are also a number of reasons to expect differences between na onal and subna-
onal level with regard to representa ves’ second decision-making mechanism, party
group agreement. This pathway entails that representa ves do have a personal opin-
ion on a par cular vote, and that this opinion coincides with the posi on of their party
group. They thus vote with their party group’s posi on out of simple agreement.
From the perspec ve of the poli cal party, party agreement is a rela vely reliable
and ‘easy’ pathway to party group unity, as it does not require relying on representa-
ves’ voluntary subscrip on to the norm of party group loyalty or their responsiveness
to posi ve and nega ve sanc ons. Therefore, par es try tomaximize agreement among
their representa ves before entering the legisla ve arena. The extent to which poten-
al candidates’ own policy preferences match the ideological profile of the party, and
their agreement with the party program and electoral manifesto, are thus important
recruitment and selec on criteria at all levels of government.
As men oned above, subna onal legislatures are usually smaller than na onal leg-
islatures, and thus party groups are also generally smaller. This entails that the number
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of (poten ally conflic ng) viewpoints in the party group is likely to be smaller as well
(Hare, 1952; Mohammed, 2001; Wessels, 1999). On the other hand, we argue that as a
result of their small size, subna onal par es are more likely to select policy generalists
as opposed to specialists, which may again increase the number of opinions on ma ers
that are put to a vote. But whereas large party groups are likely to employ a hierarchical
group organiza on and thus decision-making schemes (e.g., a division of labor organized
around policy specialists who provide vo ng advice to the rest of the members of the
party group, or a decision-making rule that grants the party group leadership the author-
ity to determine the party group’s final posi on), small groups are more likely to engage
in consensus and unanimous decision making (Burawoy, 1979; Buchanan and Tullock,
1962; Romme, 2004). Combined with the argument that subna onal par es are more
likely to select policy generalists, this may entail that individual representa ves aremore
involved in determining the posi on of the party group during the parliamentary party
group mee ng the first place, which would make themmore likely to agree with the po-
si on of their party group when the issue is put to a vote. This leads to the expecta on
that subna onal representa ves are more likely to frequently agree with the party than
na onal MPs (H2).
5.2.3 Party loyalty
At the third stage of the decision-making sequence, representa ves who disagree with
the posi on of the party group on a vote must decide whether their subscrip on to
the norm of party group loyalty overrides their conflict with the party’s posi on. If so,
representa ves submit to the party group line voluntarily.
Again, party group loyalty is likely to be an important candidate selec on criterion
at all levels of government, and although the decision to adhere to the norm lies with
individual representa ves, party group loyalty is argued to be the result of a process
of socializa on; representa ves internalize norms of solidarity through their previous
party experience. In their study of career pa erns, for which they use the same Par-
Rep Survey and background data as is used in this study, Pilet et al. (2014, 212-215)
find that although the majority of representa ves included in their analysis had been
ac ve at only one level of government, 20 percent of na onal MPs had previously been
ac ve as a representa ve at another level of government, whereas only 6 percent of
regional representa ves had been. Although the authors omit other types of previous
party experience and the total amount of me representa ves had already been ac ve
in party poli cs from their analysis, their study does provide some evidence for the claim
that MPs at the na onal level are more likely to have previous party experience, and are
therefore more likely to be socialized into norms of party group loyalty, than represen-
ta ves at the subna onal level.
Moreover, party group loyaltymay also beweaker at the subna onal level than at the
na onal level due to the rela vely smaller size and closer proximity—in terms of both ge-
ography and popula on—of representa ves’ cons tuencies. This may lead subna onal
representa ves to engage in a more direct dyadic rela onship with their voters, who
act as compe ng principals to poli cal par es (Carey, 2007, 2009). Copus (1999a, 89)
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contends that due to both the nature of the issues that dominate the decision-making
agenda and as well as the closeness of ci zens to the poli cal systems at the local level
specifically, “[i]t is [...] at the local rather than na onal level, that the poten al for con-
nec on between governor and governed is greatest”. Although Copus’ (1999a) study fo-
cuses on the municipal level in the United Kingdom, one could argue that the lower the
level of government, the more likely that representa ves’ loyalty to the poli cal party
group is diffused by their loyalty to voters.
Indeed, in his comparison of cons tuency representa on in legislatures at the Fed-
eral and Länder level inWest Germany, Patzelt (2007, 59-64) finds that Länder represen-
ta ves have a stronger desire to represent their cons tuents’ views closely, and are less
inclined to vote against their cons tuents’ preferences, than na onal MPs. In line with
Copus (1999a), Patzelt’s (2007) explana on for this difference is that the smaller districts
at the regional level allow for closer linkage between representa ves and their voters.
Relying on the same Par Rep Survey as is used in this study, Dudzinska et al. (2014, 26-
28) find that the percentage of representa ves who are classified as ‘voter delegates’ is
slightly higher at the regional than at the na onal level in both mul level and unitary
se ngs,6 and that voter delegates are more likely to consider the people in their con-
s tuency, and their voters specifically, a much more important focus of representa on
than other poten al foci of representa on.7 André et al. (2014, 172-173, 184), who also
use the Par Rep Survey data, observe that regional representa ves tend to priori ze
cons tuency work more than their na onal counterparts,8 and that this priori za on
6 Dudzińska et al.’s (2014, 26) study is based on respondents’ transi ve pa erns of answers to three ques ons
concerning the their styles of representa on (Wessels and Giebler, 2010). In the Par Rep Survey, respon-
dents are asked how an MP ought to vote in the case of disagreement between 1) his own opinion and his
party’s posi on, 2) his own opinion and his voters’ posi ons, and 3) his party’s posi on and his voters’ po-
si on. A respondent who indicates that the party’s posi on should prevail above both his own opinion and
the posi on of his voters is categorized as a party delegate, a respondent who selects his voters’ posi on
above both his own opinion and his party’s posi on is considered a voter delegate, and a respondent who
chooses his own opinion above his party’s and his voters’ posi on is labeled a trustee. Respondents who
do not consistently select one above the other two have intransi ve preferences when it comes to their
style of representa on (only 5 percent of respondents included in Dudzińska et al.’s (2014, 26) analysis is
categorized as such).
7 In order to determine respondents’ focus of representa on, Dudzińska et al. (2014) use the Par Rep Sur-
vey ques on ‘How important is it to you, personally, to promote the views and interests of the following
groups of people?’. The different foci included are: a) ‘all the people who voted for you’ (only included
for respondents in legislatures with a preferen al electoral system or single-member districts), b) ‘all the
people who voted for your party’, c) ‘all the people in your cons tuency’ (or area of residence for Israel
and the Netherlands), d) ‘your party’, e) ‘a specific group in society’, f) ‘in your region’ (op on was only put
to regional MPs, excluding Austria), and g) ‘all the people in the country’ (included for respondents in all
na onal legislatures, and only in the regional legislatures in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland).
8 In the Par Rep Survey, respondents are asked what they consider the most important task they themselves
fulfill as an MP, which is used to gauge respondents’ role orienta on as developed by Searing (1994). Re-
spondents are categorized as policy advocates if they consider ‘influencing government policy’ most impor-
tant. Parliament men pick ‘liaising between members of the parliamentary party and the party leadership
and managing Parliament’s business’ above the other tasks. Welfare officers consider ‘providing assistance
to individual voters in their dealings with public authori es’ most important, whereas local promoters hold
the opinion that ‘looking a er the collec ve social and economic needs of the local area’ is their most im-
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also translates into more me spent in the cons tuency itself and more cons tuency-
oriented behavior in the legisla ve arena (the propor on of legisla ve ini a ves that
are derived frommee ngs with individual ci zens, for example, is higher at the regional
level than at the na onal level). All in all, given that cons tuencies’ opinions are likely
to be more diverse than, and not always consistent with, the party group’s posi on,
it is probable that subna onal representa ves, who are more likely to have a stronger
direct connec on with their cons tuencies’ than na onal MPs, are also more likely to
experience a pull away from the party group in terms of their loyalty in the case of dis-
agreement with the party’s posi on. Our third hypothesis is therefore that subna onal
representa ves are less likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than na onal MPs
(H3).
5.2.4 Party discipline
At the final stage of the decision-making process, representa ves whose opinion on a
vote conflicts with that of the party group, and who do not subscribe to the norm of
party loyalty, are confronted with disciplinary measures by the party (group) leadership
in order to elicit them to vote with the party group, albeit involuntarily. At this stage of
the decision-making process, representa ves decide whether defying the party group’s
posi on outweighs the poten al nega ve repercussions they may incur if they dissent.
Par es can also try to get their representa ves to vote the party group line by promising
certain rewards for doing so.
In principle, poli cal party (group) leaders at the subna onal levels of government
have access to many of the same types of carrots (posi ve sanc ons) and s cks (nega-
ve sanc ons) that poli cal party (group) leaders at the na onal level have. But because
subna onal representa ves are less dependent on their party than na onal represen-
ta ves, the threat or actual use of these tools is probably less effec ve than at the na-
onal level. Whereas in most countries na onal MPs ‘live off poli cs’ (Weber, 1919)
and are employed full- me, subna onal representa ves usually only engage in poli cs
part- me, and in some countries are even non-salaried, receiving only modest financial
compensa on for their work. Moreover, given that only a small percentage of subna-
onal representa ves are eventually promoted to higher posi ons within their party
organiza on or are selected as representa ves at higher levels of government, subna-
onal representa ves are also less dependent on their poli cal party in terms of their
future career ambi ons, which are likely to extend beyond the poli cal realm. Thus,
because representa ves at the lower levels of government do not depend as much on
their party for their (future) livelihood, they have far less to lose when confronted with
the (threat or promise of) sanc ons when they threaten to dissent from the party group
line, rendering the sanc ons themselves less effec ve. Moreover, as a result of the large
number of seats to fill at the subna onal level, intra-party compe on is lower, and par-
es are also limited in their ability to use candidate reselec on as a credible disciplining
portant job. André et al. (2014) combine the la er two categories into cons tuency members (Strøm, 1997,
167).
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tool. Finally, the use of formal discipline o en necessitates drawing on party group hi-
erarchy, but because party groups are generally smaller at the subna onal level than at
the na onal level, doing so could have a structural nega ve effect on the func oning of
the party group, and thus the party group leadership at the subna onal level is likely to
think twice before doing so. All in all, we expect that subna onal representa ves are
less likely to be disciplined than na onal MPs (H4).
5.3 Analysis of thedecision-makingmechanisms in na onal
and regional parliaments in nine European democra-
cies
In order to test the hypotheses developed above, we first take a look at differences be-
tween na onal and regional parliaments in the nine mul level countries included in the
Par Rep Survey.9,10 Whereas at the na onal level about 24 percent of MPs from these
mul level countries par cipated in the survey, response rates are slightly higher at the
regional level with on average 27 percent of representa ves from the selected legisla-
tures par cipa ng in the survey (see Table 5.1). We are again faced with the fact that
the na onal level response rates for Italy (7 percent), France (9 percent) and the United
Kingdom are below the threshold set by the members of the Compara ve Candidate
Survey (2007). At the regional level, all country response rates are above 20 percent,
although with 21 percent, Switzerland and Italy are only just above the threshold. These
figures should again be kept in mind during the analyses that follow.11
At the na onal level, MPs from governing par es and MPs whose par es are in the
opposi on are represented almost equally in these nine mul -level countries (49 per-
cent are government MPs, and 51 percent are opposi on MPs, not shown in Table 5.1).
At the regional level, about 66 percent of respondents are from governing par es, and
34 percent are members of the opposi on. The sample of surveyed representa ves
closely resembles the popula on not only in terms of government-opposi on, but also
party group membership (of which there are over 100), although there are a few ex-
cep ons (Deschouwer et al., 2014, 11).12 In the tables below, responses are weighted
for party group and parliament size, and respondents from party groups with only one
legisla ve seat are excluded from the analysis. Table 5.1 also displays the regional leg-
islatures’ 2006 scores on the Regional Authority Index (RAI) on the self-rule and shared
9 For a descrip on of the Par Rep Survey data collec on process, see chapter 4.
10 For the purpose of this analysis, the na onal/federal parliaments included in the Par Rep Survey are re-
ferred to as ‘na onal parliaments’, and the subna onal representa ve assemblies (including Länder, com-
muni es, regional assemblies, etc.) are referred to as ‘regional parliaments’.
11 All analyses have been checked for correla ons with response rates. Noteworthy findings are discussed in
the text.
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rules dimensions (Hooghe et al., 2008,?).13
5.3.1 Division of labor
Our first hypothesis is that, as a result of the smaller size of subna onal legislature and
their party groups, subna onal party groups are less able to apply a division of labor and
therefore also less likely to select policy specialists, and thus that subna onal represen-
ta ves are less likely to engage in the cue-taking than na onal MPs (H1). In terms of
their size, the nine na onal parliaments included in our analysis consist of 399 seats
on average (see Table 5.1), with the Bri sh House of Commons taking the lead (650
seats), followed by the Italian Camera dei Deputa , (630 seats), the Germany Bundestag
(622 seats) and the French Assemblée Na onale (577 seats). The Belgian Kamer van
Volksvertegenwoordigers has the fewest number of seats (150 seats), followed by the
Austrian Na onalrat (183 seats). With an average of 86 seats, the regional legislatures
selected for the survey are twice (in the case of Belgium and Switzerland) to 11 mes
(in the case of Italy) as small as their na onal counterparts. Given that in most of our
nine mul level countries the regional legislatures are considerably smaller than the par-
liaments at the na onal level, it is safe to assume that their party groups are generally
smaller as well.
As a result of the smaller size of party groups, we expect there to be fewer policy spe-
cialists, and more generalists, at the regional level than at the na onal level. However,
at the aggregate level, and in most individual countries, the differences between the
levels of government when it comes to the percentage of representa ves who indicate
to specialize in one or two policy areas (referred to as specialists), or prefer to speak on
a wide range of issues from different policy areas (referred to as generalists), is prac -
cally the same. At both levels of government slightly more than half of the respondents
consider themselves specialists (57 and 55 percent respec vely), and slightly less than
half describe themselves as generalists (44 and 45 percent respec vely, see Table 5.2).
There are a few individual countries where the differences between the levels are larger,
with Spain, Italy, and Portugal corrobora ng our hypothesis. Notably, in France the per-
centage of specialists is 17 percentage points higher at the regional level than it is at
the na onal level. This is odd given the fact that the French administra ve regions are
among the smallest and they also have the lowest regional authority (RAI) score (see
Table 5.1). There are also more specialists at the regional level than at the na onal level
in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland (although the differences
in the la er countries are very small). The regional parliaments in these countries are
13 The RAI scores displayed are those for 2006. The self-rule score, which ranges between zero and 15 points,
is calculated by adding the scores legislatures obtain on the items ‘ins tu onal depth’ (0 to 3 points), ‘pol-
icy scope’ (0 to 4 points), ‘fiscal autonomy’ (0 to 4 points), ‘assembly representa on’ (0 to 2 points) and
‘execu ve representa on’ (0 to 2 points). The score for shared rule, which ranges from zero to 9 points,
is calculated by adding the scores legislatures obtain on the items ‘law making’ (0 to 2 points), ‘execu ve
control’ (0 to 2 points), ‘fiscal control’ (0 to 2 points) and ‘cons tu onal reform’ (0 to 3 points). The total
RAI score ranges from zero to 24 points and is obtained by adding the scores for self-rule and shared rule
(the total RAI score is not shown in Table 5.1 ) (Hooghe et al., 2008).
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among the largest, and all also have the highest RAI scores (with the excep on of the
United Kingdom).
Respondents were also asked whether they consider it true or false that the parlia-
mentary party spokesperson determines the posi on of the party on his topic. As we
predict that subna onal representa ves are less likely to engage in cue-taking than na-
onal MPs, we expect that regional representa ves are more likely than na onal MPs
to consider the statement false. Although the differences between the na onal and
regional level are sta s cally significant, they are not very large: 23 percent of the to-
tal number of regional representa ves consider the statement (mostly) false, which is
only two percentage points more than at the na onal level (see Table 5.3).14 Moreover,
the percentage of regional representa ves who answer that it is (mostly) true that the
parliamentary party spokesperson determines the posi on of the party (64 percent) is
slightly higher than at the na onal level (60 percent). When looking at individual coun-
tries, regional representa ves are more likely to consider the statement (mostly) false
than na onal MPs in Spain, Austria, France and Germany. In Portugal, Belgium, Italy and
United Kingdom, regional representa ves are actually more likely to indicate that the
parliamentary party spokesperson does indeed determine the party’s posi on. All in all,
when it comes to cue-taking the differences between the na onal and regional level in
our nine mul level countries are not very large, not in line with our expecta ons, and
not consistent between countries.
5.3.2 Party agreement
We expect that subna onal representa ves are more likely to frequently agree with the
party’s posi on than na onal MPs (H2). The reasoning behind this is that, as a result of
the smaller size of party groups at the subna onal level, representa ves are more likely
to be involved in determining the party group posi on on a wider range of issues in the
first place, and therefore more likely to agree with the posi on of the party group on
issues that are put to a vote in parliament.
The issues that are relevant for the day-to-day decisions that are put to a vote in leg-
islatures at the subna onal level, however, differ from the na onal level in that they are
less likely to be ideologically charged, and aremore likely to beof a prac cal, technocra c-
administra ve nature (De Vries, 2000). Party agreement in terms of representa ves’
own posi on and their percep on of their party’s posi on on the Le -Right ideological
scale, as is some mes done in studies of party group homogeneity, is therefore too ab-
stract a measure to gauge the true essence of party agreement at the subna onal level
(Copus and Erlingsson, 2012; Denters, 1993; De Vries, 2000; Kuiper, 1994). We there-
fore rely on the same measure of party agreement as used in chapter 4: the frequency
of disagreement. In the Par Rep Survey, respondents were asked how o en, in the last
year, they found themselves in the posi on that their party had one opinion on a vote
14 For presenta on purpose the extremes of answering categories of the ques on whether it is true or false
that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the posi on of the party are combined: ‘mostly





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3. Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in na onal and regional parliaments
in nine European democracies
in parliament, and they personally had another. As already explained in chapter 4, this
ques on goes further than abstract ideological and policy scales: the ques on specifies
two actors (the individual MP and the party) and the event (a difference of opinion over
an upcoming vote), and provides quan fiable answering categories (the frequency of
disagreement over months and years).15
In line with our hypothesis, the percentage of representa ves who infrequently dis-
agree with their party’s posi on on a vote in parliament is quite a bit higher in our re-
gional legislatures (33 percent disagree with the party’s posi on once a year, and 37
percent indicate do to so (almost) never) than in the na onal legislatures (34 percent
disagree once a year, and 24 percent (almost) never do so) when all respondents from
all countries are taken together (see Table 5.4).16 The differences between the regional
and na onal level are greatest in Portugal, France, the United Kingdom and Germany.
Belgium and Switzerland are the only countries where the percentage of respondents
who infrequently disagree with their party’s posi on is higher among na onal MPs than
among regional representa ves, but in both countries the differences between the levels
are not very large. Thus, given the difference between the regional and na onal level in
the aggregate, and the consistency between countries, it seems that party agreement, as
a pathway to party group unity, plays a rela vely more important role in bringing about
party group unity at the regional level than it does at the na onal level.
5.3.3 Party loyalty
Wehypothesized that subna onal representa ves are less likely to subscribe to the norm
of party loyalty than na onal MPs (H3) because they are likely to have less party ex-
perience through which socializa on into norms takes place, and because subna onal
representa ves are more likely to have their loyalty to the party group diffused by their
loyalty to their voters. As a follow-up to the ques on about the frequency of disagree-
ment, respondents were asked how an MP ought to vote in the situa on that the party
has one posi on on a vote in parliament, and they personally have a different opinion.17
15 In chapter 4, which deals with all of the 15 na onal parliaments included in the Par Rep Survey, the fre-
quency of disagreement was compared to the absolute distanceMPs perceive between their own and their
party’s posi on on the ideological Le -Right scale as a means of valida on. There is a nega ve linear re-
la onship between the two: the larger the absolute distance perceived by MPs, the more likely that they
are to frequently disagree with their party. We can thus assume that the frequency of disagreement is also
a good measure for party agreement at the na onal level, where ideology is likely to play a more impor-
tant role than at the subna onal level. At the regional level, the rela onship between the two variables is
substan ally weaker (see Van Vonno et al., 2014).
16 At the regional level, the two countries with the highest percentage of representa ves who frequently dis-
agree with their party (Italy and Switzerland) are also the two countries with the lowest response rates. It
could be that representa ves who frequently disagree with their party are more likely to par cipate in the
survey than representa ves who usually agree. This rela onship does not seem to hold, however, at the
na onal level, as respondents from countries with low response rates are not systema cally more likely to
frequently disagree.
17 Asmen oned before in chapter 4 (see footnote 24), in past parliamentary surveys held in the Dutch Second
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The answering category ‘an MP ought to vote according to his party’s posi on’ is taken
to be indica ve of a respondent’s subscrip on to the norm of party loyalty.
Surprisingly, the percentage of respondents who answer that an MP ought to vote
according to the party’s posi on in the case of disagreement is actually higher at the
regional level (63 percent) than at the na onal level (48 percent, see Table 5.5). More-
over, when looking at the differences between the levels of government in individual
countries, there is not a single country where the percentage of regional representa-
ves who indicate to vote according to the party’s posi on in the case of disagreement
is lower than among na onal MPs.18
By using the choice between an MP’s own opinion and his party’s posi on we im-
plicitly assume, however, that voters as a poten al focus of representa on are encom-
passed representa ves’ answer to vote according to their own personal preferences. In
other words, a representa ve who answers that an MP ought to vote according to his
own opinion may do so because his own opinion is informed by the voters’ opinion; by
vo ng according to his own opinion, he is loyal to voters’ who act as a compe ng prin-
cipal to the party. As a more precise indicator of the influence of voters as compe ng
principals of the poli cal party, we can also look at respondents’ answer to the ques on
how anMPought to vote if his voters’ opinion conflicts with the party’s posi on. Accord-
ing to the theory of compe ng principals, wewould expect that regional representa ves
are more likely to pick the voters’ opinion over their party’s posi on. There are hardly
any differences between the levels of government, however, as the majority of all re-
spondents at both the na onal (62 percent) and regional level (59 percent) answer that
in the case of disagreement, an MP ought to vote according to his party’s posi on (see
the columns labeled ‘All’ in Table 5.6). If we look at the individual countries, there does
not appear to be a consist pa ern: in Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium, and to
a lesser extent in Portugal and France, na onal MPs are more likely to choose the vot-
ers’ opinion over the party’s posi on, whereas in Austria, Switzerland and Italy, regional
representa ves are more likely to do so (not shown in Table 5.6). In most countries, the
differences between the levels of government are not very large, which seems to imply
party group included a middle answering category ‘it depends’, which was always the most popular among
na onal MPs. The omission of this category in the 2010 Par Rep Survey was associated with almost 30 per-
cent of respondents refusing to answer the ques on, and a very high percentage of respondents selec ng
the answering category ‘MP should vote according to his party’s opinion’ (see Table 6.18 in chapter 6). In
the nine countries included in the analysis in this chapter, however, the omission of this category seems
to have had a smaller effect on the response rate. For all nine countries combined, only 5 percent (34 re-
spondents) of na onal MPs’ responses to the ques on are missing. Almost the same holds for the regional
level (3 percent, 35 respondents missing). In comparison: 2 percent (13 respondents) of na onal MPs, and
1 percent (13 respondents) of regional representa ves refused to answer the ques on that preceded this
ques on in the survey (these percentages and number of respondents are not weighed).
18 The percentage of regional representa ves who would answer than an MP ought to vote according to his
own opinion in the case of disagreement is highest in Italy and Switzerland, where response rates were also
the lowest. It could be that MPs who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty were more likely to
par cipate in the survey than MPs who do subscribe to the norm. In both cases, however, the percentages
of na onal MPs who answer that an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion are also among the
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that the hypothesized greater influence of compe ng principals at the regional level is
probably not as strong as we predicted.
Table 5.6 also shows that around three-quarters of na onal representa ves who
choose voters’ opinion over the party’s posi on, also indicate to vote according to their
own opinion instead of the party’s posi on when the two conflict. This entails that it
is likely that their lack of subscrip on to the norm of party loyalty can, in part, be ac-
counted for by their loyalty to voters as compe ng principals. Of the regional repre-
senta ves who indicate to vote according to the opinion of the voters instead of the
party’s posi on, however, the percentage who would then also let their own opinion
trump that of the party is lower than at the na onal level (62 percent). So, not only is
party loyal stronger at the regional level than at the na onal level, which is not in line
with our expecta ons, the influence of voters as compe ng principals to party on those
representa ves who do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty seems to be (slightly)
weaker at the regional level than at the na onal level.
5.3.4 Party discipline
Because subna onal representa ves are less likely to depend on their poli cal party for
their livelihood and future careers, we expect disciplinarymeasures to be less effec ve at
the subna onal level, and therefore party discipline to play a less important role in deter-
mining party group unity at the subna onal level than it does at the na onal level (H4).
As was explained in chapter 4, the actual use of party discipline is difficult to observe,
and thus we use the same ques on that inquires into representa ves’ sa sfac on with
party discipline in their party. Representa ves who indicate that party discipline ought
to be less strict are those who are likely to have been disciplined in the past and/or who
value the freedom of an individual representa ve above the collec ve benefits of act-
ing as a united front, whereas representa ves who answer that it should be more strict
consider the benefits of a united front more important than a representa ve’s individual
mandate, and would like to see their fellow party group members put on a ghter leash.
Finally, those who answer that party discipline should remain as it is probably perceive a
good balance between a representa ve’s individual freedom and the collec ve benefits
of party group unity, or at least agree with the way in which the two are balanced by the
party (group) leadership.
At the aggregate level, the difference between na onal and regional representa ves’
sa sfac onwith general party discipline is prac cally non-existent: in both cases around
70 percent are contentwith general party discipline, around 20 percent think it should be
applied more strictly, and 10 percent would like to see less strict general party discipline
(see Table 5.7). Moreover, only Portugal and Spain seem to corroborate our hypothesis
that party discipline is less strict at the regional level; in all other countries, the percent-
age of respondents who hold the opinion that party discipline should be less strict is
either almost the same as at the na onal level, or actually higher (notably in Italy, the
United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Belgium).
The answering pa erns are not very different when we inquire into specific aspects
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party line in votes, which ismost relevant for the study at hand, there are again no signifi-
cant differences between the na onal and regional level (see Table 5.8). The same holds
for when it comes to seeking authoriza on from the parliamentary party before taking
poli cal ini a ves (see Table 5.9). Moreover, in both cases there is not a consistent
pa ern when we look at the differences between na onal MPs and regional represen-
ta ves in the individual countries; in some countries the percentage of representa ves
who would like to see party discipline applied less strictly is higher at the na onal than
at the regional level, whereas in other countries it is the other way around.
There is one excep on to this overwhelming sa sfac on with party discipline, and
that is when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confiden al; at both levels
of government over half of respondents answer that party discipline should be more
strict, and only 1 percent think it should be less strict (see Table 5.10). However, when
asked whether they agree with the statement that confiden al party discussions usually
find their way to the media, the answering pa erns for the two levels of government
are quite different: whereas at the na onal level 62 percent considers the statement
(mostly) true, only 36 percent of regional representa ves answer that this is the case
(see Table 5.10).19 The majority of regional representa ves actually consider the state-
ment (mostly) false. Thus, while the majority of representa ves at both levels of gov-
ernment are apparently concerned with keeping internal party discussion confiden al,
their concern seems most merited at the na onal level. It could be speculated that po-
li cal par es are under more (media) scru ny at the na onal level, and there is more
pressure to present a united front.
5.3.5 The sequen al decision-making process
The main argument of this study is that the decision-making mechanisms dealt with in-
dividually above are ordered in a par cular sequence. If a representa ve does not have
an opinion on a par cular vote, he follows the vo ng advice given to him by his fellow
party group’s members and thus engages in cue-taking. Therefore, agreement, loyalty
and discipline are not important for ge ng the representa ve to vote with the party’s
posi on and contribute to party group unity. Likewise, if a representa ve does have
an opinion on a vote, and he is in agreement with his party group’s posi on, whether
he subscribes to the norm of party group loyalty is not relevant, and the party (group)
leadership also does not have to coax him to follow the party line through (the promise
of) posi ve and (the threat of) nega ve sanc ons. A representa ve who has an opinion
that conflicts with the posi on of the party group moves on to third decision-making
stage. If his subscrip on to the norm of party group loyalty overrides the conflict, this
drives him to toe the party group line on his own accord, and thus discipline is s ll un-
necessary. Finally, if a representa ve has a conflic ng opinion and his subscrip on to
the norm of party group loyalty does not outweigh the intensity of the conflict, party
19 For presenta on purpose the extremes of answering categories of the ques on as to whether it is true or
false that confiden al party discussions usually find their way to themedia are combined: ‘mostly false’ and
‘false’ are collapsed into one category, as are ‘mostly true’ and ‘true’.
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discipline becomes relevant as a means of ge ng the representa ve to fall in line, albeit
involuntarily. If, at this final stage of the decision-making sequence, the party (group)
leadership’s disciplinary measures are not enough to elicit compliance, we expect that
the representa ves will vote according to his own opinion and thus dissent from the
party group line.
As already discussed in chapter 4, such an explanatory model of decision making
would ideally be tested by asking representa ves what mo vated their choice at each
stage of their decision-making process on individual legisla ve votes. Unfortunately,
the available data preclude us from doing so. We can, however, get a general idea of the
rela ve importance that three of the decision-making mechanisms, party agreement,
party loyalty and party discipline, play in determining party vo ng unity, since the three
ques ons that we used to gauge these mechanisms all specifically refer to vo ng in par-
liament. (In order to gauge party discipline, we use the ques on that inquires into a
respondent’s sa sfac on with party discipline specifically when it comes to s cking to
the parliamentary party line in votes, see Table 5.8.) Including the rela ve contribu on
of the first stage, cue-taking, is problema c as the ques ons that we used to gauge it
do not refer to vo ng, and do not specifically ask whether respondents have an opinion,
or whether, in their opinion, MPs (should) vote according to the parliamentary party
spokesperson’s vo ng advice when a personal opinion is lacking. Moreover, the ques-
on used as an indicator of the second decision-making mechanism, party agreement,
also does not allow us to exclude representa ves who lack a personal opinion. In other
words, we do not know for certain if representa ves who indicate to infrequently dis-
agree with the party do so because they actually share the opinion of the party, or be-
cause they have no personal opinion on thema er. For these two reasons the first stage
of the decision-making process, cue-taking, is omi ed from the model.
The first column in Table 5.12 includes the percentage of representa ves who indi-
cate to infrequently disagree with the party’s posi on. For presenta on purposes, the
answering categories ‘about once a month’ and ‘about once every three months’ are
combined into ‘frequently disagree’, and the categories ‘about once a year’ and ‘(almost)
never’ are collapsed into ‘infrequently disagree’.20 As we saw above, and in line with our
hypothesis (H2), when all representa ves are taken together, party agreement is higher,
and thus plays a more important role in determining party group unity, at the regional
level (71 percent) than it at the na onal level (58 percent). The pa ern is also consis-
tent inmost individual countries, with the excep on of Switzerland and to a lesser extent
Belgium, where the percentage of representa ves who infrequently disagree with the
party is higher at the na onal level than at the regional level.
Next, party loyalty is only relevant for those representa ves who indicated to fre-
quently disagree with the party. The percentage of representa ves who frequently dis-
agree with their party’s posi on, but s ll toe the party line out of a sense of loyalty,
is slightly higher at the na onal level (17 percent) than at the regional level (14 per-
cent). Thus, although we found above that party loyalty was stronger at the regional
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level when looking at all representa ves regardless of whether they frequently or infre-
quently disagreed with their party’s posi on (see Table 5.5), it seems that in the case
of disagreement, a larger propor on of na onal MPs than regional representa ves can
be counted on to vote according to the party’s posi on out of loyalty. In other words,
the mechanism is more important at the na onal level than it is at the regional level.
This is in line with our hypothesis (H3), albeit that the difference between the levels of
government is small (only 3 percentage points). The excep ons to this pa ern are the
United Kingdom and Germany, where the percentage of representa ves who frequently
disagree but do vote according to the party line out of loyalty is higher at the regional
then at the na onal level, and Austria and Italy, where the percentages are the same for
both levels of government.
Finally, the sequen al decision-making model also reveals that party discipline plays
a more important role at the na onal level than at the regional level, which is as we
expected (H4). At the na onal level, 8 percent of the total number of MPs frequently
disagree with the party, do not hold the opinion that an MP should vote with the party
in the case of disagreement, and would like to see party discipline be applied less strictly
when it comes to vo ng in parliament (which, according to our interpreta on, implies
that they are more likely to have experienced discipline in the past than representa ves
who are sa sfied with party discipline as it is or answer that party discipline ought to
be stricter). At the regional level, 3 percent of representa ves fall into this category,
and there is slightly less variance between countries. The pa ern is generally consistent
between countries (with the excep on of Belgium and to lesser extent Spain, where
the percentage of regional representa ves who indicate to frequently disagree, to not
subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, and to like to see discipline applied less strictly is
higher at the regional level than at the na onal level).
17 percent of na onal MPs and 12 percent of regional representa ves are s ll un-
accounted for: they frequently disagree with the party, do not subscribe to the norm
of party loyalty in the case of disagreement, and do not seem to have been disciplined
in the past, as they indicate that party discipline when it comes to vo ng in parliament
can remain as it is, or should be even stricter. For some legislatures our findings are
in line with previous studies on party group unity, such as in the case of the Swiss na-
onal parliament, where party vo ng unity has been found to be rela vely lower than
in other European na onal parliaments (see chapter 4). In general, however, our model
would predict more dissent and less party group unity than is now the case in these par-
liaments (as far as we know). As explained before in chapter 4, party discipline may be
underes mated by the model as a result of the formula on of the survey ques on, and
we are unable to include cue-taking as a first decision-making stage for similar reasons.
These two limita ons of the model may, in part, explain the rela vely high percentage
of representa ves who are currently unaccounted for.
In terms of our findings, we find few differences in terms of the number of gener-
alists and specialists at the two levels of government, and regional representa ves are
unexpectedly more likely than na onal MPs to indicate that the parliamentary party
spokesperson determines the posi on of the party. Moreover, with the excep on of
party agreement, the differences we do find between the two levels of government are
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not very large. One reason for this may the fact that many of the regional legislatures
included in our analysis are much more similar to their na onal counterparts than we
assumed. Indeed, in terms of size, some of the regional parliaments included in the
Par Rep Survey represent rather large districts, and also have around 100 seats, which
means that party groups are s ll likely to be quite large. In addi on, quite a few of
the regional parliaments also have RAI scores close to 20 (out of a maximum of 24, see
footnote 13), meaning that these parliaments are likely to have quite broad jurisdic ons
and poli cal authority, which require a certain level of professionaliza on. Indeed, for
some of these regional parliaments, we know that their representa ves are employed
full- me and receive a good salary, which means that they are s ll very much depen-
dent on the party for their livelihood and future careers, thus living ‘off’ poli cs (see,
for example, Gunlicks’ (2003, 252-260) study of the German Lander parliaments).21 In
addi on, the comparison between the levels of government is confounded by the fact
that in some countries, the subna onal levels of government also have electoral and
legisla ve ins tu ons (which are held to influence MP decision making, and thus party
group unity, see chapter 4) that are different from those at the na onal level.
Fortunately, we have data for one country, the Netherlands, where the electoral and
legisla ve ins tu ons at the na onal and subna onal levels of government are very sim-
ilar, and the ques ons from the Par Rep Survey were put to na onal, as well as both
regional and local municipal councilors. By comparing these three levels, we increase
the varia on on the dependent variable, while keeping the ins tu onal se ngs at the
na onal and subna onal levels of government rela vely constant. The Netherlands is a
decentralized unitary country, in which the decision-making powers at the subna onal
levels are much weaker than at the na onal level. The subna onal parliaments, espe-
cially at themunicipal level, are alsomuch smaller than the regional parliaments studied
above, entailing that party groups are also generally smaller as well. Moreover, we know
that Dutch provincial and municipal councilors receive a fairly modest compensa on for
their council work, and that most engage in poli cs part- me, usually maintaining an-
other job in order to sustain their livelihood (www.gemeenteraad.nl, 2014).
5.4 Analysis of thedecision-makingmechanisms in theDutch
SecondChamber, provincial councils andmunicipal coun-
cils
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, party vo ng unity is, and always has
been, very high in the Dutch Second Chamber. Li le to no research has been done, how-
ever, on the vo ng behavior of representa ves at the subna onal levels of government
in the Netherlands. Most provincial and municipal councils provide the council minutes
and vo ng results on their websites, and since 2008 a number ofmunicipal councils have
21 Of the countries included in the Par Rep Survey, Swiss na onal MPs are not employed full- me (Power,
2012, 50).
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also started collec vely publishing their vo ng records online on the website ‘how does
my council vote?’ (wat stemt mijn raad?). On the basis of a general overview of the
figures presented on these websites, one can conclude that party vo ng unity is proba-
bly very high at the subna onal level as well. Another source for municipal party vo ng
unity is Van der Meij’s (2013) analysis of municipal council vo ng in the city of Leiden.
Van der Meij finds that in 99.59 percent of votes taken in the city council between 2006
and 2010, none of the councilors from the six largest par es dissented from (the major-
ity of) their party group. Between 2010 and 2013 there was no dissent in 99.79 percent
of votes. In a much older work da ng back to the 1960s, Morlan (1964) highlights that
even back then, party bloc vo ng was already the rule in Dutch municipali es.22 Thus,
although we have limited data on the subna onal levels, it seems safe to assume that
party group unity is quite high at all levels of government in the Netherlands.
The fact that many of the formal ins tu ons that are deemed to influence party
group unity are very similar at all three levels makes the Netherlands an ideal case
for cross-level comparison. First, representa ves at all three levels of government are
elected through direct elec ons every four years, and at all levels the electoral system is
one of Propor onal Representa on. However, whereas at the na onal level the fall of
governmentmay result in the dissolu on of the Second Chamber and early elec ons, the
electoral cycles at the subna onal levels are fixed. If confidence in the execu ve branch
is lost, par es renego ate their coali on agreement, or a new coali on is formed con-
sis ng of a different combina on of par es.
There are a total of 150 seats in the Second Chamber, and the number of seats to
be distributed at the subna onal levels varies between 39 and 55 in the 12 provincial
councils, and between 9 and 45 seats in themunicipal councils.23 Just like at the na onal
level, in provincial and municipal elec ons voters are presented with a ballot displaying
lists of candidates as ordered by the poli cal par es, and cast their vote for an individual
candidate. The number of seats obtained by a party is determined by the total number
of votes for a party’s candidates in the en re province ormunicipality, and at the na onal
level votes are pooled na on-wide. In order to obtain a seat on the basis of preference
votes a candidate must cross the threshold of 25 percent of the electoral quota, or 50
percent at the municipal level if the number of seats in the council is less than 19 (as is
the case in smaller municipali es). And even though they can only be elected via their
poli cal party’s list, once in the legisla ve arena representa ves at all three levels of
government formally vote without a binding mandate (Cons tu on of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, ar cle 67.3 and ar cle 129.6) and are also under no legal obliga on
to give up their seat to their party if they are expelled, or voluntarily defect, from their
party group.
22 Morlan (1964, 323-324) men ons that some mes formal council vo ng did not even take place because
the outcome was already known, as councilors had detailed informa on (presumable about the posi ons
of all the poli cal par es) before the council mee ngs.
23 The number of municipali es in the Netherlands is consistently decreasing. During the municipal elec ons
in 2011 there were 418 municipali es. The number of seats in the councils at the subna onal level is based
on popula on size.
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Next, the implementa on of the 2002 Local Government Act and 2003 Provincial
Government Act led to the replacement of the old monis c system by one of strict du-
alism at the two subna onal levels. This entails that at the municipal level the posi on
of alderman (wethouder) cannot be combined with membership of the municipal coun-
cil, and at the provincial level membership of the provincial government (Gedeputeerde
Staten) is incompa ble with that of the provincial council (Denters and Klok, 2005; De
Groot, 2009, 431).24 Thus, execu ve-legisla ve rela ons at the subna onal levels of gov-
ernment today mirror those at the na onal level where the posi on of (junior) minister
cannot be combined with that of MP. At all levels of government execu ve-legisla ve
rela ons are dominated by poli cal par es (see sec on 6.2 in chapter 6 for a discussion
of the dominance of poli cal par es in the Dutch Second Chamber). In her study on the
implica ons of the Local Government Act, for example, De Groot (2009, 19-20) com-
ments that one of the main complaints of the old monis c systemwas the applica on of
party discipline by council aldermen. Denters (1993, 78) makes a similar observa on, in
that themonis c execu ve-legisla ve rela ons allowed for li le debate in themunicipal
council because most policy had already been decided on beforehand by the coali on
leadership. Although the new system of dualism could lead to a weakening of poli cal
par es’ control over execu ve-legisla ve rela ons at the subna onal levels, anecdotal
evidence does not point in this direc on (Korsten and No en, 2005).
Finally, although formally a decentralized unitary system, the powers of the subna-
onal levels of government are limited to such a degree that in the past the Netherlands
was generally considered a unitary system (Toonen, 1990). According to the Dutch con-
s tu on, the provincial and municipal governments in the Netherlands can take on any
competence as long as it does not violate na onal policy or cons tu onal bounds (ar cle
124). In prac ce, the municipal, but especially the provincial level of government, has
the power to act autonomously over only a rela vely narrow set of policy areas and is to
a large extent limited to the implementa on and execu on of legisla on passed at the
na onal level (this is referred to as co-administra on or co-governance) (Korsten and
Tops, 1998). The provincial level’s jurisdic on mainly encompasses infrastructure and
environmental policy. Municipali es share responsibility with the na onal and provin-
cial governments for local land management, urban development, infrastructure, trans-
porta on, the economy, the environment, social affairs, welfare, employment and edu-
ca on (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). The con nuous processes of decentraliza on to the
municipal level, of which the most recent include increased municipal responsibili es
for certain social and welfare policy domains (such services for the disabled, youth pol-
icy, social assistance, and work and income), contribute to the debate as to whether the
Netherlands ought to be considered a unitary system or a decentralized unitary system.
What is important for our analysis, however, is that even when taking the processes of
decentraliza on into account, the fact is that the jurisdic ons and powers of the three
levels of government vary considerable.25
24 Comparable changes also recently took place in the United Kingdom as well as a number of Scandinavian
countries (Haus and Swee ng, 2006, 273).
25 According to Hooghe et al. (2008, 271), in 2006 the Dutch provincial level obtains a RAI score of 8.0 on the
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Table 5.13: Par RepMP Survey response rates for the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial
councils and municipal councils
Popula on Sample Response
Legislatures Seats Started survey Finished survey
N N n % n % n %
Na onal 1 150 63 42 62 41
Provincial* 12 564 139 25 112 20
Municipal** 418 9538 2000 21 513 26 407 20
Municipal level na onal par es’ local branch 397 77 306 75
Municipal level local par es 116 23 101 25
* The provinces areDrenthe (41 seats), Flevoland (39 seats), Friesland (43 seats), Gelderland (55 seats), Gronin-
gen (43 seats), Limburg (47 seats), Noord-Brabant (55 seats), Noord-Holland (55 seats), Overijssel (47 seats),
Utrecht (47 seats), Zeeland (39 seats) and Zuid Holland (55 seats).
** The municipali es selected for the sample are Graafstroom (13 seats), Oudewater (13 seats), Strijen (13
seats), Zoeterwoude (13 seats), Bedum (15 seats), Bernisse (15 seats), DeMarne (15 seats), Ha em (15 seats),
Li enseradiel (15 seats), Lopic (15 seats), Mon oort (15 seats), Opmeer (15 seats), Rijnwaarden), Simpelveld
(15 seats), Texel (15 seats), Uitgeest (15 seats), Voerendaal (15 seats), Bladel (17 seats), Bodegraven (17 seats),
Dantumadiel (17 seats), Enkhuizen (17 seats), Gennep (17 seats), Heeze-Leende (17 seats), Nuth (17 seats),
Oirschot (17 seats), Slochteren (17 seats), Staphorst (17 seats), Vianen (17 seats), Weesp (17 seats), Zandvoort
(17 seats), Dongeradeel (19 seats), Leerdam (19 seats), Maasdriel (19 seats), Aa en Hunze (21 seats), Borger-
Odoorn (21 seats), Dalfsen (21 seats), Dinkelland (21 seats), Edam-Volendam (21 seats) Heemstede (21 seats),
Kaag en Braasem (21 seats), Leusden (21 seats), Sint-Michielsgestel (21 seats), Stein (21 seats), Waddinxveen
(21 seats), Winterswijk (21 seats), Boxtel (23 seats), Castricum (23 seats), Deurne (23 seats) Meppel (23 seats),
Sneek (23 seats), Tytsjerksteradiel (23 seats), Gedrop-Mierlo (25 seats), Goes (25 seats), Heemskerk (25 seats),
Hellendoorn (25 seats), Oud Ijsselstreek (25 seats), Steenwijkerland (27 seats), Zuidplas (27 seats), Zwijndrecht
(27 seats), Berkelland (29 seats), Overbetuwe (29 seats), Pijnacker-Nootdorp (29 seats), Rijswijk (29 seats),
Waalwijk (29 seats), Kampen (31 seats), Roermond (31 seats), Assen (33 seats), Leidschendam-Voorburg (35
seats), Lelystad (35 seats), Amstelveen (37 seats), Deventer (37 seats), Hengelo (27 seats), Apeldoorn (39
seats), Arnhem (39 seats), Amsterdam (45 seats) and Utrecht (45 seats).
Note: The Dutch extension of the 2010 Par Rep MP Survey to the provincial and municipal levels was also
financed by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO).
Our analysis of the decision-making mechanisms at the three levels government in
the Netherlands relies on data that was also collected in the context of the Par Rep
project.26 As is shown in Table 5.13, 42 percent of representa ves of the Dutch Second
Chamber par cipated in face-to-face interviews in the spring of 2010. At the provincial
and municipal level representa ves were invited by e-mail to fill in a shorter internet
self-rule dimension (which ranges from zero to 15 points), and a 6.5 on the dimension of shared rule (which
ranges from zero to nine points). The total RAI score obtained by the Dutch provinces is 14.5. The RAI score
does not capture local government (Schakel, 2008, 149).
26 Parts of the analyses in this sec on formed the basis for Van Vonno and Andeweg (2014).
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version of survey, which was available online in December 2010 and January 2011.27 At
the provincial level all 564 councilors were approached, resul ng in a response rate of
around 25 percent, with 20 percent comple ng the survey. At the municipal level, a
stra fied cluster sample based on council size was drawn. For the purpose of stra fica-
on, municipal councils were divided into four categories based on their size: small (17
seats or less), medium-small (19 to 29 seats), medium-large (31 to 37 seats) and large
(39 seats or more).28 This yielded a response rate of about 26 percent, and a comple-
on rate of 20 percent. As is o en the case with lengthy Internet surveys, the a ri on
rate among provincial and municipal respondents is quite high (Crawford et al., 2001),
despite the efforts that were made to shorten the web-based version of the survey.
At both the provincial and municipal level the distribu on of respondents across the
various local branches of na onal par es is very similar to the distribu ons found in the
popula on of council members (not shown in Table 5.13). Furthermore, of the munici-
pal councilors who completed the survey, three-quarters are members of local branches
of na onal par es and the remaining 25 percent are members of par es that are only
ac ve at the municipal level.29 These distribu ons are roughly equal to those found in
the popula on of municipal councilors (Hendriks and Schaap, 2011). Finally, 58 percent
of municipal respondents, and 67 percent of those at the provincial level, are members
of governing par es. At the na onal level, only 38 percent is coded as such. (Only mem-
bers of the Christen-Democra sch Appèl (CDA) and ChristenUnie (CU) are considered
governing par es. Members of the Par j van de Arbeid (PvdA) are coded as being in
opposi on, because the PvdA had dropped out of the government a few weeks before
the survey was scheduled to take place.)
5.4.1 Division of labor
Returning again to our first hypothesis, we expect that subna onal representa ves are
less likely to engage in cue-taking than na onal MPs (H1). The argument is that as a re-
sult of the smaller size of legislatures and party groups, subna onal party groups are less
likely to apply a strict division of labor which requires specializa on, and are more likely
to recruit policy generalists. Generalists are more likely than specialists to have an opin-
ion on a wider range of topics, and therefore less dependent on the vo ng advice given
27 The data collec on process among themembers of the Second Chamber took take place in themonths prior
to elec ons in June 2010, which were held early as a result of the fall of the Balkenende IV government. The
electoral cycle was also coming to an end at the provincial level at the me of the survey; the scheduled
elec ons took place in March 2011, which was a few weeks a er the survey was taken offline. Municipal
council elec ons had taken place in March 2010, the same year the survey had been put online (December
2010).
28 These categories are based on the size categories used by the Associa on of Dutch Municipali es (Verenig-
ing van Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG) From each category 20 percent of municipali es were randomly
selected. In the analyses below, differences at the municipal level that are related to council size are only
men oned if they are sta s cally significant.
29 Of the 13 councilors represen ng provincial par es (i.e., par es that are only ac ve at the provincial level)
at the me of the survey, only 1 par cipated; this respondent is excluded from the analysis.
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Table 5.14: Specialist or generalist in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and
municipal councils (%)
Generalist Specialist Total Total (n)
Na onal 62 38 100 58
Provincial 62 39 101 136
Municipal 70 30 100 500
χ² (2) = 5.281, sig. = .071; φc = .087, sig. = .071
Municipal councils only: council size
Generalist Specialist Total Total (n)
Large 56 44 100 77
Medium-large 68 32 100 78
Medium-small 73 27 100 227
Small 76 24 100 118
χ² (3) = 10.816, sig. = .013; φc = .147, sig. = .013
to them by other party group members. As men oned above, the Dutch Second Cham-
ber consists of 150 seats, which is the same number as the smallest na onal parliament
included in the interna onal-compara ve analysis above (Belgium). The size of the 12
Dutch provincial councils varies between 39 and 55 seats, and municipal councils in the
Netherlands have between 9 to 45 seats, which means that the subna onal councils are
between 3 and 17 mes as small as the na onal parliament. The number of seats in the
Dutch provincial and municipal councils is also well below the average number of seats
in the regional parliaments included in the interna onal-compara ve analysis (86 seats).
Moreover, the policy-making jurisdic ons of the two subna onal levels of government in
the Netherlands are quite narrow, especially when compared to the powers of the some
of the regional parliaments included in the interna onal-compara ve analysis above.
In our interna onal-compara ve analysis of the nine na onal legislatures and their
regional counterparts, there was hardly any difference between the levels of govern-
ment in terms of the percentage of representa ves who consider themselves specialists
and those who conceive of themselves as generalists. In fact, specialists were in the ma-
jority at both levels of government (see Table 5.2). In the Netherlands, however, gen-
eralists are in the majority at all three levels of government, and at the municipal level
the percentage of generalists is almost 10 percentage point higher than at the other two
levels of government, which is in line with our hypothesis (see Table 5.14). If we focus
on the municipal level only, the percentage of generalists increases as the number of
seats in a municipal council decreases, reaching 76 percent in the smallest municipal
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Table 5.15: ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s posi-
on on his topic’ in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal coun-
cils (%)
(Mostly) false Neither (Mostly) true Total Total (n)
Na onal 19 21 60 100 63
Provincial 21 25 54 100 135
Municipal 32 20 48 100 499
χ² (4) = 10.545, sig. = .032; φc = .087, sig.=.032; gamma = -.185, sig. = .004
councils, which is 20 percentage points more than in the largest municipal councils (see
the bo om half of Table 5.14). Thus even at the municipal level itself, the smaller the
council, the more likely representa ves are to consider themselves generalists.
When it comes to whether the party group spokesperson determines the party’s po-
si on on his topic, which is used as ameans of gauging the division of laborwhich is likely
to spur cue-taking, we found few differences between the na onal and regional legis-
latures in the nine countries analyzed above; the majority at both levels of government
considered the statement (mostly) true, and contrary to our expecta ons, this percent-
age was slightly higher at the regional level than at the na onal level (see Table 5.3). In
the Netherlands, most representa ves at all levels also consider it to be (mostly) true
that the party group spokesperson determines the posi on of the party on his topic (see
Table 5.15). However, there percentage of representa ves who consider the statement
(mostly) true decreases with the level of government, and the percentage of represen-
ta ves who answer (mostly) false increases as wemove down the ladder of government
levels: whereas 19 percent of na onalMPs consider the statement (mostly) false, 21 per-
cent of provincial and 32 percent of municipal councils think so.30 These results point
in the direc on that subna onal representa ves are less likely to engage in cue-taking
than na onal MPs, thus corrobora ng our hypothesis.
The Dutch version of the Par Rep Survey also included an addi onal ques on that
may help us further assess the importance of the party specialists, and thus the role of
cue-taking, in determining party groupunity at the three levels of government. Weasked
representa ves what they consider to be the main decision-making center in their par-
liamentary party group (see Table 5.16).31 Whereas 61 percent of the respondents from
30 At the municipal level, 61 percent of councilors from the largest municipali es (39 seats or more) consider
the statement that the party group spokesperson determines the posi on of the party on his topic (mostly)
true. The percentage of councilors from the smaller municipali es who considers the statement (mostly)
true varies between 40 and 47 percent. The pa ern is not perfectly linear and not sta s cally significant,
however (χ² (6) = 16.136, sig. = .013; φc = .127, sig.= .013; gamma = -.058, sig. = .313).
31 The ques on that asks respondents to iden fy the main decision-making center in the parliamentary party
group was taken from the earlier 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies.
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Table 5.16: The main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the
Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
Mee ng Commi ee Specialist Leadership Total Total (n)
Na onal 61 20 13 7 101 56
Provincial 73 11 12 5 101 112
Municipal 86 5 6 3 101 408
χ² (6) = 29.590, sig. = .000; φc = .160, sig. = .000
the Second Chamber consider the party group’smee ng to be themain decision-making
center, this percentage is significantly higher at the two subna onal level: respec vely
74 percent at the provincial level and 86 percent at the municipal level.32 At the na-
onal level, 33 percent of MPs select either the party group commi ees or specialists as
the party group’s main decision-making center, as opposed to 23 percent of provincial
councilors and only 11 percent of municipal councilors. This provides some evidence for
the argument that party groups at the higher levels of government are likely to apply a
stricter division of labor than at the lower levels of government.
5.4.2 Party agreement
As we expected (H2), our interna onal-compara ve analysis of ninemul level countries
revealed that although the majority of representa ves at both the na onal and regional
level indicate to infrequently disagree with the party’s posi on, regional representa ves
aremore likely to do so than na onalMPs (see Table 5.4). The pa ern in theNetherlands
is the same: the majority of respondents at all levels of government indicate to disagree
infrequently with the party’s posi on, and thus at all levels par es can to a great extent
rely on party agreement for the unity of their party group. In line with our hypothesis,
provincial andmunicipal councilors aremore likely to disagree infrequently than na onal
MPs (see Table 5.17). The difference between the Dutch levels of government is not very
large and it is not sta s cally significant, however.
At all levels of Dutch government, the percentage of representa ves who disagree
infrequently with the party is higher than the aggregate percentages of na onal and re-
gional representa ves in the nine mul level countries. Whereas in the Dutch case 71
percent of na onal MPs disagree infrequently (answering that they either disagree only
32 Although the percentage of councilors who consider the party group mee ng the most important decision-
making center increases as the size of the municipal council decreases, the differences between municipal
councilors from different sized councils are not sta s cally significant (χ² (9) = 6.762, sig. = .662; φc = .074,
sig.=.662). Noteworthy, however, is that the percentage of representa ves who consider the party group
specialist the most important decision-making center is twice as high in largest municipal councils (12 per-
cent) then it is in the smaller municipal councils (between 5 and 6 percent).
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once a year or (almost) never), only 58 percent of all na onal respondents combined
from the interna onal-compara ve analysis do so (a difference of 13 percentage points).
At the subna onal level in the Netherlands, 84 percent of provincial councilors, and 81
percent of municipal councilors infrequently disagree, in comparison to 70 percent of all
regional representa ves combined (a difference of 14 and 11 percentage points, respec-
vely). Most of these percentage differences are owed to a higher percentage of Dutch
representa ves answering that they (almost) never disagree with the party’s posi on,
however. In other words, party agreement is generally higher at all levels of government
in the Netherlands than it is in the interna onal-compara ve survey, but the rela ve dif-
ference between the levels of government is about the same in both analyses. Thus, it
does not seem to be the case that increasing our variance on the independent variable
(legislature size) has an effect on party agreement; the effect seems to be related to
country context.
On the other hand, if we zoom in on the municipal level itself, we see that councilors
from the largest municipali es (37 seats or more) are more likely to frequently disagree
with the party’s posi on (11 percent indicate that this occurs about once a month, and
24 percent answer that it occurs about once every three months) than councilors from
the smaller municipali es (in the smallest municipali es with 17 seats or fewer, for ex-
ample, 7 percent disagree with the party’s posi on about once a month, and 8 percent
do so about once every three months, see the bo om half of Table 5.17). Noteworthy
is also the difference in the percentage of municipal councilors who (almost) never dis-
agree: in the largest municipali es 28 percent indicate to do so, whereas in the smaller
municipali es between 44 and 52 percent answers that they (almost) never disagree.
Therefore, at the municipal level itself, council size seems to have an effect on party
agreement.
We hypothesized in subsec on 5.2.2 that party agreement would be stronger at the
subna onal level than at the na onal level because subna onal representa ves are
more likely to be involved in determining the posi on of their party in the first place,
as party groups are more likely to be smaller at the subna onal level of government,
and small groups are more likely to engage in consensus and unanimous decision mak-
ing. The fact that the percentage of representa ves who consider the party mee ng the
main decision-making center of the party group increases as we move down the ladder
of government levels already provides some evidence for this expecta on Table 5.16).
In the Dutch version of the Par Rep Survey, we also asked respondents directly whether
they feel involved in the decision making in the party group.33 Although at all levels of
government very few representa ons indicate to feel (completely) uninvolved in party
group decision making, the percentage of representa ves who select the extreme an-
swering category ‘completely involved’ increases by over 20 percentage points as we
move from the na onal to the provincial to the municipal level (see the figures in the
33 The ques on that asks respondentswhether they feel involved the decisions in the party group, was inspired
by the ba ery of ques ons included in the 2007 survey that Russell (2012) put to the Bri sh House of Lords
for her analysis of party unity in what could be considered a discipline-free environment.
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Table 5.17: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi on
on a vote in parliament) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils andmunicipal
councils (%)
Frequently disagree Infrequently disagree
Once Every Once (Almost) Total Total (n)
a month three months a year never
Na onal 7 22 33 38 100 60
Provincial 2 15 34 50 101 137
Municipal 5 14 36 45 100 498
χ² (6) = 7.798, sig. = .253; φc = .075, sig. = .253 (four answering categories)
χ² (2) = 3.922, sig. = .141; φc = .075, sig. = .141 (four answering categories collapsed into ‘frequently
disagree’ and ‘infrequently disagree’)
Municipal councils only: council size
Frequently disagree Infrequently disagree
Once Every Once (Almost) Total Total (n)
a month three months a year never
Large 11 24 37 28 100 75
Medium-large 3 12 42 44 101 78
Medium-small 3 14 35 49 101 227
Small 7 8 34 52 101 118
χ² (6) = 25.206, sig. = .003; φc = .130, sig.=.003 (four answering categories)
χ² (3) = 15.796, sig. = .001; φc = .178, sig. = .001 (four answering categories collapsed into ‘frequently
disagree’ and ‘infrequently disagree’)
column ‘all’ in Table 5.18).34
Table 5.18 also shows the rela onship between representa ves’ answers to the ques-
on about their involvement in party group decision making cross-tabulated with their
34 For the previously presented tables that included 5-point ordinal scale answering categories, the extremes
of the scales were collapsed for presenta on purposes. However, because for the ques on whether repre-
senta ves feel involved in the decisionmaking in the party group the answering pa erns are heavily skewed
towards ‘agree’ and ‘completely agree’, the extremes ‘completely disagree’ and ‘disagree’ and combined
with the middle category ‘neither’. We assume that a respondent’s agreement with the statement reflects
the extent towhich he indeed personally feels involved in the decisionmaking in the party group. Therefore,
for the sake of presenta on, we renamed the answering categories to reflect the extent of involvement: the
answering category ‘completely agree’ is labeled ‘completely involved’, ‘agree’ is renamed ‘involved’, and
the combina on category of ‘(completely) disagree / neither’ is now ‘(completely) uninvolved / neutral’ (see
Table 5.18).
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Table 5.18: Party agreement (the frequency of disagreement with the party’s posi on
on a vote in parliament) and ‘I feel involved in the decision making in the party group’ in
the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
All Frequently Infrequently Total Total (n)
disagree disagree
Na onal
(Completely) uninvolved / neutral 3 50 50 100 2
Mostly involved 48 32 68 100 28
Completely involved 49 24 46 100 29
Total 100
Total (n) 61
χ² (2) = .898, sig. = .638; φc = .123, sig. = .638
All Frequently Infrequently Total Total (n)
disagree disagree
Provincial
(Completely) uninvolved / neutral 4 60 40 100 5
Mostly involved 37 33 67 100 42
Completely involved 58 6 94 100 66
Total 99
Total (n) 113
χ² (2) = 18.548, sig. = .000; φc = .405, sig. = .000
All Frequently Infrequently Total Total (n)
disagree disagree
Municipal
(Completely) uninvolved / neutral 2 67 33 100 6
Mostly involved 27 28 72 100 109
Completely involved 72 13 87 100 290
Total 100
Total (n) 407
χ² (2) = 21.476, sig. = .000; φc = .230, sig. = .000
χ² (2) = 38.145 sig. = .000; φc = .257, sig. = .000
(Frequency of disagreement & I feel involved in the decision making in the party group & government level)
χ² (4) = 18.402, sig. = .001; φc = .178, sig. = .001; gamma = .327, sig. = .000
(I feel involved in the decision making in the party group & government level)
Note: The number of respondents in the last two columns may not add up to the total number of respondents included in the
first column (‘All’) because the la er two columns only include respondents who answered both ques ons.
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self-indicated frequency of disagreement.35 At all levels of government, party agree-
ment increases as representa ves feel more involved in the decision-making process in
the party group. The rela onship is, however, much stronger at the two subna onal lev-
els of government than at the na onal level. Thus, it may indeed be the case that party
agreement at the subna onal level is more likely to result from councilors’ involvement
in determining the posi on of their party in the first place.
5.4.3 Party loyalty
Moving on to the next decision-makingmechanism,we saw in our interna onal-compara ve
analysis that regional representa ves are actually more likely than na onal MPs to an-
swer that in the case of disagreement with the party’s posi on, an MP ought to vote ac-
cording to the party’s posi on (see Table 5.5), which was not in line with our hypothesis
(H3). However, when in our sequen al decision-making model we excluded representa-
ves who indicate to frequently agree with the party, party loyalty was more important
at the na onal level, albeit only slightly so (see Table 5.12).
In the Netherlands, however, the pa ern is as we expected: whereas at the na onal
level 86 percent of MPs indicate to vote according to the party’s posi on in the case of
disagreement,36 this percentage drops to 57 percent at the provincial level, and only 40
percent at the municipal level (see Table 5.19).37 The norm of party loyalty seems to
have a much stronger foo ng among na onal MPs than among subna onal councilors,
especially those at the municipal level. At the municipal level, we see that councilors
from the largest municipal councils (37 seats or more) are most likely to subscribe to the
norm of party loyalty (see the bo om half of Table 5.19); this may be explained by the
fact that the largest city councils in the Netherlands tend to be more strongly poli cized
along party lines than those in smaller municipali es.38
35 The answering categories are again dichotomized into ‘frequently disagree’ and ‘infrequently disagree’.
36 As already men oned in footnote 17, almost 30 percent of Dutch na onal MPs refused to answer the ques-
on (also see Table 6.18 in chapter 6).
37 Another finding worth men oning is the difference between the levels of government when looking at
representa ves whose par es partake in government. First, at all levels of government the percentage of
representa ves who subscribe to the norm of party loyalty in the case of disagreement with their party is
higher for government representa ves than it is for those in opposi on (χ² (1) = 10.009, sig. = .002; φc =
.123, sig. = .002) . However, whereas 80 percent of na onal MPs who belong to governing par es indicate
to vote according to the party’s posi on in the case of disagreement, only 46 percent of provincial, and
52 percent of municipal government representa ves agree. This difference may be explained by the fact
that while at the na onal level, disunity within governing par es carries the risk of the fall of the cabinet
a er which early elec ons (usually) take place, at the subna onal levels this is not the case because the
electoral cycles are set (although this does not exclude the possibility that the a new coali on consis ng of
a different combina on of par es can be formed). As men oned before, however, the PvdA is coded as an
opposi on party because it had le the coali on at the me of the survey. We cannot be sure, however,
if the members of the PvdA who par cipated in the survey answered the survey ques ons based on their
then-current posi on in the opposi on, or their experience as members of a governing party. If the la er
is the case, this may influence the results.
38 At the municipal level, councilors who belong to the local branch of a na onal party are more likely to vote
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Table 5.19: Party loyalty (ownopinion versus party’s posi on) in theDutch SecondCham-
ber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
Own opinion Party’s posi on Total Total (n)
Na onal 14 86 100 43
Provincial 43 57 100 134
Municipal 60 40 100 492
χ² (2) = 40.918, sig. = .000; φc = .247, sig. = .000
Municipal councils only: council size
Own opinion Party’s posi on Total Total (n)
Large 47 53 100 74
Medium-large 68 33 101 77
Medium-small 62 38 100 225
Small 79 41 100 116
χ² (3) = 17.348, sig. = .062; φc = .122, sig. = .062
Compe ng principals
According to the theory of compe ng principals, representa ves’ decision to vote ac-
cording to their own opinion in the case of conflict with the party group’s posi on may
be the result of their loyalty to their voters. In other words, a representa ve may indi-
cate to vote according to his own opinion instead of the posi on of the party because his
own opinion is informed by the posi on of his voters (which is at odds with the posi on
of the party group), and he wishes to remain loyal to his voters. In our interna onal-
compara ve analysis, we looked more closely into the ques on of voters as compe ng
principals, by including representa ves’ opinions on how an MP ought to vote in the
case of disagreement between his voter’s opinion and the party’s posi on. At both lev-
els of government around 60 percent of representa ves indicate to vote according to the
party’s posi on instead of the voters’ opinion, and there are no sta s cally significant
differences between the levels (see Table 5.6), indica ng that in general, and contrary
to our expecta ons, regional representa ves do not pay more heed to the voters than
na onal MPs do. Moreover, although at both levels the majority of those who answer
that the voters’ opinion trumps the party’s posi on also think that an MP ought to vote
according to his own opinion when in conflict with the party’s posi on (which is likely to
mean that these representa ves are indeed influenced by voters’ as compe ng princi-
according to the party’s opinion in the case of disagreement (43 percent) than councilswhobelong to par es
that are only ac ve at the municipal level (31 percent) (χ² (1) = 4.667, sig. = .031; φ = .097, sig.=.031).
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pals), the percentage is (slightly) lower at the regional level.
In the Netherlands, however, we expect larger differences between the levels of
government, especially between the municipal level and the two higher levels of gov-
ernment. In their study of the 2010 municipal elec ons, Boogers et al. (2010) find that
the average percentage of preference votes cast for a candidate other than the party
leader ranged from 35 to 63 percent,39 which is much higher than the 16 percent cast
in the Second Chamber elec ons in that same year (Van Holsteyn and Andeweg, 2012).
The fact that voters are more likely to cast preference votes during municipal elec ons
may mean that municipal councilors are more likely to be loyal to their voters who act
as compe ng principals to the poli cal party. Li le is known about voters’ use of prefer-
ence votes during provincial elec ons, but considering that turnout for these elec ons
is quite low,40 and that one of the main complaints is the provincial level’s disconnect
from ci zens, it is probable that voters are less likely to cast preference votes at provin-
cial elec ons then they are at na onal andmunicipal elec ons. Provincial councilors are
thus expected to experience less of a pull away from the party group by their voters than
municipal councilors.
Indeed, the percentage of representa ves at the municipal level (36 percent) who
indicate to opt for their voters’ opinion instead of the party’s posi on is higher than at
the provincial (22 percent) and na onal level (8 percent) (see the column labeled ‘All’ in
Table 5.20).41, 42 Although the percentage differences between the levels are larger than
those found in the interna onal-compara ve analysis (see Table 5.6), with themaximum
of 36 percent at the municipal level, the influence of voters’ as compe ng principals to
the party does not seem to be very strong at any level of government in the Nether-
39 One should keep in mind, however, that only seven municipali es were included in Boogers et al.’s (2010)
study (Almere, Delfzijl, Den Haag, Maassluis, Deurne, Tilburg and Dinkelland).
40 The turnout for the 2007 provincial elec ons was 46 percent. This is 8 percentage points lower than the
turnout for the 2010 municipal elec ons (54 percent) and 29 percentage points lower than the turnout for
the 2012 elec ons for the Second Chamber (75 percent). All three elec onsmen oned directly precede the
data collec on for the Par Rep Survey. Van Tilburg (1991, 164) ascribes the low turnout for the provincial
elec ons to voters’ lack of knowledge about the responsibili es and powers of the provincial government.
This is in line with the findings by Van der Eijk and Schild (1992, 94-95), who show that voters generally
consider ins tu ons at the provincial level far less important than at the na onal level, and Hendriks and
Tops (2003, 302), who contend that “[p]rovincial government, forming the other level of subna onal gov-
ernment, is significantly less important than local government in terms of the ci zen–government interface
[...]. In comparison, provincial government ismore abstractly government oriented, while local government,
with its prominent role in policy-implementa on and service provision, is more concretely ci zen oriented”.
41 At the municipal level, 31 percent of councilors from the largest municipali es (39 seats or more) answer
that an MP ought to vote according to the voters’ opinion in the case of conflict with the party’s posi on,
whereas 46 percent of councilors from the smallest municipali es answer that an MP ought to adhere to
the voters’ opinion. The pa ern is not perfectly linear for councilors from medium-sized councils, however
(χ² (3) = 7.943, sig. = .047; φc = .132, sig.=.047).
42 Of all Dutch respondents, 25 percent of government respondents, and 37 percent of those in opposi on,
indicate to choose the opinion their voters’ over the posi on of their party (χ² (1) = 11.347, sig. = .001; φ
= .135, sig.= .001). If we only look at representa ves whose par es are in government, only 6 percent of
na onal MPs opt for their voters’ opinion, while 18 percent of provincial councilors do so, and 25 percent
of municipal councilors do.
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Table 5.20: Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) and compe ng principals
(voters’ opinion versus party’s posi on) in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial coun-
cils and municipal councils (%)
Own Party’s
All opinion posi on Total Total (n)
Na onal
Voters’ opinion 8 33 67 100 3
Party’s posi on 92 6 94 101 33
Total 100
Total (n) 48
χ² (1) = 2.678, sig. = .102; φ = .273, sig. = .102
Own Party’s
All opinion posi on Total Total (n)
Provincial
Voters’ opinion 22 74 26 100 27
Party’s posi on 78 34 66 100 100
Total 100
Total (n) 129
χ² (1) = 13.969, sig. = .000; φ = .332, sig. = .000
Own Party’s
All opinion posi on Total Total (n)
Municipal
Voters’ opinion 36 74 26 100 160
Party’s posi on 64 34 66 100 294
Total 100
Total (n) 459
χ² (2) = 22.769, sig. = .000; φ = .224, sig. = .000
χ² (1) = 47.161 sig. = .000; φ = .276, sig. = .000
Party loyalty (own opinion versus party’s posi on) & compe ng principals (voter’s opinion versus party’s posi on) &
government levels
χ² (2) = 21.203, sig. = .000; φc = .183, sig. = .000
Compe ng principals (voter’s opinion versus party’s posi on) & government levels
Note: The total number of respondents in the last column do not add up to the total number of respondents included in the
first column (‘All’) because the total in the last column only include respondents who answered both ques ons.
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lands. However, at both the provincial and municipal level of government, councilors
who would vote according to voters’ opinion in the case of conflict with the party’s posi-
on, are also more likely to vote to follow their own opinion when in disagreement with
the party (74 percent at both levels). In other words, there is some evidence that at the
lower levels of government, councilors who vote according to their own opinion in the
case of disagreement with the party’s posi on, may do so because their own opinion is
informed by the voters’ opinion, and thus their loyalty to the party is diffused by voters’
ac ng as compe ng principals.
Party group solidarity and representa ves’ internaliza on of norms of party unity
The sociological approach to party group unity and its determinants highlights par es’
(leaders’) efforts to create an environment which fosters party group solidarity and vol-
untary party-oriented behavior (Crowe, 1983; Hazan, 2003). Again, the Dutch version of
the Par Rep Survey allows us to delve deeper into whether representa ves actually ex-
perience a strong sense of solidarity in the party group.43 The expecta on is that na onal
MPs aremore likely to perceive a strong sense of solidarity in the party group than at the
subna onal councils are, as the higher level of intra-party compe on at the na onal
level allows par es to apply a stricter candidate selec on procedure, of which previous
party experience and the internaliza on of the norm of party group loyalty (o en ob-
tained through previous party experience) are likely to be important criteria. Moreover,
the fact that the decision-making powers of the na onal level are much stronger than
those of the subna onal levels, also entails that there is more at stake, which could also
contribute to party group members’ voluntary subscrip on to the norm of party group
loyalty, and thus MPs’ percep on of a stronger sense of solidarity in their party group.
Table 5.21 shows that themajority of representa ves at all levels report such a sense
of solidarity, but whereas almost 80 percent of representa ves at both the na onal and
municipal level (completely) agree that there is a strong sense of solidarity in their party
group, only 60 percent of provincial councilors (complete) agree.44 Noteworthy is also
that the percentage of provincial councilors who (completely) disagree (16 percent) is
quite a bit higher than at the other levels of government (respec vely 5 and 6 percent).
Thismay be caused by the fact that provincial party groups generallymeet less o en than
groups at the other levels of government in the Netherlands, which to a certain extent
may limit the party group leaders’ ability to build and foster a strong feeling of solidarity.
Also, the rela vely small size of councils and party groups at the municipal level, and
resultant high level of involvement of individual representa ves in party group decision
making (see Table 5.18), could explain why the percentage of municipal councilors who
43 The Dutch formula on of the ques on is: ‘Er heerst een sterk gevoel van saamhorigheid in de frac e’ (trans-
la on CvV). Saamhorigheid can be translated into solidarity or unity in English.
44 For presenta on purposes the extremes of answering categories of the ques on as to whether there is
a strong feeling of party unity in the party group are combined: ‘completely disagree’ and ‘disagree’ are
collapsed into one category, as are ‘completely agree’ and ‘agree’.
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Table 5.21: ‘There is a strong feeling of unity in the party group’ in the Dutch Second
Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
(Completely) disagree Neither (Completely) agree Total Total (n)
Na onal 5 16 79 100 61
Provincial 16 24 60 100 113
Municipal 6 16 79 101 405
χ² (4) = 19.769, sig. = .001; φc = .131, sig.= .001; gamma = .218, sig. = .011
Table 5.22: ‘An individual representa ve’s freedom or party unity’ in the Dutch Second
Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
Individual’s freedom ← ↔ → Party unity Total Total (n)
Na onal 2 0 16 51 31 100 61
Provincial 3 15 16 44 21 99 117
Municipal 5 14 29 39 12 99 416
χ² (8) = 35.689, sig. = .000; φc = .245, sig.= .000; gamma =-.328, sig. = .000
agree with the statement is quite high.45
Although representa ves may observe a strong feeling of solidarity in their party
group, in order for an individual representa ve’s behavior to actually be driven by norms
of loyalty, these must be internalized. As indicator of this internaliza on, we use a ques-
on that was included in the Dutch version of the survey which asked representa ves
to indicate what they consider more important: an individual representa ve’s freedom
or the unity of the party. At all levels of government the majority of representa ves opt
for party unity (see Table 5.22).46 There are, however, significant differences between
the government levels when it comes to the distribu on of responses along the scale.
Whereas 82 percent of na onal level MPs place a high value on party unity (selec ng a 4
or a 5 on the 5-point scale), this figure drops to 65 percent among provincial, and 51 per-
cent among municipal councilors. Although at all levels very few representa ves place
45 The difference between government and opposi on MPs and their reac ons to the statement that there
is a strong sense of unity in the party group is only sta s cally significant at the na onal level, where 95
percent of MPs from governing par es (completely) agree, in comparison to only 68 percent of opposi on
MPs (χ² (2) = 7.032, sig. = .030; φc = .340, sig.=.030).
46 Because collapsing the 5-point scale into a 3-point scale would hide some interes ng differences between
the levels of government, the original 5-point ordinal answering scale is kept intact for the choice between
a representa ve’s individual freedom and the unity of the party.
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a high value on an individual representa ve’s freedom, the rela vely high percentage
of subna onal representa ves who place themselves towards the middle of the scale
indicates that these subna onal councilors, especially at the municipal level, tend to opt
for more of a balance between a representa ve’s freedom and party unity. This implies
that the internaliza on of the norms of party loyalty is indeed probably weaker at the
subna onal levels than it is at the na onal level in the Netherlands.
Party group decision-making rules
Besides a general feeling of party group solidarity, and an individual’s internaliza on of
the importance of party group unity, there may also be situa ons in which representa-
ves consider vo ng with the party group in the case of disagreement with the party
‘appropriate’, depending on the origins of the party group’s posi on and on how widely
the posi on of the party is shared by the othermembers of the party group. In the Dutch
version of the Par Rep Survey, we presented respondents with a number of these po-
ten al situa ons, and asked themwhether anMPwho disagrees with the party posi on
on a vote in parliament s ll ought to vote according to the party’s posi on.47 As we
found party loyalty to be stronger at the na onal level than at the subna onal level, we
also expect that subscrip on to these (informal) decision-making rules will be stronger
among na onal MPs than subna onal representa ves.
First, majoritarian and consensus decision-making rules seem to be quite important
at all levels of government (see Table 5.23). About half of na onal MPs agree that when
the majority or all of the members of the party group (excluding the representa ve him-
self) share the opinion of the party, this cons tutes a good reason to vote with the party
despite disagreement. In line with our expecta ons, provincial andmunicipal councilors
are less sensi ve to majority and consensus decision-making rules, although s ll over a
third of councilors at both levels do think these are good reasons to opt to vote with the
party’s posi on when in disagreement.
In our sequen al decision-making model, we assume that in order to deal with the
workload of parliament par es apply a division of labor, and that representa ves engage
in cue-taking when they do not have a personal opinion on a par cular topic. One could
argue, however, that it be considered appropriate behavior to follow the vo ng advice
of the party group specialist and/or spokesperson not only when representa ves lack an
opinion, but also when they disagree with the party’s posi on. Although the percentage
of na onal MPs who consider following the vo ng advice of the party group specialist
in the case of disagreement with the party’s posi on appropriate behavior is not very
high (16 percent), it is s ll twice as high as at both subna onal levels. There are even
larger differences between the levels when the party’s posi on originatedwith the party
group leadership: 19 percent of na onal MPs consider this a good reason to vote with
47 The survey described four situa ons, and respondents were given the op on to answer either yes or no.
Respondentswere also allowed to fill in other reasons thatwould lead one to vote according to the party line
despite disagreement (open-ended ques on). At all levels, the party manifesto or the coali on agreement
as the origin of the party’s posi on were men oned by many representa ves as reasons to vote with the
poli cal party even when in disagreement.
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Table 5.23: Situa ons in which an MP who disagrees with the party’s posi on on a vote
in parliament s ll ought to vote according to the party’s posi on in the Dutch Second
Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (% who answer affirma vely)
Na onal Provincial Municipal
When the en re party group (excluding the MP himself) shares the party’s posi on 45 39 36
χ² (2) = 2.146, sig. = .342; φc = .056, sig. = .342
When a majority of the party group shares the party’s posi on 50 37 31
χ² (2) = 9.960, sig. = .007; φc = .121, sig. = .007
When the party’s posi on originated with the party group commi ee or specialist 16 8 8
χ² (2) = 4.054, sig. = .132; φc = .077, sig. = .132
When the party’s posi on originated with the party group leadership 19 4 4
χ² (2) = 25.046, sig. = .000; φc = .191, sig. = .000
the party despite their disagreement, whereas only 4 percent of subna onal councilors
agree. In line with our expecta ons, party loyalty and other norms of party-oriented
behavior do indeed seem to play a stronger role in the Dutch Second Chamber than in
the subna onal councils.
5.4.4 Party discipline
Sa sfac on with party discipline
When it comes to party discipline, the ini al results of the interna onal-compara ve
analysis do not support our expecta on that party discipline would be used less o en
at the subna onal level (H4): at both the na onal and regional level, the vast majority
of representa ves are sa sfied with general party discipline, and at both levels only 10
percent would like to see general discipline be applied less strictly (see Table 5.7). Once
placed in our sequen al decision-making model, however, party discipline does play a
stronger role at the na onal level than at the regional level (see Table 5.12).
In the Netherlands, representa ves at all level seem compara vely more content
with howgeneral party discipline is applied than the representa ves in our interna onal-
compara ve analysis, as at all levels of government the percentage of respondents who
answer that party discipline should remain as it is, is higher. The differences between the
levels are not very large either, but the percentage of municipal councilors who prefer
less strict general party discipline (4 percent) is lower than at both the provincial (10
percent) and na onal level (8 percent) (see Table 5.24).48 This is (in part) in line with
48 At the municipal level, 14 percent of councilors from large councils (37 seats or more) hold the opinion that
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Table 5.24: Sa sfac on with general & specific aspects of parliamentary party discipline
in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
General party discipline
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Na onal 12 80 8 100 61
Provincial 11 80 10 100 113
Municipal 8 88 4 100 407
χ² (4) = 8.621, sig. = .071; φc = .086, sig.=.071; gamma = -.054, sig. = .635
S cking to the parliamentary party line in votes
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Na onal 0 95 5 100 61
Provincial 5 84 12 100 111
Municipal 2 92 5 100 409
χ² (4) = 9.631, sig. = .047; φc = .091, sig.= .047; gamma = -.154, sig. = .239
Taking poli cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Na onal 7 87 7 100 61
Provincial 6 87 6 100 111
Municipal 8 87 5 100 408
χ² (4) = .687, sig. = .953; φc = .024, sig.=.953; gamma = -.097, sig. = .417
Keeping internal party discussions confiden al
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Na onal 25 75 0 100 61
Provincial 5 96 0 100 112
Municipal 6 94 1 100 409
χ² (4) = 30.422, sig. = .000; φc = .162, sig.=.000; gamma = .440, sig. = .007
Keeping posi on in commi ee in tune with party posi on
More strict Remain as it is Less strict Total Total (n)
Na onal 12 84 5 100 61
Provincial 13 82 5 100 112
Municipal 10 88 2 100 403
χ² (4) = 4.987, sig. = .289; φc = .066, sig.=.289; gamma = -.043, sig. = .712
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our hypothesis that sanc ons are less effec ve, and therefore applied less o en, at the
lower levels of governments.
Dutch representa ves are also overwhelmingly more sa sfied with party discipline
when it comes to more specific aspects of the party life than the representa ves in our
interna onal-compara ve analysis (see Table 5.24), but in most cases the differences
between the levels are again not very large; for most of these specific aspects the per-
centage of representa ves who would like to see discipline applied less strictly is only a
few percentage points lower at the subna onal levels than at the na onal level. There
is a difference between the levels when it comes party discipline when vo ng in parlia-
ment: the percentage of provincial representa veswhowould like to see less strict party
discipline is over twice as high as at the na onal and municipal level,49 which seems to
imply that vo ng disciplining occursmost o en at the provincial level in theNetherlands.
Another aspect for which there is a noteworthy difference between the levels of gov-
ernment in representa ves’ evalua on of party discipline regards keeping internal party
discussions confiden al. A quarter of na onal MPs feel that party discipline ought to be
more strict, in comparison to respec vely only 4 percent of provincial councilors, and
6 percent of municipal councilors. Moreover, when asked whether confiden al party
discussions usually find their way to the media in the day-to-day prac ce of parliament
(see Table 5.11), 13 percent of na onal Dutch MPs agree (see Table 5.25). The percent-
age of subna onal councilors who consider the statement (mostly) true is much lower at
(only 1 percent of provincial and 3 percent of municipal councilors). Thus, whereas the
regional representa ves in the interna onal-compara ve analysis appear unnecessar-
ily concerned with party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions
confiden al (see Table 5.10 and Table 5.11), this concern does not seem to be present
at the Dutch subna onal level.
Likelihood of nega ve sanc ons
Although it is difficult to observe (the threat and/or applica on of) sanc ons, in the
Dutch version of the Par Rep Survey we did ask representa ves how likely sanc ons are
when a representa ve repeatedly does not vote according to the party line. This may
give us some insight into which types of nega ve sanc ons are actually applied by party
(group) leaders to get their representa ves to fall in line. Sanc ons can vary in terms of
their severity, their visibility to those outside the party group, and the extent to which
they can be applied immediately (see Table 5.26) or are delayed un l the next elec ons
(Table 5.27). As we hypothesize that discipline is less effec ve, and therefore used less
o en, at the subna onal level than at the na onal level, we also expect that subna onal
general party discipline ought to be less strict. In the smaller municipali es, the percentage ranges from 1
to 6 percent (χ² (6) = 22.600, sig. = .001; φc = .167, sig.= .001; gamma = -.278, sig. = .028).
49 There are no differences between differently sized councils for any of the specific aspects of party discipline,
with the excep on of when it comes to vo ng with the party in the council. 12 percent of councilors from
the largest councils (37 seats or more) would like to see stricter party discipline. For the other councils this
percentages ranges between 0 and 6 percent (χ² (6) = 11.603, sig. = .071; φc = .119, sig. = .017; gamma =
-.128, sig. = .071).
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Table 5.25: ‘Confiden al party discussions usually find their way to the media’ in the
Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
(Mostly) false Neither (Mostly) true Total Total (n)
Na onal 71 16 13 100 63
Provincial 93 5 2 100 137
Municipal 91 6 3 100 500
χ² (4) = 30.163, sig. = .000; φc = .147, sig.=.000; gamma = -.289, sig. = .029
representa ve will also consider the applica on of specific types of sanc ons less likely
than na onal MPs.
When it comes to punishing a representa ve who repeatedly does not toe the party
line by removing himas a party group spokesperson (a reasonably severe, public sanc on
that can be applied by the party group leadership without much delay), the differences
between the levels of government are as predicted.50 The percentage of representa-
ves who consider this a (very) likely consequence of vo ng dissent decreases as we
move down the ladder of government levels, and the percentage of who consider this
a (very) unlikely sanc on increases.51 We also asked respondents whether a rebellious
representa ve will have trouble finding support for his own poli cal ini a ves among
the other members of his party group.52 This sanc on can take place quite covertly
within the boundaries of the party group, which minimizes the chance of nega ve con-
50 Removing someone as a party group spokesperson or expelling him from the party (group), are not only, or
even primarily, used as sanc ons when a representa ve dissents from the party line in vo ng, but also if
party group unity is breached in other ways. Recent examples from the Dutch na onal parliament include
the removal of parliamentary party spokesperson Paul Tang (PvdA, finance), who leaked the budget figures
(Miljoenennota) to the media in 2009. Rita Verdonk (VVD), who had received more preference votes than
party leader Mark Ru e in the 2006 na onal elec on, was expelled from her party in 2007 for publicly
cri cizing both Ru e’s leadership as well the party’s policy posi on on specific issues. In 2013, Louis Bontes
(PVV)was also expelled a er publicly cri cizing party leaderWilders. These sanc onsmay also be employed
when a representa ve acts in a way that calls into ques on his integrity concerning a specific issue for which
he is parliamentary party spokesperson, or fails to inform his party about certain issues from his past. This
happened to Eric Lucassen (PVV, defense) in 2010, who had failed to inform his party that he had been found
guilty of sexual misconduct when he was a pe y officer in the army (for other examples, see Lucardie et al.
2006).
51 At the na onal level, the percentage of government MPs who consider it (very) likely that a representa ve
will be removed as a party group spokesperson (67 percent) is over twice as high as it is among opposi on
MPs (32 percent) (χ² (2) = 7.567, sig. = .023; φc = .349, sig.=.023). At the other levels of government there
are no sta s cally significant differences between government and opposi on representa ves.
52 83 percent of na onal MPs from governing par es, and 55 percent of na onal MPs from opposi on par es,
consider it (very) likely that a representa ve who repeatedly dissents from the party could have trouble
finding support for his own poli cal ini a ves among the other members of his party group (χ² (2) = 8.567,
sig. = .014; φc = .372, sig.=.014). At the other levels of government there are no sta s cally significant
differences between government and opposi on representa ves.
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Table 5.26: The likelihood of immediate nega ve sanc ons when a representa ve re-
peatedly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial
councils and municipal councils (%)
The representa ve will have trouble finding support for his own poli cal ini a ves among members of his
party group
(Very) unlikely Neither (Very) likely Total Total (n)
Na onal 24 10 66 100 62
Provincial 17 14 69 100 134
Municipal 19 14 67 100 474
χ² (4) = 2.049, sig. = .727; φc = .039, sig.=.727; gamma = -.008, sig. = .915
The representa ve will be removed as a party group spokesperson
(Very) unlikely Neither (Very) likely Total Total (n)
Na onal 32 23 45 100 62
Provincial 31 30 39 100 130
Municipal 39 28 33 100 466
χ² (4) = 6.049, sig. = .196; φc = .068, sig.=.196; gamma = -.144, sig. = .028
The representa ve will be expelled from the party group
(Very) unlikely Neither (Very) likely Total Total (n)
Na onal 70 17 13 100 60
Provincial 54 36 11 100 132
Municipal 59 26 15 100 476
χ² (4) = 9.640, sig. = .047; φc = .085, sig.=.047; gamma = .049, sig. = .498
sequences for the image of the poli cal party. There are, however, very few differences
between the levels of government when it comes to the percentage of representa ves
who consider this a (very) likely sanc on (around two-thirds at all levels).
There are also almost no differences between the levels when it comes to those who
consider this a (very) likely sanc on (although in this case, these percentages are very
low, ranging from 11 to 15 percent), but na onal MPs are again more prone to consider
the expulsion of an MP (very) unlikely (70 percent) than subna onal representa ves (54
percent at the provincial level, and 59 percent at the municipal level). By expelling a
representa ve, a party runs the risk of losing the seat (as the representa ve can remain
in parliament or the council as an independent member) and any control it might s ll
have over the behavior of the representa ve. This is especially pressing for government
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Table 5.27: The likelihood of delayed nega ve sanc ons when a representa ve repeat-
edly does not vote with the party line in the Dutch Second Chamber, provincial councils
and municipal councils (%)
The representa vewill not be appointed to oneof the important parliamentary commi ees a er the upcoming
elec ons
(Very) unlikely Neither (Very) likely Total Total (n)
Na onal 10 24 66 100 62
Provincial 11 24 64 100 132
Municipal 20 21 59 100 471
χ² (4) = 8.236, sig. = .083; φc = .079, sig.=.083; gamma = -.141, sig. = .045
The representa ve will be placed on an unelectable posi on on the poli cal party electoral list
(Very) unlikely Neither (Very) likely Total Total (n)
Na onal 8 23 69 100 62
Provincial 9 19 72 100 134
Municipal 15 20 65 100 471
χ² (4) = 4.751, sig. = .314; φc = .060, sig.=.314; gamma = -.126, sig. = .095
The representa ve will not be placed on the poli cal party electoral list
(Very) unlikely Neither (Very) likely Total Total (n)
Na onal 15 28 57 100 61
Provincial 12 28 60 100 134
Municipal 25 26 49 100 468
χ² (4) = 12.901, sig. = .012; φc = .139, sig.=.012; gamma = -.204, sig. = .002
(coali on) par es with a small majority.53 This might explain why na onal MPs aremore
prone to consider this type of sanc ons (very) unlikely than representa ves at the sub-
na onal level, where coali ons are more o en oversized.
Party (group) leaders may prefer sanc ons in the long-term because applying too
much pressure in the short-term may result in dissenters leaving the party group—and
taking their seats with them. When it comes to the likelihood of delayed sanc ons, the
differences between the levels are as expected. Not being appointed to the important
commi ees a er the next elec ons, for instance, is considered quite likely at all levels of
53 The differences between government and opposi on representa ves are, however, not sta s cally signifi-
cant at any of the three levels of government.
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government, but the percentage of representa ves who consider this a (very) unlikely
sanc on is twice as high at the municipal level (20 percent) as it is at the na onal and
provincial level. This sanc on s ll involves a representa ve actually being renominated
(and reelected), however. Depending on a party’s selectoral procedures, party (group)
leaders can also punish a representa ve by placing him on an unelectable slot on the
party electoral list for the next elec on, or excluding him from the electoral list com-
pletely, which in essence means ending the representa ve’s poli cal career.54 The use
of the party electoral candidacy lists, as well as commi ee appointments, can conceal
the use of discipline, because it is difficult to dis nguish the applica on of sanc ons from
other factors mo va ng par es and representa ves’ choices.55
At all levels of government at least two-thirds of representa ves consider it (very)
likely that a representa ve will be placed in an unelectable slot if he repeatedly votes
against the party’s posi on. Being excluded from the party electoral list completely is
also considered (very) likely by the majority of representa ves at all levels. The per-
centage of representa ves who consider these sanc ons (very) likely is lowest at the
municipal level, however, and one-fourth of municipal councilors even consider it (very)
unlikely that a dissen ng councilor will not be selected for the next elec ons. This could,
in part, be explained by the recruitment problems that poli cal par es at the subna onal
level have in the Netherlands, where compe on for subna onal posi ons is quite low
in comparison to the na onal level given the large number of council seats at the provin-
cial andmunicipal level (in 2011 there were 564 provincial councilors and around 10,000
municipal councilors). In combina on with the decline in party membership that poli -
cal par es have been experiencing over the past decades (Van Biezen et al., 2012), many
par es have trouble finding sufficient candidates for the subna onal level. Thus, threat-
ening to exclude a councilor from the party electoral list is less likely to be interpreted
as a realis c threat at the municipal level.
Added to this is the fact that subna onal councilors are generally less dependent on
their representa ve func on for their livelihood than na onalMPs. Municipal councilors
are officially non-salaried, but receive a financial compensa on of between 235 and
2200 euros per month (depending on municipal popula on size, see www.overheid.nl,
54 A representa ve could s ll create his own new poli cal party to enter into the elec ons. At the na onal
level, however only few of these new par es have been able to gain representa on in parliament (see
subsec on 6.3.1 in chapter 6). It is unlikely that this would be very different at the subna onal levels of
government.
55 In her compara ve analysis of party discipline, based on interviews with party group leaders and experts
five European parliamentary systems (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the European Parliament), Bailer (2011) finds that candidate nomina on as a means of exer ng power over
party group members is most powerful and commonly used in the Netherlands. Bailer (2011, 12) asked
party group leaders and experts to rate the use of different tools as a disciplinary mechanisms on a scale
ranging from never (0) to very o en (4). The average score given by Dutch party group leaders was a 2.4
on the scale, which is very high when compared to the scores given by party group leaders in the other
parliaments (for which the average score ranged between 0.4 and 1.0). Experts on the Netherlands scored
the use of candidate selec on as a means of exer ng influence over individual MPs in the Netherlands a 3.0
on the scale, which is also higher than the average score given by experts on other countries (the expert
average score ranged between 1.5 and 2.0).
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2015a). The compensa on received by provincial councilors is about 1100 euros per
month (regardless of provincial popula on size, see www.overheid.nl, 2015b). Accord-
ing to a recent online survey conducted by Gemeenteraad.nl, over half (52 percent) of
municipal councilors even have a full- me job. Councilors from small municipali es are
most likely to combine their council work with a full- me job, whereas councilors from
larger municipali es are more likely to work part- me (www.gemeenteraad.nl, 2014).
Na onalMPs, on the other hand, have a salary of over 7300 euros permonth (Parlement
& Poli ek, 2015a). In other words, only at the na onal level, and in the largest municipal
councils, are Dutch representa ves likely to be able to live ‘off’ poli cs.
On a general note, taken together with their high sa sfac on with party discipline,
it seems that Dutch representa ves are aware of these poten al consequences, and for
themost part accept them. However, given the fact that formost of these different sanc-
ons, over half of the respondents at all levels of government considered them (very)
likely, it may be that party discipline, or at least its threat, plays a more important role
than the responses to the sa sfac onwith party discipline ques onwould lead us to be-
lieve. In linewith our hypothesis, these results seem to confirm that party discipline, and
in par cular the applica on of delayed sanc ons through the use of party’s candidate
selec on processes, is indeed less common at the subna onal level than at the na onal
level.
5.4.5 The sequen al decision-making process
Wenowplace the decision-makingmechanisms in our sequen almodel, again excluding
the first stage of cue-taking. In the first column in Table 5.28, we see that at all levels of
Dutch government, party groups can to a great extent rely on their representa ves to
toe the party line out of simple agreement, but that as expected (H2) party agreement
plays a slightly more important role at the provincial (81 percent) and municipal level
(82 percent) than it does at the na onal level (77 percent). Note, however, that these
percentage differ from those in Table 5.17 (where the percentage of representa veswho
disagree infrequently with their party was 71 percent at the na onal, 84 percent at the
provincial level, and 81 percent at the municipal level) because Table 5.28 only includes
representa ves who answered all three ques ons included in the sequen al decision-
makingmodel (i.e., the frequency of disagreement, how anMP ought to vote in the case
of disagreement with the party’s posi on, and sa sfac on with party discipline when it
comes to vo ng in parliament).56
Representa ves who frequently disagree with the party line move on to the next
decision-making stage, which is to ascertain whether their subscrip on to the norm
of party loyalty outweighs their resolve to vote according to their own opinion in the
case of conflict. At the Dutch na onal level, par es can count on another 21 percent
of their MPs to submit to the party line voluntarily despite their disagreement, and the
percentage decreases as we move to the lower levels of government: 15 percent of
56 Again, asmen oned in footnote 17 almost 30 percent of Dutch na onalMPs refused to answer the ques on
we use to measure part loyalty (also see subsec on 6.5.3 in chapter 6).
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Table 5.28: The rela ve contribu on of party agreement, party loyalty and party dis-
cipline when it comes to s cking to the parliamentary party line in votes in the Dutch
Second Chamber, provincial councils and municipal councils (%)
Voluntary Involuntary
Agreement Loyalty Discipline Unaccounted Total Total (n)
Na onal 77 21 0 2 100 43
Provincial 81 15 3 3 102 109
Municipal 82 9 2 7 101 404
χ² (6) = 15.342, sig. = .038; φc = .110, sig. = .038
Municipal councils only: council size
Voluntary Involuntary
Agreement Loyalty Discipline Unaccounted Total Total (n)
Large 63 19 7 11 99 57
Medium-large 87 3 0 10 100 62
Medium-small 83 9 2 6 101 189
Small 88 7 0 5 99 96
χ² (9) = 25.102, sig. = .003; φc = .249, sig. = .003
These percentages may differ from previous tables in this chapter because they only include respondents who
answered all three ques ons. Unfortunately, the ques ons about party discipline were located near the end
of the survey, and 20 na onal MPs refused to answer the ques on pertaining to party loyalty.
provincial councilors, and 9 percent of municipal councilors, thus confirming our expec-
ta on that the importance of party loyalty as a decision-making mechanism decreases
with government level (H3). Together, these two voluntary pathways to party group
unity—party agreement and party loyalty—account for 98 percent of na onal MPs, 94
percent of provincial councilors, and 91 percent of municipal councilors. It is therefore
not shocking that very few representa ves move on to the final decision-making stage.
Party discipline seems to play a slightly more important role at the two subna onal lev-
els (3 percent of provincial councilors and 2 percent of municipal councilors) than at the
na onal level (0 percent). Although absolute percentages at the subna onal levels are
not high, and percentage differences between the levels of government are not large,
this is not in line with our hypothesis (H4), and it is also a bit surprising considering our
findings concerning respondents’ own indica on of the likelihood of sanc ons, espe-
cially those that involve candidate selec on at the na onal level. Again, it could be that,
as a result of the formula on of the ques on used to measure party discipline, our se-
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quen al decision-making model underes mates the importance of party discipline (see
chapter 4). However, with 98 percent of na onal MPs already accounted for by the two
voluntary pathways to party group unity, it is unlikely that a more precise formula on of
the party discipline ques on would have yielded very different results.
At the Dutch municipal level, we see that the greatest differences can be found be-
tween councilors who belong to the largest municipali es (37 seats or more) and those
who belong to the three categories of smaller municipali es (see the bo om half of
Table 5.28). First, the percentage of councilors who can be counted on to disagree in-
frequently with the party, and thus contribute to party vo ng unity out of simple agree-
ment, is quite a bit lower in the largest municipal councils (63 percent) than it is in the
smaller ones (ranging between 83 and 88 percent). Party loyalty, however, is stronger
among those who frequently disagree in the largest municipali es (19 percent) than it
is in the smaller ones (ranging between 3 and 9 percent). Finally, 7 percent of coun-
cilors from the largest municipal councilors frequently disagree, do not subscribe to the
norm of party loyalty, and indicate that party discipline when it comes to vo ng in the
council ought to be less strict. For the smaller municipal councils, this ranges between
0 and 2 percent. Even at the municipal level itself, we see that most of our expecta ons
are met: party agreement increases as municipal council size decreases, whereas party
loyalty and party discipline decrease in importance.
5.5 Conclusion
In general, we can conclude that although all four pathways to party group unity are
present at both the na onal and subna onal level of government, the rela ve impor-
tance of these pathways, and thus the way in which representa ves come to decide to
vote with the party and contribute to party group unity, differs at the different levels
of government. In both the interna onal-compara ve analysis as well as in the Dutch
case, party agreement played a stronger role at the subna onal level, whereas party
loyalty and party discipline, when placed in our decision-making sequence, decreased
in importance as we moved down the ladder of government levels.
Contrary to the first analysis of na onal and regional parliaments in nine mul level
countries, our analysis of the Dutch case allowed us to control for the effects of country
context, electoral ins tu ons, execu ve-legisla ve rela ons and party system. It also
enabled us to increase the varia on in terms of district, parliament and party group size.
Moreover, in the Dutch case there are certainly differences between the levels of gov-
ernment when it comes to their jurisdic on and poli cal authority, as well as represen-
ta ves’ dependence on the poli cal party for their livelihood and careers. For our indica-
tors of cue-taking, aswell as party loyalty, we found larger differences between the levels
of government in the Netherlands than was the case in our interna onal-compara ve
analysis. The results were also more consistent with our expecta ons.
The inclusion of addi onal ques ons in theDutch version of the Par Rep dataset also
allowed us to explore each of the mechanisms in more detail. Noteworthy, for exam-
ple, is that subna onal representa ves are much more likely to iden fy the party group
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mee ng as the main decision-making center, and are likely to feel more involved in the
decision making in their party group, than na onal MPs. The fact that there is a strong
rela onship between subna onal representa ves’ feeling of involvement in party group
decision making and their frequency of disagreement, entails that at these lower levels
party agreement is not only owed to preexis ng exogenously formed policy preferences
(or the lack thereof), but also the result of collec ve decision making and debate within
the parliamentary party group. At the na onal level there does not seem to be a rela-
onship betweenMPs’ feeling of involvement and their frequency of disagreement, but
MPs are more likely to agree that the party group spokesperson determines the posi on
of the party on his topic, and are more likely to iden fy the party group commi ee or
specialist as the main decision-making center (although the majority also chooses the
party group mee ng). This, as expected, points in the direc on of a stronger division
of labor in party groups at the na onal level, and a greater tendency to engage in cue-
taking.
Surprisingly, the regional representa ves in our nine mul level countries are more
likely to answer that in the case of disagreement between an MP’s opinion and the
party’s posi on, an MP should s ck to the party line. In the Netherlands, however, we
found that party loyalty isweaker among subna onal representa ves, who are alsomore
likely to have their loyalty to the party diffused by voters (although the influence of vot-
ers as compe ng principals is likely to be limited, given that at even at the lowest level of
government only about one-third of councilors would vote according to voters’ opinion
instead of remaining loyal to the party’s posi on when the two conflict). At all levels
of Dutch government, representa ves report a strong feeling of solidarity in their party
group (albeit slightly less so at the provincial level), but the internaliza on of the norm
of party unity versus the freedom of an individual representa ve is much weaker at the
subna onal level. That there is a strong feeling of party solidarity at the municipal level
may also be related to the different mode of collec ve party group decision making.
Finally, in both our analyses, party discipline seems to play the least important role in
determining party (vo ng) unity. However, as men oned before, our indicator of party
discipline requires quite a bit of interpreta on as to the underlying meaning of ‘sa s-
fac on with party discipline’, and what representa ves mean when they answer that it
should be more or less strict. Our inquiry into the likelihood of different types of sanc-
ons in the Dutch case seems to indicate that we may be underes ma ng the role that
(the treat of) nega ve sanc ons play, par cularly those that can be kept hidden from
the public, and those that involve candidate selec on.
As men oned before, one of the limita ons of the interna onal-compara ve anal-
ysis of the nine mul level countries is that we do not control for the formal electoral
and legisla ve ins tu ons that are deemed to influence the pathways to party unity.
Moreover, we assume that government level captures a number of different variables,
some of which we lack data for. These include those that have already been theorized
and explored in other studies on party group unity, such as representa ves’ district size
and the rela onship representa ves’ have with their voters (i.e., the extent to which
voters’ act as compe ng principals, Carey, 2007, 2009). However, we also argue that
government level captures a number of variables that may affect MPs’ decision making
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that have been not been explored by previous research on party unity, such as the ex-
tent to which representa ves are dependent on their party for their (future) livelihood
(i.e., whether representa ves are salaried or receive only a modest (financial) compen-
sa on, and whether they engage in their representa ve func on full- me or they do so
part- me and are also employed elsewhere, etc.). Future research on representa ves’
decision making and party group unity in general, and the differences between govern-




Changes over me: party group
unity and MPs’ decision-making
mechanisms in the Dutch na onal
parliament over me
6.1 The one- or two-arena model
Chapter 2 describes the changes in both the prac ce and theory of representa on over
me as outlined by Manin (1997). Whereas parliamentarianism holds the individual MP
to be the main representa ve actor in both theory and in prac ce, the poli cal party
is the central representa ve actor in party democracy. However, the decrease in the
number of partymembers (Katz et al., 1992;Mair andVanBiezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al.,
2012) and party iden fiers in many advanced industrial democracies (Dalton, 2000, 25-
27), as well as the increase in electoral vola lity (Dalton et al., 2000, 38-48), cast doubt
on poli cal par es’ ability to maintain their role as main representa ve actor. Manin
predicts that audience democracy, which is associated with increased electoral vola lity
and par san dealignment, will lead to the return of the individual MP (especially the
party leader) in the electoral arena, but he is less clear about the effects of these changes
on the rela onship betweenMPs and their par es in the legisla ve arena in general, and
party group unity in par cular.
Some authors argue that electoral vola lity and par san dealignment do have con-
sequences for party group unity in the legisla ve arena (André et al., 2013; Kam, 2009).
Kam (2009, 73-74), for example, argues that dealignment and MPs’ dissent ‘appear to
travel together’. In his analysis of MPs’ vo ng behavior in four Westminster systems be-
tween 1945 and 2005, he finds that the differences in electoral dealignment are likely
to explain the different development of vo ng dissent between the United Kingdom
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and Canada (where dissent became more frequent and extensive over me) and Aus-
tralia and New Zealand (where dissent remained a rare phenomenon). In the former
two countries, party iden fica on and party popularity among voters decreased over
me, whereas in the la er two countries this was much less the case.
The arguments by those who contend that electoral vola lity and par san dealign-
ment affect MPs’ dissent and party group unity the legisla ve arena are generally in line
with the ‘two-arena model’ (Mayhew, 1974), which holds that MPs are primarily vote-
seeking, and that their behavior in the legisla ve arena is determined by ins tu ons and
incen ves in the electoral arena. Thus, party group unity in the legisla ve arena is “seen
as a consequence of the need to fight and win elec ons” (Bowler, 2000, 158); the u l-
ity of ac ng in concert with the other members of the party group is determined by its
benefits in the electoral arena. According to the two-arena model, if the poli cal party
label as a decisive cue for voters decreases in importance, candidates are more likely
to use individualis c strategies to appeal to the electorate. Dissen ng from the party
group line in the legisla ve arena may be one of these strategies. Indeed, Kam (2009,
128) finds that in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand, dissent tends to earn MPs
more name recogni on and approval, mainly among non-par san and weakly par san
voters.1
Bowler (2000), however, finds li le evidence of a decline in party group unity over
me. If anything, MPs in European parliaments tend to s ck to the party group line
more, rather than less (with the excep on of the United Kingdom).2 Bowler thus argues
that MPs and their party groups in the legisla ve arena may be insulated from changes
in the electoral arena. In other words, MPs and par es ‘compartmentalize’ their leg-
isla ve and electoral roles (Norton and Wood, 1993, 38; Kam, 2009, 128). This is in line
with the ‘one-arena model’, which holds that in the legisla ve arena MPs are not pre-
dominantly vote-seeking but instead care primarily about policy, and secondarily about
office resources that allow them to pursue policy more effec vely (Bowler, 2000, 163;
Thies, 2000, 250). Party group unity is thus generated by ins tu ons and incen ves
in the legisla ve arena itself (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). According to the one-arena
model, as long as within parliament party groups consist of rela vely like-minded poli -
cians who care about policy (Thies, 2000, 251), and being a member of a party group
offers procedural advantages that are beneficial to MPs’ pursuit of policy, and the party
group (leadership) is granted the tools to solve collec ve ac ons problems among its
members, MPs have an incen ve to act in concert.
As highlighted by Bowler (2000, 159-160), the discussion of the one-arena and two-
arenamodel “suggests a (decep ve) straigh orward line of empirical a ack”. In order to
ascertain which of the two models is correct, one could simply correlate party (roll call)
vo ng unity in the legisla ve arenawith electoral vola lity or par san dealignment in the
electoral arena. The reliance on roll call votes specifically could be problema c in a com-
para ve analysis, however, because vo ng procedures differ between legislatures and
1 Kam (2009) basis his analysis on the 1997 Bri sh Elec on Study and the 1993 New Zealand Elec on Study.
2 Bowler (2000) looks at party group vo ng unity during the 1980s and 1990s in France, Germany, Norway
and Switzerland. He also presents sta s cs on vo ng dissent for Denmark and the United Kingdom.
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over me (Owens, 2003), and in some parliaments their summons may be endogenous
to par es’ procedural advantages in the legisla ve arena, which would make correla on
with changes in the electorate spurious.
Moreover, as pointed out by Kam (2009, 73-74), aggregate level analyses of vo ng
behavior do not allow one to determine why an MP is more or less likely to toe the
party group line, i.e., which decision-making mechanism is affected by changes in the
electorate (two-arena model), or is influenced by par es’ procedural advantage over
MPs in the legisla ve arena (one-arena model). Whereas Kam contends, in line with
the two-arena model, that cas ng a dissen ng vote could be an electoral strategy, one
could argue (as André et al., 2011 do) that the mechanism that is affected here is party
group loyalty, because when in disagreement with the party group line, the MP chooses
to let his loyalty to a compe ng principal, i.e. (poten al) voters, trump his loyalty to the
party group (see also Carey, 2009). Alterna vely, Krehbiel (1993, 259-260) argues that
MPs’ preferences are largely exogenous to the legisla ve arena, and that legisla ve party
groups may have become more heterogeneous as a consequence of the influx of those
who have also been affected by the social changes underpinning par san dealignment.
If party groups are more heterogeneous in terms of their MPs’ policy preferences, this
makes it more likely that MPs will disagree with each other in the first place. From the
perspec ve of the one-arena model, which emphasizes the procedural advantages of
party groups, and specifically their leaders, overMPs, aggregate levels of vo ng behavior
do not allow one to pinpoint whether party group leaders use their control over access
to policy making (agenda-se ng power, for example) and selec ve benefits (such as
commi ee assignment and removal) in the parliamentary arena as a posi ve or nega ve
sanc on to elicit party group unity through obedience.
As admi ed by Bowler (2000, 159), “neither view on its own offers a complete expla-
na on for the presence of par es inside chambers”. The debate over party group unity
as origina ng inside (‘par es in office’) or outside (‘par es in the electorate’) of the leg-
islature tends to overlook the fact that ‘par es as organiza ons’ may play an important
role as gatekeepers, and that par es’ procedural advantage over individuals extends be-
yond the legisla ve arena into the electoral arena through candidate selec on proce-
dures (Bowler, 2000, 177-178). Whereas Kam seems to hint that dealignment will cause
MPs to be less loyal to their party, and Krehbiel expects that the social changes under-
pinning par san dealignment may lead to more heterogeneous party groups in terms
of MPs’ policy preferences, party leaders’ control over candidate selec on procedures
may allow them to minimize, or even counteract, the effects of these changes, by en-
suring that only loyal candidates whose policy preferences match those of the party are
nominated. Moreover, candidate selec on procedures can also help limit MPs’ defec-
on by serving as poten al disciplining mechanisms as well. As par es’ procedural ad-
vantages obtained through candidate selec on are located outside the legisla ve arena,
and ins tu onalized within the electoral systems, some have argued that the explana-
ons of party group unity offered by the ‘par es as organiza ons’ perspec ve fall under
the two-arena model (Linek and Rakušanová, 2005, 427). On the other hand, ‘par es
as organiza ons’ also act within the legisla ve arena through the crea on and mainte-
nance of informal party group rules that reach beyond the power granted to par es by
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the legislature’s formal ins tu ons and rules. An example is the applica on of a strict
division of labor among its group members, which spurs MPs to engage in cue-taking
when they themselves lack the me or exper se to form an opinion on ama er put to a
vote (although this is in part encouraged by a parliament’s commi ee system). In other
words, ‘par es as organiza ons’ act in both arenas.
According to the ‘par es in the electorate’ perspec ve, wewould expect party group
unity to decrease over me because par san dealignment and electoral vola lity would
bring forth MPs who are more likely to frequently disagree with their party group, and
who are less likely to vote according to the party group line out of loyalty in the case of
disagreement.3 In this case, par es’ procedural advantages in the legisla ve arena are
not enough to counteract these changes. Alterna vely, according to the ‘par es in of-
fice’ perspec ve, we would expect no decrease in party group unity over me. We may
s ll see an increase in party group preference heterogeneity and MPs’ disagreement
with the party group’s posi on, and a decrease in party group loyalty among MPs, but
the effects of these changes on party group unity would be contained by par es’ proce-
dural advantage over MPs and their ability to solve collec ve ac on problems among
their members within the legisla ve arena. Finally, if party group unity remains un-
changed, and some of the pathways to party group unity seem nega vely affected by
changes in the electorate whereas others have been strengthened, this points in the
direc on of the ‘par es as organiza ons’ thesis. This would entail that within the leg-
isla ve arena poli cal par es have taken measures to control the behavior of their MPs
beyond those formally accorded to them by the rules of parliament, and par es’ proce-
dural advantages over individuals extend beyond the legisla ve arena into the electoral
arena through candidate selec on procedures. In other words, ‘par es as organiza ons’
have ac vely takenmeasures to curtail and thus neutralize the effects of electoral vola l-
ity and par san dealignment in the electoral arena.
Solving this puzzle necessitates a casewhich displays high electoral vola lity and par-
san dealignment, and for which we have behavioral data that enables us to measure
party group unity, and survey data that allows us to gauge poten al changes in the use
of these different decision-making mechanisms, all over an extensive period of me.
Unfortunately, there are few parliaments for which this data is available over the nec-
essary me span (Owens, 2003). The Dutch case offers a unique opportunity, however,
because we have both data on MPs’ party group defec ons and vo ng behavior (both
regular and roll call) over a long period of me (1945-2010), as well as MPs’ responses
to surveys held at five points in me (the 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Par-
liamentary Studies). We also present data from the Dutch part of the 2010 Par Rep MP
Survey. However, because the formula on of some of the ques ons and answering cat-
egories differ quite a bit from those in the Dutch Parliamentary Studies, we only include
the 2010 Par RepMP survey in our longitudinal analyses when these are the same as in
the Dutch Parliamentary Studies.
3 Par san dealignment and electoral vola lity are likely to have a stronger effect on MPs’ group loyalty when
electoral ins tu ons are candidate-centered than when electoral ins tu ons are party-centered.
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Table 6.1: Average electoral vola lity and second order personal votes in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2012
Elec on Par es represented in parliament (n) Vola lity (% of seats) Personal votes (% of cast votes)
1946 7 - 3.1
1948 8 4.0 3.2
1952 8 5.0 4.4
1956 7 7.0 3.4
1959 8 5.3 6.6
1963 10 6.0 9.6
1967 11 10.0 10.8
1971 14 13.3 11.5
1972 14 13.3 10.5
1977 11 12.7 8.3
1981 10 9.3 7.5
1982 12 10.0 9.6
1986 9 11.3 17.4
1989 9 5.3 11.0
1994 12 22.7 19.4
1998 9 16.7 21.3
2002 10 30.7 27.1
2003 9 16.0 18.5
2006 10 20.2 22.8
2010 10 22.7 15.9
2012 11 15.3 18.9
Mean 10 12.84 12.42
Note: For electoral vola lity the Pedersen Index (1979, 3) is used, which defines electoral vola lity as ‘the
net change within the electoral party system resul ng from individual vote transfers’. It is measured as the
aggregate seats gained (or lost) of all winning (or losing) par es in an elec on.
6.2 The Dutch case
6.2.1 The electoral arena
The Netherlands is a representa ve case in terms of the changes in the electorate de-
scribed above, which according to the two-arena model should lead to lower levels
of party group unity in the legisla ve arena. During the 1950s and 1960s, Dutch so-
ciety was strongly segmented (pillarized) and the voters in each of the different pil-
lars (zuilen) were ed to par cular poli cal par es through a strong sense of iden ty
and loyalty, thus crea ng a highly structured and stable electorate. During this period
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of pillariza on, the Social Democra c PvdA (Par j van de Arbeid) and the smaller le -
socialist PSP (Pacifis sch Socialis sche Par j) represented the socialist pillar, while the
conserva ve-liberal VVD (Volkspar j voor Vrijheid en Democra e) represented the lib-
eral pillar. The Catholic pillar was represented by the KVP (Katholieke Volkspar j). The
Reformed (Gereformeerd) ARP (An -Revolu onaire Par j), the Dutch Reformed (Neder-
lands Hervormd) CHU (Christelijk-Historische Unie) and the smaller Orthodox Protestant
GVP (Gereformeerd Poli ek Verbond) represented the Protestant pillar. In 1980 the KVP,
ARP and CHU formally fused together to form the Chris an Democra c CDA (Christen-
Democra sch Appèl). From the mid-1960s onwards a process of depillariza on set in,
and electoral vola lity increased and party membership decreased in step with most
other Western European countries. By the 1990s, however, electoral instability in the
Netherlands was higher than in all other Western European countries, save Italy (Mair,
2008, 237-238; also see Table 6.1), making it a crucial case study.
Whereas electoral vola lity increased over me, the electoral system itself remained
quite stable (Van der Kolk, 2007, 271-273). Our focus is on the House of Representa-
ves, or Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer),4 which consists of 150 members (100 un l
1956) elected every four years via a system of Propor onal Representa on introduced
in 1917.5 During na onal elec ons voters are presented with a ballot paper displaying
lists of candidates as ordered by the poli cal par es, and cast their vote for an individual
candidate. The number of parliamentary seats obtained by a party is determined by the
total number of votes for the party’s candidates pooled na onwide. The electoral sys-
tem (which uses the Hare quota) is therefore quite open; the threshold for gaining access
to parliament for new and small par es is quite low, and the composi on of parliament
is very sensi ve to changes in the electorate (Andeweg, 2005). Indeed, Mair (2008) as-
cribes the increase in electoral vola lity to the fact that the openness of compe on
between par es was unable to constrain the electoral effects of the depillariza on, sec-
ulariza on and individualiza on of Dutch society.
The degree to which the electoral system is party-oriented is of special importance
with regard to party group unity. In order to obtain a seat on the basis of preference
votes a candidate for the Dutch Second Chamber must cross a threshold of 25 percent
(50 percent un l 1996) of the electoral quota. Andeweg and Van Holsteyn (2011) do de-
tect a trend in voters increasingly cas ng intra-party preferences votes (those not cast
for the party leader who is usually placed first on the list) between 1946 and 2012 (see
Table 6.1), but voters tend to select candidates who would have been elected on the
basis of their list posi on anyway. The number of candidates who obtain a seat in par-
liament on the basis of preference votes who would not have been elected on the basis
of their par es’ list ordering has increased since the change of the electoral quota thresh-
old in 1996, but is s ll limited to only one or two per elec on (see Table 6.2). Although
voters’ increased use of personal votes (which Rahat and Sheafer (2007) consider a form
of public behavioral personaliza on, see subsec on 2.4.2 in chapter 2) has been offered
4 The Dutch nomenclature differs from what is customary in the interna onal literature, where the Lower
House is called the First Chamber, and the Upper House is the Second Chamber.
5 In 1970 compulsory electoral vo ng was abolished, which led to a decrease in voter turnout.
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Table 6.2: MPs who entered the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on the basis
of preference votes who otherwise would have not have done so on the basis of their
list posi on and the number of votes obtained by their poli cal party 1946-2012
Elec on Party Name Votes (n)
1959 KVP Karel van Rijckevorsel 91,000
1972 KVP Dolf Hutschemaekers 27,900
1986 VVD Theo Joekes 250,000
1998 CDA Camiel Eurlings 24,000
CDA Annie Schreijer-Pierik 17,400
2002 ChristenUnie Tineke Huizinga-Heringa 19,800
2003 ChristenUnie Tineke Huizinga-Heringa 19,650
LPF Hilbrand Nawijn 21,200
2006 D66 Fatma Koşer Kaya 34,564
2010 D66 Pia Dijkstra 15,705
CDA Sabina Uitslag 15,933
2012 CDA Peter Omtzigt 36,750
Note: the number of votes are taken directly from the website of the Dutch Parliamentary Documenta on
Center (Parlement & Poli ek, 2015e).
as an explana on for decreases in party group unity from the perspec ve of the two-
arena model (VanWijnen, 2000, 449; Krouwel, 2003, 79), in the Netherlands voters’ use
of personal votes seems to be embedded within the choice for a party (which Andeweg
and Van Holsteyn (2011) term second-order personaliza on).
Thus, even though the Dutch list system is formally flexible, due to voters’ own be-
havior preference vo ng it is generally ineffec ve, which leads Mitchell (2000) to cate-
gorize the Dutch electoral system as party-centered. Associa on with the poli cal party
label is therefore important to candidates and since the order of the list is difficult to
overturn a candidate’s posi on on the list has significant consequences for his chances
of (re-)elec on (Marsh, 1985, 367). As an electoral strategy, an MP is be er off con-
vincing the party candidate selec on commi ee to grant him a high posi on on the list
than campaigning for preference votes amongst the electorate (Andeweg, 2005). On the
other hand, voters’ propensity to cast preference votes has increased over me,6 and
Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012, 177-178) show that MPs who do engage in individual
campaigns tend to obtain more preferences votes than MPs who do not engage in indi-
vidual campaigns, which indicates that preference votes campaigns can be effec ve in
influencing voters.
6 This, in combina on with the fact that the electoral system has become slightly more candidate-centered,
leads Karvonen (2010, 104) to categorize the Netherlands as mixed-posi ve in terms of personaliza on.
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6.2.2 The legisla ve arena
Cons tu onal & parliamentary rules
According to the one-arena model, MPs will act in concert regardless of changes in the
electoral arena if the cons tu onal and parliamentary rules give MPs be er access to
policymakingwhen they belong to a legisla ve bloc than if theywere to act alone. There
have been rela vely few changes to the Dutch cons tu onal and legisla ve rules over
me, entailing that any changes in party group unity are not likely to find their origins in
the legisla ve arena.
At first glance, the procedural advantages granted to party groups in the legisla ve
arena seem quite limited, and there are few formal constraints on individual MPs. The
Dutch cons tu on clearly favors individual MPs, as most legisla ve rights with regard to
policy making (such as the ini a on of both regular and roll call vo ng, the submission
of privatemember bills, amendments and resolu ons (mo es), and the asking of wri en
and oral ques ons) belong to the individualMP.MPs also formally votewithout a binding
mandate (ar cle 67.3),7 but as is the case in most legislatures, the Dutch cons tu on
requires that all decisions bemade bymajority vote (ar cle 67.2),8 meaning that in order
to be effec ve in terms of policy making, MPs need to cooperate with each other, which
is most likely to occur among MPs who belong to the same party group.
In contrast to many other European parliaments, there is li le formal regula on of
poli cal par es and their parliamentary caucuses (Lucardie et al., 2006, 126), and the
parliamentary party group is no more than a collec ve label for its individual MPs (An-
deweg, 2000, 98). In fact, there is no men on of poli cal par es in the Dutch cons tu-
on (Lucardie et al., 2006, 126; Van Biezen, 2008, 341; Van Biezen, 2012, 194; van Biezen
and Borz, 2012, 331, 337) nor are there are any special party laws, with the excep on of
those concerning party financing (Van Biezen, 2008, 341). Moreover, although in prac-
ce party groups have existed since the second half of the nineteenth century in the form
of ad hoc parliamentary clubs (Elzinga and Wisse, 1988), they were also absent from
the Second Chamber’s Standing Orders (Reglement van Orde van de Tweede Kamer der
Staten-Generaal) un l the 1960s. Since 1966, the Standing Orders define a PPG (frac-
e)9 as all Members of Parliament who were declared elected on the same electoral list
(ar cle 11.1). AnMP is, however, under no legal obliga on to give up his seat to his party
if he is expelled from, or voluntarily leaves, his parliamentary party group. SecededMPs
need only to no fy the Speaker of the House of their breakaway to be recognized as a
7 Un l the cons tu onal revision in 1983, MPs voted without both a binding mandate and consulta on. It
was, however, argued that this gave the impression that MPs were not allowed to consult their poli cal
party, their voters or other actors, which was considered an inaccurate reflec on of poli cal reality (Dölle,
1981). It can be argued, therefore, that this cons tu onal change was of limited impact on the rela onship
between MPs and their par es.
8 A double majority in both the upper and lower House is required when it comes to changing the cons tu-
ons.
9 Most party groups also have a board consis ng of around three MPs (depending on the size of the party
group), which is considered the party group leadership.
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separate parliamentary party group, and there is nominimumnumber of seats to qualify
as such.
There are, however, also a number of procedural advantages accorded to party groups
specifically. The funding that party groups receive to hire staff, as well as plenary speak-
ing me, and commi ee membership and chairs, are distributed roughly propor onal
to party group seat share, with special considera on for smaller party groups (Andeweg
and Irwin, 2014, 168-169). Once speaking me is distributed, party groups are le to
select their own spokespersons (Andeweg, 2000, 98). And although the Speaker of the
House is formally responsible for commi ee appointment and removal (ar cle 25), he
acts on the proposals of the party groups (Franssen, 1993, 28), and party group lead-
ers meet informally to discuss the distribu on of commi ee chairs (Döring, 2001, 41).
Thus policy spokesmanship and commi eemembership are in prac ce controlled by the
party group (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011b; Damgaard, 1995), and can be used by
party (group) leaders as posi ve and nega ve sanc ons to solve collec ve ac on prob-
lems among their members.
Parliamentary party group rules
Some par es have elaborate statutes and parliamentary party group standing orders
s pula ng rules concerningMPs’ behavior inside, but some mes also outside, of parlia-
ment. These rules also o en grant the party (group) leadership certain powers to solve
collec ve ac on problems among their members. According to the Standing Orders of
the Chris an Democra c CDA (2003, ar cle 82), for example, candidates are expected
to sign a document declaring their assent to the party program and electoral manifesto.
Similarly, in the Social Democra c party PvdA (2012, ar cle 14.10) all party representa-
ves are expected to commit themselves to promo ng and achieving the objec ves of
the party. In both par es, the parliamentary party group Standing Orders further s pu-
late that MPs are bound by the decisions made during the weekly party group mee ng,
even if they were not present at the mee ng. In most party groups the weekly parlia-
mentary party group mee ng, which all party representa ves are expected to a end,
is the highest party authority and most important decision-making arena. The mee ng
usually takes place at the beginning of the week and as a rule the discussions that take
place during these mee ngs stay behind closed doors.
In most par es, if an MP wants to depart from the party group line when vo ng in
parliament, he is expected to give due no ce. In the CDA (2003, ar cle 83) poten al can-
didates do so before they are even taken into considera on for nomina on in the form
of a gravamen, which entails that candidates register their ‘principled, insurmountable
conscien ous objec ons’ (Voerman, 2002, 43, transla on CvV) concerning specific parts
of the party’s electoral manifesto. However, according to the 1986 gravamen regula ons
(gravamenreglement), a gravamen cannot be used to stop the crea on or con nued sur-
vival of a government (Koole, 1992, 243-244) which arguably severely limits its u lity to
the individual MP. According to the PvdA’s Standing Orders, MPs are expected to inform
the other members of the party group at the weekly mee ng of their (preferably pre-
viously announced) disagreement with the party’s posi on before the vote takes place
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in parliament (Lucardie et al., 2006, 130). Lucardie et al. (2006, 132-133) note that in
GroenLinks, according to the party group communica ons officer, there is no formal re-
quirement of party group unity during vo ng, although the party group does admit to
try to reach unanimity prior to the vote as much as possible.
Some par es, such as the PvdA (2012, ar cle 1.22.12), the Liberal Democrats (D66)
(2002, ar cle 2.8.5.j), the GreenLe (GroenLinks) (2012, ar cle 28.3) and the Socialists
(SP) (2003, ar cle 15.1) require their representa ves to sign a document sta ng that they
will give up their seat if they are asked to do so. This may occur if an MP is reprimanded
by his party (group) (which may be a consequence of vo ng dissent) or if he voluntarily
leaves the parliamentary party group. The Standing Orders of the Liberal VVD (2009)
do not s pulate any such rules concerning the giving up of an MP’s seat. There are,
however, informal rules that call for the same procedure. When in 2006MPRita Verdonk
was reprimanded for cri cizing party leader Mark Ru e, for example, the poli cal party
board asked her to give up her seat in parliament or face expulsion from the poli cal
party. A er first being expelled from the parliamentary party group, she kept her seat
in parliament, and her party then ended her VVD membership (Benneker, 2007).
Some par es also try to control their MPs’ use of other individual parliamentary
rights. In the case of the CDA, PvdA and Social Chris an party (ChristenUnie), for ex-
ample, parliamentary ques ons, mo ons and amendments need to be put to the party
group at the weekly mee ng, or if pressed for me, to the party group leader or the
head of relevant internal commi ee, before they are introduced in parliament (Lucardie
et al., 2006, 129, 131; Van Schendelen, 1992, 80-81). The CDA and ChristenUnie also
regulate contact between individual MPs and the media, as do most party groups.
All in all, many of these internal party rules make up for the lack of procedural ad-
vantage granted to par es by the formal rules of the legislature (although one should
not underes mate the power of commi ee and spokesperson assignment). One could
argue that these internal party rules and prac ces are uncons tu onal given the individ-
ualMP’s freemandate (Andeweg, 2000, 99). And indeed, a poli cal party cannot take an
individual representa ve to court for not vo ng according to the party group line or leav-
ing the parliamentary party group without giving up his seat to his party. However, as
argued by Elzinga andWisse (1988, 184-189), an individual is allowed to voluntarily bind
himself to the formal and informal party rules. De jure,MPs are free to follow their own
opinion. De facto, however, MPs are poli cally and morally bound to follow the party
group line, and poli cal par es dominate the day-to-day life of MPs in parliament.10
6.3 Party group unity over me
According to the one-arena model, we would expect to see few changes over me in
terms of party group unity; althoughMPs in the Netherlands have quite a few individual
10 Elzinga and Wisse (1988), compare an MP’s mandate to an individual’s right to property; although the indi-
vidual has a right to property, he is free to voluntarily give up, or refrain fromexercising, that right. According
to Elzinga and Wisse (1988) the same principle holds for MPs and their personal mandate.
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rights, in prac ce party groups control commi ee membership and issue spokesman-
ship, and par es themselves have quite elaborate standings orders that aim to further
control the behavior of their MPs beyond the formal rules of parliament. Li le has
changed over the past decades in regard to the party groups’ procedural advantages
and the availability of tools to solve collec ve ac on problems within the parliamen-
tary arena. According to the two-arena model, however, MPs are predominantly vote-
seeking, and we would expect a decrease in party group unity as a result of an increase
in electoral vola lity and par san dealignment, regardless of par es’ procedural advan-
tages inside parliament. As in other countries (Karvonen, 2010), Dutch voters have in-
creased their use of second order preference votes, albeit that the number of MPs who
obtain a seat in parliament who would have not done so on the basis of their original list
posi on remains limited. Nonetheless, this does not precludeMPs from using strategies
(such as vo ng dissent) in an a empt to appeal to voters on an individual basis, which
form an impediment to party group unity. Below, we rely on two measures of party
group unity (party defec on and party vo ng unity) in order to ascertain whether there
have indeed been any changes over me.
6.3.1 Party group defec on
MPs’ early departure (i.e. before the next elec ons) from their parliamentary party
group is used as our first indicator of party group unity and MPs’ dissent (Owens, 2003).
Defec on takes place when anMP leaves parliament and thus automa cally gives up his
seat, which the na onal Electoral Council then offers to the next eligible person on the
MP’s party’s candidacy list from the previous elec on. According to the website of the
Dutch Parliamentary Documenta on Center (Parlement & Poli ek, 2015e) on average
around one-fi h of MPs (about 32) le parliament before elec ons per parliamentary
term between 1956 and 2012, of which about half (on average 16) did so because they
were appointed to government.11 For the other half it is difficult to ascertain what mo-
vated them to leave parliament early because the reasons officially forwarded (a job
offer elsewhere or personal circumstances, for example) may be used as a guise to cover
up factors related to party group unity. An MP may, for example, leave parliament vol-
untarily because he regularly finds himself at odds with the party group’s posi on, and
feels that he cannot be loyal despite disagreement. Recent examples of MPs who gave
up their seats to their party are PvdA MPs Désirée Bonis and Myrthe Hilkens, who in
2013 both took issue with their party group’s posi on in parliament, which they argued
was too heavily influenced by their party’s coali on agreement with the VVD.
AnMPmay also be pressured by his party to give up his seat, or in the most extreme
case, may be expelled from the party when in conflict. Although an MP is under no le-
gal obliga on to give up his seat when pressured or expelled, he may wish to honor the
(informal) party rule to do so. Some mes these conflicts between an MP and his party
11 In the Netherlands there is a strict division of roles, responsibility and membership between the execu ve
and parliamentary branch of government, and the posi on of (junior) minister is incompa ble with the
posi on of MP.
161
6.3. Party group unity over me
take place in the public sphere, but more o en they are kept out of the eyes of the pub-
lic, making it difficult to iden fy these cases. The Dutch Parliamentary Documenta on
Center (Parlement & Poli ek, 2015e) lists a total of 11MPs who le parliament early due
to a conflict with their party since 1956.12 In an earlier study of why Dutch na onal MPs
leave parliament,13 De Vos (1990, 42-43) finds that over half of the reasons forwarded
for departure related to anMPs work in the Second Chamber and party group. Of these,
only a few can be directly related to tensions between an MP and his party group when
it comes to party group unity, however.
AnMP can also defect fromhis party group but remain in parliament. Although in the
Netherlands it is an MP’s legal right to remain in parliament, he is likely to be accused
of seat robbery (zetelroof ). Theore cally, there are two types of defec on applicable
to the Dutch case that involve an MP remaining in parliament: an MP could form an
independent group, or he could switch to another party group.14 Most studies that deal
with party defec on focus on the la er (Owens, 2003, 18-20). In both cases, the fact that
the MP remains in parliament can be interpreted a sign of conflict with the party group
and therefore party group disunity, either due to intense and frequent disagreement
with the party posi on, lack of loyalty or the party’s applica on of sanc ons. In contrast
to an MP who gives up his seat to his party, an MP who remains in parliament does not
have his party’s best interest at heart, and ignores any internal party commitment he
may havemade pertaining to his seat. AnMP is likely to defect from his party group if he
considers the benefits (which may include a be er ideological fit,15 increased chances
of re-elec on, legisla ve perks or even a cabinet post) to be higher than if he were to
remain in his current party group, and if he perceives the transac ons costs of defec on
to be low (Desposato, 2006).
Heller and Mershon (2008, 910-911) also consider defec on a reac on to party dis-
cipline. If an MP votes against the party group line, or regularly finds himself (intensely)
at odds with the party group posi on, and this disagreement o en supersedes his loy-
alty to his party group, there is a good chance that he will face (the threat of) sanc ons,
including expulsion. In the case of expulsion, which par es are likely to only use as an
ul mum remedium, his defec on from the party group would be involuntary. Recent ex-
amples from the Dutch case include VVD member Rita Verdonk, who was expelled from
her party in 2007, and Louis Bontes’ expulsion from the right-wing PVV (Par j voor de
12 The basis for these figures is unknown and the categoriza on is somewhat unclear. For the year 2013, for
example, there are no cases listed under conflict. This means that the above men oned examples of PvdA
MPs Désirée Bonis andMyrthe Hilkens are likely to fall under either the category ‘health/personal’ or ‘other
reasons’.
13 A total of 104 MPs who le parliament were interviewed. These figures include MPs who, between 1972
and 1982, le parliament early, but also those who were not placed on the party’s electoral list, or those
who were selected but not elected, during the elec ons that followed (De Vos, 1990, 159-160).
14 According to Shabad and Slomczynski (2004), party switching (both within and between parliamentary
terms) can also be the result of ‘structural factors’, such as party dissolu ons, party splits and party mergers
(which all may be connected to intense party disunity).
15 Studies show that whenMPs switch par es they are likely to do sowithin the same ideological family (Heller
and Mershon, 2008).
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Vrijheid) party group in 2013. MPs may, however, also decide to ‘jump before they are
pushed’, i.e., leave the party group before they are expelled (Jones, 2002, 177).
Since the Second World War there have only been 42 instances of an individual or
group ofMPs (involving a total of 58MPs)who le and/orwere removed from their party
group and formed their own group in the Dutch parliament (see Table 6.3). Although the
total number of defec ons is quite low, it has increased over me. Whereas there was
only 1 (involving 4 MPs) case in the 1950s, there were 5 (6 MPs) in the 1990s, and 11
(12 MPs) in the first half of the 2010s. If we look more closely, however, we see that
this type of defec on usually occurs in new par es, represented in parliament for the
first or second me. Two of the par es to have recently gained representa on in parlia-
ment, the right-wing LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) and the PVV, experienced quite a number of
these defec ons, albeit for different reasons. Whereas the LPF lacked strong leadership
(its party leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated 9 days before the 2002 parliamentary
elec ons), resul ng in chaos in the party, the PVV is renowned for its strong leadership,
which seemed to backfire in the Spring and Summer of 2012 with the defec on of a
number of MPs who remained in parliament as independents. One and a half year later
three more MPs le the party group; Louis Bontes was expelled from the party group
for cri cizing the workings of the party group board, and both Ronald van Vliet and Jo-
ram van Klaveren defected in response to party leader Geert Wilders’ statements about
Dutch Moroccans made on the evening a er the municipal elec ons in 2014. Moving a
bit further into the past, the pensioners’ party AOV (Algemeen Ouderen Verbond), rep-
resented in parliament between 1994 and 1998, experienced quite a few splits. And in
the 1960s and 1970s, there were also a number of defec ons from the famers’ party BP
(Boerenpar j) as well.
Among the established par es in the Netherlands, however, party group defec on
did not occur very o en, each party having experienced defec on only two or three
mes over the en re period since the SecondWorld War. Thus, the changes in the elec-
torate, which include an increase in electoral vola lity, in combina on with the highly
propor onal and thus very open electoral system, do not seem to have affected the
unity of established par es (as measure by party group defec ons), but have increased
the number of defec ons through the introduc on of an increased number of new par-
es in the Dutch parliament. That this type of defec on usually occurs in new par es
may be the result of both the MPs, as well as the party organiza on as a whole, being
rela vely new to poli cs and parliament. MPswho are new to poli cs, and do not have a
history of party membership, are likely to be less socialized into the norm of party group
loyalty than MPs. And new poli cal par es probably have li le experience recrui ng
and selec ng candidates (and are likely do so quite has ly as most new par es com-
pile their electoral candidacy lists just before elec ons), which may lead to lower levels
of homogeneity in terms of the policy preferences of their MPs, which makes it more
likely that their MPs will frequently disagree with the party group’s posi on. Moreover,
it may also be that new par es are less effec ve at controlling the behavior of their MPs
through internal parliamentary party group rules.
By becoming an independent or forming an independent group an MP is freed from
the restric ons of belonging to a party group (depending on the size of the indepen-
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Table 6.3: Parliamentary party group defec ons in the Second Chamber of the Dutch
Parliament 1946-2015
Date MPs (n) Former party group Independent
14-04-1958 4 CPN Group-Gortzak
13-12-1966 1 Boerenpar j Group-Voogd
27-02-1968 3 KVP Group-Aarden
27-06-1968 4 Boerenpar j Group-Harmsen
12-12-1968 1 Group-Harmsen Group-Kronenburg
14-05-1970 2 PvdA Group-Goedhart
28-07-1970 1 PvdA Veenendaal-van Meggelen (joined Group-Goedhart)
09-02-1971 1 Boerenpar j Group-Verlaan
13-09-1971 1 NMP Group-De Jong
30-03-1976 1 CHU Group-Huijsen
22-06-1976 1 D’66 Group-Nooteboom
08-12-1983 2 CDA Group-Scholten/Dijkman
05-12-1984 1 Centrumpar j Group-Janmaat
23-04-1985 1 RPF Group-Wagenaar
18-04-1985 1 Group-Scholten/Dijkman Not applicable (Scholten joined PPR in parliament)
21-01-1986 1 PSP Group-Van der Spek
21-09-1993 1 PvdA Group-Ockels
11-10-1994 1 AOV Group-Hendriks
30-05-1995 2 AOV Group-Wingerden/Verkerk
06-09-1995 3 AOV Group-Nijpels
31-03-1998 1 Group-Wingerden/Verkerk Group-Verkerk
07-10-2002 2 LPF Group-De Jong
13-10-2002 1 LPF Group-Wijnschenk
03-02-2004 1 SP Group-Lazrak
03-09-2004 1 VVD Group-Wilders
23-06-2005 1 LPF Group-Nawijn
07-07-2006 1 LPF Group-van Oudenallen
16-08-2006 1 LPF Van As (joined Group-Nawijn)
11-09-2006 1 Group-Nawijn Group-Van As
06-09-2006 1 VVD Group-Van Schijndel
20-09-2006 1 LPF Eerdmans (joined Group-Van Schijndel)
14-09-2007 1 VVD Member-Verdonk
20-03-2012 1 PVV Member-Brinkman
03-07-2012 2 PVV Group-Kortenoeven/Hernandez
06-07-2012 1 PVV Member-Van Bemmel
29-10-2013 1 PVV Member-Bontes
21-03-2014 1 PVV Member-Van Vliet
22-03-2014 1 PVV Van Klaveren (joined Group-Bontes)
28-05-2014 1 50Plus 50Plus/Baay-Timmerman (returned to 50Plus)
06-06-2014 1 50Plus Member-Klein
13-11-2014 2 PvdA Group Kuzu-Öztürk
25-03-2015 1 VVD Member-Houwers
164
6.3. Party group unity over me
dent group). He also obtains rela vely be er access to parliamentary resources than
he had as a member of a (larger) party group because special considera on is given to
small party groups in the distribu on of finances to hire staff, plenary speaking me, and
commi ee membership and chairmanship. If the defec ng MP is on his own he also au-
toma cally becomes the party group chairman, which leads to an increase in salary.16
He will, however, s ll have to work together with other party groups in parliament in
order to a ain his own policy goals. Moreover, becoming an independent is not a wise
choice in terms of a future poli cal career. Many party defectors do end up crea ng new
par es which they enter into the next elec on,17 of which only a few have gained rep-
resenta on in parliament. In 2006 the MP Geert Wilders, who le the VVD in 2004 but
remained in parliament as an independent un l the next elec on, gained representa on
in parliamentwith his right-wing PVV, and has been present since. The green-progressive
PPR (Poli eke Par j Radikalen), which was created in 1968 by a number of MPs who had
split from the Catholic KVP, also had consistent representa on in parliament from 1971
un l 1989, when it first par cipated in elec ons under the flag of GroenLinks with the
le -socialist PSP (Pacifis sch Socialis sche Par j), the communist CPN (Communis sche
Par j van Nederland) and Chris an-progressive EVP (Evangelische Volkspar j). Usually,
however, the par es created by these independents are unsuccessful. That so many try
might also be explained by the electoral system, which is highly propor onal and affords
even par es with a small electoral support access to parliament (Nikolenyi and Shenhav,
2009).
When it comes to party switching, there are three instances of an MP joining an al-
ready exis ng independent group consis ng of MPs who had previously le the same
party, and one case of two MPs from different par es forming one independent group
(in 2006 LPFmember Joost Eerdmans joined Anton van Schijndel who had been expelled
from the VVD). There is, however, only one case of an MP switching to another estab-
lished parliamentary party group (i.e., a group of MPs declared elected on the same
electoral list) within the same parliamentary term. Stef Dijkman entered parliament as
a representa ve of the CDA in 1982 and joined the Poli cal Party of Radicals (Poli eke
Par j Radikalen, PPR) party group in 1985. His switch was not direct, however, as he
first formed an independent party group with Jan-Nico Scholten (who had also le the
CDA) for two years before joining the PPR party group. Generally, poli cal par es in
the Netherlands are weary of accep ng and promo ng MPs who sat in parliament for
another party, especially within the same parliamentary term.18
16 Parliamentary party group chairmen (frac evoorzi ers) receive an addi onal 1 percent of the compensa on
afforded to regular MPs, plus an addi onal 0.3 percent per member of their party group (Parlement &
Poli ek, 2015a).
17 Although it is possible to start a new party while in parliament as an independent group or member, the
independent group or member is not referred to by the name of the new party in the parliament. The new
party must be formed outside of parliament and par cipate in elec ons and win its own seats in order to
obtain the formal status of a parliamentary party group.
18 There are only a few cases of MPs who leave parliament as a member of one party and return as a repre-
senta ve of another a er elec ons. Margot Kranenveldt-van der Veen, for example, gave up both her seat
and party membership of the center-right LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) in the summer of 2006, and returned to
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While in the compara ve literature party defec on is o en considered to be mo -
vated by MPs’ (electoral) ambi ons, it is ques onable whether party defec on in the
Netherlands fits into this mold. Party group switching within parliament is very rare be-
cause established par es generally do not accept MPs from other par es, and forming
an independent group may involve some short term legisla ve perks, but usually en-
tails the end of the MP’s (na onal) poli cal career. Thus, in terms of an MP’s (poli cal
career) ambi ons, he is be er off staying in his party, or leaving parliament voluntarily
if the conflict with his party group becomes severe. An MP who does defect but stays
in parliament, apparently feels that he is serving his voters (or his purse for the short
term), or represen ng a par cular group of party members, by staying in parliament as
an independent. The fact that the number of individual or groups of MPs who le their
party group but stayed in parliament as independents has increased over me means,
however, that parliament is not insulated from changes in the electoral arena. But it is
not the case that the party group unity (as measured by party group defec ons) of the
established par es has suffered as a result of the changes in the electorate. Instead, the
increase in electoral vola lity in the rela vely open Dutch electoral systems has resulted
in an increase in the number of new par es that, likely as a result of their newness to
poli cs and their lack of an ins tu onalized party organiza on, are more likely to expe-
rience party defec ons.
6.3.2 Party group vo ng
Vo ng procedures
As men oned above, in the Dutch parliament most decisions are taken by simple ma-
jority vote (Cons tu on of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, ar cle 67.2). Vo ng is an-
nounced on the agendawhich is published ahead of me asmuch as possible, and in the
Second Chamber nowadays usually takes place on Tuesdays a er the weekly ques on
hour. In order to ensure that vo ng is valid, the Speaker of the House only opens the
plenary mee ng of the day whenmore than half of the 150MPs are signed in as present
in parliament’s building.
According to the Second Chamber’s Standing Orders, vo ng need only take place
if one or more MPs (including the Speaker, who is a vo ng member) ask that it do so
(ar cle 69.1 and 69.4). In prac ce, however, the members of the Presidium Commi ee
implicitly exercise their right asMPs to request that vo ng take place when they compile
the plenary agenda.19 The Speaker can also propose that decisions be taken without a
vote (ar cle 69.4). This is referred to as the gavel (hamerslag) procedure: the Speaker
makes a statement which is registered in the parliamentary records and the proposal is
acceptedwith a knock of the gavel (Wolters, 1984, 182-183). Before the knock, individual
MPs and party groups may request that the parliamentary records show that they were
parliament the following year as a representa ve for the PvdA.
19 The Presidium commi ee consists of a number of MPs from different party groups, including the Speaker
and Deputy Speakers.
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against the decision, ensuring that their opposing posi on is registered. If this happens,
the proposal is assumed to be accepted with the support of the other members who are
present. The gavel procedure is primarily used for proceduralma ers and for substan ve
ma ers if the opposing minority is considered to be small.20
There are two vo ng procedures parliament can follow: regular or roll call vo ng
(ar cles 69.3 and 70.1).21 For a regular vote the MPs who are present on the floor cast
their vote by a showof hands and do so on behalf of all themembers of their party group;
the number of MPs physically present on the floor is not counted (Tweede Kamer der
Staten-Generaal website, 2015a). Un l 1969 the parliamentary records did not register
the vo ng posi on of party groups, but onlymen oned the outcome of the vote and the
names of individual MPs who explicitly requested that their posi on be recorded (which
for a regular vote is necessary if an MP wishes to dissent from his party group’s posi on
posi on).22 Since 1969, the rule is that the parliamentary records register the posi on
of each individual party group as well (Wolters, 1984, 183).23 This prac ce is evidence
that party group unity in the Dutch parliament is quite high, as the procedures by default
assumes that party representa ves vote in unison.
In a roll call vote each individual MP verbally announces his posi on (aye or nay)
(ar cle 70.4). As the vote takes place at the individual level, the number ofMPsphysically
present on the floor for the vote is important tomeet the quorum for the vote to be valid
(more than half of the 150 MPs need to be present) and for the outcome of the vote.
The Speaker will some mes adjourn the mee ng and let the division bell in the building
sound again in order for more MPs to make their way to the plenary hall, even allowing
me for par es to rally their troops from outside the building if necessary. The Speaker
may also close the mee ng and call a new mee ng at a later me (ar cle 70.5). A roll
call can also be also requested when the results of a vote taken by the show of hands
procedure are unclear, as long as the request comes before the Speaker accepts the vote
(with a knock of the gavel) (ar cle 70.2).
Before 1887, roll call vo ng was formally required for all parliamentary decisions.
But already in 1851, the Speaker implemented the gavel procedure men oned above
20 Because strictly speaking vo ng does not take place during the gavel procedure, these votes are not included
in the analysis. If these were included this would most likely result in higher party group vo ng unity scores.
21 Wri en (and thus secret) vo ng is a third procedure vo ng, which is usedwhenparliament votes on appoint-
ments (ar cles 74 to 86). This prac ce is, for example, nowadays used for the appointment of the Speaker
of the House, for which it was first used in 2002 with the elec on of Frans Weisglas (VVD) as Speaker.
22 For the years before party group posi ons were registered in the parliamentary records (Handelingen der
Staten-Generaal) vo ng posi ons were inferred from party groups’ (MPs’ posi ons taken in the earlier de-
bate. One drawback of this method is that it does not take into account that party groupsmay have changed
their posi on between the debate and the vote, without affec ng the outcome of the decision. This is quite
unlikely, however.
23 Both the gavel procedure and the regular vo ng procedure are usually categorized as anonymous vo ng in
compara ve studies on parliamentary vo ng procedures (Saalfeld, 1995, 532-533). Since 1969, however,
the parliamentary records include the posi ons of party groups for regular votes, thus making the posi ons
of party groups public. Furthermore, individual MPs’ can request that their vote be registered, meaning
that MPs can make their own posi on public if they wish to do so.
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(Pippel, 1950, 364), presumably to save me. This prac ce was formalized in the con-
s tu on of 1887, with the inclusion of the clause that vo ng takes place if requested by
any one MP. When exactly the prac ce of regular vo ng was implemented is unclear. In
an earlier publica on on the workings of parliament, Van Raalte (1959, 190) men ons
that the method of rising in place, which cons tuted the ‘regular’ vo ng procedure at
the me and is referred to as chamber gymnas cs (kamergymnas ek),24 was used only
sporadically un l the increase in the number of parliamentary seats from 100 to 150 in
1956, which made the use of the roll call vo ng procedure even more me-consuming
than before.25 The method of rising in place was formalized as the regular vo ng pro-
cedure in the Second Chamber’s Standing Orders in 1967 (Wolters, 1984), and was itself
formally replaced by the show of hands procedure in 1983.
The parliamentary records (Handelingen der Staten-Generaal) include almost 60,000
substan ve ma ers that were put to a vote between 1946 and 2010, including amend-
ments (31 percent), bills (8 percent) and mo ons (56 percent). The changes in vo ng
procedures described above in part can account for the decrease in the number and rel-
a ve share of roll call votes between 1946 and 2010: in the earlier parliamentary terms,
around half of all votes were taken by roll call (see Table 6.6). In total, however, only
about 1,750 votes (3 percent of all votes) were taken by roll call since the first elec on
a er the Second World War, out of which 1,107 took place before the formaliza on of
the method of rising in place in 1967, and a total of 1,464 before 1983 when the show of
hands procedure was implemented. Since then, the percentage share of roll call votes
per parliamentary term dropped to around one percent or less, although in absolute
terms, the number of roll call votes taken per parliamentary term increased again slightly
since the second half of the 1990s.
A word on absence
As men oned in chapter 3, absten on and absenteeism (non-vo ng) are generally ig-
nored in studies of party group unity (but see Carey (2007, 2009) for excep ons). Ab-
sten on is formally not possible when vo ng in the Dutch parliament. MPs can implicitly
abstain by not showing up in parliament or a vo ng session, or by leaving the floor dur-
ing a par cular vote (Bovend’Eert and Kummeling, 2010, 526). This type of ‘absten on’
is o en of a symbolic nature: an MP may not agree with his party group’s posi on on
a par cular vote, but not disagree enough to actually vote against his group, or may
even have been requested by his party group to leave the floor rather than publicly vote
against the party line.26 For a vote held by the regular show of hands procedure these
purposive absences have no effect on the end result because the MPs who are present
24 This is s ll the official procedure in the Dutch Senate (Eerste Kamer) (Bovend’Eert and Kummeling, 2010,
526).
25 Bovend’Eert and Kummeling (2010, 528) note that a roll call vote takes between six and eight minutes. This
does not include the me it takes for MPs to make their way to the floor.
26 It is, however, difficult to dis nguish between symbolic absenteeism and absence brought about by, for
example, MPs who leave the floor to a end to a phone call or visit the restroom.
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on the floor are held to vote for all the members of their party group, and vo ng is regis-
tered per party group. For roll call votes, however, absences can influence the end result
of a vote, since amajority of the total number ofMPs signed in as present in the building
is required for the vote to pass.27
Some mes roll call votes are requested purposelywhen the absence ofMPs is known
to other party groups. In 1994 during the forma on of the first Purple coali on, for
example, the opposi on par esGroenLinks, VVD andD66 asked for a roll call on amo on
that prohibited the caretaker Minister of Internal Affairs (Ed van Thijn, PvdA) and the
caretakerMinister of Jus ce (Ernst Hirsch Ballin, CDA) to con nue their involvementwith
the Interregional Criminal Inves ga on Team (Interregionaal Rechercheteam, IRT) for
the remainder of the cabinet forma on period (Boom and Voorn, 1994). That evening, a
number of MPs were par cipa ng in the filming of the amusement program ‘Star Ba le’
(Sterrenslag) and were called back to parliament for the vote. Of the MPs who were on
the set of the TV program, two VVDMPs, Robin Linschoten and Anne Lize van der Stoel,
and one from GroenLinks, Marijke Vos, did manage to make it to parliament in me for
the vote. The PvdA MPs Henk Vos and Evan Rozenblad, however, arrived in parliament
a er the vote had already taken place. The mo on was accepted (61 against 59 votes)
and led to the resigna on of both caretaker ministers.
Absence during roll call vo ng can further be used to stall for me. In 1955, for
example, the Communist party was able to prevent a vote from taking place by first
reques ng a roll call vote, and then having all its MPs stand behind the green curtain at
the back of the plenary hall, thereby ensuring that the vote could not take place because
the quorum of MPs for the vote to be valid was not met (Van Raalte, 1959, 189). A more
recent example is that of the PVV in 2012, when its party leader GeertWilders requested
a roll call vote because he wanted to delay vo ng on the European Stability Mechanisms
(ESM) pending a court case (NOS, 2012). There are, however, very few cases of recorded
absences during roll call votes. This might indeed be because absenteeism is used to
stop a vote from taking place by not mee ng the necessary quota (and therefore there
is no record of the vote), or MPs might not even sign in to parliament on the day they
plan to symbolically abstain. Both seem unlikely to occur frequently, however.
Of all votes included in the data set based on the parliamentary records, there are
about 1,000 recorded absences. Of these absences, 90 percent were recorded during
a single parliamentary term (1982-1986). Those mainly responsible for these absences
during that period are Hans Janmaat (40 percent), who was the only representa ve for
the Center Party (Centrumpar j), the independent Jan-Nico Scholten (25 percent) and,
to a lesser extent, Cathy Ubels (12 percent) from the Chris an-progressive EVP (Evan-
gelische Volkspar j) and Gert Schu e (12 percent) from the Orthodox Protestant GVP
(Gereformeerd Poli ek Verbond). As a rule, therefore, absences that are recorded are a
characteris c of small party groups consis ng of only one, occasionally two, MPs. This
makes sense since if these MPs are not present on the plenary floor themselves there is
27 There are also cases of the informal prac ce of ‘pairing’ between government and opposi on MPs who
cannot be present in parliament during a roll call vote. It is, however, not possible to ascertain whether
pairing occurred during a par cular vote because there is no formal record of the prac ce.
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no one to cast a vote for their part group, and therefore the parliamentary records show
that they (and their en re party group) are absent. As parliamentary party groups con-
sis ng of only one member are not included in the calcula on of party group unity and
dissent scores below (because there is always perfect party group unity in a group con-
sis ng of only one representa ve), absenteeism can safely be ignored for the purpose
of this study.
Frequency of MPs’ dissent
Previous studies on vo ng in the Dutch Second Chamber, of which there are only a few,
show that party vo ng unity is high, even near complete (Andeweg and Thomassen,
2011a, 4). One of the earliest analyses of roll call votes was conducted by Tazelaar
(1974) who covered the end of the period of pillariza on, and es mated that for the
six largest par es during the De Jong Cabinet (1967-1971) party group unanimity varied
between 92 and 98 percent (cited in Wolters, 1984, 183). Visscher (1994) also looked at
party group unity in the period between 1963 and 1986, and concluded that although
there was slightly higher disunity during the Den Uyl Cabinet (1973-1977), unity was al-
most complete during the rest of the period, especially in the larger parliamentary party
groups. Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 658) provide informa on on vo ng between
1998 and 2008. During this period parliament voted a total of 14,532 mes out of which
there were only 67 votes (0.46 percent) in which at least one MP (1.37 on average) de-
viated from the party group line.
Table 6.4 shows the percentage of votes in which at least one MP voted differently
than the majority of his party group, for all groups combined (excluding those with only
one seat) in each parliamentary term since the first elec on a er the Second World
War.28 On average, dissent occurs quite infrequently in the Dutch parliament; in less
than 1percent of all votes did at least oneMPvote against his party group. The frequency
of dissent also decreased over me. Star ng at around 8 percent in the 1946-1948 par-
liamentary term, the frequency of dissent increased slightly during the parliamentary
terms in the first half of the 1960s, but dropped to around 2 percent at the start of the
1970s, and con nued to decrease to even less than 0.1 percent as of the end of the
1990s.
The average frequency of dissent is higher for the roll call votes (about 8 percent)
than regular votes (less than 1 percent). For roll call votes, there are two noteworthy
outliers. During the 1963-1967 term at least one MP deviated from the party group line
in 21 percent of the 127 roll call votes held. Roll call vote dissent occurred most fre-
quently in three par es during this term: the KVP (43 mes), the ARP (25 mes) and
PvdA (22 mes) (not shown in Table 6.4). The KVP managed to bring down two gov-
ernments led by prime ministers from its own party during that period. The first, the
28 There is no sta s cally significant rela onship between the types of proposals (amendments, bills or mo-
ons) and party vo ng unity, therefore the analysis below only focuses on the differences between the
method of vo ng, regular and roll call. Furthermore, four percent of proposal types are unknown, and
there are a few votes that took place for which the method of vo ng is unknown. These are excluded from
the analysis.
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Table 6.4: Percentage of votes inwhich party group unitywas not complete in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010 (%)
Start term Par es (n) All votes (n) Regular votes (n) Roll call votes (n)
1946 7 8.3 88 0.6 1 9.8 87
1948 8 5.2 202 3.5 51 6.2 151
1952 8 5.2 196 2.6 60 8.2 136
1956 7 6.5 106 3.3 27 9.9 79
1959 8 10.0 189 5.0 40 13.8 149
1963 10 8.2 166 3.7 35 21.0 131
1967 11 2.5 363 1.8 239 7.2 124
1971 14 2.2 152 1.8 119 11.3 33
1972 14 2.6 746 2.3 640 7.6 106
1977 11 0.7 226 0.7 211 5.7 12
1981 10 0.4 32 0.4 32 0.0 0
1982 12 0.2 95 0.2 89 5.5 6
1986 9 0.3 40 0.2 31 18.8 9
1989 9 0.2 77 0.3 75 2.6 2
1994 12 0.2 76 0.1 57 4.0 19
1998 9 0.1 47 0.1 42 1.0 5
2002 10 0.1 14 0.0395 4 6.8 10
2003 9 0.1 78 0.1 69 2.3 9
2006 10 0.0159 12 0.0133 10 0.6 2
2010 10 0.0078 5 0.0 0 1.1 5
Mean / total 10 0.6 2,910 0.4 1,832 7.6 1,078
χ² (1) = 12376.290, sig. = .000; φ = -.157 sig. = .000
(total votes, regular versus roll call)
Marijnen Cabinet, fell because of inter-party and intra-party disagreement about the
government’s public broadcas ng policy and adver sement revenues from public chan-
nels (Van der Heiden, 2010).29 The Cals Cabinet, which was formed near the end of
1965, was brought down by its own party group leader Norbert Schmelzer during the
1966 parliamentary budget debates (Algemene Beschouwingen), when he introduced a
mo on asking the government to take addi onal measure to decrease government ex-
penditure. The mo on was interpreted as a mo on of no confidence by Prime Minister
Jo Cals, who resigned that same evening (known as the ‘Night of Schmelzer’) (Van Kessel,
29 The mo on-Baeten, introduced by a KVP MP, called the Marijnen Cabinet to make haste in making its posi-
on on the ma er public, which indirectly led to the fall of the Cabinet (Van der Heiden, 2010, 155-166).
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Table 6.5: Percentage of votes inwhich party group unitywas not complete in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD averages only (%)
Party All votes (n) Regular votes (n) Roll call votes (n)
CDA* 2.1 1,366 1.2 720 13.9 646
PvdA 1.0 557 0.7 373 10.5 184
VVD** 0.6 331 0.3 182 8.5 149
* Figures before 1977 include vo ng by the CDA’s predecessors, the ARP, CHU and KVP.
** Figures before 1948 include vo ng by the VVD’s predecessor, the PvdV (Par j van de Vrijheid).
2010). In both cases, the KVP parliamentary party group leadership turned against the
government’s posi on, forcing MPs to choose between the two.
Over the en re me period, the KVP is the party that suffered from the most fre-
quent dissent during roll call votes. Dissent by at least one KVP MP occurred 278 mes
between 1946 and 1977, the year that the party first par cipated in elec ons under
the flag of the CDA together with the ARP and the CHU. This may, in part, account for
the high percentage in the frequency of dissent in the CDA over the en re period (13.9
percent, see Table 6.5) which includes the dissent within its predecessors. If only the
parliamentary periods a er the electoral merger of the three Chris an par es in 1977
are included, the frequency of dissent during roll call votes for the CDA drops to 7.6 per-
cent (6.3 percent for the PvdA and 3.4 percent for the VVD a er 1977, not shown in
Table 6.5), totaling 20 cases of dissent, of which 11 occurred during the first period a er
the electoral fusion.
A final noteworthy outlier shown in Table 6.4 is that during the 1986-1989 term there
was dissent in almost 19 percent of roll call votes. Only nine roll call votes were held in
total, however. Of these nine votes, MPs from the CDA and D66 did not vote in uni-
son on one vote each, the PvdA did not vote as a unified bloc on three votes and the
members of the VVD did not vote together on four votes. One of the issues that led
to disunity in the PvdA and VVD was the con nua on of the state-paid pension to the
families of former MPs, brought about by the controversial case of the ‘black widow’,
Florrie Rost van Tonningen-Heubel, whose husband had been an MP for the Na onalist-
Socialist movement (Na onaal-Socialis sche Beweging, NSB) before the Second World
War.
In sum, the percentage of votes for which at least one MP voted differently from the
majority of his party group is quite low, entailing that dissent occurs quite infrequently in
the Dutch parliament. Moreover, the frequency of dissent has actually decreased over
me, which is not what would be expected if the changes in the electoral arena had
affected MP behavior in the legisla ve arena as predicted by the two-arena model.
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Rice scores
The most common party group unity score is the Rice score, named a er Stuart Rice
(1925), which is calculated per party group (i) per vote (j) by taking the absolute differ-
ence in the percentage of votes for and votes against. The Rice score can range from 0
(when an equal number of MPs from the same party group vote Aye and Nay, in other
words, the party is split on the vote) to 100 (all MPs from the same party group vote the
same).
RICEij =
|%Ayeij − %Nayij |
%Ayeij + %Nayij
As suspected, party group unity has always been high in the Netherlands, with the
average Rice scores for all votes star ng out at 96.32 percent during the 1946-1948 par-
liamentary term, and averaging at 99.81 percent for the en re period (see Table 6.6).
One can s ll detect an increase in party group unity, however, as at the end of the 1960s
party group unity for all votes increased to above 99 percent, a er which it con nued to
increase, reaching over 99.99 percent in the latest term inves gated (2006-2010). The
only poli cal party to go below 99.90 percent since the turn of the century is the LPF
(99.78 percent in 2002-2003 and 99.88 percent 2003-2006, not shown in Table 6.6).
When it comes to regular votes, new and small party groups have rela vely low Rice
scores. The party with the lowest Rice score for regular votes (85.11 percent) is the
NMP (Nederlandse Middenstandspar j), a party aimed at represen ng the interests of
business owners and entrepreneurs, which was only in parliament for one short term
between 1971 and 1972. The party group consisted of two MPs of whom one (De Jong)
defected and becamean independent in 1971 (see Table 6.3). The le -socialist PSP (Paci-
fis sch Socialis sche Par j) comes second in terms of the lowest Rice score for regular
votes, scoring 92.53 percent in its first parliamentary term in 1959-1963, and together
with the Reformed SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Par j) (97.31 percent, three seats)
and the communist CPN (Communis sche Par j van Nederland) (95.50 percent, three
seats) pulls down the average for the 1959-1963 parliamentary period. (Interes ngly,
these three par es score the highest Rice scores for roll call votes during this period.)
Star ng in the 1977-1981 period, no party group, large or small, has scored below 99.76
percent for regular votes (not shown in Table 6.6). Thus, although the introduc on of
more new par es, which could be ascribed to the increase in electoral vola lity and par-
san dealignment, has led to an increase in the number of MPs who leave their party
but stay in parliament since the 2000s (see subsec on 6.3.1), it does not seem to have
had an effect on party group vo ng unity.
There is a sta s cally significant difference in average party group unity between
roll call and regular votes. Over the en re period, party group unity averaged 97.06
percent for all roll call votes and 99.89 percent for all regular votes. The difference is
greatest during the 1986-1989 period, the only me when the average Rice score for
all party groups combined dipped below 90 percent for roll call votes (of which there
were 8 that period). D66 (93.75 percent), the PvdA (79.87 percent) and the VVD (65.00
percent) score their lowest average Rice score for roll call votes in this period, the VVD’s
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Table 6.6: Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament
1946-2010 (Rice score)
Start term Par es (n) All votes (n) Regular votes (n) Roll call votes (n)
1946 7 96.3215 162 99.8918 24 95.6484 138
1948 8 97.8546 587 98.5462 210 97.4426 377
1952 8 97.9735 526 98.9185 289 96.6750 237
1956 7 97.8219 234 98.9612 114 96.6442 120
1959 8 96.2602 256 97.9663 102 94.9957 154
1963 10 96.9950 236 98.8805 105 95.3674 131
1967 11 99.2239 1,187 99.4835 1,034 97.2668 153
1971 14 99.2463 588 99.4141 562 95.3699 26
1972 14 99.1685 2,247 99.2769 2,137 96.9910 110
1977 11 99.8671 4,629 99.8807 4,589 98.2127 40
1981 10 99.9288 806 99.9283 802 100.0000 4
1982 12 99.9679 5,953 99.9733 5,941 97.2676 12
1986 9 99.9140 2,644 99.9494 2,636 88.2493 8
1989 9 99.9669 4,255 99.9674 4,244 99.7852 11
1994 12 99.9508 4,078 99.9678 4,033 98.2537 45
1998 9 99.9831 5,054 99.9838 4,995 99.9120 59
2002 10 99.9668 952 99.9951 937 98.0039 15
2003 9 99.9763 5,933 99.9792 5,890 99.5749 43
2006 10 99.9981 7,541 99.9982 7,505 99.9627 36
2010 10 99.9985 6,304 100.0000 6,256 99.7911 48
Mean / total n 10 99.8163 54,172 99.8973 52,405 97.0630 1,767
F-test = 45,868.456 (sig. = .000);
t-test (df = 14,243.430) = 26.449 (sig. = 000)
(total votes, regular versus roll call votes means, equal variance not assumed)
score being the lowest average party group unity score for roll call votes in the Dutch
parliament in the en re period under study. The CDA’s score on roll call votes in 1986-
1989 period (91.00 percent) also comes close to its lowest score (89.69 percent in 1977-
1981, the first parliamentary term a er its electoral fusion) (not shown in Table 6.6). If
the CDA’s and VVD’s predecessors are included in the calcula on of its average Rice score
for the en re period since the first elec on a er the end of the SecondWorld War, their
party group unity scores are pulled down (see the bo omof Table 6.6). If only the period
a er the electoral fusion of the CDA in 1977 is considered, the party group unity scores
of the three largest par es is well above 99 percent for roll call votes (99.94 for both the
CDA and the PvdA, and 99.96 for the VVD).
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Table 6.7: Average party group unity in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament
1946-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (Rice score)
Party All votes (n) Regular votes (n) Roll call votes (n)
CDA* 99.3626 66,192 99.7294 61,556 94.4926 4,636
PvdA 99.8099 54,157 99.8976 52,404 97.1905 1,753
VVD** 99.8236 53,995 99.9301 52,404 96.6356 1,751
* Figures before 1977 include vo ng by the CDA’s predecessors, the ARP, CHU and KVP.
** Figures before 1948 include vo ng by the VVD’s predecessor, the PvdV.
At first glance, the difference in party group unity between regular and roll call votes
does seem to hint that roll call votes are requested strategically when MPs or party
groups suspect disunity in other groups, as suggested by Depauw and Mar n (2009).
When one looks closely at the parliamentary records, however, it is o en the Speaker
of the House who asks for the vote to take place by roll call. This request by the Speaker
usually coincides with a prior debate in which it is clear that there are MPs who wish
to vote differently from the other members of their party group, or immediately a er a
regular vote has already taken place for which the result is unclear. These differences in
vo ng unity between regular and roll call votes provides evidence for the claim by Car-
rubba et al. (2008) and Hug (2010) that relying only on roll call votes to gauge party group
unity may lead to selec on biases. Most important for the study at hand, however, is
the finding that in terms of their Rice-scores on both regular and roll call votes, par es’
vo ng unity is very high in the Dutch parliament, and has actually increased over me.
Number of dissen ng MPs
Table 6.8 the depth of dissent, i.e., the number of MPs who vote differently from the
majority of their party group (Kam, 2009), per parliamentary term. Dissent is usually
limited to oneMP, and the general trend is that the depth of dissent also decreased over
me. Whereas the depth of dissent for roll call votes was highest in the terms before
1971, for regular votes dissent was deepest during the terms between 1967 and 1977.
Over the en re period, the cases of deepest dissent occurred in the KVP, with 48
cases of six or more MPs dissen ng on regular votes in the period before 1977, and 85
cases of six or more MPs vo ng against the party group on roll call votes (not shown
in Table 6.8). Of the la er, 38 occurred in the 1972-1977 parliamentary term, during
which the KVP par cipated in government together with the ARP, PvdA, PPR and D66.
The KVP and ARP had, however, already commi ed themselves to forma on of the CDA
with the CHU, which was le out of the cabinet. Whereas the PvdA and D66 considered
the cabinet to be a parliamentary cabinet (which entails that there is a detailed coali on

























































































































































































































































































































































































































6.3. Party group unity over me
party groups), the Chris an par es ARP and KVP viewed the Den Uyl Cabinet as extra-
parliamentary (because there was no real coali on agreement, but a coali on program
to which the parliamentary party groups were not bound) (Parlement & Poli ek, 2015b,
2015c).
In this first parliamentary term a er the electoral list fusion of the Chris an par es
1977, dissent occurred both frequently and deeply in CDA party group, with in total
almost 100 cases of dissent (86 during regular vo ng and 11 during roll call) of which
there were 24 occurrences of more than six MPs dissen ng (18 on regular votes and six
roll call votes) (not shown in Table 6.8). During the 1980s, the frequency and depth of
dissent in the CDA subsided. Since the 1990s, the CDA has joined the VVD as one of the
two (large) par es with the deepest dissent.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the depth of dissent is very limited in the
Dutch parliament. The deepest case of dissent has involved the PvdA party group.30
In 2003, four PvdA MPs voted against their party group’s posi on that favored send-
ing troops to Iraq. Several PvdA MPs also voted against their party’s posi on on the
introduc on of an automa c organ donor registra on system. A recent outlier is the
2003-2006 parliamentary term, during which there were a total of 69 cases of dissent
(including those in the PvdA men oned above). 18 of these cases occurred in the rela-
vely young and troubled LPF, which suffered from a few party group defec ons as well
(see subsec on 6.3.1). Finally, VVD MP Stef Blok was responsible for six of these recent
cases of dissent because he repeatedly voted against his party group on the day that the
final report ‘Building Bridges’ (Bruggen slaan) of the parliamentary commi ee inves -
ga ng the integra on of ethnicminori es in the Netherlands was voted on in parliament
in 2004. Stef Blok was the chairman of the commi ee.
Finally, whereas dissent by one or two MPs is, if it occurs, generally a characteris c
of large par es in the Dutch parliament, party groups spli ng on a vote (when half the
party votes yea and the other half votes nay) is a characteris c of small par es with
fewer than six legisla ve seats (not shown Table 6.8 ). The CHU, a medium sized party,
the seat number of which ranged from eight to thirteen between 1946 and 1977, also
managed to split on twelve roll call votes. All in all, however, the number of MPs who
dissent is usually limited, and the number of cases in which more than one MP dissents
from the majority of his party group has decreased over me.
The descrip ve sta s cs above show that party group unity in the Netherlands has
not only remained strong over me, but that it has actually increased in strength. There
are very few cases of MPs leaving their party but remaining in parliament (we can say
li le about those who le parliament, however), and although there seems to be an in-
crease in the number of party group defec ons over me, these defec ons have gener-
ally been limited to a number of new par es represented in parliament since the 2000s.
We see this same pa ern in terms of the difference between new and established par-
es in party groups’ Rice scores, albeit that the pa ern is limited to an earlier period
in me; since the end the 1970s, party group unity has almost always been above 99.9
30 Overall the PvdA comes in second in terms of the depth of dissent over the en re period of study, with 46
roll call and 85 regular votes in which more than six MPs dissented.
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percent, and both the frequency and depth of dissent have decreased over me.
6.4 Expecta ons
Given our findings above, it would seem that the legisla ve arena is insulated from
changes in the electoral arena, since electoral vola lity and par san dealignment seem
to have had li le effect on party group unity in terms of defec ons and legisla ve vot-
ing, especially when it comes to established par es. It could also be that the changes in
the electorate have affected some of the pathways to party group unity (i.e., the legisla-
ve arena is not insulated from the electoral arena), but that party groups’ procedural
advantages within the legislature are strong enough to elicit party group unity anyway.
From the perspec ve of poli cal par es, however, one could argue that relying solely
on the rules in the legisla ve arena would be a risky strategy. It seems more likely that
par es have ac vely takenmeasures, in both the legisla ve and electoral arena, to coun-
teract the effects of electoral vola lity and par san dealignment on theirMPs’ legisla ve
behavior. Taking the perspec ve of ‘par es as organiza ons’, we hypothesize how par-
es have tried to strengthen each of the pathways to party group unity, and thus influ-
ence the associated MP decision-making algorithm that is central to this book. We then
test these expecta ons using the 1972, 1978, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary
Studies, and the Dutch data from the 2010 Par Rep survey.
6.4.1 Division of labor
Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) contend that cue-taking is encouraged by the Dutch
parliament’s specialized commi ee system. As men oned above, commi ee member-
ship is distributed propor onally to party groups (with special considera on paid to
smaller party groups), and thus within each party group MPs specialize in, and/or act
as spokespersons for, the issue areas dealt with in their parliamentary commi ee(s).
Larger party groups usually also have their own internal system of commi ees, o en
mirroring those in parliament. This entails, however, that MPs are more likely to rely on
their fellow party group members for vo ng advice when it comes to issues outside of
their own por olio (and those not included in the party program, or in the case of gov-
ernment par cipa on, the coali on agreement). Moreover, MPs may be encouraged
to not interfere with the policy areas of their fellow party group members in exchange
for more independence and freedom in their own issue area, as part of a tacit t-for-tat
agreement within the party group (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a).
Even though the number of specialized commi ees was reduced from 29 perma-
nent commi ees in 1990 to only 13 in 2006 (Oldersma, 1997, 147-148; Van Vonno,
2012, 131) there has been an overall increase in the number of commi ee mee ngs
over me, whereas the number of plenarymee ngs has remained rela vely stable since
the 1970s (see Table 6.9). This means that MPs spend more me working within their
own commi ees, thus strengthening the division of labor in parliament as a whole, but





























































































































































































































































































































































































their fellow party groupmembers for vo ng advice when it comes to issues dealt with in
other commi ees. As there have been no changes in the parliamentary rules in terms of
the number of required commi ee mee ngs, the increase in the number of commi ee
mee ngs has probably been ini ated by MPs and their party groups themselves. In ad-
di on, even though the number of government and private member bills has remained
rela vely stable, the total number of amendments and resolu ons has increased over
me, entailing that more votes are taken in parliament.31 MPs are thus required to vote
on more topics, and again, the majority of these votes will probably be about issues
that do not fall within their area of specializa on. Add to this the fact that MPs spend
more me in their commi ees, and therefore have less me to form an opinion on all
ma ers that fall outside their own por olio, it is likely that MPs increasingly rely on the
cues given to them by their fellow party group members. The hypothesis is therefore
that cue-taking as a result of the division of labor in the Dutch na onal parliament has
increased over me (H1).
6.4.2 Party agreement
Whereas cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism is relevant under the condi on
that MPs do not always have the me or resources to form their own opinion, party
agreement, as a determinant of party group unity, involves MPs vo ng together on the
basis of shared ideological and policy preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a;
Kam, 2009; Krehbiel, 1993). In otherwords, there are issues, usually ideologically charged,
on which MPs simply agree with each other and with the posi on of their party as a
whole and their party group in par cular. Since this is a rela vely ‘easy’ pathway to
party group unity, the expecta on is that poli cal party (group) leaders prefer to maxi-
mize the homogeneity of policy preferences of their (candidate)MPs in order to decrease
the likelihood of disagreement in the first place, thereby limi ng the need for alterna ve
mechanisms to elicit party group unity, such as discipline. The necessity and advantages
of includingMPs with specific exper se and backgrounds in certain specific policy areas,
however, means that those are responsible for the recruitment and ini al selec on of
candidates for the electoral list cannot only take (candidate) MPs’ agreement with the
party program and electoral manifesto into considera on during the recruitment and
selec on process. Moreover, there may also be electoral reasons to select par cular
candidates who may not be in complete agree with the party on all issues, but who is
deemed to be a rac ve to certain (groups of) voters. Par es’ ability to influence party
agreement is argued to be determined by the electoral system and par es’ candidate
selec on procedures, as well as the process of delibera on that takes place within the
parliamentary party group. One could argue that in the Netherlands, the combina on
of the party-oriented electoral system and par es’ rela ve freedom when it comes to
candidate selec on, enable ‘par es-as-organiza ons’ to extend their procedural advan-
31 This increase in parliamentary ac vity could also be offered as an example of decentralized poli cal behav-
ioral personaliza on (see subsec on 2.4.2 in chapter 2). Our interest in it here, however, is its consequence
for MPs’ sequen al decision-making process.
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tages over individuals into the electoral arena.
Rahat and Hazan (2001) offer a framework to classify par es’ candidate selec on
methods according to four dimensions, of which the decentraliza on of selec on meth-
ods (where, or at what level of the party organiza on, are candidates selected?)32 and
the inclusiveness of selectorate (who can select candidates?) are most relevant to the
discussion at hand.33 The more the candidate selec on process is controlled by the na-
onal party leadership (i.e., the more centralized the method and the less inclusive the
selectorate), the more it is able to control the final composi on of the list, and thereby
maximize the homogeneity of policy preferences among itsMPs. At first sight, candidate
selec on in the Netherlands has changed such that we may expect party agreement to
have decreased over me.
In the Netherlands there has always been minimal state interference when it comes
to candidate selec on, leaving poli cal par es free to organize it as they see fit. Accord-
ing to Hazan and Voerman (2006, 155), the 1917 change in the electoral system to one
of Propor onal Representa on, which treats the en re country as one cons tuency,
enabled the centraliza on of candidate selec on procedures in the hands of the na-
onal party execu ve, which was responsible for the recruitment and selec on of can-
didates, and the dra ing of the provisional list. The provisional list was then put to party
members who could influence the ranking of candidates indirectly via representa ves at
party conferences or directly viamembership ballots. Although the involvement of party
members (or their representa ves) in the finaliza on of the candidacy list means that
par es’ selectorates can be classified as rather inclusive, this stage of candidate selec-
on generally did not affect the composi on of the list; at most a candidate was moved
up or down a few slots (Lucardie and Voerman, 2004; Hazan and Voerman, 2006).
In the 1960s a number of par es abolished individual members’ votes, resul ng in a
less inclusive selectorate, and instead gave regional party organiza ons a greater say in
the composi on of the provisional list, which entailed a more decentralized procedure
and limited the power of the na onal party organiza on. In the early 1990s candidate
selec on procedures again became more centralized, as for example in both the PvdA
and VVD the power of the regions over the provisional list was taken away and given
back to the central party organiza on. In return, local representa ves at the party con-
ference were granted the final vote, thereby again increasing the inclusiveness of the
selectorate. By the early 2000s, most par es further democra zed their candidate se-
lec on procedures allowing for direct par cipa on by their members in the selec on of
candidates and/or the leading candidate or ‘list-puller’ (lijs rekker) (who are then placed
first on the list), making the selectorate even more inclusive (Hazan and Voerman, 2006;
Hillebrand, 1992; Koole and Leijenaar, 1988; Lucardie and Voerman, 2007).
32 Above, the degree of decentraliza on is described as territorial. It can, however, also be func onal (i.e.,
including the func onal representa on of women, minori es, etc.) (Rahat and Hazan, 2001, 304).
33 The other two dimensions deal with who can be selected (with the en re electorate represen ng the most
inclusive pole and the restric on to only party membership plus addi onal requirements (such as length
of party membership) at the most exclusive end of the con nuum) and how candidates are nominated (by
vo ng procedures or appointment) (Rahat and Hazan, 2001).
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Today, in most poli cal par es it is the na onal party execu ve that dominates the
preparatory phase and coordina on of candidate selec on. The na onal party execu ve
formulates a set of candidate selec on criteria (such as age, regional origin and policy
specializa on) and appoints a special selec on (and some mes recruitment) commi ee,
which makes recommenda ons to the execu ve, which in turn dra s a provisional list
(Lucardie and Voerman, 2007). Informally, however, party execu ves and special com-
mi ees o en consult the parliamentary party group leadership in evalua ng incumbent
MPs, who thus play an advisory role (Louwerse and Van Vonno, 2012). Hazan and Voer-
man (2006, 150, 155) categorize today’s candidate selec on procedures as centralized,
given the role of the na onal party execu ve and the fact that in most par es selec on
takes place at the na onal level, and quite inclusive, as a result of partymembers’ formal
involvement in the finaliza on of the candidacy list and their ability to vote on leading
candidates. 34
Hazan and Voerman (2006, 149, 158) argue that increasing the inclusiveness of the
selectorate could lead candidates to employ more individualis c strategies as a means
of appealing to partymembers in order to increase their chances of (re-)selec on. If suc-
cessful, this could influence the composi on of the candidate list, resul ng in the nomi-
na on of candidates whose preferences are more akin to the party membership instead
of the party leadership. In her analysis of policy preference congruence between CDA,
PvdA, VVD and D66 partymembers and their representa ves in parliament in the 1980s,
1990s and 2000s, Den Ridder (2014, 200-226, 331) finds that although preference ho-
mogeneity is generally lower among party members than among their representa ves,
the level of average congruence between the preferences of party members and their
representa ves in parliament is quite high and has not systema cally increased or de-
creased over me. This suggests that the effects of party democra za on are likely to
be limited in terms of party group preference homogeneity in the legisla ve arena.
In addi on, Hazan and Voerman (2006, 149) argue that a high degree of centraliza-
on in the hands of the na onal party organiza on can minimize the effect of increased
inclusiveness. Indeed, the fact that the provisional lists presented by the party execu ve
and/or selec on commi ees remain largely unaltered indicates that the direct influence
of party members remains minimal. This, and the fact that the composi on of the list
and the order in which candidates are placed is also difficult to overturn at the electoral
stage, means that poli cal par es, and especially the party leadership and na onal ex-
ecu ve, have a strong procedural advantage over the individual in the electoral arena
(Bowler, 2000; Sieberer, 2006).
Given that the influence of party democra za on is probably quite limited, and the
na onal party organiza ons have reestablished their centralized control over candidate
34 Selec on procedures are less centralized and more inclusive in GroenLinks, which formally does not involve
the execu ve; the party council appoints a commi ee that makes recommenda ons to the party confer-
ence. And the members of D66 are allowed to express their preferences for the candidate list by means of
postal ballot, on the basis of which an advisory commi ee (appointed by the party conference) determines
the ranking on a provisional list, which is then put to the party conference. The final excep on is the PVV,
which formally has only one member (the party leader Geert Wilders) who makes all decisions himself,
making its selec on procedure very centralized and exclusive (Lucardie and Voerman, 2007).
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selec on, it is likely that, in an a empt to curtail the poten al effects of par san dealign-
ment, par es have made an effort to select candidates whose policy posi ons are in
agreement and closely match those s pulated in the party program and electoral man-
ifesto, thereby increasing the homogeneity of the party group in parliament, and mini-
mizing the need for alterna ve measures of maintaining party group unity. As a result
of streamlining candidates in terms of policy posi ons, we expect that party agreement
in the Dutch na onal parliament increased over me (H2).
6.4.3 Party loyalty
In the case of disagreementwith the party group line, anMPmay s ll votewith the party
group voluntarily because he subscribes to norms of party group loyalty and thus follows
a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Electoral vola lity and par san dealignment are argued to
have a nega ve effect on party group loyalty because MPs may be more likely to choose
to vote according to the posi on of other (poten al) principals (i.e., voters) in the case
of disagreement with the party group line. Although the decision to adhere to the norm
of party group loyalty lies with the individual MP, party selectorates can try to influence
the number of MPs in the parliamentary party group who adhere to the norm, and the
extent to which MPs do so.
As is the case with party agreement, the na onal party leadership’s centralized con-
trol over candidate selec on plays a determining role when it comes the degree of sol-
idarity in the party group. To a certain extent, candidates are socialized into norms of
party group loyalty through their previous experience within the party or as party rep-
resenta ves at other levels of government (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 1983; Kam, 2009; Rush
and Giddings, 2011), and being nominated as a candidate for the na onal parliament is
considered a rewards for these former party ac vi es (Secker, 2000, 300). Although the
number of first- mers in parliament has increased over me as a result of both electoral
vola lity and party selectorates’ own tendency to increasingly opt for new instead of
incumbent candidates (Thomassen et al., 2014, 185-186), the percentage of MPs with
previous party experience has remained rela vely stable over me (Secker, 2000, 300;
but also see Parlement & Poli ek 2015d). Given the risks for party group unity associ-
atedwith electoral vola lity and par san dealignment, candidates’ previous track record
when it comes to subscrip on to the norm of party group loyalty as a selec on criterion
has likely increased in importance over me. All in all, we expect that par es have been
able to counteract the effects of electoral vola lity and par san dealignment, and that
party group loyalty in the Dutch na onal parliament has increased over me (H3).
6.4.4 Party discipline
Party discipline entails that an MP submits to the party group line involuntarily in re-
sponse to (the promise or threat of) posi ve or nega ve sanc ons by the party (group)
leadership (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Crowe, 1983; Jensen, 2000; Kam, 2009).
In this case, an MP disagrees with the party group line and either has not sufficiently
internalized the norm of party group loyalty, or the conflict with the group’s posi on is
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so intense that it supersedes his loyalty. As highlighted elsewhere in this book, par es
have a number of different tools through which they can a empt to persuade MPs to
obey the party despite their disagreement and lack of loyalty. Within the parliamentary
arena, par es’ control over commi ee membership and issue spokesmanship serve as
important procedural advantage that can be used to elicit MPs’ obedience. MPs who
follow the party group line can be rewarded with the more pres gious commi ees and
topics, whereas those who defy the party group can have their commi ee membership
and spokesmanship taken from them. The fact that in the Dutch parliament an increas-
ing amount of parliamentary work takes place within parliamentary commi ees means
that the impact of such punishments, as perceived by MPs, may have increased over
me. Thus, although the actually use of commi ee membership and issue spokesman-
ship as a means of disciplining MPs may not have increased over me, one can argue
that the party’s carrots have become increasingly tasty and the s cks increasingly hard.
What has increased over me is the number of cabinet (junior) ministers with pre-
vious parliamentary experience. Before 1967, 53 percent of cabinet (junior) ministers
had previously held the posi on of MP. Between 1967 and 1986 this percentage rose to
69 percent, but dropped to 61 percent between 1986 and 2006. In the period between
2007 and 2012, however, 81 percent of cabinet (junior) ministers had been an MP prior
to their promo on to the government (Thomassen et al., 2014, 187), which means that
(poten ally) governing par es have probably increased the use of (the promise of) gov-
ernment posi ons as a posi ve incen ve to influence MPs’ behavior.
Again, candidate selec on also serves as an important tool with which party (group)
leaders can (promise to) reward or (threaten to) punish theirMPs. Knowing that inmany
Dutch par es the na onal party execu ve and selec on commi ee consult the party
group when evalua ng incumbent MPs (Louwerse and Van Vonno, 2012), recalcitrant
MPs can be credibly threatened or actually punished with an unelectable slot on, or
even removal from, the candidacy list. That candidate selec on may be an important
disciplinary tool is illustrated by an example offered by Koole and Leijenaar (1988, 205),
who men on that the “...six CDA parliamentarians who voted against the installa on
of Cruise Missiles on Dutch Soil in 1986 paid the penalty by being relegated to much
lower posi ons on the advisory list at the next elec on, although their supporters in the
branches did manage to get them moved a li le on the final list.” Moreover, our earlier
analysis of party discipline in the Dutch case in chapter 5, revealed thatMPs consider be-
ing placed on an unelectable posi on on the party electoral list, or not being reselected
at all, a likely response to anMPwho repeatedly does not vote with the party group (see
Table 5.26 in subsec on 5.4.4). Furthermore, although the increase in electoral vola lity
has led to an increase in the number of seats exchanged between par es as a result of
elec ons over me (see Table 6.1), the number of new MPs in parliament cannot sole
be ascribed to changes in the electorate; par es themselves are increasing less likely to
reselect incumbent MPs (Thomassen et al., 2014, 185-189; Van den Berg and Van den
Braag, 2004, 69-71), making it more likely that party (group) leaders make good on their
threat to not reselect MPs who disobey.
Moreover, whereas during the period of pillariza on many MPs in the Netherlands
were recruited from, but could also return to, the organiza ons within their pillar a er
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their me in poli cs (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a, 665), depillariza on has meant
that these es between poli cal par es and other societal organiza ons have disap-
peared, as has automa c recruitment and career advancement within the societal pillar.
In addi on, since the 1970s the posi on of MP has become a full- me profession. Al-
though once in parliament an MP’s income is secured because the party cannot legally
oblige him to give up his seat, par es do control whether the MP will be selected for
upcoming elec ons, and thus MPs are solely dependent on the party for their future
income if they would like to pursue a career in poli cs. Both depillariza on and profes-
sionaliza on entail that over me MPs have become more dependent on their poli cal
party for their career and livelihood, which means that the weight of candidate reselec-
on as a disciplining tool has probably increased over me. All in all, we expect that as
a pathway to party group unity, party discipline in the Dutch parliament has increased
over me (H4).
6.5 Analysis of thedecision-makingmechanisms in theDutch
Second Chamber
As stated, the Dutch case provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses devel-
oped above because the 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Stud-
ies35 provide a tudinal data based on face-to-face interviews over a long span of me.
As stated before, although we include data from the Dutch part of the most recent 2010
Par Rep MP Survey, we only include it in our discussion of longitudinal trends when the
formula on of the ques ons and answering categories allows us to do so.
Although the response rate a ained for the first surveys was 90 percent or more,
there seems to be a trend towards a decrease in response rates with 76 percent of MPs
par cipa ng in the 2006 survey, and only 43 percent in the Par Rep Survey in 2010 (see
Table 6.10). Both the 2006 and 2010 surveys took place in themonths prior to elec ons,
however, which probably nega vely influenced MPs’ willingness to par cipate in the
survey.36 In addi on to their regular parliamentary du es, most were also involved in
35 Parts of the analyses in this sec on are replica ons of those found in Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a).
The replica ons used the original 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies (i.e., raw
data).
36 When it comes to the ming of the surveys with respect to the elec ons for the Second Chamber, the
interviews for the 1972 survey were held in the Spring of 1972, about one year a er the scheduled April
1971 elec ons, and six months before the November 1972 elec ons, which were held as a result of the
unexpected early fall of the Biesheuvel I Cabinet in July of that year. Most of the interviews for the 1979
survey were held in November and December 1978, more than two years a erMay 1977 elec ons, and two
years before the May 1981 elec ons (the Van Agt I Cabinet completed its en re term). In 1990 the survey
was held approximately one year a er the September 1989 elec ons, and the next elec ons were held in
May 1994 (the Lubbers II Cabinet also ran its en re term). The 2001 survey was held three years a er the
May 1998 elec ons, and one year before the scheduled elec ons in May 2002 (the Kok II Cabinet fell early,
but only a fewweeks before the scheduled elec ons). Finally, in both 2006 and 2010, the surveys were held
in the months leading up to the elec ons for the Second Chamber. In 2006, early elec ons were held in
November due to the fall of Balkenende II Cabinet that was caused by D66’s withdrawal from government
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electoral campaigning, and thus did not have the me to par cipate in the surveys.
The first four Dutch Parliamentary Surveys a ained response rates above 90 percent,
with the distribu on of MPs among party groups, and governing or opposi on par es,
very closely matching those found in the Second Chamber at that me. For the 1972
survey, the respondents from the CDA’s predecessors (ARP, CHU and KVP) are presented
jointly (aswas also done for the vo ng data); these par es fought under one electoral list
as of the 1977 elec ons. For the 2006 survey, the response rate of MPs per party group
varied from 38 to 100 percent, averaging at about 75 percent per party group. The ra o
between respondents whose par es par cipated in government (48 percent) and those
in the opposi on (52 percent) is almost exactly the sameas that in the parliament itself at
the me. Because D66 ended support for the coali on and withdrew from the cabinet
before the interviews were held (see footnote 36), it is coded as an opposi on party.
For the 2010 Par Rep Survey, the response rate of MPs per party group varied from
0 to 100 percent, the average being around 36 percent per party group. In this case,
the PvdA had dropped out of government, and is thus treated as an opposi on party.
S ll, respondents from government par es are slightly overrepresented: 37 percent of
respondents are from governing par es, whereas 31 percent of the MPs in parliament
were from governing par es when the 2010 Par Rep Survey was held.37
In previous chapters we were able to combine MPs’ responses to different survey
ques ons and follow an individualMP through the different steps of the decision-making
sequence central to this study (excluding the division of labor pathway and the associ-
ated cue-taking mechanism). Although the mechanisms are ordered as s pulated in
our sequen al decision-making model, they are dealt with separately and at the ag-
gregate MP level for each available survey. The reason is that because of the formu-
la on and nature of some of the survey ques ons, especially those pertaining to the
first two decision-making mechanisms (cue-taking and party agreement), it is not pos-
sible to track the number of MPs who move into the next stage of the decision-making
sequence. Moreover, comparison over me is some mes problema c, since not all of
the ques ons that are used to gauge the four different decision-making mechanisms are
included in all of the surveys, nor are they formulated consistently over me.38
in June. In 2010, the PvdA dropped out of the Balkenende IV Cabinet in February and elec ons were held
in June.
37 Differences between MPs who belong to governing par es and those in opposi on are only men oned
when these are sta s cally significant.
38 Ideally, we would have connected MPs’ survey answers to their actual vo ng behavior or defec on. This
would have made it possible to see whether an individual MP who (occasionally) votes against the party
group, or leaves his parliamentary party group, differs from his peers in his applica on of the different
decision-making mechanisms. Respondents were, however, guaranteed anonymity, and the fact that de-
fec ons and vo ng dissent occur so very infrequently in the Dutch Parliament might have made it possible
to iden fy individual MPs’ responses.
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Table 6.10: Dutch Parliamentary Studies and Par Rep MP Survey response rates for the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament
Year Survey Response
n %
1972 Dutch Parliamentary Study 141 94
1979 Dutch Parliamentary Study 139 93
1990 Dutch Parliamentary Study 138 92
2001 Dutch Parliamentary Study 135 90
2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study 114 76
2010 Par Rep MP Survey 65 43
Note: The 1972, 1979, 1990 and 2001 Dutch Parliamentary Studies were financed by the Dutch Na onal Sci-
ence Founda on (Nederlandse Organisa e voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, NWO). The 2006 Dutch Parlia-
mentary Study was financed by the Dutch government’s advisory Council on Public Administra on (Raad voor
het openbaar bestuur, ROB). The author would like to thank Rudy B. Andeweg and Jacques J.A. Thomassen for
sharing these surveys. The 2010 Par RepMP Survey was financed by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office
(BELSPO).
6.5.1 Division of labor
In the Dutch Parliamentary surveys, MPswere askedwhether, when it comes to bills that
they did not deal with themselves for the party group, they usually vote according to
the advice of the parliamentary party spokesperson.39 The figures in Table 6.11 indeed
confirm that most MPs in the Dutch parliament usually rely on the vo ng cues provided
by their fellow party groupmembers. In line with our hypothesis, there also seems to be
an increase in cue-taking over me: whereas in 1972 almost 80 percent indicated that
MPs usually vote according to the advice given to them by their parliamentary party
spokesperson, in the 2006 survey over 95 percent do so.40
39 Respondents were asked to respond to the statement ‘As an MP you usually vote according to the advice of
the parliamentary party spokespersonwhen it comes to bills that you did not deal with yourself for the party
group’ (Als Kamerlid stem je bij wetsvoorstellen die je niet zelf voor de frac e behandeld hebt, doorgaans
volgens het advies van de frac ewoordvoerder, transla on CvV). The Dutch Parliamentary Studies surveys
use different answering categories for the ques on used to gauge cue-taking. The 1972 and 1979 surveys
provided respondents with three answering categories: ‘that is the case’, ‘that is somewhat the case’, and
‘that is not the case’. The 2001 and 2006Dutch Parliamentary Studies asked respondents to answerwhether
they agree with the statement on a five-point ordinal scale. For presenta on purpose the three answering
categories from 1972 and 1979 are used, and those from the 2001 and 2006 surveys are combined: ‘fully
agree’ and ‘agree’ are combined into ‘that is the case’, ‘fully disagree’ and ‘disagree’ are collapsed into ‘that
is not the case’, and ‘partly agree, partly disagree’ is included in the middle category ‘that is somewhat the
case’ (see Table 6.11).
40 In the 2010 Par Rep Survey MPs were asked a different ques on, namely whether they agree with the
statement that ‘The parliamentary party spokesperson gets to determine the party’s posi on on his/her
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Table 6.11: ‘As an MP you usually vote according to the advice of the parliamentary
party spokesperson when it comes to bills that you did not deal with yourself for the
party group’ in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2006 (%)
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006
That is the case 79 91 - 96 96
That is somewhat the case 19 8 - 2 5
That is not the case 2 1 - 2 0
Total % 100 100 - 100 100
Total n 99 138 - 135 110
χ² (6) = 27.830, sig. = .000; φc = .179, sig.=.000; gamma = -.495, sig. = .000
Table 6.12 showswhatMPs’ iden fy as themain decision-making center within their
parliamentary party group. The ques on was included in the Dutch version of the 2010
Par Rep Survey, but unfortunately it was not a part of the 1972 Dutch Parliamentary
Study ques onnaire. Moreover, in 1990 it was only posed to members of the CDA,
PvdA and VVD; MPs from small party groups were excluded. For the sake of compar-
ison, the bo om of Table 6.12 shows only the responses of MPs from the three largest
party groups for the other years as well. When comparing the top and bo om halves
of the table, we see that the inclusion of small party groups is associated with a higher
percentage of MPs iden fying the weekly parliamentary party mee ng (and to a lesser
extent the party specialist) as the main decision-making center, especially in later years.
That the percentage of MPs who iden fy the party group commi ee as most important
is higher when only the CDA, PvdA and VVD are included makes sense since smaller po-
li cal par es usually do not have a system of internal party group commi ees in which
the spokespersons for adjacent policy areas meet. The percentage of MPs who iden-
fy the party group leadership as the main decision-making center is roughly the same
whether small par es are included or not. When MPs from small par es are excluded,
topic’. 60 percent of MPs (mostly) agree that this is indeed the case, 19 percent (mostly) disagree, and
22 percent neither agree or disagree (not shown in Table 6.11). At first glance this could be taken an an
indicator that the importance of cue-taking seems to have decreased since the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary
Study. One should keep in mind, however, that although at the individual level an MP may take his vo ng
cues from his fellow party group members, it may be quite another ma er, from the perspec ve of an
MP, to let one individual decide the posi on of the party as a whole. The party’s posi on may already be
formulated in the electoral manifesto or party program, for example, or may be broadly determined during
the weekly parliamentary party group mee ng. In other words, whereas the 2010 Par Rep ques on refers
to the role of party group spokespersons in determining the party group posi on (and thus may be a be er
indicator of the division of labor within a party group), the Dutch Parliamentary Studies’ ques on inquires
into more specifically into the role of cue-taking in MPs’ decision regarding their vo ng behavior.
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Table 6.12: The main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group in the
Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1979-2010 (%)
All
1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
Mee ng 51 - 37 33 59
Commi ee 39 - 29 24 19
Specialist 8 - 27 34 14
Leadership 3 - 8 10 9
total % 100 - 100 101 102
total (n) 134 - 123 104 58
χ² (9) = 44.236, sig. = .000; φc = .188, sig. = .000
CDA, PvdA and VVD only
1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
Mee ng 48 26 27 32 52
Commi ee 43 53 39 31 23
Specialist 8 13 24 27 16
Leadership 2 9 10 11 9
total % 101 100 100 100 100
total (n) 120 102 90 82 44
χ² (12) = 46.438, sig. = .000; φc = .188, sig. = .000
the parliamentary party group mee ng and commi ee rival each other as the main
decision-making center, although the parliamentary commi ee seems to have been los-
ing ground to the party group specialist (un l the 2010 survey, see the discussion below).
The increase in the importance of individual specialists as decision makers may provide
some evidence as to the increased specializa on and professionaliza on ofMPs, and the
consolida on of a strict division of labor within parliamentary party groups.
MPs’ responses in 2010 are out of stepwith the earlier surveys, however.41 The party
group mee ng is most important, at the expense of both the party group commi ee
and specialist. At first glance, the increase in the importance of the party groupmee ng
could be related to the decrease in the number of seats a ainedby the ‘large’ established
41 The formula on of the ques on and available answering categories was exactly the same in all five surveys.
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par es, which may, among other things, be the result of the increase in the number of
party groups in parliament. For both the PvdAandVVD, the increase in the importance of
the party groupmee ng is confined to the 2010 survey (not shown in Table 6.12 ), which
was preceded by the 2006 parliamentary elec ons in which both par es had shrunk in
terms of their share of seats (the PvdAwent from42 seats in the 2003 elec on to 33 seats
in the 2006 elec on, and the VVD went from 28 to 22 seats). However, for the CDA this
increase of importance of the party group mee ng, and decrease in the importance of
the party group commi ee, is already visible in the 2006 survey (not shown in Table 6.12
), at which me it had obtained 44 seats in the 2003 elec on, which is 1 more seat than
in the 2002 elec on, and 13 more than it had a er the 1998 elec on. Moreover, with
41 seats, the CDA s ll cons tuted as a ‘large’ party group (by Dutch historical standards)
at the me of the 2010 Par Rep Survey. This, this explana on does not seem to hold
for the CDA. Only me will tell whether the high percentage of MPs who iden fy the
party group mee ng as the main decision-making center in the 2010 survey is a single
occurrence, or whether the importance of the party groupmee ngwill con nue to grow
over me.
Even if we accept the 2010 survey as valid, the role of the party group specialist is
s ll more important in this most recent survey than it was in the 1979 and 1990 studies.
On balance there do some to be some indica ons that cue-taking and the division of
labor in parliamentary party groups, especially large ones, has strengthened over me
andmay therefore have an increased contribu on to the high levels of party group unity
in the Netherlands.
6.5.2 Party agreement
Unfortunately, the ques on concerning the frequency of disagreement with the party’s
posi on on a vote in parliament, which we used to gauge party agreement in our analy-
ses in the previous chapters, was not included in any of the Dutch Parliamentary Studies.
In all six surveys respondents were asked to place both themselves and their poli cal
party on a number of different policy scales,42 including the ideological Le -Right scale.
MPs’ self-placement on policy scales found in elite surveys are o en used to calculate
party group agreement coefficients (Van der Eijk, 2001). In order to gaugewhether there
are any changes in party group agreement over me, Table 6.13 shows Van der Eijk’s
(2001) agreement coefficients for the three largest established par es in the Dutch par-
liament (CDA, PvdA and VVD). The coefficient of agreement, which is designed specif-
ically for ordinal ra ng scales, ranges from -1 (entailing complete dispersion and thus
polariza on among MPs from the same party group) to 0 (which occurs when MPs are
spread equally across the scale) to +1 (when there is complete agreement between party
42 The surveys are generally not consistent when it comes to the policy areas scales thatMPs are asked to place
themselves on, making the longitudinal analysis of party group homogeneity based onMPs’ self-placement
for specific policy areas difficult.
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Table 6.13: Party group ideological homogeneity on the Le -Right scale in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (coefficient of
agreement)
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010 Mean
CDA .76 .75 .68 .71 .77 .61 .71
PvdA .84 .77 .83 .83 .84 .87 .83
VVD .71 .68 .93 .65 .85 .79 .77
Note: These agreement coefficients may differ from those found in Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 663) as
a result of a different transforma on of the scales used in the surveys (see footnote 43).
group MPs).43
As this is a replica on of the analysis in Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a, 61-64)
(with the addi on of the 2010 Par Rep data), it is not surprising that the results are
very similar. The parliamentary party groups of the three largest established poli cal
par es in the Netherlands are very homogeneous on the ideological Le -Right scale, as
well as in regard to specific issues (not shown in Table 6.13), as most coefficients are
above 0.5 and thus closer to complete homogeneity than to complete dispersion. This
indicates that agreement is likely to be an important pathway to party group unity in the
Dutch parliament. However, although there are somefluctua ons, there is no systema c
change in party group homogeneity, entailing that it does not seem to be the case that
party group agreement has increasedover me. Although this does point in the direc on
of the one-arena model and that parliament may be isolated from the electoral arena, it
could be s ll be the case that party (group) leaders have taken measures to counteract
changes in the electoral arena (just enough to maintain party agreement, instead of
increasing it).
As pointed out by Kam (2001a, 103), however, it need not be the case that MPs who
place themselves at the same posi on on a policy scale also see themselves at equal dis-
tance from the party’s posi on, as theymay have different interpreta ons of the posi on
of their party. Kam suggests that it may instead be be er to measure how far MPs sub-
jec vely perceive themselves to be from their party’s posi on. In all five of the Dutch
Parliamentary Studies, as well as the Par Rep Survey, MPs were asked to place both
themselves and their poli cal party on an ideological Le -Right scale, allowing for the
calcula on of the absolute distance MPs perceive between their own and their party’s
43 Before calcula ng the Van der Eijk’s (2001) coefficient of agreement, the scales for all the Le -Right ide-
ological placement ques ons were converted to a 7-point scale using the formula y = a + bx (Irwin and
Thomassen, 1975, 417-418). For the 9-point scale (which was used in the 1972 and 1979 Dutch Parliamen-
tary Studies) where 1must equal 1 and 9must equal 7, the formula used is y = 1/4 + 3/4*x. For the 11-point
scale (which was used in the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study and the 2010 Par Rep Survey) , where 1 must
equal 1 and 11 must equal 7, the formula y = 2/5 + 3/5*x is used. For the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study
and 2010 Par Rep Survey the values were first recoded so that 0 equals 1 and 10 equals 11 by adding 1.
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posi on.44 As we saw in previous chapters, a large perceived distance between an MP’s
posi on and that of his party is associated with frequent disagreement with the party’s
posi on on a vote in parliament, whereas a small perceived distance between an MP’s
policy posi on and that of his poli cal party entails that an MP frequently agrees with
the party line; a rela onship that also holds for the Dutch na onal parliament in the
2010 Par Rep Survey (see chapter 4 and chapter 5).45
Table 6.14 shows that, contrary to our hypothesis, party agreement in terms of the
ideological distance MPs perceive between their own and their party’s posi on has ac-
tually decreased over me. In 1972 65 percent of MPs place themselves on the same
posi on as their party, whereas in the 2010 Par Rep Survey only 33 percent of MPs do
so. From 1979 to 2006, however, the percentage who perceive no difference between
their own and their party’s posi on remains quite stable at around 50 percent. There
thus seem to be two large dips in party agreement: in the 1979 survey and in the 2010
survey (although we must be careful about interpre ng the 2010 survey as a part of a
trend given the different nature of the survey and the lower response rate). Star ngwith
the 2006 survey, however, there is an increase in the percentage of MPs who perceive
a distance of two points or more, hin ng that in the case of the 2010 dip, the decrease
had already set in before.
The three largest established par es, PvdA, VVD and CDA, follow the general trend
of a decrease in the percentage of MPs who perceive no difference between their own
posi on and that of their party (see Table 6.15). The decrease in party agreement over
me is greatest within the CDA. One might expect a sharp decrease in the 1979 survey,
since this was the first survey a er the 1977 elec ons, which the ARP, CHU and KVP
fought with one electoral list for the first me before the official crea on of the CDA in
1980.46 Party agreement can be expected to be lower in a newly merged party groups,
and indeed, in terms of party vo ng unity, the party group suffered rela vely frequent
and deep dissent during its first parliamentary term (see subsubsec on 6.3.2). Instead
of a one- me dip, however, the decrease in party agreement con nued and deepened,
especially in the 2006 and 2010 surveys, even though vo ng unity was reestablished
and consolidated to near perfec on following the ini al period a er the fusion. The
perceived ideological distance among PvdA MPs follows the general trend but also os-
cillates over me. There are two notable dips in party agreement: in the 1990 and 2006
surveys. The VVD also follows the general trend, with one very large dip in 1979, and
44 The ques ons are located consecu vely in all 5 surveys, making it reasonable to assume that any distance
indicated by MPs is conscious and meaningful. However, that MPs are first asked to place themselves may
act as a pull for where they subsequently place the poli cal party, and that the la er is con ngent on the
former. This may lead to an underes ma on of the distance between MPs and the poli cal party.
45 The surveys include Le -Right ideological scales of different lengths: the 2010 Par Rep Survey and 2006
Dutch Parliamentary Study use an 11-point scale, the 2001 and 1990 Dutch Parliamentary Studies use a 7-
point scale, and the 1979 and 1972 Dutch Parliamentary Studies use a 9-point scale. In order to compare the
distance on the ideological scales over me, the scales are converted to an ordinal 11-point scale ranging
from 0 to 10 (see footnote 43 for the conversion formulas).
46 For the 1972 survey, the MPs from the ARP, CHU and KVP are all included as CDA in the tables. MPs were
asked, however, to place the ARP, CHU or KVP, depending on the poli cal party they belonged to.
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Table 6.14: Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Chamber
of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%)
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
0 65 52 52 53 49 33
1 30 38 41 41 33 47
2+ 5 11 8 6 18 20
Median 0 0 0 0 1 1
Mean 0.42 0.66 0.58 0.49 0.79 0.91
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total n 133 125 116 128 107 64
χ² (30) = 94.130, sig. = .000; gamma = .188, sig. = .000
again in 2010.
There are also significant differences in perceived ideological distance between MPs
whose party is in government and those in opposi on (see Table 6.16). With the excep-
on of the 2001 survey (in which the difference between government and opposi on is
very small), governmentMPs are more likely to perceive a difference between their own
and their party’s posi on and, usually a higher percentage of government MPs is more
likely to experience a difference of two points or more. This may be explained by the
coali on nature of Dutch government, which o en forces MPs whose par es partake in
government to support certain unpopularmeasures or compromises that are included in
the government coali on agreement. As the party has signed the coali on agreement,
it is likely that MPs associate the coali on agreement with the posi on of their party.
However, when looking at the difference in perceived ideological distance for the CDA,
PvdA and VVD it does not seem to be the case that MPs’ perceived ideological distance
co-varies with their par es’ government par cipa on (see Table 6.15).
Instead, the difference between MPs whose party is in government and those in
opposi on may be the result of the fact that par es in opposi on tend to be small or
medium sized party groups. Indeed, the larger the party group the more likely MPs
are to perceive a difference between their own and their party’s posi on on the scale
(see Table 6.17). Whereas 74 percent of MPs whose party has five or fewer seats in
parliament perceive no distance between their own and their party’s posi on, only 64
percent of medium size party groups (six to nineteen seats) do so, and only 48 percent
of large party groups (twenty seats of more) do so. MPs from large party groups are
also most likely to perceive a distance of two points of more (12 percent MPs from large
party groups, and only 3 percent of MPs from both medium and small party groups).
This may have to dowith the fact that in small party groupsMPsmay bemore personally
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Table 6.15: Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Chamber
of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%)
CDA
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
0 62 56 50 52 36 10
1 31 36 36 40 39 48
2+ 8 8 14 8 25 43
Median 0 0 0 0 1 1
Mean 0.48 0.58 0.67 0.58 0.94 1.38
Total % 101 100 100 100 100 101
Total n 52 36 36 25 36 21
χ² (30) = 43.450, sig. = .012; gamma = .346, sig. = .000
PvdA
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
0 67 60 36 51 39 50
1 31 37 58 46 48 44
2+ 3 4 7 2 13 6
Median 0 0 1 0 1 0
Mean 0.44 0.46 0.73 0.48 0.81 .56
Total % 101 101 101 99 100 100
Total n 39 52 45 41 31 18
χ² (30) = 43.050, sig. = .058; gamma = .191, sig. = .022
VVD
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
0 81 14 73 61 56 36
1 13 50 20 30 13 55
2+ 6 36 7 9 31 9
Median 0 1 0 0 0 1
Mean 0.25 1.5 0.33 0.45 1.0 0.73
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total n 16 22 15 33 16 11
χ² (25) = 41.762, sig. = .019; gamma = .007, sig. = .952


























































































































































































































































































6.5. Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch Second Chamber
Table 6.17: Perceived ideological distance on the Le -Right scale in the Second Chamber
of the Dutch Parliament: party group size (%)
Small (5 or less seats) Medium (6 to 20 seats) Large (21 or more seats)
0 74 64 48
1 23 33 40
2+ 3 3 12
median 0 0 1
mean 0.29 0.40 0.64
Total % 100 100 100
Total n 35 121 517
χ² (24) = 20.462, sig. = .000; gamma = .358, sig. = .000.
involved in determining the posi on of the party group in the first place. As we saw,MPs
from small party groups are more likely then MPs from larger party groups to iden fy
the weekly parliamentary party mee ng as the main decision-making center. Moreover,
small parliamentary par es aremore likely to consist of only those candidates whowere
ranked at the top of their party’s candidacy list, who are more likely to have previous
party experience and who held top posi ons in the party organiza on. It thus makes
sense that they would perceive li le to no distance between their own and their party’s
posi on, as it is likely that they themselves were involved in the formula on of the party
program.
We are, however, le with a discrepancy between the fact that there is no change
over me in terms of the ideological homogeneity of party groups based on MPs’ self-
placement, while the average difference between an MP’s self-placement and his per-
cep on of his party’s posi on has increased over me. This could be caused by MPs
interpre ng the posi ons on the scales differently, as argued by Kam (2001a, 103). We
have no reason to believe, however, that MPs’ tendency to do so would have increased
over me.47 There is another explana on for the difference between the two findings.
MPs who do place themselves at a distance with respect to their party’s posi on on the
Le -Right ideological scale tend to do so in the same direc on. Most MPs tend to place
themselves to the le of where they perceive their party to be, with the excep on of
the VVD MPs, who place themselves to both the le and the right of their party (not
shown in Table 6.14). Thus, in terms of the effects of changes in the electoral arena on
the pathways to party unity in the parliamentary arena, it would seem that depillariza-
47 It could also be that the Le -Right ideological scale is too abstract and therefore does not accurately gauge
what parliamentary vo ng is actually about. It is unlikely, however, that the level of abstrac on has in-
creased over me.
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on has not led poli cal party selectorates to diversify their selec on of parliamentary
candidates in terms of their policy preferences as a means of appealing to a wider voter
audience.
Related to this is that in all of the surveys the ques on that instructs MPs to place
their ‘poli cal party’ does not specify which part of the poli cal party organiza on MPs
should keep in mind. We have no way of knowing whetherMPs place the posi on of the
parliamentary party group, the extra-parliamentary party or the party-as-whole (and
whether this includes party members) on the ideological Le -Right scale. If most MPs
think of the party group’s posi on when answering the ques on, it is indeed likely that
this increase in disagreement involves concrete votes in parliament.
If, however, MPs interpret the ques on as referring to the extra-parliamentary or-
ganiza on or party-as-a-whole, it is more difficult to know whether this also has im-
plica ons for the rela ve importance of agreement when it comes to determining party
group vo ng unity in parliament. At first glance, the finding thatMPs have becomemore
likely to experience a larger distance between their own and their poli cal party’s po-
si on would seem to actually provide some evidence for the popular assump on that
since depillariza on par es have become ‘catch-all’ as a conscious electoral strategy,
with a more diffuse ideological iden ty in order to appeal to as many voters as possible
(Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a). If this is true, the fact that party group policy homo-
geneity based onMPs’ self-placement has not decreased but remained high would again
mean that this broadening of ideological profile has not affected the parliamentary party
group in the same way. However, as most MPs place themselves in the same direc on
from their party’s posi on, it is likely that the ideological profiles of par es have not be-
come more catch-all, but have rather moved in one direc on (or at least according to
MPs’ percep on).
On the other hand, the party group is bound to the electoral manifesto and the party
program, which in most par es are determined the members and/or board of the polit-
ical party (organiza on) outside of parliament. Thus, even if MPs interpreted the ques-
on as referring to the extra-parliamentary party or the party-as-a-whole, there may
s ll be more frequent disagreement with the party’s posi on in parliament when a vote
concerns an issue for which the party’s posi on is determined outside of parliament.
In conclusion, it seems that although par es have been able to maintain a high de-
gree of ideological homogeneity among their MPs, party agreement in terms of distance
MPs perceive between their own and their party’s posi on has increased over me.
Thus, although MPs might s ll usually agree amongst themselves, this does seem to
indicate that disagreement with the party’s posi on, whether origina on in or outside
of parliament, has becomemore likely over me, meaning that the chance thatMPs find
themselves at odds with the posi on of their party has increased over me.
6.5.3 Party loyalty
As opposed to other measures used in this chapter, the ques on used to measure party
group loyalty refers directly to vo ng in parliament. In the Dutch Parliamentary Studies,
MPs were asked whether, in the case of disagreement with their party group’s posi on
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Table 6.18: Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010 (%)
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
Own opinion 40 22 11 10 5 12
It depends 53 65 69 66 66 -
Party (group) posi on 7 14 20 24 31 88
Total % 100 100 100 100 101 100
Total n 141 130 138 135 105 45
χ² (8) = 84.783, sig. = .000; φc = .256, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)
Note: Whereas the ques on in the earlier Dutch Parliamentary Studies refers to the party group (frac e) po-
si on, the ques on in 2010 Par Rep Survey refers to the party’s (par j) posi on.
on a vote in parliament, an MP ought to vote according to his own opinion or the party
group’s posi on. The la er answer is taken as indica ve of an MP’s subscrip on to the
norm of party loyalty.
In line with the hypothesis, subscrip on to the norm of party group loyalty has in-
creased over me (see Table 6.18). The percentage of MPs who think that in the case of
disagreement an MP ought to vote with the party group has steadily increased from 7
percent in 1972, to 31 percent in 2006. When comparing MPs’ responses to the Dutch
Parliamentary surveys, for which that the ‘it depends’ answering category was included,
one can see that the percentage of MPs who think that ‘it depends’ stays quite stable,
whereas the percentage of MPs advoca ng that an MP who disagrees with the posi on
of his party ought to follow his own opinion has decreased over me from 40 percent
in 1972 to only 5 percent in 2006. The three largest par es in the Dutch parliament
(CDA, PvdA, VVD) follow the same general pa ern, although the moment at which the
trend sets in is different for each of the par es (see Table 6.19). Among PvdA MPs the
increase in the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty oc-
curred quite early (in the 1979 survey) and remained rather stable over me. Loyalty
among CDAMPs increased as of the 1990 survey, whereas among VVDMPs there was a
definite increase as of the 2001 survey.
In the 2010 Par Rep Survey, the ques on refers to a conflict between an MP’s and
the ‘party’s’ posi on, not specifically the party group. This makes its comparison to the
Dutch Parliamentary Studies problema c. In addi on, the answering category ‘it de-
pends’ is not included as an answering category, forcing MPs to choose between the
two op ons.48 The percentage of respondents who answer that an MP ought to vote
48 In the 2010 Par Rep Survey 20MPs refused to answer the ques on, o en indica ng to the interviewer that
‘it depends’ (not shown in table).
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according to the party’s posi on is very high (88 percent). It is noteworthy that the cate-
gory that subscribes to the norm of party loyalty ‘profits’ more from the absence of the
op on ‘it depends’ than the category that includes MPs who feels that an MP should
vote according to his own opinion in the case of disagreement.
The threat of early elec ons if the government is brought down could lead one to ex-
pect that government MPs have a stronger feeling of responsibility towards their party,
and are thus more likely to voluntarily support their party group in the case of disagree-
ment, than opposi on MPs (Van Schendelen, 1992, 82). The responses in Table 6.20
are not always consistent with this expecta on: whereas in the 1990 and 2001 surveys
government MPs are more likely to vote according to their party group’s opinion in the
case of disagreement than opposi on MPs, in all other years opposi on MPs are more
likely to do so (with the excep on of 1972, when 7 percent of both government and
opposi on MPs subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty). Moreover, if we look at
the largest established par es that have par cipated in government over the past 40
years specifically (CDA, PvdA and VVD, see Table 6.19), it does not seem to be the case
that moving from the government to the opposi on bench has a systema c effect on
the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty. Within each
of these established par es the increase in the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the
norm of party group loyalty over me is stronger than the effect of government par ci-
pa on. Table 6.20 shows that opposi onMPs generally aremore likely to vote according
to their own opinion than government MPs, but again the pa ern is not consistent over
me and does not seem to hold for the CDA, PvdA and VVD individually.
6.5.4 Party discipline
As has become evident throughout this study (see subsec on 3.2.2 in chapter 3 and
subsec on 4.3.4 in chapter 4, gauging party discipline and its actual use is difficult. In the
2001, 2006 and 2010 surveys, MPs were asked for their opinion about party discipline in
their party. Unfortunately, the ques on was not asked in earlier surveys, making it im-
possible to trace MPs’ opinions concerning party discipline over a longer period of me.
In all three surveys more than three-quarters of MPs are sa sfied with general party dis-
cipline in their party, as they answered that general party discipline should remain as it
is (see Table 6.21). Of those who indicate to be dissa sfied with party discipline, there
seems to be a small increase in the percentage of MPs who hold the opinion that party
discipline ought to bemore strict, which is rather surprising ifMPs indeed associate party
discipline with coercion. Although it is difficult to interpret these answering categories,
we argue that MPs who indicate that party discipline ought to be more strict are those
who value the collec ve benefits of presen ng a united front to the outside world above
an individual MP’s freedom and personal mandate. Those who answer that party disci-
pline should remain as it is probably perceive a good balance between the two, or value
one above the other, but are content with how they aremaintained in the parliamentary
party group. And MPs who answer that party discipline ought to be less strict are those
who value anMP’s freedom and personal mandate above presen ng a united front, and
are likely to be those who were confronted with (threats of) party discipline in the past.
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Table 6.19: Party group loyalty (own opinion versus party group’s posi on) in the Second
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament 1972-2010: CDA, PvdA and VVD only (%)
CDA
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
Own opinion 36 26 15 4 3 15
It depends 57 70 57 60 64 0
Party (group) posi on 7 5 28 36 33 85
Total % 100 101 100 100 100 100
Total n 58 43 47 25 36 13
χ² (8) = 37.155, sig. = .000; φc = .298, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)
PvdA
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
Own opinion 49 14 4 12 0 15
It depends 49 63 71 69 74 0
Party (group) posi on 3 22 25 19 26 65
Total % 101 99 100 100 100 100
Total n 39 49 48 42 31 13
χ² (8) = 46.086, sig. = .000; φc = .332, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)
VVD
1972 1979 1990 2001 2006 2010
Own opinion 25 23 11 3 7 0
It depends 69 64 79 71 47 -
Party (group) posi on 6 14 11 27 47 100
Total % 100 101 101 101 101 100
Total n 16 22 19 34 15 7
χ² (8) = 16.865, sig. = .000; φc = .282, sig. = .000 (1972 - 2006 only)




























































































































































































































































6.5. Analysis of the decision-making mechanisms in the Dutch Second Chamber
Table 6.21: Sa sfac onwith general party discipline in the Second Chamber of the Dutch
Parliament 2001-2010 (%)
2001 2006 2010
More strict 2 9 11
Remain as it is 87 76 81
Less strict 11 15 8
Total % 100 100 100
Total n 135 110 63
χ² (4) = 9.456, sig. = .051; φc = .124, sig. = .051; gamma = -.192, sig. = .083
MPs’ responses to the ques ons pertaining to specific aspects of party discipline, in-
cluded in the 2006 and 2010 surveys (see Table 6.22), provide some addi onal insight
into the circumstances under which party discipline is more or less likely to be applied,
accepted, or even desired. When it comes to s cking to the party line during parliamen-
tary vo ng, the ques on most relevant to party vo ng as an indicator of party group
unity, almost 95 percent of MPs are sa sfied with party discipline as it is. Party vot-
ing unity therefore seems fairly undisputed in the Dutch parliament. This also seem to
hold for seeking permission from the party group before taking parliamentary ini a ves;
around 85 percent of MPs indicate to be sa sfied with party discipline for this aspect of
parliamentary behavior as well.
The one excep on to this pa ern is the MPs’ evalua on of party discipline. When
it comes to keeping internal party discussions confiden al the majority is sa sfied with
party discipline, but almost all of those who are dissa sfied would like to see party disci-
pline be appliedmore strictly (34 percent in 2006 and 24 percent in 2010). This highlights
that party group unity is not just about the final vote in parliament, but refers to a much
broader requirement that comprises the en re policymaking process. Apparently, there
are MPs who do breach confiden al intra-party discussions, otherwise there would not
be MPs who would like to see party discipline applied more strictly. It also seems, how-
ever, that those who do breach party confiden ality get away with it, or at least accept
the consequences, otherwise there would have been more MPs who indicate that party
discipline should be less strict.
That a rela vely high percentage of MPs would like to see stricter party discipline
when it comes to keeping internal party discussions confiden al, however, means that
maintaining (the appearance of) a united front is considered very important and it is
something that MPs and par es are ac vely concerned about. In the parliamentary
arena, other par es may try to profit from par es that do not present a united front ear-
lier in the policy making process, by pu ng certain controversial issues on the agenda,
framing debates and proposals in such a way as to elicit MPs’ dissent, or even calling
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Table 6.22: Sa sfac on with specific aspects of party discipline in the Second Chamber
of the Dutch Parliament 2001-2010 (%)
S cking to the parliamentary party line in votes
2006 2010
More strict 1 5
Remain as it is 93 95
Less strict 7 0
Total % 101 100
Total n 108 63
χ² (2) = .752, sig. = .687; φc = .067, sig. = .687; gamma = -.059, sig. = .855
Taking poli cal ini a ves only with the parliamentary party’s authoriza on
2006 2010
More strict 8 6
Remain as it is 84 87
Less strict 7 6
Total % 99 100
Total n 114 63
χ² (2) = .210, sig. = .900; φ = .035, sig. = .900; gamma = .033, sig. = .877
Keeping internal party discussions confiden al
2006 2010
More strict 34 24
Remain as it is 66 76
Less strict 1 0
Total % 101 100
Total n 110 63
χ² (2) = 2.174, sig. = .337; φ = .113, sig. = .337; gamma = .197, sig. = .243
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for roll call votes strategically. MPs and par es may also be concerned with the conse-
quences of the appearance of parliamentary party disunity in the electoral arena. New
par es that are troubled by party disunity tend not to return to Dutch parliament for a
second or third term (the LPF, for example). In his analysis of Westminster parliaments
Kam (2009), for example, finds that voters tend not to vote for par es they perceive to
be disunited. Although his analysis only includes the influence of party vo ng disunity,
it seems that par es and their MPs are not only concerned with party group unity in the
final policy making stage (i.e., vo ng), but also during the process preceding it.
6.6 Conclusion
Even though electoral vola lity and par san dealignment in the Netherlands have in-
creased through me, they do not ‘appear to travel together’ (Kam, 2009, 73-74) with
MPs’ dissent in the na onal parliament. Party group unity has always been very high
in the Netherlands, whether measured in terms of vo ng unity, the frequency or depth
of MPs’ dissent, or MPs’ defec on from their party group, especially when it comes to
the established par es. Moreover, and in line with the findings in Bowler’s (2000) study
of other European parliamentary democracies, party vo ng unity has even increased
slightly over me. When vo ng dissent does take place, both in terms of its frequency
and depth, this seems to be a characteris c of new par es (e.g., the LPF in the 2000s,
as well as in the par es that fused into the CDA at the end of the 1970s). Party group
defec ons, when they occur, are also a characteris c of new par es. In the established
par es, the frequency and depth of vo ng dissent are limited, and party defec ons take
place only sporadically.
This seems to indicate that parliament is insulated from the changes in the elec-
torate, poin ng to the one-arena model that emphasizes the procedural advantage that
‘par es in office’ have over MPs in the legisla ve arena (Bowler, 2000). There are, how-
ever, some changes over me in the rela ve contribu on of the different pathways to
party group unity outlined in this study. Whereas the ideological homogeneity among
MPs from the same party group has remained high over me, average party agreement,
in terms of MPs’ percep on of the distance between their own and their party’s posi-
on on the ideological Le -Right scale, has decreased over me. Although we cannot be
sure, this does seem to indicate that the parliamentary arena is not insulated from the
electoral arena. S ll, given that party group unity scores have stayed above 99 percent
and have actually increased slightly since the first survey, par es’ procedural advantages
over individual MPs in the legisla ve arena may have been sufficient to counteract this
decrease in party agreement over me.
The percentage of MPs who iden fy the party group specialist as the main decision-
making center in the parliamentary party group, as well as the percentage of MPs who
indicate to take their vo ng cues from the parliamentary party spokesperson, have in-
creased over me aswell, indica ng thatMPs have increased their reliance on cue-taking
as a decision-making mechanism. Because cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism
takes place before agreement, as it follows fromMPs not having the me and resources
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to form their own opinion on ma ers put to a vote, it is likely that MPs’ increased re-
liance on the cues of their fellow party groupmembers has to a certain extent contained
the effects of the decrease in party agreement. Given that the increase cue-taking is
likely to be connected to the increase in parliamentary ac vity over me, and the fact
that the la er cannot be ascribed to any changes in the formal rules and/or organiza on
of the Dutch parliament itself, it is likely that this increase in cue-taking has been brought
about by either individual MPs themselves, or their par es ac ng as ‘organiza ons’.49
The percentage of MPs who indicate to subscribe to the norm of party group loyalty
has also increased over me.50 Although par es can try to socialize MPs into the norm
of party group loyalty once they reach the parliamentary party group, it is more likely
that subscrip on to the norm has increased in importance as a candidate selec on cri-
terion. This entails that ‘par es as organiza ons’ have taken advantage of their control
over candidate selec on, and have thus been a empted to counteract the effects that
electoral vola lity and par san dealignment seem to have had on party agreement.
The fact that party agreement has decreased, whereas cue-taking and party loyalty
have increased, indicate that parliament is not insulated from changes in the electorate,
but that par es have not stood idle either and relied solely on the roles of the legisla-
ve arena in order to maintain party group unity. Instead, par es have responded to
the changes in the electorate through the extension of their procedural advantages into
the electoral arena through candidate selec on. Although par es have been unable to
counteract the effects of electoral vola lity and par san dealignment on party agree-
ment, they have been able to do so for cue-taking and party loyalty.
Finally, our data do not allow us to study the actual applica on party discipline, nor
are we able to trace the changes in MPs’ sa sfac on with party discipline over an ex-
tended period of me. We therefore do not know if party (group) leaders have re-
sponded to the changes in the electorate by increasing their use of (the threat of) party
discipline. The fact that in the last three surveys MPs are not very concerned with party
discipline in general, when it comes to vo ng or seeking authoriza on from the party
before taking parliamentary ini a ves, means that party group unity in these areas is
not really an issue; the great majority of MPs probably s ck the party line and abide by
the party (group) rules voluntarily or otherwise readily accept the consequences of not
doing so. That those who are unsa sfied with party discipline when it comes to keeping
internal party discussions confiden al aremore likely towant party discipline to bemore
strict, indicates that MPs are concerned with maintaining (the appearance of) a united
front not only when vo ng, but also during other stages of the policy making process.
This concern with maintaining the appearance of a united front again indicates that it is
unlikely that parliament is insulated from the electoral arena.
49 It may be that policy specializa on has become a more important selec on criteria in the process of candi-
date selec on, but we do not have the data to corroborate this argument.
50 The different formula on of ques ons used in the 2010 Par Rep Surveymake an analysis over all six surveys




The sequen al approach
evaluated
7.1 The decision-making mechanisms
Trea ng poli cal par es as unitary actors is one of the most prevalent assump ons in
both poli cal theory and empirical poli cal science, as well in prac ce. Party group unity
in parliament is considered ‘normal’ (Olson, 2003, 165) or even ‘natural’ (Patzelt, 2003,
102), and as such is o en taken for granted. However, as pointed out by Kam (2009, 16)
party group unity “must be constructed one MP at a me”. We argue that party group
unity is a collec ve phenomenon, that the degree to which party groups are unified
is the result of the aggrega on of individual MPs’ behavior, and that each individual
MP’s behavior is brought about by his individual decision-making process consis ng of a
number of different stages that take place in a par cular order. Although our decision-
making model may not be exhaus ve and represent somewhat of a simplifica on of MP
decisionmaking, it does include themost important pathways iden fied in the literature
on party group unity.
Moreover, although previous studies on party group unity have found vo ng unity
to co-vary with par cular ins tu onal configura ons, the main argument forwarded in
this book is that parliamentary party unity is not affected by ins tu ons directly, but that
these ins tu ons affect the decision-makingmechanisms thatMPs apply in determining
whether to toe the party group line or dissent from it. Indeed, this is o en implicitly
acknowledged in research that focuses on explaining party vo ng unity in the theore cal
arguments used to underpin the hypotheses about the effects of ins tu ons on party
group unity. In our three empirical studies, we studied the occurrence and the rela ve
contribu on of these pathways, i.e., to what extent party groups in parliament can count
on each of themechanisms to get theirMPs to fall in line, andwhether and how these co-
vary with different cross-country ins tu onal se ngs (chapter 4), levels of government
(chapter 5), and changes in the electoral arena over me (chapter 6).
207
7.1. The decision-making mechanisms
In most of the 15 na onal parliaments included in our first study (chapter 4), pre-
vious research shows party vo ng unity to be very high—in some cases close to per-
fect (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Carey, 2007, 2009; Carrubba et al., 2006, 2008;
Depauw and Mar n, 2009; Kam, 2001a,b, 2009; Lanfranchi and Lüthi, 1999; Sieberer,
2006). However, studies that focus on the ul mate dependent variable—party vo ng
unity—do not tell us anything about how MPs come to vote with the party group, and
whether the rela ve contribu on of the different decision-makingmechanisms thatMPs
apply is the same in all parliaments. In other words, the decision-making mechanisms
applied by MPs that par es can generally count on for their MPs to toe the party group
line,—cue-taking, agreement, loyalty and obedience—may differ per individual MP, and
per parliament. In addi on, and in line with what is men oned above, we expected each
of the decision-making mechanisms to be affected by ins tu onal se ngs, and in the
first study we focused on the influence of parliamentary government (and thus the dif-
ference between MPs whose par es partake in government and those in opposi on),
electoral ins tu ons and MPs’ par es’ candidate selec on procedures.
Although the number of studies on party group unity at the subna onal level pales
in comparison to those that deal with party group unity at the na onal level, party (vot-
ing) unity seems to be the rule in (European) parliamentary democracies at the sub-
na onal level as well (Copus, 1997a,b, 1999b; Cowley, 2001; Davidson-Schmich, 2000,
2001, 2003; Denters et al., 2013; Deschouwer, 2003; Dewan and Spirling, 2011; Patzelt,
2003; Stecker, 2013). However, because at the subna onal level electoral districts, leg-
islatures and party groups are smaller than at the na onal level, and the subna onal
levels’ powers and jurisdic on are more limited than the na onal levels’, we expected
that the way in which party groups achieve unity, i.e., the rela ve contribu on of the dif-
ferent decision-making mechanisms, is different at the subna onal level than it is at the
na onal level. In our second study (chapter 5), we first analyzed representa ves’ ap-
plica on of the decision-making mechanisms in the na onal and regional parliaments
from the nine mul level countries included in the Par Rep Survey. We then repeated
the analysis of the four sequen al decision-making mechanisms at the Dutch na onal,
provincial andmunicipal level, as the case offered us more varia on on the independent
variable, and allowed us to keep the country context and ins tu onal se ngs constant.
Our third and final study (chapter 6) dealt with the ques on whether the changes
in the electoral arena over me, including increased electoral vola lity and par san
dealignment, have affected MPs’ behavior and par es’ ability to maintain party group
unity in the legisla ve arena (the ‘two-arena model’, Mayhew, 1974). We looked at
behavioral party group unity in terms of the number of party defec ons (measured in
terms ofMPswho leave their party group but stay in parliament), party vo ng unity (Rice
scores) and the frequency and depth of vo ng dissent over me in the Second Cham-
ber of the Dutch na onal parliament. Our analysis showed that although party defec-
ons are infrequent, their occurrence has increased slightly over me. This is, however,
mainly the result of the increase in the number of new party groups in parliament; the
number of defec ons among established par es is limited to two or three over the en-
re period since the Second World War. Party vo ng unity is very high, and has even
increased slightly over me. At first sight, this would seem to indicate that (established)
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par es’ ability to maintain party group unity is unaffected by changes in the electorate,
and that parliament is indeed isolated from the electoral arena (the ‘one-arena model’,
Bowler, 2000). However, we argue that this is unlikely, as relying solely on the ins -
tu ons of parliament to maintain party group unity would be a risky strategy from the
perspec ve of poli cal par es. We therefore expected that while the changes in the
electoral arena may have affected certain decision-making mechanisms, ‘par es as or-
ganiza ons’ have taken ac ve measures to increase the rela ve contribu on of other
mechanisms to counteract, and thus minimize, the effects of the changes in the elec-
torate.
In the subsec ons and tables below, we summarize our findings from the three stud-
ies, and draw comparisons between the studies for each of the decision-making mech-
anisms. As men oned in the introduc on of this book, because the studies involved
numerous different parliaments at different levels of government at different points in
me, and the survey ques ons used tomeasure the decision-makingmechanisms some-
mes differ across the three studies, comparison across the studies should be done
carefully. This sec on is followed by with some sugges ons of avenues for future re-
search, with a specific focus on ways in which we can improve our measurement of the
decision-making mechanisms in MP surveys. The chapter ends with a discussion of the
implica ons of our findings.
7.1.1 Division of labor
According to the sequen al decision-making model, when determining how to vote in
parliament, an MP first gauges whether he has a personal opinion on the vote at hand.
An MPmay not have a personal opinion on all topics that are put to a vote, and may not
have the me and resources to enable him to form a personal opinion. If this is the case,
the MP votes according to the cues given to him by his fellow party group members
who are specialized in, and/or who act as a spokesperson for the party group on the
ma er, or the party group leadership itself. Cue-taking as a decision-making mechanism
is made both possible and necessary by the party group’s applica on of a division of
labor; in order to deal with theworkload of parliament it is more efficient for party group
members to each specialize in par cular policy areas. As highlighted in chapter 3, cue-
taking is an o en (implicitly) acknowledged, but probably the most under-researched,
pathway to party group unity.
We did not formulate any hypotheses concerning the influence of electoral and can-
didate selec on ins tu ons on cue-taking for our study of the 15 na onal parliaments,
because we argued that this pathway is likely to be most affected by legisla ve ins -
tu ons, such as parliamentary party group size, legisla ve workload and parliamentary
(party group) rules. However, our descrip ve sta s cs provide some evidence of par-
es’ applica on of the division of labor in our 15 na onal parliaments, as 50 percent
of MPs consider themselves specialists, and over 60 percent answer that it is (mostly)
true that the parliamentary party spokesperson determines the party’s posi on on his
topic (see subsec on 4.3.1, not shown in Table 7.1). From this we can infer that MPs are
likely to engage in cue-taking when it comes to vo ng on issues outside of their arena of
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exper se for which they lack a personal opinion.
Although our expecta on was that cue-taking would play a less important role at
the subna onal level than at the na onal level as the result of the rela vely smaller size
of parliaments and party groups which limits party groups’ ability to apply a division
of labor among their party members (see Table 7.1), we actually found very few differ-
ences between regional and na onal representa ves in our nine mul level countries
(see subsec on 5.3.1). It may be that the na onal and subna onal legislatures in these
countries aremore similar thenwe assumed them to be. In the Dutch case, however, the
percentage of representa ves who consider themselves specialists is slightly higher at
the na onal level than at the subna onal levels, andwe found that at themunicipal level
itself, the percentage of specialists decreases with municipal council size (the la er is
not shown in Table 7.1). Moreover, the percentage of representa ves who consider the
statement that the party group spokesperson determines the posi on of the party group
on his topic (mostly) true, as well as the percentagewho iden fy the party group special-
ist or leadership as the main decision-making center in the parliamentary party group,
also decrease as we move down the ladder of government levels (see subsec on 5.4.1).
It therefore seems, that at least in the Netherlands where we were able to include rela-
vely small municipal councils which are likely to have very small party groups, that the
division of labor and associated decision-making mechanism of cue-taking play a less
important role at the subna onal level than at the na onal level, as expected.
In our study on the Dutch na onal parliament over me, we argued that in order to
deal with the increasedworkload of parliament, cue-taking as a decision-makingmecha-
nismwould have increased in importance over me as party groups are expected to have
increased the strength of the division of labor. There are indeed some indica ons that
over me Dutch MPs have increased their reliance on the cues given to them by their
party group spokesperson when it comes to vo ng on ma ers that MPs did not deal
with themselves for the party group. Moreover, when it comes to the main decision-
making center in the parliamentary party group, the percentage of DutchMPswho iden-
fy the party specialist or the party leadership as the main decision-making center also
increased over me, which points in the direc on of the consolida on of a stricter divi-
sion of labor and hierarchical decision making within the parliamentary party group (see
subsec on 6.5.1).
7.1.2 Party agreement
If anMP does have a personal opinion on thema er that is put to a vote, hemoves on to
the second decision-making stage, at which he assesses whether his opinion coincides
with the posi on of his party group. If this is the case, anMP votes according to the party
group line out of simple agreement. As opposed to the division of labor and its associ-
ated decision-making mechanism cue-taking, party groupmembers’ shared preferences
as a pathway to party group unity is probably most widely acknowledged and theorized
(Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bailer et al., 2011; Hazan, 2003; Kam, 2001a, 2009;
Krehbiel, 1993; Norpoth, 1976). And all three of our studies do indeed confirm the im-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. The decision-making mechanisms
vo ng behavior.
In order to gauge party agreement, we used a ques on included in the 2010 Par Rep
Survey that asked respondents how o en they disagree with the party’s posi on on a
vote in parliament. Of all MPs in our 15 na onal parliaments, 60 percent infrequently
disagree with the party on a vote in parliament. And although there are some differ-
ences between parliaments, in all countries over half of MPs indicate that they disagree
infrequently with the party line, entailing that in all parliaments party agreement is likely
to be a rela vely important pathway to party group unity. In terms of the influence of
ins tu ons, we argued that party selectorates are likely to select candidates whose pol-
icy preferences match their own, and thus expected MPs in par es with exclusive and
centralized candidate selec on procedures to bemore likely to frequently agreewith the
party line than MPs in par es in which candidate selec on is more inclusive and decen-
tralized, because the la er is likely to encompass a larger selectorate (which is likely to
have a broader range of preferences) and limits the na onal party’s (leadership’s) control
over which candidates are selected to run for elec on (see Table 7.2). And indeed, in our
15 na onal parliaments, MPs from par es in which candidate selec on is concentrated
in the hands of the na onal party leaders or a na onal party agency are more likely to
usually agree with the party than MPs who are selected by subna onal party leaders or
agencies, or party primaries at any level of the party organiza on (see subsec on 4.3.2).
Building on this same line of argumenta on, we hypothesized that MPs in party-
oriented electoral systems (where voters are unable to cast a preference vote and/or
there are few incen ves for personal-vote seeking and intra-party compe on)would be
more likely to frequently agree with the party than MPs from more candidate-oriented
electoral systems, because in the case of the former a party’s selectorate’s control over
candidates extends into the electoral arena. Our results are somewhat mixed, however.
Although on its own voters’ inability to cast a personal vote for an individual candidate
has a posi ve effect on party agreement, this effect actually decreases when district
magnitude increases. This may be the result of our rather crude measure of the ‘party-
orientedness’ of electoral systems, or the coding of par cular countries.1
We also find that government par cipa on has a nega ve effect on MPs’ propensity
to frequently agree with the party in our 15 na onal parliaments. This is in line with our
reasoning that domes c and interna onal circumstances, and in the case of coali on
government, the coali on agreement, may lead governments to take (ad hoc) measures
that are not included in the party program or electoral manifesto, which their parlia-
mentary counterparts are s ll expected to support, but individual MPs may not agree
with.
The percentage of representa ves who infrequently disagree with the party’s po-
si on on a vote in parliament in the nine mul level countries is higher at the regional
level than at the na onal level, entailing that party agreement is a rela vely stronger
pathway to party group unity at the subna onal level (see subsec on 5.3.2). This is in
line with our hypothesis, as we expected that party agreement would play a rela vely
1 As men oned in footnote 17 in chapter 4, alterna ve classifica ons of the formal proper es of electoral


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. The decision-making mechanisms
more important role at the subna onal level as a result of the smaller size of parliaments
and party groups. Although party agreement is stronger at all levels of government in
the Netherlands than in almost all of the nine mul level countries in the Par Rep Sur-
vey, the percentage point difference between the na onal and the subna onal levels
of Dutch government is about the same as between the na onal and regional level in
our nine mul level countries. At the municipal level, the percentage of councilors who
indicate to frequently agree with the party increases as council size decreases, thus sup-
por ng our argument that party agreement is easier to obtain in smaller party groups
(see subsec on 5.4.2).
In the Dutch case we also saw that whereas there is no rela onship between na-
onal MPs’ involvement in the party group and the frequency of disagreement, at the
subna onal level the more councilors feel involved in the decision making of their party
group, the more likely they are to frequently agree with their party on a vote. Given
that the percentage of representa ves who completely agree that they feel involved in
the decision making in their party group is much higher at the lower levels of govern-
ment (especially the municipal level) than at the na onal level, the analysis of the Dutch
case provides evidence for the no on that party agreement is not only determined by
ins tu ons external to the parliamentary arena (such as candidate selec on), and that
the mechanisms do not stand in isola on of each other; party agreement is also depen-
dent on the way in which party group decision making is organized (i.e., whether party
groups apply a division of labor and allow the party group spokesperson to determine
the posi on of the party group, or party group decision making and posi on crea on is
organized in a more collec ve manner within the party group).
Although the Dutch Parliamentary Studies do not allow us to assess the frequency
of disagreement in the Dutch parliament over me, we were able to ascertain both the
ideological homogeneity among the party group member from the three largest par-
es, as well the distance all MPs perceive between their own and their party’s posi on
on the Le -Right ideological scale. Our expecta on was that par es would have taken
measures to counteract the effects of electoral dealignment by making party agreement
a more important candidate selec on criterion over me. Whereas par es have been
able to maintain a high degree of ideological homogeneity among their MPs within their
party group, the distance MPs perceive between their own and their party’s posi on
actually increased over me (see subsec on 6.5.2). Given this increased distance, it is
likely that DutchMPs have over me becomemore likely to find themselves at odds with
the posi on of their party.
7.1.3 Party loyalty
At the third stage of our decision-making sequence, at which an MP finds himself in the
situa on that his party group has one posi on on a vote in parliament, but he himself
does not share that posi on, anMPmust decidewhether his subscrip on to the norm of
party group loyalty is strong enough to move him to vote with the party line voluntarily
despite his agreement. In our 15 na onal parliaments, 60 percent of all the MPs answer
that anMP ought to vote according to the party’s posi on in the case of conflict with the
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MP’s own opinion, whichmeans that on its own, party loyalty is also a powerful pathway
to party group unity (see subsec on 4.3.3). There are substan al differences between
countries, however, ranging from 89 percent of Dutch MPs subscribing to the norm of
party loyalty, to only 13 percent of Swiss MPs doing so. When placed in our sequen al
decision-making model, 20 percent of all MPs frequently disagree with the party, but
s ll vote with the party out of a sense of loyalty, entailing that in comparison to party
agreement, party loyalty is of less importance in ge ng MPs to toe the party line volun-
tarily (see subsec on 4.3.5).2 Thus on average the party groups in these parliaments can
count on the two voluntary pathways of party agreement and party loyalty for almost 80
percent of their MPs. That in our sequen al decision-making model party loyalty is less
important than party agreement is, of course, the result of the order in which we place
party agreement and party loyalty in our decision-making sequence. However, the order
of mechanisms was extensively theorized, and is also matched by the formula on of the
ques on used to measure party loyalty, which inquires specifically into the situa on in
which anMP’s opinion and the party’s posi on conflict (i.e., following the stage at which
an MP gauges whether his own personal opinion matches the party’s posi on).3
When it comes to the influence of ins tu ons onMPs’ propensity to subscribe to the
norm of party group loyalty, we expected MPs from par es with exclusive and central-
ized candidate selec on procedures to bemore likely to subscribe to the norm thanMPs
from par es with inclusive and decentralized candidate selec on methods. In the same
vein, we hypothesized that MPs who are elected through party-oriented electoral sys-
temswould bemore likely to indicate to remain loyal to the party thanMPs in candidate-
oriented electoral systems (see Table 7.3). The underlying argument of both these ex-
pecta ons is that the former ins tu onal configura ons minimize the extent to which
MPs are confronted with compe ng principals (either in the form of a broader selec-
toral body or the voters in the electorate) who may diffuse MPs’ loyalty to the party
group in parliament. However, although on its own candidate selec on does have the
predicted effect on party loyalty, voters’ inability to cast a personal vote does not, and
both do not have the predicted effect on party loyalty in our mul variate model (see
subsec on 4.3.3).
As an alterna ve to the formal proper es of electoral systems, we also added two
variables to our model that gauge MPs’ a tudes concerning (and the value they as-
cribe to) personal vote seeking and their choice when it comes to a conflict between
their two main principals: the voters and their party. Our analysis revealed that MPs
who prefer to run a party campaign as opposed to a personal campaign are also more
likely to vote according to the party’s posi on instead of their own opinion in the case
2 Asdiscussed in eachof our empirical chapters, we are unable to include thefirst stage of our decision-making
sequence, cue-taking, in our sequen al decision-making model due to the formula on of the ques ons
we used to gauge cue-taking. This is discussed in more detail in the sugges ons for future research (see
sec on 7.2).
3 The theorized order between party agreement and party loyalty was also matched in the 2010 Par Rep
Survey, where the ques on used to measure party loyalty was a direct follow-up ques on to the ques ons
which asks how o en the respondent finds himself in disagreement with the party’s posi on, which was
used to gauge party agreement.
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of conflict, but the difference disappears in the full model. We also found that MPs who
hold the opinion that an MP ought to vote according to voters’ opinion instead of the
party’s posi on when the two conflict, are also more likely to opt for their own opinion
over the party’s posi on (this variable is sta s cally significant on its own as well in the
mul variate model). In other words, whereas our formal ins tu onal variables that are
theorized to influence the degree to which MPs are confronted with compe ng princi-
pals to the party group do not have the predicted effect onMPs’ propensity to subscribe
to the norm of party loyalty, our a tudinal measure of the importance MPs ascribe to
the voters versus the party as compe ng principals does.
Our third and final hypothesis for our 15 na onal parliaments was that MPs’ from
government par es would be more likely to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty than
opposi on MPs because the added responsibility of suppor ng government ini a ves
and the threat of early elec ons would ins ll in government MPs a stronger feeling of
loyalty. Although in the predicted direc on, on its own government par cipa on does
not have a sta s cally significant effect on party loyalty. The variable is just shy of sta-
s cal significance in the full model, however.
Returning to the logic of the compe ng principals theory, one of themain differences
between the na onal and subna onal level of government is the rela vely smaller size
and closer proximity (in terms of both geography and popula on) of subna onal rep-
resenta ves’ cons tuencies, which we expected to lead subna onal representa ves to
engage in a more direct rela onship with voters who may diffuse representa ves’ party
loyalty. We thus hypothesized subna onal representa ves to be less likely to subscribe
to the normof party loyalty than na onalMPs, but our analysis of party loyalty on its own
reveals the opposite (see subsec on 5.3.3). However, when we only include represen-
ta ves for whom party loyalty is a relevant decision-making mechanism, i.e. those who
indicate to frequently disagree with the party line, party loyalty is, as expected, stronger
among na onal MPs than among regional representa ves (see subsec on 5.3.5). When
comparing the three levels of Dutch government, party loyalty is strongest at the na-
onal level when including all representa ves, as well as in the sequen al model when
we only include those who frequently disagree with the party on a vote in parliament
(see subsec on 5.4.3 and subsec on 5.4.5).
Aswas the case in our analysis ofMPs in 15 na onal parliaments, in both the analyses
in chapter 5, we looked more closely at the influence of MPs’ choice when confronted
with a conflict between voters’ opinion and the party’s posi on (not shown in Table 7.3).
We found no difference between na onal and regional representa ves; in both cases
around 60 percent places the party’s posi on above the voters’ opinion. In the Dutch
case, the percentage of representa ves who answer that anMP ought to vote according
to the voters’ opinion instead of the party posi on does indeed increase as we move
down the ladder of government levels, but with a maximum of 35 percent op ng for
voters’ opinion at the municipal level, the influence of voters’ as compe ng principals
does not seem be very strong at any level of government in the Dutch case. However, at
the Dutch provincial andmunicipal level, of the councilors who answer thanMP ought to
s ck to the voters’ opinion instead of the party’s posi on, two-thirds also answer that an




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. The decision-making mechanisms
two conflict. This can be interpreted as meaning that for most of those councilors who
do not subscribe to the norm party loyalty and thus vote according to their own opinion,
this decision may be influenced by their loyalty to the voters as compe ng principals to
the party. In our nine mul level countries, representa ves who consider voters’ opinion
more important than the party’s posi on are alsomore likely to opt for their own opinion
when in conflict with the party’s posi on, but the rela onship is weaker at the regional
level than at the na onal level.
Finally, in the Dutch na onal parliament, party loyalty increases in strength over
me; the percentage of MPs who indicate that in the case of disagreement anMP ought
to vote according to the party line increases over me, whereas the percentage of MPs
who think that an MP ought to hold his ground and vote according to his own posi on,
decreases over me (the percentage of MPs who answer that it depends remained rel-
a vely stable, see subsec on 6.5.3). This is in line with our hypothesis, for which we
argued that over me party loyalty as a candidate selec on criterion would have in-
creased in importance as par es tried to counteract the effects of par san dealignment
and electoral vola lity.
As is clear from the summary above, our studies providemixed results when it comes
to party loyalty. Whereas in our analyses of the three levels of Dutch government and
the Dutch na onal parliament over me, our findings with regard to party loyalty gen-
erally meet our expecta ons, this is not the case in the studies of the 15 na onal par-
liaments and the na onal and regional legislatures from the nine mul level countries.
In both of these analyses, we have varia on in the percentage of representa ves who
subscribe to the norm of party loyalty, but this varia on does not seem to correspond
to the differences in ins tu onal se ngs that are theorized to influence the extent to
which representa ves are confronted with compe ng principals to the party. It could be
that even if electoral ins tu ons provide themeans to discriminate between candidates
on the basis of their loyalty to different principals, candidates’ subscrip on to certain
norms is a less important selec on criterion than party agreement seems to be, or that
the electorate is unable to accurately gauge candidates’ loyalty. Admi edly, the oper-
a onaliza on of the formal electoral ins tu ons that are deemed to affect the extent
to which representa ves are confronted with compe ng principals is up for discussion,
and thus our findings with regard to these formal ins tu ons may not be very robust.
Our a tudinal measures of the importance that representa ves ascribe to voters’ ver-
sus the party do have the predicted effect, however. Thus it could be that the theory of
compe ng principals hasmerit, but not through formal ins tu ons, but representa ves’
personal internaliza on of norms of party versus voter loyalty, which are likely to be the
result of their (previous) experience as representa ves of their party, or his legisla ve
party group environment. The judging of the applicability of these norms is an individual
MP’s decision, and seems largely unaffected by his electoral ins tu onal environment.
7.1.4 Party discipline
If an MP has an opinion on the ma er that is put to a vote, but his opinion does not cor-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. The decision-making mechanisms
or his conflict with the party’s posi on is so intense that it supersedes party loyalty, an
MP’s party group (leadership) may s ll try to elicit the MP to toe the party line through
sanc ons. Our final pathway to party group unity is therefore party discipline, which
entails that representa ves vote with the party line involuntarily out of obedience in re-
sponse to the an cipa on, promise, threat or actual applica on of posi ve and nega ve
sanc ons by the party group (leadership). In all three of our studies, we measure party
discipline by inquiring into representa ves’ opinions on whether party discipline ought
to be less strict (which we take to be indica ve of that representa ves have experience
being disciplined or operate under the threat of sanc ons), more strict or remain as it
is. And in all of our studies, representa ves are overwhelmingly content with general
party discipline as it is, as well as with most specific aspects of party discipline, including
party discipline when it comes to s cking to the party line when vo ng in parliament. As
discussed before in each of our three empirical chapters, our ques ons regarding repre-
senta ves’ sa sfac on with party discipline required quite a bit of interpreta on, which
may have resulted in an underes ma onof the importance of the pathway. On the other
hand, in all of our studies the voluntary pathways of party agreement and party loyalty
account for a very large percentage of representa ves’ vo ng behavior once the three
mechanisms are placed in the sequen al decision-making model, which does seem to
indicate that party discipline is not as relevant a pathway to party group unity as is o en
(implicitly) assumed in the literature.
In our study of the 15 na onal parliaments, we expected candidate selec on proce-
dures that are exclusive and centralized to enhance the (parliamentary) party’s leaders’
ability to credibly (threaten or promise to) use candidate reselec on as a disciplining
mechanism, and that party-oriented electoral systems further extend this control into
the electoral arena (see Table 7.4). We also hypothesized that the responsibility of gov-
ernment and threat of early elec ons would make governing par es more willing to
(threaten or promise to) use discipline than opposi on par es. MPs’ sa sfac on with
party vo ng discipline is not affected by any of the formal ins tu ons, however. But
MPs who either frequently disagree with the party line, or do not subscribe to the norm
of party loyalty, are more likely to want less strict party vo ng discipline, which is in line
with our argument that discipline is only relevant when voluntary pathways fail to bring
MPs to toe the party line on their own (see subsec on 4.3.4). It therefore seems that
it is not party leaders’ access to ins tu ons that can be used to credibly punish or re-
wardMPs that determineswhether they are disciplined, butMPs’ decisions at the earlier
stages of the decision-making sequence.
We expected party discipline to be less common at the subna onal level than at the
na onal level because subna onal representa ves are likely to be less dependent on
their party for their (future) career and livelihood than na onal MPs are, rendering the
use of discipline less credible and thus less effec ve. Although there are no differences
between the regional and na onal level in our nine mul level countries when it comes
to their sa sfac on with party discipline on its own, party vo ng discipline did play the
expected stronger role at the na onal level than at the regional level once placed in our
sequen al decision-makingmodel (see subsec on 5.3.5). In the Dutch case the percent-
age of representa ves who indicate that party discipline ought to be less strict is also in-
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deed lower at themunicipal level than at the na onal level (subsec on 5.4.4). Given the
high levels of sa sfac on with party discipline at all three levels of Dutch government,
it is a bit surprising that when asked about the likelihood of specific types of sanc ons,
in most cases over two-thirds considered the sanc on (very) likely, which also indicates
that our model may underes mate the role of party discipline. Lower level representa-
ves are, however, also more prone to consider sanc ons less likely, however.
Finally, we also expected the use of party discipline to have increased over me in the
Dutch na onal parliament because MPs have become increasingly dependent on their
party as a result of the demise of societal pillars, and the fact that the func on of MP
has become a full- me occupa on. But because only the last three surveys (the 2001
and 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Studies and the 2010 Par Rep Survey) contain ques ons
concerning party discipline, we were unable to assess whether there are any changes
in party discipline over a longer period of me for the Dutch na onal parliament. How-
ever, the fact that in these three later surveys over three quarters of Dutch MPs are
sa sfied with the level of general party discipline in their party, and over 90 percent are
sa sfied with party discipline when it comes to vo ng in parliament, indicates that party
discipline, when it is applied, is likely to be considered acceptable and vo ng unity fairly
undisputed (see subsec on 4.3.4).
Another final finding worth men oning is the fact that in all three of our studies,
representa ves tend to be least sa sfied with party discipline when it comes to keeping
internal party discussions confiden al. As men oned before, the fact that many repre-
senta ves would like to see stricter party discipline when it comes to this specific aspect
of party life highlights that party group unity is not just about the final vote in parliament,
but a much broader requirement that comprises the en re policy making process. MPs
seem to beworried about the appearance of disunity, which serves as another indica on
that the legisla ve arena is not insulated from the electoral arena.
7.2 Sugges ons for future research
Our studies reveal that ins tu ons affect the decision-making mechanisms in different
ways. Whereas MPs’ frequency of agreement seems to be most strongly influenced by
changes and ins tu ons outside the parliamentary arena, this is less the case for MPs’
propensity to subscribe to the norm of party loyalty. MPs’ sa sfac on with party dis-
cipline, which we interpret as indica ve of MPs experience with their party’s applica-
on of party discipline, seems least affected by the ins tu onal configura ons in which
MPs and par es are situated. In our analysis of 15 na onal parliaments, we use rather
roughmeasures of candidate selec on procedures and electoral ins tu ons, which may
account for some of the unexpected results. However, given that in our cases these in-
s tu ons are quite party and country specific, a more precise classifica on may have
led to high levels of mul collinearity with the countries and par es to which these MPs
belong (which we already take into account by using a mul level model). Furthermore,
for our analysis of the regional and na onal parliaments in nine mul level countries in
chapter 5, we do not control for electoral and legisla ve ins tu ons, and use the levels
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of government towhichMPs belong as a proxy for cons tuency size, legisla ve authority,
party size, and the extent to whichMPs are dependent on their party for their livelihood
and future career. In our study of the Dutch na onal parliament, we similarly use me
as a variable to capture the poten al effects of electoral vola lity and par san dealign-
ment. Although using proxies was unavoidable as a result of data restric ons, future
research could further explore these rela onships using more precise measures.
Our studies also show that the rela ve contribu on of the decision-making mecha-
nisms differs between parliaments, levels of government, and over me, which research
that focuses solely the outcome, MPs’ vo ng behavior, is unable to provide insight into.
All of the studies were based on (preexis ng) elite surveys, however, and as such we
were limited in our ability to accurately gauge the rela ve contribu on of some of the
decision-making mechanisms. Moreover, our analyses of representa ves’ responses
some mes required quite a bit of interpreta on. Although repea ng exis ng ques ons
in future elite surveys certainly has its merits in terms of diachronic comparison, we do
have some sugges ons for prospec ve elite surveys that would to enable us to measure
the (rela ve) role of decision-making mechanisms more precisely.
For our measures of cue-taking, for example, we argued that if anMP considers him-
self a specialist, it is reasonable to assume that he will not have an opinion on all ma ers
that are put to a vote and thus need to engage in cue-taking. And we took MPs’ agree-
ment with the statement that the party specialist determines the posi on of the party
in parliament as an indica on of par es’ applica on of the division of labor. But we did
not have a ques on that inferred specifically into the role of cue-taking inMPs’ decision-
making process when it comes to vo ng in parliament. Moreover, the ques on we use
in our first two studies to gauge party agreement, the frequency of disagreement, is un-
able to discriminate betweenMPs who indicate that they infrequently disagree because
they almost always share the posi on of the party, or because they lack an opinion on
the ma er at hand (and thus do not disagree). For these reasons, we were unable to
include cue-taking in our sequen al decision-making model, and this limited our abil-
ity to assess its rela ve contribu on, which might have led to an overes ma on of the
importance of the decision-making mechanisms in the stages that follow.
As outline in Figure 3.1 (see chapter 3), at the first stage of our decision-making
model, anMP asks himself whether he has a personal opinion on the vote at hand. Thus,
in order to include this stage in our decision-making sequence, a first ques on to intro-
duce to future MP surveys could be ‘When it comes to vo ng in parliament, how o en
are you faced with the situa on that you do not have a personal opinion on a vote?’.
We cannot expect, however, MPs to remember exactly how many mes this occurred.
As is the case with the answering categories to our ques on concerning the frequency
of disagreement (i.e., our measure of party agreement in chapter 4 and chapter 5), we
would probably then need to use broad frequency descrip ons (‘about once a month’,
‘about once every three months’, ‘about once a year’ and ‘(almost) never’) as answering
categories. This ques on could then be followed by one that asks ‘What do you (usually)
dowhen you do not have a personal opinion on a vote in parliament?’, with the following
answering op ons:
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1. I invest me and resources to form my own opinion.
2. I vote according to the party posi on as s pulated in the party program and/or
electoral manifesto.
3. I vote according to the advice of the party group spokesperson on that topic.
4. I vote according to the advice of the party group leadership.
According to the sequen al decision-making model, respondents who pick the first an-
swer move on to the second stage of the decision-making process, which involves as-
sessing whether their own opinion corresponds to the party’s posi on. If a respondent
selects one of the other three answers, this means that he engages in cue-taking. The
inclusion of three alterna ve sources would give us more insight into the rela ve impor-
tance of these sources as poten al vo ng cue-givers.4
The ques on used in our first two empirical studies tomeasure party agreement, the
frequency of disagreement, is appropriate for the sequen al decision-making model as
it refers specifically to vo ng and specifies the actors (the MP and his party) and the
situa on at hand (a disagreement over a vote). It allowed us to move beyond the use
of abstract Le -Right ideological and policy scales, and enabled us to place both party
agreement as well as the stages that followed in the sequen al decision-making model.
The fact that it precedes our measure of party loyalty is also a posi ve characteris c, as
we can safely assume that respondents were likely to interpret the ques on as inquiring
into the frequency of disagreement before vo ng takes place (and thus that it does not
measure behavioral party group unity).5
The ques on thatwe used tomeasure party loyalty is the same as the one developed
by Eulau et al. (1959), later amended by Converse and Pierce (1979, 1986), to measure
representa onal role orienta on and style (the party delegate role).6 It was also used by
4 Alterna vely, instead of asking respondents to select only one answer to the ques on about what they
(usually) do in the situa on inwhich they donot have a personal opinion on a vote, we could ask respondents
to rate each of the answering categories an ordinal scale in terms of their likelihood (as we did for the
ques ons concerning the likelihood of nega ve sanc ons in the Dutch version of the Par Rep Survey (see
subsec on 5.4.4 in chapter 5). This would, however, make it more difficult to place the ques on in the
sequen al decision-making model.
5 The original answering categories (‘about once a month’, ‘about once every three months’, ‘about once
a year’ and ‘(almost) never’), and especially their dichotomiza on into the two categories ‘frequently dis-
agree’ and ‘infrequently disagree’ for the sequen al decision-making model, is open to cri cism, because
the number of votes taken may differ across parliaments. Our argument is, however, that if disagreement
occurs about once a year or (almost) never, an MP ought to be able to recall each of these infrequent oc-
casions on which disagreement it took place individually, whereas if it occurs about once a month or once
every three months, the MP may not be able to recall each case individually and thus can be classified as
disagreeing frequently.
6 We have assumed that an MP’s adherence and thus loyalty to the opinions of other poten al foci of repre-
senta on, which may act as poten ally compe ng principals to the poli cal party, are subsumed in anMP’s
own opinion. In doing so, we do not differen ate MPs who take on a ‘trustee’ style of representa on from
those who could be labeled ‘voter delegates’ (Converse and Pierce, 1979, 1986). Furthermore, our study is
far from exhaus ve in terms of the influence of other poten al compe ng principals and other actors who
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Andeweg and Thomassen (2011a) to gauge party loyalty in their earlier study of the path-
ways to party group unity in the Dutch parliament. As is the case with our measure of
the frequency of disagreement, the ques on refers specifically to the two relevant actors
(although in this case, it refers to ‘an MP’ in the abstract, and not the respondent him-
self) and a specific situa on (a disagreement over a vote). We interpreted it as referring
specifically to norma ve reasons to vote with the party line voluntarily, but must admit
that we cannot be completely sure that all the representa ves in the different surveys
interpreted the ques on and answering categories in the same way. Some may have
interpreted it as indeed referring to norma ve mo va ons exclusively (which is implied
by the use of the term should in the answering categories), whereas other may also have
taken ra onalist calcula ons and the possible (threat of) party discipline into account in
their answer. In order to avoid this confusion in future surveys, the ques on could be
formulated more specifically: ‘Disregarding any posi ve and nega ve consequences for
the MP personally, how do you think an MP should vote in the case of disagreement
between the MPs’ opinion and the party posi on on a vote in parliament?’
Finally, when it comes to our measure of party discipline, we argue that MPs who
answer that party discipline ought to be less strict are those who have experienced dis-
cipline in the past. It is unlikely that someone who has personally experienced discipline
in the past would like to see discipline be applied more strictly, but one could argue that
an MP who has been disciplined in the past could s ll be sa sfied with party discipline
as it is, as he accepts the need for discipline, and agrees with the way in which an MP’s
individual freedom and the collec ve benefits of party group unity are balanced within
his party. Although we do use MPs’ assessment of party discipline when it comes to
vo ng according to the party line in parliament specifically in our sequen al decision-
making model, the ques on suffers from the same limita ons as do our measures of the
first decision-making mechanism, cue-taking (i.e., we are unable to specifically gauge
an individual MP’s personal responsiveness to posi ve and nega ve sanc ons when it
comes to vo ng). We thus may have underes mated the importance of party discipline
throughout our analyses. However, including it in our model is less problema c than
is the case for our cue-taking ques on because party discipline is the last stage in our
decision-making model. As an alterna ve, future surveys could reformulate the ques-
on concerning party discipline when it comes to vo ng in parliament to ‘How do you
think your party group (leadership) will respond in the case of disagreement between
an MPs’ opinion and the party’s posi on on a vote in parliament?’, or more specifically,
‘How do you think the party (group) leadership will respond when an MP expresses his
intent to not vote according to the party line?’, with the following answering categories:
1. The party (group) leadership will let the MP vote according to his own opinion.
2. The party (group) leadership will make the MP vote according to the party’s posi-
on.
try to influence the behavior of parliamentary actors. Our argument is, however, is that this study focuses
on the rela onship between MPs vis-à-vis their par es specifically.
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The first answer indicates that an MP would be allowed to dissent from the party line,
whereas the second implies that the party (group) leadership will apply pressure in or-
der to elicit obedience from theMP (although the former answering category admi edly
does not exclude the possibility of the party (group) leadership applying nega ve sanc-
ons in the long term). The ques on could be followed by a ques on that inquires into
the likelihood of different nega ve sanc ons, similar to the ques on that was included
in the Dutch version of the Par Rep Survey (see subsec on 5.4.4 in chapter 5).
These sugges ons for future elite surveys would provide for a fuller understanding of
the sequence, and enable us tomeasure the rela ve contribu onof each of the decision-
making mechanisms more precisely than we were able to do in our studies. Aggregated
at the level of the parliaments, the use of elite surveys as the main source of data en-
ables us to analyzeMPs’ applica on, and the rela ve contribu on, of these mechanisms
as general tendencies. However, as evidenced by the popularity of the answering cat-
egory ‘it depends’ when it comes to the ques on whether in the case of disagreement
anMP should vote according to his own opinion or the party’s posi on in the Dutch Par-
liamentary studies (see subsec on 6.5.3), an individual MP’s decision-making process is
likely to be affected by variables other than those included in these studies. If we want
to go beyond the study of general trends and look more closely at the circumstances
that may affect MP decision making, and further test and refine our sequen al decision-
making model, other data sources and research methods may be preferred.
As highlighted earlier (see the discussion of the simplifica onof the sequen almodel
in subsec on 3.3.3 in chapter 3), whether or not anMP has an opinion is likely to depend
on the importance and substance of the vote at hand. AnMPwho lacks a personal opin-
ion may usually follow the vo ng advice provided by the party spokesperson or party
leadership, but if the vote is important to him personally, he may invest me and re-
sources to form his own opinion. It may also be that theMP first had a personal opinion,
but was convinced to alter his posi on based on substan ve discussions in the party
group mee ng or with actors outside of parliament. Again, the fact that others were
able to change theMP’s opinion may be influenced by the substance of, and importance
ascribed to, the vote (by either the MP himself or the actors with who he deliberates).
As we have acknowledged, the substance and importance of the vote can also affect
whether or not anMP votes with the party out of loyalty: even if an MP has internalized
the norm of party loyalty, there may be some issues about which an MP (or those ac-
tors outside the party group who he considers his poli cal principals) feels very strongly,
and thus on which the conflict is so intense that it supersedes his loyalty to his party
group.7 Finally, the importance of the vote may also influence the extent to which the
party (group) leadership is willing to apply sanc ons, and theMP is willing to incur them.
Admi edly, the studies in this book have not been able to take this into account. One
could argue, however, that the substance and importance of the vote do not change the
ques ons MPs ask themselves in determining to vote with the party line or not, or the
7 Furthermore, an MP’s subscrip on to party loyalty, as well as his responsiveness to sanc ons, may not only
depend on the substance and the importance of the ma er put to vote, but also on the stage of an MP’s
career (Kam, 2009).
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order in which they do so.
In addi on, we have not taken into account the fact thatMPs are constantly involved
in numerous different decision-making processes that take place simultaneously over an
extended period of me. This means that that the factors that play a role in one decision
may affect a decision on a different vote. The parliamentary party group is not only a
delibera ve arena, but also a poli cal arena. An MP may, for example, not form an
opinion about a certain vote because he promised a colleague that he would vote with
the party group, in exchange for his colleagues support on his own proposal. His lack of
an opinion is therefore not only dependent on his lack of me and resources, or on the
substan ve content and importance of the vote, but also by his promise to colleague on
a different vote. Or an MP may disagree with the party groups posi on, but may again
toe the party line because he exchanged his support on the vote at hand for support from
a colleague on other issue. As we saw in Table 5.26 in chapter 5, the majority of Dutch
representa ves at all levels of government answered that it is very likely that anMPwho
(repeatedly) does not vote according to the party group line will have trouble finding
support among his fellow party group members for his own ini a ves. It is therefore
likely that the ac vemechanism here is anMP’s fear of nega ve repercussions, and thus
party discipline.
The fact MPs are involved in mul ple simultaneous decision-making processes over
an extended period of memeans thatMPs have repeated experiencewith the decision-
making process. This may entail that, on a par cular vote, MPs’ decisions at earlier
stages of the decision-making process may be influenced by their an cipated decisions
at later stages in the sequence. Their an cipa on being based on their own personal
previous vo ng experience. The lack of a personal opinion, and resultant decision to
vote with the party as a result of cue-taking, for example, could also arise from an MP’s
general subscrip on to the norm of party loyalty being so strong, that anMP decide that
he need not even bother developing a personal opinion, as he is convinced that even if
he disagrees, he will vote with the party’s posi on out of loyalty anyway. The MP may
also not form an opinion because he an cipates that if he disagrees with the party’s po-
si on, sanc ons will be applied to which the MP knows he will be responsive. Thus, if
both MPs and party (group) leaders are aware of this order the decision-making mech-
anisms, and MPs’ decisions at earlier stages of the model may indeed be influenced by
their an cipa on of their decision at the stages that follow, wemay overes mate the rel-
a ve importance of the first mechanisms in the model, especially that of cue-taking. In
addi on, the possibility of an cipa onmay blur the lines between themechanisms, and
thus may also lead MPs (and therefore also researchers) to muddle the decision-making
mechanisms.
As men oned in the introduc on to this book (see page 7 in chapter 1), the ul mate
dependent variable in a study of party group unity would be individual MPs’ final behav-
ioral outcome. Thus, the ul mate test of the sequen al decision-making model would
be to apply it to individual MPs (who are at different stages of their career) as they come
to their vo ng decision (or other types of behavior) on different topics. In order to do
so we would need to obtain access to individual MPs and, ideally, the party groups to
which they belong. Access to individual MPs would enable us to study howMPs come to
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their vo ng decisions on specific votes. This would require either a large research team
of observers and interviewers, or limi ng the study to a few specificMPs, comparable to
Richard Fenno’s (1978; 1990) study of US legislators in the 1970s. In order to take into
account that MPs are constantly confronted with mul ple votes from different issue ar-
eas to which they ascribe different degrees of importance, and to gain be er insights
into the role of the decision-making mechanisms, as well as the role of an cipa on, we
would need have mul ple observa ons and interviews over me. All in all, accessing
the individual MP and directly study their decision-making process in rela on to specific
votes would allow us to not only further test the model in its current form, but also re-
fine is in order to deal with complica ng factors such as the fact that MPs are involved in
constantly involved in mul ple decisions on different votes, and the associated possibil-
ity of an cipa on by both the MP himself as well as others, including his poli cal party
(group) members and leadership.
Accessing the parliamentary party group,8 and specifically the interac ons between
group members behind the scenes and during the mee ngs of the parliamentary party
group, would enable us to observe the processes of cue-taking and delibera on within
the group, and get a glimpse of the applica on of party discipline in terms of both posi-
ve and nega ve sanc ons, as well as the role of subtler forms of (group) pressure and
persuasion. This could take on the form of a single-case study of one party group, al-
though accessing mul ple party groups would allow for comparison of groups of dif-
ferent ideologies, sizes, age, etc., that may have different styles of leadership and group
decision-making. Although there are a fewexamples of journalists and researchers being
allowed behind the closed doors of the parliamentary party group (for the Netherlands,
see Van Westerloo (2003) for an example), it is likely that this will be a difficult research
method to apply.9 As has become apparent in all three of our studies, representa ves
tend to worry about the appearance of party disunity, evidenced by the fact that many
would prefer stricter party discipline when it comes to keeping internal party discussions
confiden al. One sugges on could be to start at the lower levels of government, as this
allows researchers to tap into a large number of legisla ve assemblies, and thus party
groups and individual representa ves, who may be easier to gain access to than those
are the na onal level. Keeping in mind the rather low response rates obtained through
the 2010 Par Rep Survey, lower government levels could also serve as a source of data
for future elite surveys on representa on in general, and party group unity in par cular.
Our findings suggest that although the sequen al decision-making model seems rele-
8 At the start of this research project, we approached all the parliamentary party groups in the Dutch Second
Chamber with the request to allow us to observe their party group mee ngs. Unfortunately, not enough of
the party groups were willing to par cipate to allow for varia on of on key independent variables (govern-
ment versus opposi on, large versus small par es, etc.) that may influence the workings of the party group
and the pathways to party group unity, and which would have enhanced our ability to guarantee anonymity.
In the end, even the par es that had ini ally shown interest withdrew from the project.
9 One of the poten al weaknesses of the observer method of data collec on and analysis is that the presence
of an observer may influence the behavior of the subjects of study (Gillespie and Michelson, 2011, 262).
The fact that in our surveys MPs seem to worry about keeping internal party discussions confiden al may
increase the risk of altered behavior.
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vant at all levels of government, the rela ve role of the decision-making mechanisms
differs at the levels of government, however, which researchers who do follow up on
this study of party group unity and MPs’ decision-making should keep in mind.
7.3 Implica ons
By approaching party group unity from the perspec ve of individual MPs’ decision mak-
ing, this bookmakes an important contribu on to our understanding ofwhat party group
unity actually consists of, and how it is brought about. All three of our studies reveal that
the vast majority of representa ves vote with the party out of simple agreement, and
that when representa ves disagree with the party’s posi on, most can be counted on to
s ll toe the party line out of a sense of loyalty despite their disagreement. In all of our
studies, only a small percentage of representa ves would prefer less strict party vo ng
discipline, and the majority of MPs are actually quite sa sfied with party vo ng disci-
pline as it is. Moreover, when put in the sequen al decision-making model, party vo ng
discipline plays the least important role of the three mechanisms (cue-taking is not in-
cluded in the decision-making sequence). Thus, party group unity mainly results from
MPs’ voluntarism, whereas party discipline plays a secondary role.
The analysis of the Dutch Second Chamber over me (chapter 6) showed that al-
though the Le -Right ideological homogeneity of party groups in parliament has re-
mained rela ve high, MPs have become more likely to perceive a larger distance be-
tween their own opinion and the party’s posi on, entailing that, at least from the per-
spec ve of MPs themselves, party agreement seems to has suffered over me. For the
Dutch case, we were unable to look at MPs’ sa sfac on with party discipline over a long
period of me, but given the fact that in both the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study and
the 2010 Par Rep Survey over 90 percent of respondents answers that they are sa s-
fied with party vo ng discipline as it, it is unlikely that par es nowadays rely much on
discipline, or have increased its use over me in response to the decrease in party agree-
ment. We do see, however, that the percentage of MPs who subscribe to the norm of
party loyalty has increased over me. Thus, even in the face of decreasing party agree-
ment, Dutch par es themselves are able to, and are likely to actually prefer to, count on
MPs’ voluntarily loyalty rather than apply party discipline for their MPs’ vo ng behavior.
Party discipline is costly both from the perspec ve of MPs, as well as poli cal par es.
An MP who needs to be (repeatedly) coaxed or threatened into vo ng according to the
party group line is likely to suffer in terms of his standing in the party group as well as
his future poli cal career (see subsec on 5.4.4 in chapter 5). And if par es apply too
much discipline, or do so too o en, this is likely to be counterproduc ve, as the con-
stant threat and applica on of sanc on is likely to affect MPs’ solidarity with the party
group leadership, and thus their loyalty to the poli cal party.
Given the high levels of party group unity in (most) of the parliaments included in our
three studies, however, party discipline is s ll relevant. In all three of our studies, the
voluntary pathways to party group unity can account for most, but not all, of the MPs
in the sequen al decision-making models. Moreover, our analysis of the 15 na onal
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parliaments (chapter 4) shows that at the individual level, MPs who do not agree with
the party line or do not subscribe to the norm of party loyalty are most likely to prefer
less strict party discipline. Our findings confirm the theore cal argument forwarded by
Bowler et al. (1999a) and further specified by Hazan (2003), that “discipline starts where
cohesion falters”. Describing party groups that act as unitary actors as disciplined, as is
o en done by both scholars and poli cal commentators alike, does not paint a repre-
senta ve picture of the way in which par es achieve their unity. Depic ng these par es
groups as cohesive seems more accurate, but does not encompass the en re picture.
Now that we have a be er insight into the way in whichMPs come to the decision to
vote with the party, what does this entail for our models of representa on? According
to Manin (1997, 196-197), “today’s alleged crisis in representa on” involves a change
from the predominance of party democracy to audience democracy, resul ng from the
deseculariza on and moderniza on of society (see chapter 2). Whereas party democ-
racy is characterized by an electorate organized along rela ve stable social-economic
cleavages whose votes express their iden ty in terms of class and religion, Manin (1997,
226-228) argues that audience democracy involves reac ve vo ng based on ‘hazy im-
ages’ of par es’ electoral promises, but increasingly more the images projected by in-
dividual poli cians, especially party leaders. Manin is clear on what party democracy
entails for the rela onship between MPs and their par es, but he remains rather vague
in terms of what a shi towards audience democracy means for MPs and their par es in
parliament.
When we base our answer to the ques on on what we know from previous stud-
ies about MPs’ vo ng behavior, the short answer seems to be ‘not much’. Party vo ng
unity in the 1990s and 2000s is found to be high in (most) the parliamentary democra-
cies. In other words, in terms of the rela onship between MPs and their par es when
it comes to vo ng in the legisla ve arena, the poli cal party model seems to have held
its ground, and audience democracy does not seem to be much different from party
democracy. Most studies on parliamentary vo ng do not, however, allow us to look at
changes in vo ng unity over me. Kam’s (2009) study of four Westminster systems is
an excep on. He finds that that while in the United Kingdom and Canada vo ng dissent
has become more frequent and extensive over me, this is not the case in Australia and
New Zealand. He concludes that MP dissent and electoral dealignment ‘appear to travel
together’, which would entail that the changes in the electorate have indeed affected
the rela onship between MPs and their par es in parliament. This does not seem to be
the case in the Dutch Second Chamber, however, as our analysis shows that vo ng unity
has remained high, and has even increased over me, in the face of electoral vola lity
and par san dealignment.
As opposed to Kam (2009), however, we were able to assess changes in the different
pathways to party vo ng unity over me for our case of the Dutch na onal parliament,
wherewe find that party agreement in terms of the distanceMPs perceive between their
own and their party’s posi on has increased over me, but party Le -Right ideological
homogeneity has not. This discrepancy between perceived distance and party ideologi-
cal homogeneity may be the result of MPs suffering from the same ‘hazy image’ of their
party as that Manin claims voters do as a part of audience democracy. Party loyalty,
229
7.3. Implica ons
however, has increased over me, meaning that it is likely that Dutch par es have taken
ac on to curtail the effects of changes in the electorate by increasing the importance
of party loyalty as a candidate selec on criterion. Whether par es in other parliaments
have faced comparable changes in party agreement, and have responded in similar ways
is not known, but there is li le reason to assume that they would have not at least tried.
That Kam (2009) does find an increase in vo ng dissent in the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, however, seems to indicate that not all par es have been equally successful in
their a empts.
Our analysis of the 15 na onal parliaments showed that party agreement as a path-
way to party group unity is most affected by formal ins tu onal configura ons, espe-
cially par es’ candidate selec on (our results regarding electoral ins tu ons are some-
whatmixed). Thus, if poli cal reformers would like to see a change in the composi on of
parliament in terms of the constella on of individual representa ves’ preferences, ap-
pealing to par es to democra ze and decentralize their candidate selec on procedures
could be a way forward. This does not guarantee, however, that MPs will forge a closer
rela onshipwith their voters in terms of loyalty, that par es will not increase their use of
discipline, and thus that this will impact party vo ng unity. Representa on is, of course,
not limited to parliamentary vo ng, and it could be that the altering ins tu ons would
result (or has already resulted) in other types of behavioral personaliza on by individ-
ual MPs. In their studies of the Israeli Parliament, for example, both Rahat and Sheafer
(2007) and Balmas et al. (2012) conclude that there over me has been an increase in de-
centralized behavioral personaliza on (measure in terms of the number of submissions
and adop ons of private member bills, the use of roll call votes, and self-references in
parliamentary speeches), and that this is likely to have resulted from ins tu onal per-
sonaliza on (see subsec on 2.4.2 in chapter 2). Given the advantages of parliamentary
party group unity, however, it seems likely that par es will resist, and otherwise curtail,
any changes that may diminish their role in the poli cal chain of delega on (especially
when it comes the legisla ve vo ng), if they have not done so already.
As a final remark, it is paradoxical that party group unity is deemed necessary for po-
li cal representa on, and some mes even considered virtuous, but also carries a nega-
ve connota on. In the Netherlands, for example, MPs are o en characterized as vot-
ing ca le (stemvee) subjected to kadaverdiscipline, blindly obeying the party’s demands.
The finding that MPs generally vote with the party of their own accord out of agreement
and/or loyalty, and that discipline is usually not necessary and thus only plays a marginal
role in determining MPs’ vo ng behavior, should be used to shed new light on the de-
bate concerning the freedom of in the individual MP and party group unity, as the two
do not seem to be mutually exclusive.
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Poli eke par jen worden door velen gezien als de belangrijkste poli eke actoren, vooral
als het gaat om vertegenwoordiging in het parlement. Dit geldt niet alleen voor bepaalde
stromingen in de poli eke theorie en de (empirische) poli eke wetenschap, maar ook
voor de prak jk. Dit komt in grote mate door het feit dat, in de meeste (Europese) parle-
mentaire democra eën, frac e-eenheid bij stemmingen in het parlement eerder regel
dan uitzondering is. Hoewel frac e-eenheid in deze parlementen gebruikelijk is, is het
niet overal ‘normaal’ (Olson, 2003, 165), en is het empirisch gezien niet per se ‘natuur-
lijk’ (Patzelt, 2003, 102). Frac es bestaan uit individuele parlementsleden, die overigens
in de meeste (Europese) parlementaire democra eën door de grondwet juist formeel
erkend worden als de vertegenwoordigende actoren. Hoe parlementsleden tot hun be-
slissing komen om wel of niet in overeenstemming met het standpunt van de frac e te
stemmen, en waarom individuele parlementsleden met hun frac e meestemmen, zijn
de onderzoeksvragen die het uitgangspunt vormen voor de studies opgenomen in dit
boek.
Onderzoek naar frac e-eenheid richt zich vaak op de vraag of en hoe frac e-eenheid
bij stemmingen varieert als gevolg van ins tu onele verschillen tussen verschillende
parlementen en poli eke par jen (Bowler et al., 1999b; Carey, 2007, 2009; Depauw and
Mar n, 2009; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004; Kam, 2009;Mar n,
2011;Mar n et al., 2014;Morgenstern, 2004; Ozbudun, 1970; Sieberer, 2006). Deze ver-
gelijkende onderzoeken beva en vaak assump es en theore sche argumenten over de
invloed van ins tu es op de pathways to party group unity, de verschillende manieren
waarop frac e-eenheid tot stand gebracht wordt. Andere onderzoeken die deze path-
ways to party group unity bestuderen zijn meestal casusstudies die zich vaak maar op
één pathway binnen één parlement focussen, en nemen over het algemeen de frac e
of het hele parlement als niveau van analyse (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011a; Bailer
et al., 2011; Bailer, 2011; Depauw, 2002; Crowe, 1980, 1983, 1986; Krehbiel, 1993; Jen-
sen, 2000; Kam, 2009; Norpoth, 1976; Norton, 2003; Russell, 2012). In beide stromingen
van de literatuur wordt het individuele parlementslid vrijwel al jd genegeerd. Terwijl,
als puntje bij paaltje komt, het juist het individuele parlementslid is die beslist om wel
of niet met het frac estandpunt mee te stemmen. Bij iedere stemming is de mate van
frac e-eenheid het resultaat van de optelsom van de beslissingen van individuele parle-
mentsleden.
Dit boek introduceert een model van de stappen die parlementsleden doorlopen bij
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de beslissing om wel of niet met de frac e mee te stemmen, geïnspireerd op de Ame-
rikaanse besluitvormingsmodellen over het stemgedrag van leden van Congress uit de
jaren zeven g (Asher and Weisberg, 1978; Cherryholmes and Shapiro, 1969; Clausen,
1973; Kingdon, 1973, 1977; Ma hews and S mson, 1970, 1975). Het belangrijkste the-
ore sche uitgangspunt van dit boek is dat het besluitvormingsproces bestaat uit een
aantal stappen met ieder een eigen besluitvormingsmechanisme, die parlementsleden
sequen eel doorlopen. De besluitvormingsmechanismen, afgeleid van de bestaande li-
teratuur over de pathways to party group unity—cue-taking, agreement, loyalty en obe-
dience—, worden dus in een specifieke volgorde geplaatst. In de empirische studies in
dit boek, die voornamelijk gebaseerd zijn op enquêtes onder individuele volksvertegen-
woordigers, beoordelen we steeds de rela eve rol van ieder van de besluitvormingsme-
chanismen apart, en waar mogelijk ook samen in de sequen ële volgorde. Verder wordt
onderzocht in hoeverre het belang van de mechanismen bij het tot stand brengen van
frac e-eenheid verschilt tussen na onale parlementen (hoofdstuk 4), tussen de niveaus
van overheid (hoofdstuk 5), en door de jd (hoofdstuk 6).
Consistent over alle studies blijkt dat frac es bijna al jd op de vrijwillige bereidwil-
ligheid van hun leden kunnen rekenen. De meeste parlementsleden stemmen met de
frac e mee omdat 1) zij geen persoonlijke mening hebben over de kwes e en dus het
stemadvies van hun frac especialist, -woordvoerder of -leiding volgen (cue-taking), of
2) zij wel een mening hebben, maar deze simpelweg overeenkomt met het frac estand-
punt (party agreement), of 3) zij het oneens zijnmet het frac estandpunt, maar de norm
onderschrijven dat, in het geval van onenigheid met de frac e, een parlementslid zich
moet schikken naar de posi e van de frac e (party loyalty). In tegenstelling tot wat vaak
(impliciet) wordt aangenomen, is frac ediscipline (party discipline), wat inhoudt dat de
parlementsleden de frac elijn onvrijwillig volgen onder de belo e van een beloning of
de dreiging van sanc es, zelden nodig.
Uit vergelijkend onderzoek blijkt dat de mate van frac e-eenheid bij stemmingen
varieert tussen verschillende ins tu onele configura es (Bowler et al., 1999b; Carey,
2007, 2009; Depauw andMar n, 2009; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Faas, 2003; Hix,
2004; Kam, 2009;Mar n, 2011;Mar n et al., 2014;Morgenstern, 2004; Ozbudun, 1970;
Sieberer, 2006). Echter, ins tu es hebben niet een direct effect op stemming, zij heb-
ben een effect op het besluitvormingsproces en de besluitvormingsmechanismen van
individuele parlementsleden. In de eerste studie (hoofdstuk 4) wordt onderzocht hoe
de besluitvormingsmechanismen beïnvloed worden door de kandidaatsselec emetho-
den van par jen (mate van decentralisa e en inclusiviteit van het selectoraat), het kies-
stelsel (districtsgroo e en demogelijkheid tot het uitbrengen van een voorkeurstem) en
regeringsdeelname van de par j. Dit eerste onderzoekmaakt gebruikt de interna onaal-
vergelijkende 2010 Par Rep MP enquête, afgenomen onder leden van het Huis van Af-
gevaardigden in 15 landen. Uit eerder onderzoek over deze parlementen blijkt dat de
frac e-eenheid bij stemmingen zeer hoog is—in sommige gevallen bijna perfect (Ande-
weg and Thomassen, 2011a; Carey, 2007, 2009; Carrubba et al., 2006, 2008; Depauw
and Mar n, 2009; Kam, 2001a,b, 2009; Lanfranchi and Lüthi, 1999; Sieberer, 2006).
Parlementsleden die zi ng nemen namens par jen met gecentraliseerde en exclu-
sieve selec emethoden zijn eerder geneigd om het vaak eens de zijn met hun par j
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(party agreement). Selec emethoden hebben een minder sterk effect op de par jloy-
aliteit van een parlementslid, en lijken helemaal niet op par jdiscipline van invloed te
zijn. De resultaten met betrekking tot de invloed van de formele eigenschappen van een
kiesstelsel zijn gemengd; dit ligt waarschijnlijk deels aan de niet zo fijnmazige opera o-
nalisering van het kiesstelsel in het onderzoek. Wat betre par jloyaliteit lijken de for-
mele eigenschappen van het kiesstelsel in ieder geval minder van belang dan de waarde
die een parlementslid zelf hecht aan een voorkeurstem en/of het voeren van een per-
soonlijke campagne om voorkeursstemmen te trekken. Parlementsleden die hier weinig
waarde aan hechten zijn meer geneigd om toch loyaal met de par j mee te stemmen
indien zij het oneens zijn met het par jstandpunt. Regeringsdeelname blijkt van nega-
eve invloed te zijn op party agreement: meer parlementsleden geven aan het vaker
oneens te zijn met hun par j wanneer deze in de regering zit, terwijl het aantal parle-
mentsleden dat par jloyaliteit in het geval van onenigheid onderschrij juist hoger is
onder regeringspar jen. Het gebruik van par jdiscipline lijkt niet te worden beïnvloed
door de drie gekozen ins tu es.
Hoewel het aantal onderzoeken naar frac e-eenheid op het subna onale niveau ver-
bleekt in vergelijking met het aantal op het na onale niveau, lijkt frac e-eenheid ook op
de lagere niveaus van (Europese) parlementaire democra eën vaak voor te komen (Co-
pus, 1997a,b, 1999b; Cowley, 2001; Davidson-Schmich, 2000, 2001, 2003; Denters et al.,
2013; Deschouwer, 2003; Dewan and Spirling, 2011; Patzelt, 2003; Stecker, 2013). Maar:
op het subna onale niveau zijn kiesdistricten, vertegenwoordigende organen en frac es
kleiner dan op het na onaal niveau, en bevoegdheden beperkter. De verwach ng voor
de studies in hoofdstuk 5 was dat dit een invloed zou hebben op de rela eve rol van de
verschillende mechanismen. Bij de vergelijking van de vertegenwoordigers uit de negen
mul level landen opgenomen in de interna onaal-vergelijkende 2010 Par Rep enquête,
blijken de verschillen echter klein, behalve dat party agreement zoals verwacht een gro-
tere rol speelt op het subna onale niveau dan op het na onale niveau.
In Nederland is de 2010 Par Rep enquête gehouden onder vertegenwoordigers op
het na onale, provinciale en gemeentelijke niveau. De data uit de enquête maken het
mogelijk om verder onderzoek te doen, waarbij het land en de ins tu onele context
constant worden gehouden, terwijl het verschil in groo e van kiesdistricten, vertegen-
woordigende organen, en frac es wordt vergroot. In Nederland zienwe dan ookwél een
verschil in de rela eve rol van de mechanismen, vooral als we kijken naar het verschil
tussen het na onale en gemeentelijke niveau. Party agreement speelt een grotere rol op
het gemeentelijke niveau, terwijl cue-taking en party loyalty juist een kleinere rol lijken
te spelen bij het tot stand brengen van frac e-eenheid op het gemeentelijke niveau.
Het laatste onderzoek (hoofdstuk 6) richt zich op veranderingen in de rela eve rol
van de besluitvormingsmechanismen door de jd. In veel (Europese) democra eën is
er de afgelopen decennia sprake van electorale vola liteit en dealignment, wat volgens
het two-arena model (Mayhew, 1974) een nega eve invloed zou kunnen hebben op
frac e-eenheid. Echter, volgens het one-arenamodel is het parlement rela ef geïsoleerd
van wat daarbuiten gebeurt (Bowler, 2000) en hebben veranderingen in de electorale
arena weinig effect gehad op het gedrag van parlementariërs en frac e-eenheid in het
parlement.
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De Nederlandse casus is representa ef in termen van electorale vola liteit en af-
name in par jlidmaatschap ten opzichte van tal van Europese parlementaire democra-
eën. De casus hee ook het voordeel dat de meeste ins tu onele variabelen die van
invloed zouden kunnen zijn op frac e-eenheid en de pathways to party unity door de
jaren heen niet (veel) zijn veranderd.
Uit het onderzoek beschreven in de eerste hel van het hoofdstuk blijkt dat frac e-
eenheid in de Tweede Kamer vanaf de Tweede Wereldoorlog al jd hoog is geweest, en
zelfs lijkt te zijn toegenomen, vooral als we kijken naar de frac es van de geves gde par-
jen. Het aantal frac e-afsplitsingen ligt heel laag, en frac e-eenheid bij stemmingen
is heel hoog. Op het eerste gezicht lijken de veranderingen in de electorale arena geen
invloed te hebben gehad in de parlementaire arena. Op basis van de Nederlandse parle-
mentsonderzoeken 1972, 1979, 1990, 2001 en 2006, alsmede het Nederlandse deel van
het 2010 Par Rep onderzoek, is het mogelijk om ook te kijken naar verandering in de
rela eve rollen van de besluitvormingsmechanismen. Dan lijkt het erop dat party agree-
ment onder parlementsleden is gedaald, terwijl het aantal parlementsleden die de norm
van frac eloyaliteit onderschrijven is gestegen. Ook is het aantal parlementsleden die
zichzelf specialist achten (in tegenstelling tot generalist) gestegen, wat erop kan duiden
dat parlementariërs vaker (moeten) vertrouwen op het stemadvies van hun frac ege-
noten (cue-taking). Enerzijds lijkt de vermoedelijke daling in party agreement te wijzen
in de rich ng van het two-arena model. Anderzijds lijkt het erop dat de (geves gde)
par jen ac eve maatregelen hebben genomen om de rela eve bijdrage van de andere
pathways to party group unity te verhogen om de effecten van de veranderingen buiten
het parlement te minimaliseren.
De studies tonen aan dat de besluitvormingsmechanismen inderdaad beïnvloedwor-
den door ins tu es (hoofdstuk 4), niveaus van de overheid (hoofdstuk 5) en verandering
door de jd (hoofdstuk 6).Wel is het zo dat party agreement het sterkstwordt beïnvloed,
en dat dit minder het geval is voor de andere besluitvormingsmechanismen. De belang-
rijkste bevinding blij echter dat frac e-eenheid overwegend op bereidwilligheid blijkt
te zijn baseert. Paradoxaal is dat frac e-eenheid noodzakelijk wordt geacht voor de poli-
eke vertegenwoordiging, maar dat het ook een nega eve connota e draagt. In Neder-
land bijvoorbeeld worden Kamerleden vaak gekenmerkt als ‘stemvee’ onderworpen aan
‘kadaverdiscipline’, blind gehoorzamend aan de eisen van de frac e. De bevinding dat
parlementsleden meestal uit eigen beweging bijdragen aan frac e-eenheid, en dat frac-
ediscipline meestal niet nodig is en dus slechts een marginale rol speelt, kan worden
gebruikt om een nieuw licht op werpen op het debat over de vrijheid van het individu-
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